Wind Down the MSS + Transfer Payment Responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation

[404DAO]

We appreciate the start to the discussion and would like to cross-post our reply to the MSS communication thread.

@404DAO

As one of the DAO-elected signers on the MSS, we want to share our perspective on where things stand and how we believe the DAO should approach next steps.

Importantly, this is not a binary decision. Two principles should guide us:

1. The DAO has multiple viable options.
2. The DAO owns the MSS initiative—it is funded by DAO treasury resources and operated by DAO-elected signers.

As Sinkas noted, any future direction for the MSS must ultimately be approved by the DAO through a formal vote. While we appreciate Entropy’s role in helping stand up the MSS, it’s important to clarify that the initiative has operated independently since inception—run by elected signers and chairs, with the Foundation assisting with KYC and ARB to stablecoin conversion.

One path under consideration is winding down the MSS and transferring its responsibilities to the Foundation. However, an equally viable—and arguably more consistent—option is to top up the MSS to allow it to complete the remaining four months of its current term. This would provide the necessary runway for the MSS team to propose a longer-term solution that includes new elections, an updated budget, and clearly defined performance expectations for signers.

Past concerns about payment delays are valid. From our perspective, much of the early friction was driven by a small number of underperforming signers who delayed transaction approvals—an issue compounded by discrepancies between the chair mandates outlined in the original proposal and how roles were executed in practice. These challenges have already prompted internal adjustments and serve as a valuable foundation for improving the MSS structure moving forward.

As execution responsibilities increasingly shift toward Arbitrum-Aligned Entities (AAEs), some may view transferring the MSS to the Foundation as a logical next step. But doing so would shift a core function of decentralized treasury management into more centralized hands. That raises important questions about the DAO’s long-term governance trajectory.

The MSS represents one of the few active initiatives through which the DAO exercises direct control over treasury operations. While not perfect, it reflects the DAO’s capacity to self-govern and execute. That autonomy is worth preserving and improving rather than handing off prematurely.

Winding down the MSS early in the name of operational efficiency may seem pragmatic. But decentralization often demands tradeoffs. Not every initiative should be judged strictly by cost or convenience. Some functions, like decentralized execution, are worth investing in even when they’re harder to manage.