AIP: BOLD - permissionless validation for Arbitrum

The breakdown of the 500 ETH and how it was calculated can be found in the Service Fees section in the forum post for this funding request. As mentioned in the BoLD AIP, the documentation about BoLD, and the BoLD whitepaper, BoLD only requires 1 active, honest participant at any point in time to advance and secure Arbitrum One. This service fee is meant to remove the disincentive for honest actors to participate and to help ensure that there is always 1 honest actor participating. Additionally, only the active proposer will be eligible for this fee. As explicitly noted in the BoLD Funding AIP from the Arbitrum Foundation, the Arbitrum Foundation is volunteering to be the first honest actor to advance the chain and will be ineligible to receive the fee. As such, for the duration of time that the only active proposer is the Arbitrum Foundation, then none of the 500 ETH will be paid out. The service fee will only get spent/paid-out if another entity, that is not the Arbitrum Foundation, steps up to assume the role of being an active proposer for Arbitrum One (by being the first to propose an L2 state root on Ethereum).


A recording of this call can be viewed here: Office Hours: BoLD AIP Temperature Checks (2024-06-10 16:06 GMT+1) - Google Drive


Is there a path to lower the bond amount in the future? and why not include $ARB in the bonding?

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As mentioned in the BoLD whitepaper and AIP text above, the bond amounts were carefully selected and calculated by Offchain Labs to balance the trade off between security and costs for participating. There have been recent optimizations to the protocol that have already allowed the proposed bond sizes to be lowered while maintaining the soundness and security of the protocol. In the future, it is possible that additional improvements to the security of the protocol can enable the BoLD bond sizes to be lowered even further. Plans and designs for doing so will be made available if they reach a stage where they can be proposed. As always, we welcome the community for contributions and discussions on this topic! As for your question about using $ARB, please refer to the BoLD FAQ for more information behind the rationale for using $ETH and not $ARB in this proposal.


I couldn’t attend the office hour for the AIP BoLD Temp Checks Proposals, but here is my rationale for each of them regarding to BoLD. In my opinion, these proposals represent a significant advancement for the Arbitrum protocol and ecosystem.

1. AIP: BoLD - Permissionless Validation for Arbitrum (FOR)

This proposal introduces the BoLD protocol, which will enable permissionless validation on Arbitrum chains, significantly enhancing security by mitigating the risks of delay attacks. The implementation of BoLD ensures that any honest party can effectively defend the integrity of Arbitrum’s chain state. Additionally, this advancement is crucial for the progressive decentralization and long-term stability of the Arbitrum ecosystem.

2. AIP: Funds to Bootstrap the First BoLD Validator - Bond Sentiment (FOR)

I support the proposal to allocate 4,234 ETH for the Arbitrum Foundation to act as the first honest validator under BoLD. This funding will cover the assertion and challenge bonds needed to establish a validator that secures the Arbitrum One chain. It is essential to ensure that there is at least one active and honest validator to protect the system from the start, thereby fostering the protocol’s security and reliability.

3. AIP: Funds to Bootstrap the First BoLD Validator - Operational Cost Sentiment (FOR)

Finally, I support the request for 900 ETH to cover operational costs and reimburse L1 gas fees for active and honest validators. This funding ensures that validators actively advancing the chain are adequately compensated, eliminating the disincentive to participate due to gas costs. This approach is vital for maintaining active participation and the ongoing security of the BoLD protocol on Arbitrum One.

I’d like to understand how another service provides can be also be part of this efforts in pro of Arbitrum Decentralization, so will do my research to find those resources.

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The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.

We’re voting FOR the proposal during temp-check.

The introduction of BOLD is a great step towards increasing Arbitrum’s decentralization and enhancing the security of all Arbitrum chains.

Delphi Digital’s summary, provided as a research member of the ARDC, was helpful in better understanding BOLD’s value proposition, how it works, and its main differences from other dispute resolution mechanisms of other rollups.

While BOLD can safely be deployed to Arbitrum One and Nova without having a polished, finalized economic model, we support the initiative to use ETH from the treasury to bootstrap the first BoLD validator as well as to pay service fees and to refund L1 gas costs for proposers who are actively participating and advancing the chain. As a result, we’re also voting FOR the respective proposals, for the bonds, and for the operational costs.

As with similar such proposals in the past, we’re committing to doing a deep-dive in the actual code once the proposal goes on-chain before casting our vote.


We just consider it a potential issue in the future to keep relying on the Foundation and validators funded by the DAO for their services, though we certainly believe the proposal as-is can be voted on and passed.

Also, watching the recording of the latest call about BoLD AIP temp checks, Derek specifically mentioned that the research about how to diversify the validator pool with economic incentives equipped will be in underway and explored with the community, which is good enough at this point and we are looking forward to the further updates.


After reviewing the proposal and the delegate feedback, we have decided to vote in favor of all three proposals during the temperature check. The feedback was positive, highlighting more benefits than drawbacks.

AIP: BoLD - Permissionless Validation for Arbitrum

We support this proposal because it enhances security and decentralization through permissionless validation. We don’t have additional technical points beyond what has been discussed.

AIP: Funds to Bootstrap the First BoLD Validator - Bond Sentiment

We support the request for 4,234 ETH to bootstrap the first BoLD validator, ensuring an honest proposer for Arbitrum. The return policy if the upgrade isn’t approved provides additional assurance.

AIP: Funds to Bootstrap the First BoLD Validator - Operational Cost Sentiment

We support the allocation of 900 ETH for operational costs, including 500 ETH for service fees and 400 ETH for L1 gas cost reimbursements. This ensures active participation and fair compensation for proposers, essential for network reliability.

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I voted for on the 3 snapshots.

While don’t having much to add technically to the discussion, I really appreciated the resources shared as it made the evaluation of the proposals easier.

I support having the Foundation as one of the validators (the first one) and the budget presented to cover operational costs.

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We’re voting For the BoLD upgrade. While there are potential issues with relying on the Foundation and DAO-funded validators long-term, BoLD is a solid step forward. It enables permissionless validation, strengthens security, and aligns with Arbitrum’s decentralization goals. The team has thoroughly tested it and is exploring ways to further diversify the validator pool. Let’s keep building!

gm, voting FOR in the 3 BOLD proposals.

It makes sense for the DAO to refund gas costs to incentivize more participants, and make sure there is at least 1 bonder at the start.

I voted FOR this proposal at the temp check stage because BOLD makes Arbitrum more secure and credibly neutral by technically allowing anyone to dispute the chain state.

We have voted FOR this proposal on Snapshot. BOLD is an exciting innovation for the Arbitrum community and a step towards a credibly neutral Arbitrum protocol by enabling permissionless state validation.

Upgrading to BoLD is a no brainer. Making progress towards getting to Stage 2 is always an easy yes.

Proposal 1: BoLD - Permissionless Validation for Arbitrum

Better security and more decentralization via permissionless validation and reduced delay attacks. Who wouldn’t want that!

It seems thoroughly tested and audited. The economic incentives for honest participation seem solid. Easy yes

Proposal 2: Funds to Bootstrap the First BoLD Validator - Bond Sentiment

Honestly, I think its really cool that making the Arbitrum Foundation the first validator is even a vote… Obviously it’s better to give them some of the ETH we have accumulated from fees than to have them sell ARB to do make this happen.

Proposal 3: Funds to Bootstrap the First BoLD Validator - Operational Cost Sentiment

Subsidizing validators costs for the first year makes sense. I’m surprised its soooo pricey I assume we can trust the foundation to ensure that no one games this system.

Voicing all three vote opinions are below. As a general opinion, it is clear that a ton of work has been done on this project and plenty of feedback / discussion has been taken into account. It also seems to have been properly audited and a lot of through has been put into the economic side of things. I am excited to see Arbitrum continue to work towards being more decentralized as time goes on.

1. AIP: BoLD - Permissionless Validation for Arbitrum
Voting “For” as this is a clear upgrade in security and decentralization of the network. Reduction in delay attacks is a positive as well. No real reason to vote against this

2. AIP: Funds to Bootstrap the First BoLD Validator - Bond Sentiment
The Arbitrum Foundation is a trusted entity in regards to running the first BoLD Validator. I see no issue with the cost, and the ability of the DAO to clawback in the event of a bad actor is appreciated.

3. AIP: Funds to Bootstrap the First BoLD Validator - Operational Cost Sentiment
Agree that it is important to subsidize the first year in order to attract Validators to the network to further increase decentralization.

We vote FOR the proposal on Snapshot.

BoLD unlocks permissionless validations for the Arbitrum chains, which is a great step for the DAO and a technological feat provided by Offchain Labs. While we need to review the economical incentive that is also sustainable for a more diversified set of operators to join in the future, we are in 100% support of the proposal and implementation of it as it stands.

Voting in favor. This proposal enhances security and decentralization via permissionless validation. I only see benefits from its implementation.

Voted in favour. BoLD will only benefit Arbitrum as a chain.

As the ITU Blockchain delegation team, we appreciate the detailed proposal and supporting documents. We recognize BoLD’s importance in providing open validation, predictable assertions, and aligning with long-term protocol goals. Given its potential to enhance security and decentralization in the Arbitrum ecosystem, we are voting in favor of this proposal.

I voted for all three aspects of the proposal on Snapshot. The protocol itself is clearly necessary for both the project’s evolution as well as maintaining Arbitrum’s role as a leader among L2s.

The two economic proposals are also well thought out and have benefited from ongoing dialogue here on the forum. The need for a single honest attestor/validator is both a security benefit and an aid to implementation, and the Foundation is the obvious party to get the technology on its feet.

It’s also encouraging that these proposals recognize the DAO’s primary role in governing the protocol and its implementation. I think it will be important for the DAO to develop its own mechanisms for monitoring the effectiveness of these incentives so that we can update them as needed (as a natural evolution of the work that @Entropy is already doing modeling sequencer revenues). This info will also be clarifying for the ongoing process of thinking about DAO revenues and budgets for security and technology needs.

In the longer term, the DAO could also explore the possibilities raised by bonding pools in order to build on the great work that Offchain Labs and the Foundation have already done to make that possible.