We are voting FOR collecting bids in ETH to the treasury as it provides the DAO with long-term flexibility and allows for future revenue decisions. Timeboost offers a meaningful mechanism for Arbitrum to capture value from MEV activities while maintaining fair user experiences and minimizing congestion. ETH is the most logical token for this, as it enables treasury diversification and future usage for ecosystem growth. With proper monitoring and potential adjustments post-implementation, Timeboost can significantly enhance DAO revenue without compromising the ecosystem’s stability or fairness.
Vote: (1st) Additional funds for one year, (2nd) 6 months from available funds, (3rd) New election at $86,581 per year, (4th) Liquidation of RWAs and STEP, (5th) Abstain
=== Voting Rationale ===
I voted to allocate additional funds to cover the full one-year tenure of the STEP Program Manager. After significant time and effort have been invested in setting up this program, it is crucial that we maintain stability and avoid unnecessary disruptions. Shortening the term to six months or opting for a new election would introduce unnecessary bureaucracy and create operational inefficiencies. Additionally, the yield from the RWA portfolio is sufficient to cover the shortfall, making it logical to utilize these funds.
By approving additional funds, we honor the original USD-based contract with the Program Manager, avoid damaging our credibility with service providers, and ensure that the STEP program continues uninterrupted. This will allow us to thoroughly evaluate the effectiveness of the Program Manager’s work at the end of the 12-month period and improve our processes moving forward.
=== VOTING RATIONALE: ===
I voted FOR the online event because I believe it’s a practical way to begin fostering more collaboration within the DAO without the need for extensive travel or large budgets upfront. An online event can serve as a test to see if this type of initiative will benefit the community, allowing us to refine the approach before committing to more complex in-person meetings. The online format also ensures inclusivity, allowing more delegates to participate regardless of their location.
I voted FOR because GovHack has a track record of producing valuable discussions and proposals for the DAO. I recognize the importance of having in-person events to build relationships and drive meaningful conversations. Although there are concerns about the lack of KPIs and timing, I believe that the GovHack format has proven effective enough to merit another iteration, especially with the reduced budget and the inclusion of a stronger post-event follow-up structure. Though I believe there are some higher level strategic decisions Arbitrum could define to make these GovHacks more productive.
I voted FOR the proposal because it strengthens the Foundation’s ability to secure strategic partnerships, which are vital for Arbitrum’s future growth. Despite some concerns about transparency and oversight, I believe the Foundation has demonstrated its value and should be empowered to continue its work. With additional safeguards and clearer reporting in the future, this proposal will greatly benefit the ecosystem.
I voted FOR DIP V1.5 because it strikes the right balance between incentivizing delegates and focusing on the quality of their contributions. The shift towards a more qualitative approach, while subjective, is a necessary step to encourage deeper and more thoughtful involvement in governance. The proposal reflects lessons learned from previous iterations, and the SEEDGov team’s commitment to continuous improvement gives me confidence that any issues will be addressed as the program evolves.
I am voting FOR whitelisting Infura as a Nova validator due to their consistent performance, strong reputation, and demonstrated reliability within the Arbitrum ecosystem. Infura has a proven history of providing reliable infrastructure services and has been supporting Arbitrum’s network operations for a significant period. This proposal not only acknowledges Infura’s existing contributions but also enhances the network’s security by allowing a reputable and experienced validator to be formally recognized.
I am voting FOR this proposal because it enables data-driven insights into community retention and health without requiring any budget or exposing sensitive information. The data requested is public, minimizing privacy risks, and the research aligns with the DAO’s interests in fostering a strong, engaged community. The proposal presents a low-risk, high-reward opportunity to support research that could positively impact the Arbitrum ecosystem’s growth and stability.
I am voting FOR this proposal because it introduces a simple and cost-effective way to improve data transparency within the Arbitrum DAO. Adopting the EIP-4824 daoURI standard enables us to create a centralized, on-chain repository of verified DAO information that is easily accessible to all stakeholders. The use of ENS txt records, in particular, provides flexibility, allowing updates to the DAO’s metadata without additional governance processes, which helps streamline operations while maintaining security.
Additionally, the proposal has been thoroughly reviewed, and no security concerns were raised, further solidifying its viability. By approving this, we strengthen the DAO’s infrastructure, improve information accessibility, and take a significant step towards greater transparency and community trust.
I am voting DO NOT FUND for this proposal. Although I value the contributions of individual community members, this proposal’s structure is insufficiently developed to ensure a fair and transparent allocation of retroactive rewards. The absence of objective criteria for evaluating contributions makes it difficult to determine funding eligibility accurately. This could set a problematic precedent of arbitrary or subjective funding decisions. A clearer framework with predefined KPIs or evaluation guidelines would provide a more effective approach for future retroactive funding initiatives.
Given that current programs already support community engagement, redirecting resources to enhance these initiatives could provide more consistent and measurable outcomes. While retroactive funding can be a valuable tool, its implementation requires well-defined metrics to uphold accountability and avoid misallocated resources. This pilot highlights the need for better-aligned incentives and structured financial strategies, which AVI could explore to support long-term, meaningful contributions to the DAO.
I am voting FOR this proposal, specifically for the Panda Partners sponsorship tier, as it represents a balanced investment in Ethereum’s security—an essential foundation for the Arbitrum ecosystem. Supporting this Attackathon not only aids in Ethereum’s security but also strengthens Arbitrum’s position as a leading Ethereum Layer 2, showing our commitment to maintaining and enhancing the security of the entire ecosystem.
Choosing the Panda Partners tier allows us to contribute meaningfully without overextending financially. This tier ensures that we support Ethereum’s long-term stability while keeping Arbitrum DAO’s spending reasonable. Additionally, the Ethereum Foundation’s involvement amplifies our contribution, creating positive visibility for Arbitrum’s alignment with Ethereum’s mission.
I am voting FOR this proposal, as it addresses a clear need for better-organized event funding and planning within Arbitrum DAO. By earmarking a dedicated $1.5M budget for 2025, the proposal allows the DAO to maintain a steady presence at important events, foster community engagement, and support operational goals. The decision to route smaller events through the Questbook program ensures efficient resource allocation and avoids overburdening the governance process with minor sponsorship requests.
The budget and structure proposed provide flexibility, allowing the DAO to adapt its event strategy based on member feedback and alignment with the broader Ethereum and Web3 ecosystems. The transparent process for selecting and prioritizing events offers a balanced approach to accountability and strategic alignment, making this a valuable initiative for Arbitrum’s continued growth and ecosystem integration.
Voted FOR: [NON-CONSTITUTIONAL] Arbitrum DAO Procurement Committee: Phase II Proposal
I voted for this proposal for the same reasons as in the Snapshot. Overall, I really believe in the team and expect them to deliver and to continue to iterate as we as a DAO learn together.
I am voting FOR this proposal because the ARDC provides substantial value in terms of risk mitigation, security analysis, and research essential to Arbitrum DAO’s continued success. The new framework, which includes a 2.09M USDC budget and a structured Supervisory Council, addresses some of the feedback and gaps identified in the first iteration. This approach ensures a prudent allocation of funds and a proactive stance toward potential challenges.
By opting for a retainer model and introducing delegate approvals for workstreams, this proposal enhances accountability and aligns the ARDC’s work closely with DAO needs. The ARDC’s role in producing long-term research reports will support strategic decision-making, and the continued investment in this program is a proactive measure to secure the DAO’s future stability and growth.
I am voting FOR this proposal because it represents an innovative approach to ecosystem development, coupling financial alignment with strategic engagement across Arbitrum’s ecosystem. The Token Swap Pilot provides a mechanism to foster bi-directional loyalty between the DAO and prominent projects, potentially strengthening ecosystem cohesion. By targeting established protocols, the initiative limits exposure to excessive volatility while engaging with partners who have already demonstrated commitment to Arbitrum’s growth.
While some delegates expressed reservations about the short lock-up period and a potential lack of long-term commitment from partner protocols, I believe these concerns can be addressed through iterative refinement. The pilot format provides a controlled setting to explore these mechanisms and allows the DAO to adapt and optimize the structure for future implementations. Additionally, using a committee to oversee the swaps ensures a level of due diligence and mitigates the risk of conflicts of interest, allowing for a more nuanced approach based on each protocol’s size and contribution to Arbitrum’s ecosystem.
I have met John personally and have been very impressed with his ability to bring quality to difficult conversations. He is exactly the type of person we need in the DAO, not just in the GCP. I cannot speak highly enough of John Kennedy.
I’ve been very impressed with Tim Chang and have heard great things about him from people I trust who interact with him consistently. Additionally, and most importantly, he went to the University of Michigan - so you know he is quality. Go Blue!
Lastly, I’m looking forward to the results of GCP. It is an innovative program and can be a differentiator for Arbitrum.
Voted FOR: Constitutional AIP - Extend Delay on L2Time Lock
I still maintain the same reasons as previously:
• Support for Extended TimeLock Delay: Approving an 8-day delay improves security by allowing the Security Council more time to assess proposals for potential threats.
• Enhanced Security Benefits: The additional delay offers significant protection, outweighing the minor inconvenience of a slightly longer waiting period.
• Strengthens Arbitrum’s Stability: This proposal supports the ecosystem’s long-term growth by enhancing safety and reliability, which are essential for sustainable development.
=== COMMENTING ON PROPOSAL: ===
As mentioned previously
This event is a practical way to define more strategic objectives in the DAO.
An online event can serve as a test to see if this type of initiative will benefit the community, allowing us to refine the approach before committing to more complex in-person meetings.
Stand by my previous Voting Rationale posted above.
I do find it curious that this type of proposal is necessary, wonder if something can be done to reduce the need for this in the future.
Currently these configuration changes require a full constitutional vote, which is odd, we probably need an easier way to adjust the configuration that does not require a full governance vote.