Arbitrum Triple Dip (Delegate Incentive Program)

[krst]

The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on our combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.

We are voting AGAINST this proposal in its current form.

First, we’d like to thank Paulo for the time and effort he put into developing this proposal. Whether one agrees with it or not, it’s a well-thought-out initiative with a coherent structure and mechanism - something we haven’t seen here in quite a while.

Let us first list things that we like in this proposal:

• We like the split between voting rewards and contributions
• We value the peer-review element of contributions. It not only decentralizes the assessment process but also encourages rewarded contributors to provide constructive feedback on others’ initiatives and comments. This has the potential to strengthen the community and foster both responsibility and autonomy.
• At the same time, the design is pretty simple and straightforward, with results derived from collective assessment rather than a single individual’s judgment. While this doesn’t guarantee ideal outcomes or full capture resistance, it does help eliminate bottlenecks and single points of failure. It also helps address the issues of personal animosities between individuals as in this design they will be dissolved, while bad behavior can still be penalized through coordinated effort.
• Overall, this design empowers the DAO to manage its own incentive program and has the potential to create a self-perpetuating mechanism that brings more valuable contributions - something we are missing much today. The DAO, as it stands, is a shadow of what it was two years ago.

However, there are also things we don’t like in this proposal:

• Most importantly, the proposal still doesn’t address the most critical question: What kinds of contributions are we actually looking for? While we understand the intention to leave this open to the community, experience shows that this approach tends to be ineffective.
• While we understand that the goal of the proposal was for it to be self-maintained without the need for a direct facilitator, we don’t think it’s the right approach. The proposal could benefit from introducing a PM role as a facilitator to help drive and support the program. SEED has been doing this with the DIP lately, and we find it net valuable. However, the facilitator should only advise and inform the DAO, not single-handedly assess contributions; this could remain the other contributors’ responsibility, as in this program. That way, the facilitator would have much less pressure and could focus on ensuring there are more valuable contributions.
• Furthermore, while we appreciate the amount of work Paulo put in that proposal, it’s clear he wasn’t able to build broader consensus and acceptance for it in the DAO. At the end, governance is not about who has the best idea, but who can coordinate with others to build support for it. This proposal clearly lacks this component.

To sum it up, while we like the overall approach, we feel it still doesn’t answer the fundamental question of what exactly we want delegates/contributors to do in the DAO. Two years ago, leaving this undefined may have been acceptable. Today, with our collective experience, it’s time to answer that question before designing mechanisms that distribute rewards simply for participation’s sake.

For this reason, we will also be voting against the other proposal currently on the forum, as it suffers from the same issue.

Ultimately, we’d like to point out that we have two separate proposals addressing the same issue, competing with each other and not working together. We find this to be a complete failure of the DAO governance process and us, as people behind it. I totally understand that there are differences between people in any community, especially one as decentralized as this one. Yet the fact that we cannot put our differences aside and seek value in the ideas shared here means that we’re doing something really wrong. This represents a missed opportunity to align efforts and create impact and it’s a waste of time, effort, and potential.

This DAO once thrived because we could debate - passionately, even heatedly - while still adding value to the ecosystem. Sadly, that spirit of collaboration and constructive dialogue feels lost. And that’s a loss for all of us.

[mihal]

I’ll be voting against this proposal for a number of reasons, including the use of forum likes in the algorithm (leads to gaming and potential cartels), the claim of zero admins (I believe oversight is useful) and more.

[jameskbh]

I voted FOR on this TEMP CHECK as I believe it is something we need. While I disagree with some points, I don’t believe it is a reason strong enough to kill the discussion.

[Euphoria]

The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

We are voting ABSTAIN for this proposal in the Snapshot voting.

Thank you, @paulofonseca, we recognise the work and thought that has gone into this proposal. Over the past several cycles, DIP has gone through multiple iterations, each trying to address specific challenges. This proposal builds on that history by splitting incentives across three layers: voting, forum engagement, and quarterly contributions. That is a logical and needed progression.

Our decision to vote abstain is not a rejection of the direction. It is a reflection that some core components of this framework are not yet mature enough to be implemented at the scale and importance that this program carries.

The introduction of the Peer Recognition Score (PRS) adds a new layer to delegate incentives. Forum engagement has always been part of the ecosystem, but turning peer recognition into a direct reward mechanism will shape delegate behaviour in ways that are not entirely predictable. Peer-weighted models can be powerful, but they can also lead to concentration of influence and feedback loops that reward popularity over value. This is not an abstract concern. It is a pattern we have observed in other systems and even in softer forms within earlier versions of the DIP. Calibrating PRS correctly is essential, and the current draft does not fully answer how this will be managed over time.

The move to quarterly contribution voting is a meaningful improvement because it reduces frequency and offers delegates a more structured moment to evaluate impact. However, it still depends heavily on subjective interpretation. Across DIP 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7, contribution evaluation was consistently the point where disagreements and disputes originated. Changing the timeline alone does not fix this. Without clear boundaries on what counts as an impactful contribution and how different kinds of work should be weighed against each other, the program risks reintroducing the same problems in a slightly different format. The friction would simply reappear later in the cycle.

Several operational questions also remain open, and these are not minor details. The proposal has not yet clearly outlined how gaming in the PRS system will be identified or handled, what minimum evidence standards will be required for contribution claims, or how collusive behaviour and tie situations will be addressed. In past DIPs, lack of clarity at this level directly led to disputes, delays, and shifting expectations among delegates. These issues tend to surface only when payouts are on the line, which is why they need to be resolved before the program is implemented.

@krst

We find this to be a complete failure of the DAO governance process and us, as people behind it.

As @krst rightly pointed out, there’s a deeper issue beyond the design itself. We now have two separate proposals addressing the same problem, moving forward in parallel instead of converging on a shared solution. This reflects a gap in how we collaborate as a DAO. Differences are natural in a decentralized system, but failing to set them aside and align on common ground is a missed opportunity to build something stronger together.

This could have been a moment to bring ideas together into a single, robust framework rather than asking delegates to choose between competing visions. The DAO’s strength has always come from constructive debate followed by collective action. That spirit feels absent here, and we fully align with this point. A coordinated approach would have served the DAO better than fragmented efforts.

[shogun]

The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.

Whilst we are understanding of @paulofonseca’s intent in fostering and inspiring delegate participation with a tiered rewarding mechanisms. This in the added novelty of the adoption of @Curia Peer Recognition Score for the triple dip. Sharing close similarities with V1 of Coordinape’s “Give system”.

We feel the system may incur some unintended consequences, as with @cp0x’s thoughts, the 500K voting power, limits activity to currently 66 delegates, and requiring their participation to enhance the ecosystem of governance in Arbitrum. This curtails the success of smaller delegates (protocol/builder alike) and their rewarded inputs into the dialogue.

We’d like to see remediation on the operational burden in the delivery for the program, since all individual contributions need to be assessed by individual delegates. Having this responsibility of reviewing the brevity of individual contribution, by installing a third-party program manager this will prevent colluding, bias, or just lack of awareness.

In conclusion, while we support the program’s intent, its current mechanics are counterproductive. The 500K voting power threshold centralises influence and excludes smaller delegates, while the delegate review process is operationally burdensome and risks bias. We are AGAINST this proposal in its current form.

[paulofonseca]

voting Abstain on the current offchain vote because I wrote this proposal.