The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
As we are the ones that made the proposal, we are obviously supporting it and we voted in its favor.
Blockworks Research will be voting FOR this proposal on Tally.
Increasing the lower threshold multisig to 9/12 appears to be the most straightforward way to maintain the Stage 1 classification. This change does not seem to intrinsically alter anything compared to the previous configuration, except for enhancing security without compromising agility, as 9 signers will always be required to perform an action.
We would like to thank @krst and @Sinkas for taking the initiative on this important topic and for working on creating a document that covers how putting together a proposal like this should be approached in the future.
Important update to the security council framework, I’m personally more in favor of 9/12 as I believe the security council role is a very important post that shouldn’t suffer from the classic “we need two more signers” desperate telegram messages. 9/12 people should be reachable and ready to act in 24 hours in all cases, otherwise that’s where the problem lies IMO.
I voted FOR this proposal on Tally. It’s essential that Arbitrum maintain its status as a stage 1 rollup. Increasing the non-emergency threshold to 9/12 is a reasonable and safe way to do it.
Overall, we found the proposal to be well-formed, to follow established methodologies set forth by the Arbitrum Constitution, and to pose no other risks to the protocol even if only part of the call chain succeeds. You can review our full analysis in the report linked below.
Voted “For”
By increasing the threshold of the non-emergency Security Council to 9/12, the proposal effectively addresses the identified risks associated with the current multisig setup. This change will enhance the security and reliability of Arbitrum’s upgradeability mechanism, providing a robust safeguard against potential malicious upgrades. This proposal not only fortifies Arbitrum’s security infrastructure but also reaffirms its dedication to upholding high standards of decentralization and user protection.
These reports are definitely a significant step in analyzing technical proposals, as they summarize and help us understand their implications.
Of course, I decided to vote FOR this proposal.
Maintaining Arbitrum’s status as a stage 1 rollup is essential. Increasing the non-emergency threshold to 9/12 is a reasonable and safe approach. This change ensures that necessary actions can be executed promptly in emergencies, with an appropriate number of signatures, preventing delays if someone cannot access quickly. It strikes a good balance.
The Princeton Blockchain Club is voting FOR increasing the non-emergency action threshold for the Security Council to 9/12 onchain. This lets us keep Arbitrum One looking nice on L2Beat, but more importantly, increasing the 7/12 multisig threshold is overall good for Arbitrum’s security.
Following the audit by ChainSecurity and review by OpenZeppelin, we’re confident in voting for the change on Tally.
Delegates: if you haven’t voted yet, please do soon! We still need ~12m votes to reach quorum, as Constitutional AIPs have higher quorum thresholds.
We agree with the Princeton Blockchain Club and recommend voting FOR increasing the Arbitrum Security Council’s non-emergency action threshold from 7/12 to 9/12.
Key reasons to support this proposal:
Aligns Arbitrum with Stage 1 requirements
Enhances security by making malicious upgrades harder
Audited by ChainSecurity & reviewed by OpenZeppelin
Straightforward implementation
This pragmatic change improves security while minimizing risks. We encourage all delegates to vote FOR this proposal on-chain.
We maintained the vote from Snapshot as we believe increasing the threshold to 9/12 is the vital first step to improve the system to achieve the revised Stage1 designation.