Proposal:Updates to the DIP, The Complete 1.7 Version
Vote: Against
Rationale: Thanks to @SEEDGov for the work that went into this proposal and for continuing to engage with the community. We appreciate the decision to delay the vote and remove retroactive changes for July. We also support the broader goal of improving the Delegate Incentive Program to reflect the current needs and maturity of the DAO.
That said, we will be voting Against DIP v1.7 in its current form. While the proposal introduces a number of meaningful improvements, there are still several concerns that we believe need to be addressed before it can move forward.
One of our main concerns is the introduction of Tier X. While this may help improve quorum by activating high-voting-power delegates, the structure heavily favors large token holders. In contrast, small and mid-sized delegates are still expected to contribute significantly in order to qualify. This creates a dynamic that feels unbalanced. It might help the DAO reach higher voting participation numerically, but we question what value this brings in the long term if it comes at the cost of devaluing meaningful engagement. The goal of the program should not just be to pass proposals more easily, but to foster thoughtful discussion and active participation across a broad set of contributors.
Smaller and mid-sized delegates are often the ones who take on the more intensive governance work. This includes reviewing proposals, participating in calls, drafting feedback, and contributing to proposal development. These responsibilities require time and effort. Under DIP v1.6, there was already a multiplier that rewarded delegates with higher voting power. With Tier X, the system appears to shift even more benefits toward large holders while making it harder for smaller delegates to stay motivated. In the long run, this could reduce the number of people contributing meaningfully, even if overall quorum looks stronger.
We are also concerned about the proposal to raise the minimum eligibility threshold to 500,000 ARB. While we understand the operational reasoning, this change would exclude many mid-sized delegates who have consistently shown up and delivered value to the DAO. It could also create a much higher barrier to entry for new contributors. Many motivated participants do not begin their journey with large voting power. Removing their opportunity to grow into the program could limit the future delegate pipeline and discourage wider participation.
On the topic of scoring, we believe that removing the ability to dispute subjective evaluations entirely may reduce transparency. While we understand that the evaluation process will now involve more stakeholders and coordination, having no formal channel to raise concerns may cause issues in edge cases. A lightweight dispute process would help maintain fairness without significantly increasing administrative burden.
We also want to acknowledge the proposed 40 percent reduction in delegate rewards. While this may be supported by recent activity data, the cut feels sudden. A more gradual adjustment could help maintain contributor motivation and give people time to adapt. Additionally, although the number of proposals may have decreased, the level of impact required to remain eligible has not changed. Delegates typically still contribute to three or more proposals each cycle. The work required to meet the threshold is still meaningful and should be reflected in the reward structure.
Lastly, we want to echo @paulofonseca about the program’s overall overhead. While delegate rewards are being reduced, the combined budget for the Program Manager and other service providers such as Karma remains unchanged. Some responsibilities, such as managing disputes, have been removed, which raises the question of whether the scope and cost of these roles should be adjusted. At present, the overhead cost is nearly half the amount allocated to delegate rewards, which feels disproportionately high compared to similar incentive programs. We believe it would be beneficial to explore ways to reduce this overhead and redirect more of the budget toward contributors who are directly involved in governance.
In summary, we support the overall intent behind DIP v1.7 and recognize the effort that has gone into improving the program. However, we believe more work is needed to ensure that it remains inclusive, transparent, and sustainable. We hope to see further iterations that address these concerns and look forward to continuing the discussion.