Rationale: We will vote against this proposal because moving all multisig authority to the Foundation concentrates decision‐making power in one place and removes the transparent, community‐driven cost structure that MSS signers provided, making it harder for delegates to verify administrative expenses and adds unnecessary complexity, risks payment delays, and requires extra governance approvals instead of allowing OpCo to assume these duties seamlessly from the start.
Rationale: We are voting Option C: Wind down the whole initiative and return the ARB to the treasury because the current implementation no longer aligns with the original purpose of the approved proposal.
Event Horizon initially received a 7 million ARB delegation to experiment with a public-access voter pool aimed at broadening meaningful community participation in governance. However, the program has since pivoted to an AI-driven, agentic governance model—a fundamental shift that was not part of the original mandate and has not yet been ratified by the DAO.
While we support innovation and experimentation in governance, significant changes to the scope and intent of a treasury-backed initiative should be brought back to the DAO for explicit approval. Until such a revised proposal is submitted and evaluated by the community, we believe it is necessary and appropriate to wind down the current initiative and return the ARB to the treasury.
That said, we strongly recommend that the 7 million ARB not remain idle. Instead, the DAO should explore new ways to redeploy these tokens to continue supporting quorum and enhancing inclusive participation. Should Event Horizon wish to pursue delegation again under a new model, we would welcome a formal proposal clearly outlining their updated goals, structure, and evaluation metrics.
Rationale: We will vote FOR this proposal. It’s quite straightforward, high-ROI treasury move: shifting the redeemed $3.5 million from idle USDC into the already-approved STEP 2 money-market sleeve instantly restores ~4-5 % annual yield and adds no new risk or operational complexity.
Rationale: We’ll be voting FOR this proposal. While we do have some concerns, particularly around the potential for scope and the need for clear accountability as OpCo gains more flexibility we believe the benefits outweigh the risks. The updates make sense given how the DAO and ecosystem have evolved, and they give OpCo the tools it needs to operate more effectively, engage with the right partners, and attract strong talent. Importantly, there are safeguards in place, like spending caps and transparency requirements, that help mitigate potential downsides. On balance, we see this as a positive step toward a more efficient and responsive operational structure for the DAO.
Rationale: We’ll be voting FOR this proposal. While we do have some concerns, particularly around the potential for scope and the need for clear accountability as OpCo gains more flexibility we believe the benefits outweigh the risks. The updates make sense given how the DAO and ecosystem have evolved, and they give OpCo the tools it needs to operate more effectively, engage with the right partners, and attract strong talent. Importantly, there are safeguards in place, like spending caps and transparency requirements, that help mitigate potential downsides. On balance, we see this as a positive step toward a more efficient and responsive operational structure for the DAO.
Rationale: We’re supporting this proposal because it simplifies and strengthens how the Arbitrum DAO manages its treasury. Right now, things are too fragmented across multiple committees, making it hard to coordinate and execute effectively. This new structure brings everything under one unified council, cuts unnecessary overhead, and clearly defines who’s responsible for what, without adding extra costs. It keeps the DAO in control while making the whole process more efficient, transparent, and better aligned with Arbitrum’s long-term goals. It’s a smart step forward.
Rationale: We will support the removal of the Amortized Cost Cap on Arbitrum Nova, as it eliminates inefficient subsidies, aligns cost recovery with actual network usage, and reflects Nova’s reduced strategic role in the evolving Layer 2 ecosystem. With the cost gap to Arbitrum One significantly narrowed by EIP-4844 and the growing adoption of Orbit chains, maintaining the cap is no longer justified. This change promotes sustainability, transparency, and better resource allocation across the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Vote: 70% for Gustavo Grieco and 30% for Andrei Andonov
Rationale:
We’re voting 70% for Gustavo Grieco and 30% for Andrei Andonov, as both bring valuable strengths to the Technical Expert role.
Gustavo has deep, hands-on experience with the Arbitrum stack from his years at Trail of Bits, where he led audits on multiple versions of the protocol. His technical depth, independence, and understanding of blockchain security make him exceptionally well-suited to guide and evaluate complex audits within the program.
Andrei brings a strong public presence in the security space, with top finishes in audit contests and a solid understanding of how projects operate and evolve. His mix of research, operations, and community engagement adds a useful perspective, especially around transparency and audit readiness.
We’re leaning more heavily toward Gustavo due to his direct experience with Arbitrum and senior audit leadership, but we also value what Andrei brings to the table
Rationale: We support this proposal, as aligning the AGV Council term with the calendar year brings much-needed stability during its first full year of execution. We also align with community suggestions around improving the transition process, such as considering staggered terms in future cycles to retain institutional knowledge, and ensuring there’s a clear handover period before new members take over. At the same time, we believe this is a good moment to reflect on what’s been accomplished so far. Evaluating the Council’s progress can help shape a clearer long-term vision, allowing us to anticipate future needs and continue improving both governance and delivery. This proposal is a strong step forward, and these additions could make it even more effective.
Rationale: After reviewing the proposal and reflecting on the work done by ARDC V2, along with the community’s input, we’ve decided to vote for Option C: Do Not Extend.
We genuinely appreciate the effort and commitment shown by the contributors over the past six months. There have been some useful outputs, and it’s clear that the team put serious work into their roles. That said, we believe the current setup isn’t the best fit for how the DAO operates today. The structure feels a bit too rigid and doesn’t always connect the research being produced with the immediate needs or priorities of the DAO.
In our view, research should be more flexible and closely tied to real-time questions or decisions. We think a model that allows for research to be commissioned based on specific topics or needs would be more effective. This would make it easier to match the right contributors with the right challenges and ensure that the work being done has a clearer path to impact.
We also want to highlight that our vote isn’t about undervaluing research or the people involved. On the contrary, we hope the expertise and knowledge developed through ARDC V2 continues to play a role in the DAO, just in a format that’s more responsive and better aligned with how things are evolving.
In short, we’re voting no on the extension because we believe it’s time to rethink and rebuild a structure that makes research more actionable, more targeted, and ultimately more valuable for the DAO.
Rationale: We support the renewal of Entropy Advisors’ mandate based on their demonstrated contributions to the Arbitrum DAO and their role in driving strategic initiatives, improving coordination, and enhancing DAO professionalism. However, we believe the proposal can be strengthened with clearer articulation of outcomes, defined KPIs, and a roadmap aligned with DAO priorities such as the SOS framework. A two-year term offers operational stability, but it’s important to pair that with transparent performance metrics, budget clarity, and alignment incentives to ensure continued accountability and value delivery. With these additions, we view this proposal as a strong step toward maturing the DAO’s execution capacity and long-term sustainability.
Rationale: We support this proposal as it streamlines the DAO’s upgrade process by introducing executeCall() , allowing for direct contract upgrades without deploying separate upgrade contracts. This improves efficiency, reduces complexity, and maintains backward compatibility. With the code already audited and no added governance risk, we see this as a low-risk, high-value improvement to DAO operations.
Rationale: We support this proposal as it enables $BORING to be bridged to Arbitrum, supporting Superboring’s expansion and incentivized adoption on the network. Since the token is non-upgradable and requires DAO intervention to register with the custom gateway, this is a simple, low-cost action that enhances ecosystem composability without introducing risk.
Rationale: We acknowledge the logic behind this proposal and understand the benefits of disabling the legacy USDT bridge, particularly in reducing UX friction and preventing edge cases involving smart contracts and delayed withdrawals. From a technical maintenance perspective, this makes sense.
However, we’re choosing to abstain from this vote in alignment with concerns raised by @Sinkas
While the migration to USDT0 has already happened and most liquidity has moved accordingly, the decision to adopt LayerZero’s OFT-based bridge was made unilaterally by Tether and Offchain Labs, without any involvement from Arbitrum DAO. As a result, the DAO no longer controls the bridging infrastructure for one of the most widely used stablecoins on Arbitrum.
This proposal may appear procedural, but in effect, it formalizes a shift toward a bridging model with new trust assumptions, around lockbox ownership, verifier networks, and protocol-level upgradability, that were never openly discussed or approved by the DAO.
We are not opposed to cleaning up unused or problematic infrastructure, but we believe it’s important to be cautious about what our votes may implicitly signal. In this case, while disabling the legacy bridge seems reasonable, fully endorsing the current USDT0 setup without broader discussion on governance, control, and risk is something we’re not yet comfortable with.
Rationale: We are voting FOR this proposal, as it reflects a responsible approach to putting idle funds to work through yield-bearing strategies, in line with the DAO’s long-term goals.
That said, we suggest earmarking the Events Budget within the ATMC rather than dissolving it entirely. This preserves flexibility for supporting regionally relevant or DAO-native events that may not align with Foundation priorities or the Grants program, while still earning yield in the meantime.
We also encourage greater transparency around how funds will be allocated within the ATMC. A simple investment framework and regular reporting would help improve oversight and confidence among delegates.
Finally, if any unused ADPC Security Subsidy funds remain, it may be worth coordinating with future security or audit efforts, where relevant.
Overall, we support the proposal and appreciate the thoughtful adjustments made so far. A few refinements could further strengthen its long-term value to the DAO.
Rationale: Thanks to @SEEDGov for the work that went into this proposal and for continuing to engage with the community. We appreciate the decision to delay the vote and remove retroactive changes for July. We also support the broader goal of improving the Delegate Incentive Program to reflect the current needs and maturity of the DAO.
That said, we will be voting Against DIP v1.7 in its current form. While the proposal introduces a number of meaningful improvements, there are still several concerns that we believe need to be addressed before it can move forward.
One of our main concerns is the introduction of Tier X. While this may help improve quorum by activating high-voting-power delegates, the structure heavily favors large token holders. In contrast, small and mid-sized delegates are still expected to contribute significantly in order to qualify. This creates a dynamic that feels unbalanced. It might help the DAO reach higher voting participation numerically, but we question what value this brings in the long term if it comes at the cost of devaluing meaningful engagement. The goal of the program should not just be to pass proposals more easily, but to foster thoughtful discussion and active participation across a broad set of contributors.
Smaller and mid-sized delegates are often the ones who take on the more intensive governance work. This includes reviewing proposals, participating in calls, drafting feedback, and contributing to proposal development. These responsibilities require time and effort. Under DIP v1.6, there was already a multiplier that rewarded delegates with higher voting power. With Tier X, the system appears to shift even more benefits toward large holders while making it harder for smaller delegates to stay motivated. In the long run, this could reduce the number of people contributing meaningfully, even if overall quorum looks stronger.
We are also concerned about the proposal to raise the minimum eligibility threshold to 500,000 ARB. While we understand the operational reasoning, this change would exclude many mid-sized delegates who have consistently shown up and delivered value to the DAO. It could also create a much higher barrier to entry for new contributors. Many motivated participants do not begin their journey with large voting power. Removing their opportunity to grow into the program could limit the future delegate pipeline and discourage wider participation.
On the topic of scoring, we believe that removing the ability to dispute subjective evaluations entirely may reduce transparency. While we understand that the evaluation process will now involve more stakeholders and coordination, having no formal channel to raise concerns may cause issues in edge cases. A lightweight dispute process would help maintain fairness without significantly increasing administrative burden.
We also want to acknowledge the proposed 40 percent reduction in delegate rewards. While this may be supported by recent activity data, the cut feels sudden. A more gradual adjustment could help maintain contributor motivation and give people time to adapt. Additionally, although the number of proposals may have decreased, the level of impact required to remain eligible has not changed. Delegates typically still contribute to three or more proposals each cycle. The work required to meet the threshold is still meaningful and should be reflected in the reward structure.
Lastly, we want to echo @paulofonseca about the program’s overall overhead. While delegate rewards are being reduced, the combined budget for the Program Manager and other service providers such as Karma remains unchanged. Some responsibilities, such as managing disputes, have been removed, which raises the question of whether the scope and cost of these roles should be adjusted. At present, the overhead cost is nearly half the amount allocated to delegate rewards, which feels disproportionately high compared to similar incentive programs. We believe it would be beneficial to explore ways to reduce this overhead and redirect more of the budget toward contributors who are directly involved in governance.
In summary, we support the overall intent behind DIP v1.7 and recognize the effort that has gone into improving the program. However, we believe more work is needed to ensure that it remains inclusive, transparent, and sustainable. We hope to see further iterations that address these concerns and look forward to continuing the discussion.
Rationale: We support the proposal introducing executeCall() as it streamlines the DAO’s upgrade process by enabling direct contract upgrades without deploying separate upgrade contracts. This change improves efficiency, reduces technical complexity, and preserves backward compatibility. With audits completed and no added governance risk, we view it as a low-risk, high-value improvement to DAO operations.
On the proposal to disable the legacy USDT bridge, we acknowledge the technical and UX benefits of removing outdated infrastructure and preventing edge-case risks. However, we are abstaining from this vote in alignment with concerns raised by delegates such as @Sinkas. While the migration to USDT0 is already underway, the adoption of LayerZero’s OFT-based bridge was decided outside the DAO, shifting trust assumptions around ownership, verification, and upgradability without community input. For us, voting to disable the old bridge could be read as an endorsement of the new model, which we believe warrants further governance discussion before formal DAO approval.
Rationale: We are supporting ArbOS 50 Dia because it is a straightforward but critical upgrade that keeps Arbitrum aligned with Ethereum’s Fusaka fork. The package of bug fixes and cryptographic improvements strengthens protocol security, while the new instrumentation for multi-gas tracking prepares the network for more flexible fee models ahead. Overall, we see this upgrade as low-risk, necessary, and positioning Arbitrum for continued growth.
Vote: Increase Cohort Duration, Allow members to rotate keys, Reduce Qualification Thresold, Allow Candidate to rotate keys
Rationale: We supported nearly the full set of proposed changes in this snapshot, with the exception of “Allow members to bypass Nominee.”
Extending cohort terms and lowering entry thresholds both feel like sensible steps to keep governance stable while also opening the door to a wider pool of candidates. Likewise, adding rotation mechanisms strengthens accountability and reduces key-person risk, an important safeguard as the Council matures.
Where we differ is on skipping the Nominee stage for sitting members. Even experienced members benefit from re-establishing their mandate with the DAO, and the suggested shortcut doesn’t strike us as necessary.
Vote: Revert the DIP to 1.5v, Sunset the DIP, Keep the current version, Abstain
Rationale: We will support reverting the Delegate Incentive Program back to the v1.5 framework.
We still see the DIP as a valuable initiative. It has encouraged more active governance, and we’d like to see it continue as a way to support delegates who invest their time and energy into the DAO. In our view, what’s needed most now is stability and inclusivity, rather than ending the program altogether.
Some of the challenges started in v1.6 with the introduction of the voting power multiplier. While the intention was understandable, in practice it has made it harder for smaller or newer delegates to participate on equal footing. Even with a perfect participation record, a delegate at the minimum threshold faces more challenges in scoring as highly as a large delegate, which creates a structural imbalance that has carried into v1.7.
The rubric scoring in v1.6 has also been tricky. It isn’t always clear how one score differs from another, which can feel subjective at times. Strong contributions in one or two areas can be pulled down by weaker scores elsewhere, and a single disputed point may reduce the value of otherwise thoughtful contributions. That can leave delegates uncertain about how their work is being recognized.
This has been especially noticeable for smaller delegates. For example, we’ve put effort into providing rationale and detailed feedback on proposals, but ended up with the same score as delegates who simply posted what they were going to vote with only brief rationale. Even though neither of us received incentives in those cases, the averaging system still pulled our overall ranking lower, which was discouraging given the extra effort.
We also feel that the VP multiplier makes it harder for newer or smaller delegates to participate meaningfully. Without it, our contributions earlier this year would have placed us consistently in Tier 3. Instead, it has become clear that the structure makes participation less balanced. This isn’t just our own experience, the number of active delegates receiving rewards has noticeably dropped since the changes.
We believe v1.5 offered clearer and more transparent rules, which made it easier for delegates to understand how their work was valued. Returning to that framework would restore a more level playing field and allow the DAO to continue exploring improvements from a stronger baseline.
Rationale: We support this proposal. While the projected yields may fall below those of simply staking ETH, we believe this trade-off is rational and aligned with the DAO’s broader objectives. The treasury is not designed to chase the highest numerical return; it is meant to preserve capital while also acting as a catalyst for ecosystem growth. Deploying idle ETH into strategies that deepen liquidity and reduce friction for participation directly strengthens DRIP and the wider Arbitrum DeFi economy in ways that passive staking cannot.
The true value here lies in the structural impact. By directing ETH into protocols that enhance liquidity, stabilize borrowing costs, and improve capital efficiency, we create conditions for long-term resilience and growth across the ecosystem. These outcomes, such as stickier TVL, more accessible leverage, and healthier market infrastructure, represent a form of return that is not captured in APY figures but is essential to Arbitrum’s success.
We also view this proposal as setting a strong precedent for how the DAO manages idle assets going forward. Rather than letting capital sit unproductive or relying solely on passive strategies, we can establish a recurring practice of putting treasury resources to work in ways that balance prudence with strategic impact. Maintaining a buffer for flexibility is sensible, but treating idle ETH as an active lever for ecosystem health ensures that the treasury is continuously delivering value.
In short, we see the modest yield sacrifice as a worthwhile exchange for deeper liquidity, stronger capital efficiency, and a healthier foundation for Arbitrum DeFi over the long term.
Rationale: [quote=“Curia, post:17, topic:29996, full:true”]
Our team has been closely monitoring Arbitrum quorum, and we thank the @Arbitrum foundation again for putting forward this well-researched proposal. We are in strong agreement with the core direction and would like to offer our analysis and specific recommendations on the proposed parameters.
1. Support for Shifting Quorum from Votable token to DVP
We strongly support the proposal to shift the quorum calculation from the total votable token to Delegated Voting Power (DVP).
Quorum should be tied to the cohort of token holders who are actively participating in governance, not a theoretical maximum supply. The current mechanism, where quorum continuously rises due to vesting unlocks while DVP remains relatively flat, poses a significant liveness risk to the DAO. We have previously highlighted in this discussion thread that this would become an increasingly urgent problem that requires longer-term solution that aligns quorum with actual participation.
In contrast, the DVP has been relatively stable, with monthly fluctuations as we have documented in our reports:
Tying quorum to DVP correctly aligns the metric with the actual pool of engaged voters and resolves this fundamental issue.
2. Recommended Percentage of Quorum
To validate the proposed numbers suggested by the Foundation:
We backtested historical voting data against various DVP-based quorum thresholds. Our goal was to find a range that aligns with the historical average participation margin of 20-40% on different time periods (2023–2024, 2024–2025, 2025, and overall). We believed this margin to be a healthy balance, providing a meaningful hurdle for proposals without making them excessively difficult to pass.
Our analysis, which can be viewed in detail in this spreadsheet, yielded the following recommendations, using the 2025 data as our primary benchmark for its relevance to the current state of the DAO:
For Non-Constitutional Proposals: A quorum between 42–50% of DVP maintains the target 20-40% participation rate against quorum margin.
For Constitutional Proposals: We believed the ideal range is 48–56% of DVP. We believe the threshold should not exceed 60%, as it would begin to severely restrict the DAO’s ability to pass crucial upgrades.
Based on this data, the Foundation’s proposed range is effective, and we would advocate for values at the lower end for non-constitutional and the higher end for constitutional proposals.
3. Concerns Regarding the Fixed Lower Bound
We understand the rationale for a fixed minimum quorum is to act as a safeguard against governance capture if DVP were to fall dramatically. That said, a static floor, while well-intentioned, introduces its own form of liveness risk. We raised this point during the DVP-Quorum for ArbitrumDAO: Open Discussion community call and wish to elaborate on it here for the broader community.
In a scenario where DVP drops significantly, the fixed lower bound could make it mathematically impossible to reach quorum, effectively freezing the DAO. The table below illustrates this using a 100M ARB lower bound for non-constitutional proposals:
DVP (in millions)
Quorum (40% of DVP)
Effective Quorum (with Lower Bound)
Passable?
300
120 M
120 M
Yes
250
100 M
100 M
Yes
249
99.6 M
100 M
No
80
32 M
100 M
No
While unlikely, this scenario would force the DAO into a difficult position, potentially requiring repeated governance actions to adjust the floor.
We suggest considering alternatives to a static minimum:
Remove the fixed lower bound and rely on the percentage-based quorum alone.
Implement a dynamic lower bound that adjusts relative to a trailing average of DVP, preventing sudden freezes.
In an extreme edge case where DVP collapses, the Security Council could serve as the ultimate backstop to ensure the DAO remains functional.
Summary
In conclusion, we strongly endorse the move to a DVP-based quorum. Our analysis supports the proposed percentage ranges, and we offer refined suggestions based on historical data. Our primary concern lies with the rigidity of the fixed lower bound.
Parallel to this, the long-term health of the DAO depends on increasing voter participation. We reiterate our support for initiatives that bring idle ARB into the governance system, such as:
Treasury delegation to active delegates (as we have mentioned previously), with clear safeguards.
Incentive programs that encourage token holders to delegate their ARB rather than keeping it idle.
Awareness and onboarding efforts to reduce friction for new delegates and improve voter turnout.
Strengthening participation alongside quorum adjustments will help ensure ArbitrumDAO remains resilient, active, and secure over the long run.
Rationale: Since we’re directly involved in the proposal related to our PRS mechanism, we’ve decided to vote Abstain to avoid any conflict of interest.
Rationale: We are voting For this offchain proposal because it establishes a clearer and more competitive compensation framework that will help attract stronger candidates for future AGV Council elections. The revised structure fixes the procedural gaps from the previous vote, introduces proper quorum and sequencing, and reinforces trust in AGV’s governance process, important steps toward ensuring the Council’s long-term quality and accountability.
Rationale: We support this proposal. While the projected yields may fall below those of simply staking ETH, we believe this trade-off is rational and aligned with the DAO’s broader objectives. The treasury is not designed to chase the highest numerical return; it is meant to preserve capital while also acting as a catalyst for ecosystem growth. Deploying idle ETH into strategies that deepen liquidity and reduce friction for participation directly strengthens DRIP and the wider Arbitrum DeFi economy in ways that passive staking cannot.
The true value here lies in the structural impact. By directing ETH into protocols that enhance liquidity, stabilize borrowing costs, and improve capital efficiency, we create conditions for long-term resilience and growth across the ecosystem. These outcomes, such as stickier TVL, more accessible leverage, and healthier market infrastructure, represent a form of return that is not captured in APY figures but is essential to Arbitrum’s success.
We also view this proposal as setting a strong precedent for how the DAO manages idle assets going forward. Rather than letting capital sit unproductive or relying solely on passive strategies, we can establish a recurring practice of putting treasury resources to work in ways that balance prudence with strategic impact. Maintaining a buffer for flexibility is sensible, but treating idle ETH as an active lever for ecosystem health ensures that the treasury is continuously delivering value.
In short, we see the modest yield sacrifice as a worthwhile exchange for deeper liquidity, stronger capital efficiency, and a healthier foundation for Arbitrum DeFi over the long term.
