Delegate Statement Template

[memento7mori]

Name (organization or individual)
Alex – memento7mori

Wallet Address or ENS
memento7mori.eth

Tally Profile URL
Tally | memento7mori.eth

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• Public Goods funding

• IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

In my opinion, Arbitrum DAO is a structure that helps everyone to remain creative, maximize their potential, be in a team of like-minded people and associates, while making balanced and fair decisions regarding the development of the project and the entire ecosystem of the project.

If we look at the liquidity process, first of all, we have to keep a balance in these issues as well. Of course, this is an important indicator, but we should not chase it. We should focus on profitability, but also on convenience and security for the end user and the Arbitrum ecosystem as a whole.
.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.

For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.

This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

My answer:

1. I would not support this proposal (in this original form).

2. No change to this decision (cancellation in its current form). It is important to always and everywhere find a balance. I would suggest developing a transparent grant program to stimulate new projects and partners (where there would be a clear distribution without outweighing the parties).

3. Accordingly, they would receive an equal share and rights. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

4. Here also a balance is important.
   It is possible to invite non-professional participants (not tied to the projects) to the boards of directors, where they will participate in the life and development of DAO (and as a motivation to receive some remuneration).
   Thus, we exclude the interest of the parties and the maximum involvement in the development of DAO project.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Issue Overview:

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

My answer:

1. I would do a full refund. Judging by the polls, we see that the majority of participants were on the first ballot. Since we have to stand up for the interests of the rank and file.

2. When we are in the crypto and DeFi, we have to remember that we are the focus of everyone’s attention. We are a new industry and a field that is just emerging. That’s why we have to keep our users in mind, to protect and defend their interests. And also to absorb the best of the classical world of finance, while setting an example for the entire finance industry worldwide.

Languages I speak and write:

Basic Russian (all Russian-speaking CIS countries) English, Belarusian, Ukrainian (read and write).

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
As a DAO experience, I am one of five Guardians in the DAO Hashflow. This is a completely impartial body that monitors possible systemic risks to the project.

I am completely unbiased and have no conflict of interest!

I adhere to this in real life as well - I take an unbiased stance and take into account the opinions of different parties. I am always willing to discuss and consider the thoughts and statements of the parties from different angles.

Discussio mater veritas est

“Truth is born in dispute” - Socrates

Well, let’s make a better Arbitrum DAO together ,

[zeke60]

Name (individual): zeke

Wallet Address or ENS: 0xc58322c40358debae4C1C8bE4a00a141d8c3A94f

Tally Profile URL : Tally | 0xc583...A94f

What area are you most interested in contributing to?: NFT development on Arbitrum and Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO: The DAO`s goal should be distributing all decision making power over as many people as possible and securing the treasury as well as the infrastructure!!!

Sample Voting Issue 1: 1) Against 2) Just cancel it altogether. 3) Voting must be decentralized; execution can be centralized and swift. But power must go to the people…there are no short cuts.

Sample Voting Issue 2: 1) Full Reimbursement, we need turst

Languages I speak and write: English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: none

[Theori2]

Name (organization or individual): Theori

Wallet Address or ENS: 0xB49bf876BE26435b6fae1Ef42C3c82c5867Fa149

Tally Profile URL: Tally | Theori

Theori is a web3-focused cyber security company. We believe in the transformative power of smart contracts to change society for the better, and we work closely with our clients to ensure their code does what it is supposed to do. We also believe that decentralization and trustlessness are important aspects of web3, and we are working on the Relic Protocol to use zero-knowledge technologies to make more data available to smart contracts in a way that is secure and trustless.

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• Supporting Infrastructure
• Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

• The DAO should be focused on growing and supporting the Arbitrum chains and ecosystem without sacrificing security or decentralization. The DAO would benefit from supporting the development of public goods that increase the utility of the chains and supporting the development of protocols that can bring in more users. This means that the DAO should be as neutral and balanced as possible.
• We will be focusing on the following goals:
  • Proactively improve security of the Arbitrum chains ecosystem.
  • Designing and building SDKs that expand Arbitrum’s capabilities and strengthen its security.

eg — how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?
Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Sample Voting Issue 1:

• Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
• For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
• This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

1. How would you vote?
   For
2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

There are two approaches that could be taken to build consensus: (1) add additional third parties to the allocation and Oversight committees, or (2) reduce the funding for the program with the understanding that it will be increased if the program is successful. The first option reduces the reliance on one partner, while the second option would allow the partner to show they are good stewards and should be trusted to have more control.

3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

It is not practical to have a DAO vote on every matter, so some centralization of authority is necessary at some level. The DAO can provide some limited authority to committees that allow them to spend up to a certain level, engage with new partners, take emergency actions, etc. Committees are ultimately accountable to the DAO and the authorities and funding for a committee or project should reflect that.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Issue Overview:

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

1. Full Reimbursement
2. No Reimbursement
3. Split Reimbursement
   Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.

While proactive security measures are always preferable to being hacked and losing funds, history has shown that attacks resulting in a loss of user funds are an eventuality. The protocol that loses the users’ funds is ultimately responsible for that loss and should work to reimburse users. However, full and immediate reimbursement may not always be in the best interests of the protocol, depending on the amount of funds lost. One possibility is to reimburse affected users over time, so the damage to the viability of the protocol is limited.

By taking a balanced approach, projects can demonstrate their commitment to their users while also reinforcing the importance of risk management in the DeFi space.

Languages I speak and write: English, Korean, Japanese, Russian, Kazakh

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
No conflict of interest.

[PurpleDuck]

Name (organization or individual):

Lio

Wallet Address or ENS:

0x617b14f2a5b217f2e1db280738d6b3ec8439abd1

Tally Profile URL:

FoodfortheSoul's DAO Profile

What area I am most interested in contributing to?

• Improving Governance participation and effectiveness
• Supporting Infrastructure
• IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

share my stance on overall goals for the DAO:

Different stages have different emphasis. Support the road towards full efficient decentralization. Oversight, improving Dao capabilities and executions, etc.

The goals of the DAO as I see it:

For Arbitrum to become a truly decentralized ecosystem it requires a truly decentralized, functional and efficient DAO. In a way. It’s like the consciousness of the ecosystem (vs the brain…).

• becoming a decentralized entity
• Developing capabilities: improve GOV’ and decision making, quality execution (originated from the DAO process), oversight capabilities, community, develop the rules of tomorrow- that supports the ecosystem and values (economic/governance/ethics).

Liquidity mining (APY for staked ARBI),Profit sharing model will be the standard IMO, it is both like dividends and revenue for security or even just price stability…

Must be derived from the revenue mostly- “real yield” model.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

Prompts to Answer:

1. How would you vote?
   For
2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
   Mainly just more checks and balances with creating a road map to give more emphasis to decentralization. How will this change in the future to support this vision?
3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
   Short term- some compromises can be taken to support growth, efficiency, etc.

End goal should be fully “autonomous” operated by the DAO, which has proved high capabilities and efficiency way above the curve.

Finally, to tie the 2 together, there needs to be a smart contract till the Target day arrives. Smart contracts will support the process. Even “crazy” things like deciding no entity can hold more than 5% of total supply- I know I get scolded for that suggestion but I do believe it’s ok to put some lines for the good of the chain, community and everyone…. Usually, if someone wants to hold, lets say 30%, they will deal with power games, or have self interest they can manipulate the chain. But I’m way off topic

Sample Voting Issue 2:

1. How would you vote?
2. Split Reimbursement
3. Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

ARBI must have a self insurance fund- generated from the yield as it is planned

So, I would think of spreading the debt over the next few years and generate the payments from the fund. Maybe a mixed solution should be also considered.

Languages I speak and write:

English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: Non

[Ali3a]

Name (organization or individual)

Ali Asadi

Wallet Address or ENS

ali3a.eth

Tally Profile URL (create a profile here 1)

ali3a.eth's DAO Profile

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

NFT development on Arbitrum
Improving Governance participation
Trading on Arbitrum
Building Web3

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

Since im a builder i keep looking for future and dont care about market situation now… i keep building and when time comes i will get the Reward

Sample Voting Issue 1:

Against
No amendments, just cancel it altogether.
The solution is reputational avatars, which solves most if not all DAO participation and token-weight voting problems.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
It depends entirely where the reimbursement would come from. If this were a case of introducing a self-executable on-chain transfer block on the hacked amount and reminting into the damaged parties’ accounts, I would vote yes. If the tokenholders and other network participants were to pay for this, no. Socializing losses across a large number of people is not acceptable when it is clear that very small circles of people are responsible for both insecure code and stealing the money.

Languages I speak and write:

English-Persian & Chineese

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

no conflicts of interest

[nwadyke]

Name stanley

Wallet Address 0x2edB088316A627200CEdfC4A8C43198cA9428d37

Tally profile URL:https://www.tally.xyz/user/0x2edB088316A627200CEdfC4A8C43198cA9428d37?redirect=/user/your-daos

What area are you most interested in contributing to? Choose up to two tags:

NFT development on Arbitrum
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
As a seasoned NFT, collaboration manager I believe the DAO should focus on creating a robust ecosystem that drives innovation in the NFT spaces. It is essential for the DAO to strike a balance between aggressive liquidity mining and sustainable growth, prioritizing long-term value creation. The DAO should also actively support and fund projects that push the boundaries of what is possible on Arbitrum.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

How would you vote?
Against

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
I would propose a more decentralized allocation and oversight committee structure, ensuring that Flipside doesn’t hold a majority of seats. I’d also advocate for the inclusion of other analytics service providers to foster a more competitive and diverse ecosystem, reducing potential biases.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
In my experience, the key to balancing centralization and efficiency is by implementing a well-structured governance framework. By creating multi-signature decision-making processes and transparent voting systems, we can maintain decentralization while still achieving our objectives efficiently.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
Split Reimbursement

In my extensive experience with NFT projects, I’ve observed that a split reimbursement approach offers a fair solution. This approach holds project teams accountable for their security measures while still providing relief to affected users. Full reimbursement should be reserved for situations where the exploit is entirely beyond the project team’s control.

Languages I speak and write: English, [Igbo]

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I hereby confirm that I have no conflicts of interest that would prevent me from using my best judgment to operate in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem. My extensive experience in NFT world allows me to bring valuable insights and informed decisions to the table, prioritizing the growth and success of Arbitrum

[rheve]

Name : Rheve (Individual)
ENS : rheve.eth
Tally : Tally | rheve.eth

Interested in contributing to:

1. DeFi development on Arbitrum
2. Improving Governance participation

Overall goals for the DAO: The DAO should aim for a balance between aggressive liquidity mining to incentivize adoption and sustainable growth to ensure long-term stability. The goal of the DAO should be to foster innovation, decentralization, and community-driven decision-making while maintaining a robust ecosystem.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

• Vote: Against
• Amendments: To address centralization concerns, involve multiple analytics service providers in the proposal and restructure the allocation and oversight committees to ensure fair representation and minimize the influence of any single entity.
• Tradeoff approach: Strive for a balance between centralization and efficiency by ensuring that the allocation of power is distributed among multiple stakeholders while maintaining a clear decision-making process.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

• Choice: Split Reimbursement
• Elaboration: Reimburse affected parties on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration factors like the degree of negligence, affected parties’ involvement in the project, and the financial impact of the exploit. Full reimbursement should be considered for cases where the protocol was at fault, while no reimbursement might be applicable if affected parties were negligent or involved in malicious activities. Split reimbursement can be applied when both parties share responsibility.

Languages I speak and write: Spanish / English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: I affirm that I don’t have any conflicts of interest that would prevent me from using my best judgment to operate in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem.

[Seamus]

Name (organization or individual): Individual

• Seamus McNab from Mycelium.

Wallet Address or ENS: 0xD35629A2b7fB9f232fda6C29b72035A7dbaFA3C1

Tally Profile URL: https://www.tally.xyz/profile/0xd35629a2b7fb9f232fda6c29b72035a7dbafa3c1

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• Supporting Infrastructure

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

The Arbitrum DAO should be growth oriented in choosing to build and work with growth partners that are going to bring the next trillions of transactions to the Arbitrum layer and scale the stack into a broader consumer market. Liquidity mining should only occur in extremely targeted ways, if at all. Arbitrum DAO will only ever have the tokens that it has now (+ any potential future inflation) and should therefore spend the tokens as wisely as possible.

Arbitrum already has a product that people care about. Better plays in my eyes would be to provide grants to attract new customers that will further scale Arbitrum (e.g. provide a grant to attract somebody like the NYSE to deploy on an L3.) I would also advise that any liquidity mining that does occur should also implement some vesting mechanism on earned Arbitrum, with a way to delegate and vote with vesting ARB.

Sample Voting Issue 1

How would you vote? Against - but not due to centralisation.

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any? If the service is worthwhile, pay for it rather than risking treasury to generate yield that pays for it. With the team in that proposal planning on interacting with any other contracts other than Uniswap or Aave that haven’t undergone serious battle-hardening and vetting there is a real risk of smart contract failure. In my view it’s not worth risking ARB treasury for community analytics which often are created anyway if there’s traction with the project. If analytics are in demand by the community then direct funding with ARB is a better path without posing any significant treasury risk.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done? The biggest threat to Arbitrum that I see is not being able to move fast enough to provide support to grow and maintain market share. With this view, I believe that centralisation of authority is fine. This is caveated with a requirement for absolute transparency and clear oversight from an expert committee. DAO governance can often slow entities down and it’s important that Arbitrum remains fast. I think another key piece is to ensure that anywhere centralisation exists, there is a dispute / eject protocol so that should a group like this start misbehaving, ultimately there is oversight by the DAO / community. Let’s give autonomy to people to create action, but ensure that misbehaving is punished.

Sample Voting Issue 2

Split Reimbursement

A partial reimbursement should be paid for by the DAO depending on the economic strength of the project. Both because FEI RARI and its token-holder community should value it’s customers and wish for them to return to the protocol and also because it is fair to do with a significant treasury and also important to maintain brand.

With that being said, customers are using speculative DeFi products and should be comfortable taking the risk that all funds could be lost from deposits as emerging technology can be risky and difficult to build. If the code is fully audited and there exists the appropriate bug bounties and avenues for blackhats to become whitehats, then this team has done basically as much as possible.

Smart contract developers and teams that have gone to the length of getting top tier firms to audit their code for vulnerabilities should not be forced to pay out in full for protocol exploits. These audits are a large cost, as are the payouts. It’s important that these teams retain runway in order to build the future of the decentralised financial system.

Languages I speak and write: English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: Builder at Mycelium within the DeFi and Infrastructure space.

[djonip]

Hello everyone!

Ilya
0xa6f0126B36291dc3BC9A8ef565A434B394e4B01E

djonip.eth's DAO Profile

I want to contribute in the following areas:

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• NFT development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

• I do not care about liquidity mining. Bribing people to use X means X is useless. We aggressively build stuff that people NEED instead.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. Against
2. No amendments, just cancel it altogether.
3. The solution is reputational avatars , which solves most if not all DAO participation and token-weight voting problems.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
It depends entirely where the reimbursement would come from. If this were a case of introducing a self-executable on-chain transfer block on the hacked amount and reminting into the damaged parties’ accounts, I would vote yes. If the tokenholders and other network participants were to pay for this, no. Socializing losses across a large number of people is not acceptable when it is clear that very small circles of people are responsible for both insecure code and stealing the money.

Languages I speak and write:

• English, Belarussian

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

• no conflicts of interest

[moneyafric]

Name: moneyafric (Individual)

ENS: 0x08d2cd1ce328580f2abe6957cba8a68bf9cb00cc (moneyafric.eth

Tally: Tally | moneyafric.eth

Areas of interest:

Public goods funding
DeFi development on Arbitrum
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
First and foremost, the purpose of a DAO is to allow for the healthy and decentralised development of the rollup. This vision, of course, can entail many different aspects, from the more technical and security focused sections of the rollup (which the DAO should have oversight over) to encouraging the development of a healthy ecosystem and growth with the ARB token. Basically, every decision the DAO makes should return to the question: ’ How does this benefit the long-term sustainability and success of not just the ARB token, but also the broader future of rollups?’ .

From this question we can begin exploring different roles that the DAO could assume in the broader Arbitrum ecosystem, and the careful balancing act that follows for each decision. Some examples include:

Technical protocol and security upgrades: If arbitrum truly wants to be community owned, they need to have an oversight over what the protocol will develop into and all the layers that are part of the Arbitrum ecosystem. However, the average voter will probably not be knowledgeable enough to vote in good faith on whether a development will be fruitful or not. One potential solution that could be explored is a technical subcommittee in charge of overseeing this side of governance, which ultimately might report back to the wider DAO. The DAO is already planning to do this with the Security Council, but this same idea could be implemented in other technical areas.
Liquidity Mining - While this strategy can assist for the short-term growth and user acquisition on the protocols selected for these campaigns, it should not be seen as a permanent fixture of any protocol. Liquidity mining serves as a great opportunity for someone to get acquainted somewhere new in search of the yield, but if subsidised too long by the Arbitrum DAO, it could lead to an unhealthy subsidy of protocols through unsustainable emissions.
Grants - While liquidity mining handles growing users and technical committees handle the rollup itself, grants are the greatest part of the DAO that will target builders. Grants have to be handled carefully, as they have a degree of social trust needed both from the DAO and the builders. Builders have to be able to demonstrate deliverables for the amount and accountability. Despite the complications, grants will allow for the development of tools and dApps that the space might need, but currently might not be as profitable.
These are just some examples of DAO goals, but of course there are endless more possibilities on what might be handled!

Sample Voting Issue 1 - UniSwap/Flipside Bounty

How would you vote?
For
Delegation of voting power is necessary for any DAO to be able to function efficiently in the long term. Even though it brings a degree of centralisation, as long as they do not control an excessive amount of the larger DAO and they have sufficient accountability measures it’s a good initiative.

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

Separate the grants into quarterly distributions: distributions: For an allocation as large as 25 Million, I don’t believe that it is wise to simply divide it into Year 1 and Year 2. I understand that half of it was going to employing staff so they would rather have the reserve upfront, but considering that the only upside of delivering such amounts once a year is saving some time on transactions and communications, it feels that dividing the allocations into at least quarterly separations would’ve been wiser.
Introduce checkpoints across the delegation period: In addition to having a committee handling immediate matters related to the grant, it would’ve been preferable to also introduce routine votes to ensure that the DAO was still comfortable with such a large allocation. This would have also encouraged the grantee to increase accountability and deliver accountability reports.
How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

It’s inevitable that effectiveness and decentralisation are inversely proportional. As long as the centralised entities are still ultimately dependent on the DAOs approval, and they operate as transparently as possible, this is a necessary tool for the development of the DAO.

A DAO should consider having centralising points only when specialists are required to act knowledgeable and quickly, something which the Vox Populi of the DAO might struggle with. The entities to do this should be trusted members of the space of course.

Sample Voting Issue 2 - Rari Hack Reinbursement

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.

i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

Split Reimbursement

Hacks and loss of funds are to this day one of the strongest blockers we have from people trusting the space and onboarding onto it. Every time a large draining of protocol contracts occurs, the idea of the Financial Legos gets threatened, as people become less and less willing to risk connecting with other protocols.

For this reason, I believe at least a partial reinbursement is always to be considered when a protocol has decided to cooperate with you. These parties decided to entrust the security of your smart contracts, and their dedication and trust that was placed onto the protocol should be thanked by at least trying to provide some funds back. In the future, this could even be handled with DAO insurance protocols, which are already being developed in the space.

However, I would be hesitant to provide a full reinbursement when the hack has already severely impacted the protocol so badly. If the amount won’t make that much of a difference to the bottom line it makes sense to give a reinbursement, but in this particular case the double impact of the hack was so severe that this lead to one of the first instances of a DAO explicitly closing doors. 13 A full reinbursement , in terms of impact, would be the same as a second equally devastating hack.

TL;DR Provide enough compensation to thank the participants for engaging in the system, but while a full reinbursement might help these stakeholders, the impact of this action could lead to the DAO entering a negative death spiral.

Languages I speak and write: By order of preference - English, Spanish, Italian

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
Currently, I am spending most of my time working on the ParaSwap DAO. This means that I will automatically abstain from any discussion that might involve DEX Aggregation, as my opinion will obviously be biased. The positive side of this participation is that ParaSwap is also deployed in Arbitrum, which means that the success of Arbitrum will also positively impact ParaSwap (through increased liquidity sources and volumes), as well as vice versa (by encouraging efficiency and decentralisation of liquidity in the rollup by aggregating all of these together through a single, simple to access interface).

Additionaly, I also applied to be a delegate on the Optimism collective, which although is also part of the wider ethereum ecosystem it could be considered a conflict of interest. Currently, I am being allocated ~ 1k OP. In addition to this, ParaSwap has also been selected as one of the Protocol Delegate Scheme recipients, and if necessary, the representative of ParaSwap could be a different DAO member if this is considered a major conflict of interest. Personally, I believe that the growth of any decentralised rollup on the Ethereum ecosystem is a net positive for everyone in the space, and I will do my best to lend my knowledge in bettering the entire space

[xmax]

Name: Xmax Ivan

ENS: 0x1342e09a4e4cc62b8a51350c349b5c0aa09855a7
silvermoon.arb

Tally: Tally | xmax

Areas of interest:

DAO
DeFi development on Arbitrum
Our Vision:
Voluntary Commitment
As the name suggests, the “Autonomous Decentralization” DAO has no specific authority or pyramid structure. Unlike a company where a CEO makes decisions and gives instructions to employees, DAOs work differently. Instead, the premise of working in a DAO is that everyone actively demonstrates their unique abilities and contributes to the project. The DAO needs your advice and contributions, and you are always a “proposer” and a “contributor.” To work in a DAO, your project and interests should have a high degree of fit, and your contribution is maximized when “what you can/want to do” and “what the DAO should do” overlap. In a DAO, no one will give you directions. If you contribute a lot, you will be recognized as a “core contributor” and rewarded.

Pay for Performance and Participate Anonymously
When working for a DAO, there is no need to provide personal information beyond what is necessary. Age, gender, and nationality do not matter. The DAO rewards are based on contributions made, and a flat, pay-for-performance society governs the DAO. Traditional work ethics such as showing loyalty to a boss or working earlier than others have no place in a DAO.

Rewards Are Tokens
The reward for contributions made to the DAO is project-issued tokens. Accepting fiat currency as a reward is a special case, and it is common sense to receive tokens in a cryptocurrency wallet. Tokens earned as rewards can be sold on the spot or held and managed as-is. These tokens are governance (voting) tokens, and the more you contribute, the more governance tokens you earn. You can reflect your intentions and interests in important decisions regarding the project. Using rewards as tokens to create a form of gameplay is also an innovation of a DAO.

Sample Voting Issue 1 - UniSwap/Flipside Bounty

How would you vote?
For
Voting is essential to democracy, and it is worth exploring effective ways to distribute power to everyone.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
DAOs are decentralized in nature, meaning they lack a central authority. However, this can pose challenges when it comes to decision-making and taking action. To address this tradeoff, the organization’s goals, structure, and community need to be analyzed. It is crucial to determine how decentralized the organization should be to achieve its objectives. Striking a balance between centralization and decentralization is necessary, and establishing smart contracts or clear guidelines and protocols for decision-making and operations can help maintain a successful DAO.

Sample Voting Issue 2 - Rari Hack Reimbursement

Outside of flipping the vote, how would you handle this situation? Should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and elaborate on your reasoning)

Full Reimbursement

Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.
Efforts should be made to compensate customers for the losses incurred due to the bug. It is essential to maintain customer trust, and refunds are necessary in cases where customers have suffered losses. However, the extent of the reimbursement should be determined based on the severity of the loss and the extent of the bug’s impact. Additionally, a system should be put in place to prevent such bugs from happening in the future.

[realjustinbieber]

Name : Mario(Individual)

ENS : realjustinbieber.eth

Tally : Tally | realjustinbieber.eth

Areas of interest:

Gaming development on Arbitrum

Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
The purpose of a DAO in the Arbitrum ecosystem is to ensure the healthy and decentralized development of the rollup, with a focus on long-term sustainability and success of the ARB token and rollups in general. The DAO should oversee technical and security upgrades, balance liquidity mining as a short-term strategy, and carefully manage grants for the development of tools and dApps. I am a DAO Ultra, just as much as a JB ultra.

Sample Voting Issue 1 - UniSwap/Flipside Bounty

1.Against
2.I would not change it all, just cancel it and move on

3.A DAO must prioritize diversity of opinions and participants to avoid centralizing power in a small group. To achieve this, committees with predefined members should be created to increase diversity and prevent personal interests from dominating.

Sample Voting Issue 2 - Rari Hack Reinbursement

Split Reimbursement

The occurrence of hacks and loss of funds causes distrust in the space and discourages people from connecting with other protocols. To show appreciation to those who entrust the security of their smart contracts, partial reimbursement should be considered. In the future, this could be handled by DAO insurance protocols. However, providing a full reimbursement after a severe impact could lead to negative consequences and result in the same impact as a second devastating hack

Languages I speak and write: German, English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I am a doctor. I took the Hippocratic oath. I am not allowed to do harm. If the DAO requires me to do harm to other persons/entities …….I am out.

[gekko.eth]

Name: Gekko (individual)

Wallet Address: gekko.eth (0xB72eD8401892466Ea8aF528C1af1d0524bc5e105)

Tally Profile URL: Tally | gekko.eth

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

• Public Goods funding
• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• Supporting Infrastructure

Please share your stance on the overall goals for the DAO:
In my view, a DAO should place a strong emphasis on decentralization, transparency, and inclusivity when making decisions in order to truly reflect the views of its community. While I understand the significance of liquidity mining, I believe that a DAO should be cautious when implementing it and prioritize the support of its most active users and builders. Additionally, I believe that investing in Layer 2 scaling solutions for Ethereum is critical for the platform’s widespread adoption. Therefore, it’s essential for the DAO to allocate funds towards public goods initiatives to foster the growth and advancement of the ecosystem, as exemplified by the positive outcomes of the Optimism Grants program.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. I would oppose to this proposal due to the following reasons:

• Conflict of interest between grant committees and self-funding.
• Excessive management fees of 50%.
• Lack of clarity and transparency regarding the 30% estimated APR

2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

• Establish clear guidelines for conflict of interest and ensure that committees managing grants are not able to pay themselves a share for funding their own operations.
• Set a reasonable limit on management fees, such as 10-20%, to ensure that the majority of the funds are being used for the intended purpose.
• Clearly explain and provide transparent models for any estimated APR or other financial projections, to give community members the ability to evaluate the proposal and make informed decisions.

3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

• The tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done is a complex issue that requires a nuanced approach, using good sense and being flexible would be my approach.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
I’d vote for full reimbursement here. While it may put some sell pressure on governance tokens, I think it’s the right move if a DAO has enough in its treasury to cover hack losses. All parties involved need to be taken into account, and with multiple DAOs claiming the distributed funds, a solution must be reached that benefits everyone. We should exhaust DAO funds before turning to governance tokens or team allocations. Of course, I’d do my research and carefully consider all interests involved before voting.

Languages I speak and write:
English, Spanish and Portuguese

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I have no personal or financial interests that would conflict with my role as an Arbitrum delegate. While I am heavily involved in DeFi in general as an investor and heavy user, I am committed to upholding the principles of fairness, transparency, and accountability in my role as a delegate. As such, I will act in the best interests of the community and work towards the growth and development of the ecosystem as a whole.

[fungusgurus]

Yawar Abbas (Individual)
Wallet Address 0xabCea3C86d4b20A1661062FeE1f73A697122AAeB
Tally

1. Improving Governance participation
2. Supporting Infrastructure

The overall goal of a DAO will depend on its specific mission and objectives, for example

• Providing decentralized financial services including but not limited to lending, borrowing, and trading, to its members.
• Building a strong community includes focus on building a strong community of members who share a common interest or goal.
• Supporting innovation by funding or investing in new technologies or applications.
• Creating social impact: by addressing social or environmental issues through its operations.

As far as Liquidity mining, it is a mechanism that incentivizes liquidity providers to contribute their assets to a decentralized finance (DeFi) protocol by rewarding them with additional tokens. The goal of liquidity mining is to increase liquidity on the protocol, which can lead to lower fees, reduced slippage, and increased trading volumes.
The decision on how aggressive to be in liquidity mining will depend on the goals and resources of the DAO. It can be a powerful tool to incentivize participation and increase liquidity on the protocol. However, it is important to balance the benefits of liquidity mining with the potential risks, such as dilution of token value and increased volatility.

I will go against with the proposal on Uniswap vs Flipside.

I will ammend overall structure of committee and grant as well.

Personally I feel there should be no representation more than 1 seat for any organisation in any board or committee. In this case flipside had 3 votes which could change the overall decision. In my opinion only 1 representation must be allowed for an organisation for fair decision

Also I will propose the way of distribution of Grant based on their KPI’s and changed term from annual to either quarterly or bi-annually with multiple level funding. That would help to make this effective and add more organisation as beneficiaries.

The tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done can be approached by balancing the benefits of centralization and decentralization, establishing clear roles and responsibilities, fostering open communication, implementing checks and balances, and delegating decision-making power to low-level members.

Regarding FEI Rari Hack, my first question would be where is the Risk coverage. When you run such as big organisation involve with Finacing and DAO there must be Risk Assessment where all these present and future risks are considered. In this case it seems that coverage is not there so for the sake of reputation and scalability I would go for Full Reimbursement. That would not only save the goodwill of the company but also add the level of trust from stakeholders. Even reimbursement are done I would further go for future risk coverage to avoid such kind of incident exploiting the whole setup and strengthen the security controls by adding additional layer that would help me to address such in future.

I am fluent in English and Urdu both speaking and writing

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I affirm that currently I am not part of any professional body or committee related to DAO or crypto or Web3 Project which may effect my decision at all and there would be no conflict of Interest. Further I have no personal or financial interest influencing my decision. I do hereby confirm that I would always work for Arbitrums best interest in mind with my all wisdom, judgement and authority.

[JPCryptoN]

Name: JPCryptoN ( individual)
ENS: jpcrypton.eth
Tally: Tally | jpcrypton.eth

Areas of interest:

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• Improving Governance participation

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview

• Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
• For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
• This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

1. How would you vote?
   For
   Against
2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

Languages I speak and write
English

[0xventure]

Name: Venture (Individual)

ENS: castledao.eth

Tally: Tally | castledao.eth

Areas of interest:

• recognition of the NFT communities
• Gaming development on Arbitrum
• NFT development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

• Acknowledge the importance of the NFT communities and the current “meta” of the arbitrum ecosystem. Arbitrum is not only Defi and on-chain treasuries. Arbitrum is a group of individuals that have been giving their time and loyalty to this ecosystem. This needs to be seen.

• Ensure true decentralization of decisions while mantaining common sense on the issues that should be delegated to trusted members of the community (for example: As a delegate i would not interfere in technical decisions made by the offchain labs team or arbitrum engineers unless they clearly threaten some important value or aspect of decentralization)

• Facilitate user onboarding. One of the goals of the DAO should be to incentivize user on-ramps to arbitrum, seamless bridging and a good UX. This could be achieved by improving the current arbitrum bridge platform or by opening a pool of grants to incentivize new teams to develop new systems.

• Decentralize TVL. Arbitrum TVL is in the hands of some major protocols and with the risk of failure of some of those protocols comes the downfall of the ecosystem. We need to attract new forms of TVL

Sample Voting Issue 1 - UniSwap/Flipside Bounty

How would you vote?
Against

While delegation is a great way to simplify voting, it has to be done with care and transparency. Also, individuals have the right to participate, not only delegates.

Groups should not be operating with the dao bounties in private.

• 1. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?*

The proposal should state that:

• The bounties should have a platform where they can be voted by individuals or by delegates
• Each bounty has to be voted individually
• Each bounty has to be proposed following a template that discloses all it’s information to the public

If there has to be a team in charge of setting things up this team should:

• Adhere to transparency. Publish biweekly reports of progress, work on an opensource way.
• Allow from feedback from the community

There should be in place a mechanism for the token holders to revoke power from this team if it doesn’t deliver what is promised.

• How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?*

Things can be done in a decentralized way when operated by small teams with close oversight from voters and community members.

Teams have to be incentivized to deliver. This could mean: good salaries or good upside in DAO tokens that reward their professionality.

Sample Voting Issue 2 - Rari Hack Reinbursement

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.

i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

Full Reimbursement (ONLY IF CERTAIN CONDITIONS ARE MET)

Okay, so this would really depend on the DAO treasury at that time.

My main thoughts are:

• The DAO should not sell DAO tokens to reimburse users. Selling DAO tokens (unless with the approval of a great part of the DAO members, and not by voting power, but by realm amount of people) should not be done, because it damages DAO investors.
• DAOs should accumulate treasuries not formed by the DAO tokens and have good risk management to be able to cover the losses suffered.
• DAOS should be able to burn the treasury to cover for DAO losses if necessary, leaving a little runway to continue operating.

Then, depending on the damage done to the people/users of the protocol, i would advocate for closing shop or not.

Companies fail in real life too, but the most important part is to not damage people, and try to make it right.

Languages I speak and write: By order of preference - English, Spanish, Catalonian

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

• Founder/Dev of CastleDAO
• Working at MakerDAO

[louisli.eth]

Name (organization or individual) Louis Li （individual）

Wallet Address or ENS 0x5d30EA6d8EB2b0C2Fa58B0Df9d023CcecA847893 louisli.eth

Tally Profile URL Tally | louisli.eth

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

eg — how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?

Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Sample Voting Issue 1:

Issue Overview 751

Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.

For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.

This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

How would you vote?

Against

It is simply a risk to decentralization and for uniswap, using FLIPSIDE is not a must. Uniswap has other options and if there would be more benefits by choosing FLIPSIDE, it is more legitimate.

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

Allocation committee should exclude flipside due to conflict of interest.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Issue Overview:

Overview Link 1 2.2k

Overview Link 2 297

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

No Reimbursement

Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.

Languages I speak and write:

The flipping decision simply means there should not be anything done at that moment.

Going forward is making a new step, while staying unchanged did not create additional risks.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

Diversity of opinions is critical to making progress and determining the future direction of the

Arbitrum ecosystem. We recognize and celebrate the fact that delegates will have diverse views and we both encourage and anticipate good-faith debates in the governance process. That being said, it’s critical that all featured delegates are operating with Arbitrum’s best interest in mind, so please affirm that you don’t have any conflicts of interest that would prevent you from using your best judgement to operate in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem.

[Bruce]

Name: Bruce1

Wallet Address or ENS: 0x88Bd639d6B029596B029c61490F29f57b0bF4a3f

Tally Profile URL: Tally | Tally | Bruce1

Areas of Interest:

Public Goods funding;
Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the Layer2 Arbitrum DAO:

As a passionate supporter of the Layer2 Arbitrum DAO, I believe that the main objective of the DAO should be to foster decentralization, promote innovation, and prioritize the security and sustainability of the platform. It is crucial to take a balanced approach towards achieving these goals while being aggressive in liquidity mining.

Sample Voting Issue 1: Allocating Funds for Community Grants and Incentive Programs

How would you vote?

For

Against

I would vote for allocating funds for community grants and incentive programs. As an active member of the Layer2 Arbitrum DAO community, I understand the importance of community engagement in the growth and development of the project. The allocation of funds will encourage the community to contribute to the project and will help in building a strong and supportive community.

Sample Voting Issue 2: Establishing a Decentralized Governance Forum for Open Community Discussions and Proposals

I strongly believe that it is crucial to establish a decentralized governance forum for open community discussions and proposals. This will enable the community to engage in discussions and share their ideas, and will lead to a more transparent and inclusive decision-making process. As a professional in the blockchain industry, I understand the importance of customized governance solutions that meet the specific needs and requirements of the project.

In addition, I believe that Layer2 Arbitrum is a powerful platform that has the potential to transform the DeFi ecosystem. I am committed to contributing to the growth and development of the Layer2 Arbitrum DAO and ensuring that it remains a leading player in the industry. With my expertise in the blockchain industry and my passion for decentralized governance, I am confident that I can help lead the Layer2 Arbitrum DAO towards a bright and prosperous future.

Languages I speak and write:

Mandarin,English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

NONE

[lamriver.eth]

Name: Pham Van Hung (Individual)

ENS: lamriver.eth

Tally: Tally | lamriver.eth

Areas of interest:

• Public goods funding
• DeFi development on Arbitrum
  Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?

I am not the biggest fan of liquidity mining, at least not directly from a DAO; I think that in the best of many cases the best is to apply to different protocols that kind of incentives, maybe like Optimism that brought diverse uses to its network incentivizing it in an indirect way in usability and ecosystem.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. How would you vote?

Against

2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

Diversity of opinions and participants should be the main objective of a DAO, if a small group centralizes power, the name DAO is only an aggregate.

Something that can help is to predefine in the beginning the creation of committees and delimit the members it should have at the expense of increasing diversity against personal interests.

3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

It is a bad reference to the DAOs, the more decentralized the more difficult it is to agree, but I feel that the committees or delegates fulfill that vital function of representing the voice of many in order to optimize the governance processes.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

3. Split Reimbursement

A DAO must ensure the best environment for its members and also take into account their survival, therefore it will depend a lot on the cases and the type of hack, by literally draining their funds I do not think they can pay.

That’s why I think the best thing to do, and depending on the case like FEI, is to return money to those affected, maybe under a vesting system or the DAO can get down to work to look after the interests of its users.

**Languages I speak and write:**Vietnamese, english

[cofee.arb]

The #ErosGameEngine is a service that @LegendOfEros will not only provide to #Arbitrum projects but any EVM compatible project. The #ErosGameEngine will allow partner projects to create token gated communities to give their NFT holders more exclusive access and benefits