Delegate Statement Template

[Cornell_Blockchain]

Name (organization or individual): Cornell Blockchain

Website: https://www.cornellblockchain.org/

Wallet Address or ENS: cornellbc.eth

Tally Profile URL: https://www.tally.xyz/profile/cornellbc.eth

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• Improving Governance participation
• Supporting Infrastructure

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

Founded in 2017, Cornell Blockchain is a student organization at Cornell University with a presence in both Ithaca and New York City with over 100+ members. The organization focuses on blockchain education, hands-on projects, and events. Cornell University is a leader in the blockchain community, from alumni founders of organizations such as Avalanche, Ribbon finance, Tezos and Cosmos Tendermint to the development of IC3, the leading academic consortium in the field. In 2022, Cornell was ranked the #2 university to study blockchain in the United States by CoinDesk and #5 in the world.

The primary objective of the DAO is to find the optimal balance between growth and long-term sustainability, while adhering to the fundamental principles of decentralization and community involvement. To accomplish this, I believe the following goals should be emphasized:

• Promote community-led initiatives that enrich the Arbitrum ecosystem and drive its overall expansion and progression.
• Emphasize the development and upkeep of essential infrastructure to improve user experience, security, and decentralization within the Arbitrum network.
• Concentrate on supporting projects and teams dedicated to long-term value creation, rather than focusing on short-term gains or solely profit-driven capital investments.
• Ensure transparency and open dialogue in the decision-making process, giving all stakeholders a voice and properly disclosing any conflicts of interest.
• Stimulate innovation and experimentation in governance, recognizing that the status quo can always be enhanced and that the Arbitrum DAO should lead the charge in these advancements.

By adhering to these principles, we believe the Arbitrum DAO can effectively guide the growth and success of the network while upholding the core values that underpin the broader Web3 ecosystem.

Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Sample Voting Issue 1:

• Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
• For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
• This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

1. How would you vote?

• We would vote in favor of the proposal, as we believe it offers a valuable opportunity to attract new users to Uniswap and fund the project through yield-generating activities. However, we also recognize the need for some adjustments to address concerns raised by the community.

2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

• While voting in favor, I would still recommend the following amendments to address some concerns:
• Move to quarterly payments instead of bulk yearly payments. This would allow the community to evaluate the project’s progress and success before allocating more resources to it. By doing so, it would encourage accountability, ensure better management of funds, and enable the community to make more informed decisions about the project’s future.
• Reconsider the allocation of seats on the allocation and oversight committees to ensure a more balanced distribution of power. This could involve involving other analytics service providers or independent parties who don’t have conflicts of interest

3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

• Striking the right balance between centralization of authority and the ability to execute projects efficiently is crucial. I believe in fostering an environment that promotes collaboration and diversity of ideas while ensuring that the decision-making process remains agile.
• This tradeoff highly depends on the nature and objective of the project. For this specific proposal, we wouldn’t mind sacrificing a bit of decentralization in order to maximize productivity and efficiency. However, it’s essential that the decision-making process and fund allocation are transparent to preserve the decentralized aspect. The community should be able to see the progress, hold those responsible accountable, and possibly veto actions if they disagree. This would create a system where the benefits of centralization can be leveraged without undermining the core principles of decentralization that underpin Uniswap’s governance.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

1. Full Reimbursement

• In the event of a security exploit, managing the resulting panic and chaos while maintaining the trust and credibility of the platform is crucial. As decentralized protocols heavily rely on community support, the trust of the community plays a significant role in a protocol’s success. With this in mind, we advocate for fully reimbursing the affected parties to preserve trust and demonstrate the platform’s commitment to user security. Although participating in crypto inherently involves risk, full reimbursement can bolster community trust and place the protocol in a stronger position for the long term. It is also essential for Fei to investigate the root cause of the hack and develop a plan to prevent similar incidents in the future. Communicating this detailed plan with the community will further enhance the protocol’s credibility.

• However, if the platform lacks sufficient funds to fully reimburse all affected parties, a split reimbursement approach is preferable. In such a scenario, it is vital to transparently communicate this information to the community, along with the underlying facts. This approach demonstrates accountability and helps retain trust in the protocol. FEI could then cover a portion of users’ losses, possibly based on their contribution levels and using a vesting system. Additionally, the platform should provide the option for the DAO to vote on full reimbursement when the protocol’s treasury reaches a strong and stable position. This ensures that users’ interests are taken into account.

Languages I speak and write: English, Mandarin, Spanish

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

There’s no conflict of interest.

[calblockchain]

Cal Blockchain Arbitrum Delegate Profile

Name (organization or individual): Blockchain at Berkeley

Wallet Address or ENS: calblockchain.eth

Links: Website | Twitter

What area are you most interested in contributing to?
DeFi development on Arbitrum
IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

Delegate Statement

Blockchain at Berkeley is a student organization at UC Berkeley that has been founded since 2014. We actively participate in governance on Aave, Compound, dYdX, Optimism, and Uniswap and we are expanding our governance focus to more protocols. We are experienced in on-chain governance and protocol design and we are very interested in the Arbitrum ecosystem. In 2022, UC Berkeley was ranked by CoinDesk as the #1 university to study blockchain in the United States and #3 in the world.

We believe that a fast-growing protocol needs a diverse team of delegates and continuous nourishment of the next generation of designers, developers, educators, and entrepreneurs. Blockchain at Berkeley is in a perfect position to supply talent from the student community to study the latest updates on Arbitrum, to foster engagement, to introduce learners to Arbitrum, and to build on Arbitrum!

In the past, we created a proposal(Compound #89) to lower the minimum proposing threshold on Compound to increase inclusivity for proposal creation. For more about our justifications for our governance votes, please check our Twitter!

Blockchain at Berkeley has departments including consulting for leading web3 projects, blockchain education on edX, blockchain accelerator program, and research. Our governance department is in charge of protocol research and voting and. We dedicate at least one lead to each protocol and include all governance members to make decisions on all proposals. The governance department meets weekly to discuss the latest updates and presents analysis on proposals and we ensure voices of all members are considered before making a decision. The voting process within the department is democratic to balance knowledge from seasoned members and thoughts from younger members.

We appreciate your consideration for us to be your delegate. We believe that our experience and dedication will greatly complement the other participants in the Arbitrum governance ecosystem. We are always happy to go in depth with decision making and analysis so you can be assured that your delegation is efficient in the system.

Overall Goals for the DAO

Sample Voting Issue 1 - Uniswap and Flipside Crypto:

How would you vote?
For. We believe this proposal has great potential to enrich the Uniswap community with useful tools to navigate the complex AMM landscape on V3. Further, we appreciate this proposal’s strategic approach that allows Uniswap-native mechanisms to generate the usable funds in this proposal can serve as a model for future grants.

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
The main gripe we had with this proposal was the lack of competition allowed for the role of service provider. We believe that if there was a competitive aspect to this proposal where multiple service providers could bid for the right to run this program, it could have been much better.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
While we recognize the fundamental value of decentralization, we also believe that there this proposal strikes a good balance between having Uniswap remaining largely decentralized and improving the ecosystem.

Sample Voting Issue 2 - FEI Rari Hack Reimbursement

How would you vote?
No Reimbursement

As previous delegates for the FEI protocol, Calblockchain voted no reimbursement on a related proposal(TIP-112).

Our reasoning was as follows:
We don’t believe this is the proper use of PCV. Fei needs all the defenses necessary, and shouldn’t be responsible for repaying the complete sum of Rari losses during an unprecedented market downturn. Rari positions carry smart contract risk, and while we believe in a future where Rari can provide compensation to users who lost out from a hack, it’s an unwise choice to put the stable coin at risk for complete repayment. Falling collateralization to ~120% is not an option: Fei still has exposure to stEth, and repayement would primarily reduce exposure to stablecoins (90% → 70%). This risk portfolio is not safe in any market, especially this one. We support alternative solutions to repay hack-affected users - such as a safety staking pool - but do not support the use of PCV to repay for the attack. Fei peg is of the highest priority to us.

We still believe that this was the right stance to take, even after a different proposal for full repayment of the Rari hack passed. As we all know, FEI protocol shut down shortly after and the reduction to PCV was a large reason why. PCV was not meant to act as a backstop and thus we have never considered it to be a backstop.

Languages we speak and write:
Cantonese, Chinese, English, French, German, Hindi, Punjabi, Russian, Spanish, Telugu, Turkish

Conflicts of Interest
We are governance delegates for Aave, Compound, DYDX, Optimism, and Uniswap.

Waiver of liability: By delegating to Blockchain at Berkeley, you acknowledge and agree that Blockchain at Berkeley will participate on a best efforts basis and will not be liable for any form of damages related to participation in Arbitrum.

[jotatotal]

Name (organization or individual)

Jota total

Wallet Address or ENS

rampiro.eth

Tally Profile URL

[Tally | rampiro.eth]

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• Public Goods funding
• Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

Arbitrum was developed to address Ethereum’s scalability problem.

The Arbitrum DAO’s objective is to govern and manage the Arbitrum network, ensuring the smooth and efficient functioning of this public good while maintaining decentralization, transparency, and community participation.

The Arbitrum DAO should enable community members to participate in network governance by voting on proposals related to network upgrades, fee structures, and other critical decisions that affect the network’s performance and overall health.

We have aso to consider, the DAO’s goal to incentivize developers and other community members to contribute to the network’s growth and development. How? by providing grants, bounties, and other rewards for their contributions. This incentivization helps to ensure that the network remains innovative, secure, and reliable, thereby attracting more users and developers to the ecosystem.

Overall, the Arbitrum DAO’s primary goal is to create a decentralized and self-sustaining ecosystem that empowers community members to contribute to the network’s growth and development while maintaining its security, decentralization, and integrity.

The proposal gives Flipside direct control over allocating Uniswap tokens to bounties, as well as overseeing the entire program. This plan’s outline and funding were acceptable, but community members raised concerns because it gave Flipside too much power on both the allocation committee and oversight committee, which raised concerns about its centralized power. It was also worrying that none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal. The proposal initially went unnoticed, but as voting deadline drew near, it garnered a great deal of attention. University clubs supported the proposal primarily because they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, some members of the community, such as Dune and Leshner, spoke up against it, highlighting potential issues with centralization and favoritism.

My vote:

Against. Despite the DAO should move forward it shouldn’t be at any cost.

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

As centralization can be useful in some cases, it is essential to balance it with decentralization and transparency to promote a healthy and sustainable program where all the members feel comfortable.

For example, Uniswap’s proposal could benefit from the involvement of more than one analytics service provider, which would allow a more diverse range of opinions to be heard and a fairer distribution of power. It is also important to ensure transparency and accountability in decision-making processes, which would help mitigate the risk of centralization. To fix this issue: regular reporting and auditing of the program’s progress and outcomes.

While centralization can have its benefits (for example speed), it is important to balance it with decentralization and transparency to create a robust ecosystem. Flipside had significant representation on both the allocation committee and the oversight committee, which raised concerns about the centralization of power and favoritism towards one service provider. It was also worrying that none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal. However, as voting deadline drew near, it garnered significant attention from University clubs that supported it primarily because they would get a seat on the allocation committee.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

The tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done is challenging, and it’s essential to find a balance between the two. On one hand, centrallization can lead to faster decision making and more efficient execution of tasks. On other hand, it can lead to the concentration of power in the hands of a few individuals or organizations, which can be risky and potentially harmful. Hence, it’s vital to prioritize building and maintaining a strong community, where all members feel valued and included. This can help to foster a sense of ownership and responsibility among community members, leading to increased participation and contribution to the network’s growth and development.

Finding a balance between centralization and decentralization is essential to promote a sustainable ecosystem. Should decision-making be transparent, accountable, and inclusive to promote community participation and to mitigate the risks of centralization.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Split Reimbursement: This option could be appropriate as the exploit occurred due to a combination of factor… In such a scenario, the parties may be partially responsible for the exploit, and a split reimbursement could be an appropriate remedy to compensate them for their losses.

Ultimately, the decision to reimburse parties for an exploit should be based on a careful assessment of the circumstances surrounding the incident, such as the severity of the exploit, the parties’ responsibility, and the impact on the network’s overall health and reputation. It’s important to ensure that any reimbursement decision is fair and equitable, promotes accountability and responsibility, and does not incentivize malicious or negligent behavior.

Languages I speak and write: Spanish, and English

No conflicts of interest

[btcltcman]

Name (individual) : btcltcman

Wallet Address or ENS: 0x45ecd61c87bd0df7993da8f2b7b9084429da496c / btcltcman.eth

Tally Profile URL: www.tally.xyz/profile/btcltcman.eth

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
DAO aims to change the decentralized way of working. In DAO offers a modern way of working that is different from conventional organizations. every decision in the organization is made based on voting by members of the organization in a transparent and decentralized manner.

Basically all processes through the DAO are recorded on the blockchain, and are known or monitored by all communities. And also DAO allows for organizational governance which includes the management of funds based on transparent collective decisions.

Prompts to Answer:

1. How would you vote? For
2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any? Nothing
3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done? Centralization of authority can provide good decision making. too much centralization can stifle innovation. on decision making that does not reflect the needs and priorities of the larger community.

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not?

1. Full Reimbursement

Languages I speak and write:

• English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

• no conflicts of interest

[Vlad89]

Hello everyone)

My name is Vladyslav
0xB5e2b8F44e9f1Ae0B23De64Cd4579f1Ce9FFfA7C ( vladpromo.eth ) I want to contribute in the following areas:

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• NFT development on Arbitrum
  Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. Against
2. No amendments, just cancel it altogether.
3. The solution is reputational avatars , which solves most if not all DAO participation and token-weight voting problems.
   What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

Separate the grants into quarterly distributions: distributions: For an allocation as large as 25 Million, I don’t believe that it is wise to simply divide it into Year 1 and Year 2. I understand that half of it was going to employing staff so they would rather have the reserve upfront, but considering that the only upside of delivering such amounts once a year is saving some time on transactions and communications, it feels that dividing the allocations into at least quarterly separations would’ve been wiser.
Sample Voting Issue 2:
It depends entirely where the reimbursement would come from. If this were a case of introducing a self-executable on-chain transfer block on the hacked amount and reminting into the damaged parties’ accounts, I would vote yes. If the tokenholders and other network participants were to pay for this, no. Socializing losses across a large number of people is not acceptable when it is clear that very small circles of people are responsible for both insecure code and stealing the money.

Languages I speak and write:

English, Ukrainian

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

no conflicts of interest

[BristolBlockchain]

Name

Bristol Blockchain Society

Wallet Address or ENS
bristolblockchain.eth | 0x43d3938ebd74106e2d177f9a304c1e9f914f2b52

Tally Profile URL: Bristol Blockchain Society

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

1. DeFi development on Arbitrum
2. Improving Governance participation

Introduction

Bristol Blockchain Society, founded in November 2022, is a non-profit organization based at the University of Bristol, a top 5 UK research university. We have around 50 active members from various academic backgrounds, including computer science, law, economics, engineering, and PhD students. We have two primary arms: Education and Governance. As one of the few active UK blockchain societies, we are dedicated to contributing to the blockchain space and promoting education in the field.

We are currently involved in the governance of AAVE and dYdX, contributing to these projects for free, with no voting power or monetary compensation, driven purely by our passion for the blockchain space and the desire to contribute positively to its growth. Our vision for the future of the Arbitrum ecosystem and its governance includes improving various aspects of the protocol, raising viewpoints from underrepresented groups, and actively participating in the decision-making process. Our team’s diverse expertise and commitment to the advancement of blockchain technology make us an ideal choice for Arbitrum users seeking knowledgeable and dedicated delegates.

By delegating even a small amount to Bristol Blockchain Society, you are not only helping increase decentralisation within the Arbitrum ecosystem, but also empowering our passionate team to have a voice in the governance process.

Your support will ensure that our efforts are acknowledged, and our contributions can make a positive impact on the ecosystem. We appreciate any support you can provide, as it demonstrates that our work is valued and our voices are heard, even without the backing of voting power or monetary incentives.

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
eg — how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?

In our opinion, the overall goals of the DAO should be to foster innovation, promote decentralisation, and create a sustainable and inclusive ecosystem for all stakeholders.

The DAO’s broad objectives are:

1. Sustainable Growth: A DAO should strive for sustainable growth that is advantageous to its community and ecosystem. This consists of finding a fine balance between rapid growth and ensuring long-term stability.

2. Decentralisation and inclusivity: Maintaining decentralisation and ensuring that the decision-making process is inclusive so that all members can have a say in the organization’s direction. These are important objectives of a DAO.

3. Transparency: Establishing trust among DAO members and stakeholders requires transparency. The DAO should provide clear and accessible information about its activities, governance, and financials.

4. Adaptability: The DAO should be agile and adaptable, able to respond to changing market conditions and technological advancements. This means being open to innovation and constantly evaluating new opportunities.

Regarding liquidity mining, the DAO should be cautious about being overly aggressive. While it can provide short-term benefits by attracting new participants, it can also lead to inflated token prices and a lack of sustainability in the long run. The goal should be to strike a balance that provides incentives for participation while maintaining long-term stability and value creation.

Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Prompts to Answer:

As the Bristol Blockchain Society, we stand:

1. How would you vote?
Against - While we appreciate the concept of using Uniswap’s treasury to generate fees, we cannot support the proposal in its current form due to the concerns outlined below. We believe changes are necessary for a more balanced and inclusive program.

2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?:
We are concerned about the centralisation of power within Flipside, as they are the contracted vendor, manager of the funds, and hold significant influence on both the allocation and oversight committees. This centralisation should be addressed.

While we recognize the value of having a CEA in this proposal, we question whether it should be solely represented by Flipside, especially considering the concerns mentioned above.

We suggest that, in the best interest of the community, Flipside should consider including other parties (particularly competitors) to foster a more competitive and diverse environment. Reducing Flipside’s voting power to 2/7 or even 1/7 would help prevent undue influence and ensure more balanced decision-making.

We acknowledge that the Flipside team has been a valuable contributor across DeFi and DAOs. However, it is crucial to maintain decentralisation and diversity to truly serve the best interests of the community.

3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
In approaching the tradeoff between centralisation of authority and the ability to get things done, we would prioritize decentralisation and inclusiveness while ensuring efficiency in decision-making. A balance can be achieved by diversifying representation, reducing the concentration of power, and encouraging collaboration among various stakeholders.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

In this situation, we would choose the option of Full Reimbursement. Our reasoning for this choice is based on the following factors:

User Protection: A primary objective of any protocol should be the protection and well-being of its users. Providing full reimbursement in the event of an exploit demonstrates our commitment to safeguarding users’ assets and ensuring their trust in the platform. This approach fosters a sense of security and confidence among the user base, which is vital for the long-term success and growth of the protocol.

Responsibility and Accountability: By opting for full reimbursement, we take responsibility for any security breaches or vulnerabilities within the protocol, emphasizing the importance of accountability within the ecosystem. This decision sends a strong message to the community that we will stand by our users and strive to rectify any adverse situations that may arise. To minimize risks, a protocol can invest in buying insurance, which can provide additional layers of protection for the platform and its users.

Long-term Sustainability: It’s true that a DAO reimbursement may cause the protocol to wind down; however, it’s a commitment to the users that we prioritize their well-being and security above all else.

In conclusion, a full reimbursement is a user-centric approach that prioritizes user protection and demonstrates our commitment to ensuring the best possible experience for our community. By taking responsibility for any security breaches or vulnerabilities and standing by our users, we can maintain and enhance our reputation and credibility, fostering long-term sustainability and growth within the DeFi ecosystem.

Languages we speak and write: English, additionally, our team also speaks Thai, Hindi, Spanish, Arabic, Greek, Turkish, Malay

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

No conflicts of interest
The Bristol Blockchain Society (BBS), is a non-profit organization dedicated to promoting knowledge and understanding of blockchain technology. We would like to affirm that our primary goal is to operate in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem. At the moment, we do not hold any voting power within the ecosystem but are still actively contributing to projects such as Aave and dYdX without any monetary compensation or voting power.

Our participation in these projects is purely driven by our passion for the blockchain space and the desire to contribute positively to its growth. As a non-profit organization, our intentions are not driven by personal gains or conflicts of interest, ensuring that our decisions and actions will always prioritize the best interests of the Arbitrum ecosystem and its community

Contact Us:
blockchainbristol@gmail.com

Bristol Blockchain Society | Instagram | Linktree

[Vic369]

Vitorio Cheeperhino

Vic369.arb / .eth / .bnb

DAO Profile on Tally

• Improving Governance participation
• Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Voting Issue 1:
Against
Decentralization means everything

Voting Issue 2:
If the affected people already reveived a refund why would the deserve another one ?
No more refund

Languages I speak and write: English Netherlands

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: Blockchain entrepreneur looking for freedom and opporunity’s.

[ercwl]

**Name (organization or individual): **

• Eric Wall

Wallet Address or ENS:

• ercwl.eth

Tally Profile:

• ercwl

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

• Eric: The guiding pricinple of Layer 2 DAO governance should be that the ideals and ethos that made Ethereum successful must be preserved in its upper layers. If they are not preserved in the upper layers, and Layer 2s become the gravitational center for transactions, the soul of Ethereum will be lost. The goal of Layer 2 DAOs is to strike a balance between growth+success and ethos+spirit.

Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. How would you vote?

• Eric: Against

2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

• Eric: The proposal should include a Bounty Committee that is represented by a broad range of community participants. Alternatively, there should be programmatic controls on how many bounties the original committee should be able to allocate in a day and UNI holders should be able to terminate the bounty program via vote.

3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

• Eric: It’s always a balance. It’s perfectly acceptable to elect centralized committees to ensure progress but have their powers limited in scope and revokable by the larger community.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

1. Eric: Full Reimbursement

• Eric: A vote was passed to reimburse victims. There was nothing material that had changed in that timespan that prompted the need for a new vote. You should not allow to constantly re-vote on things until a specific coalition reaches a desired outcome by wearing out the opposition.

Languages I speak and write:

English, Swedish

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

Please visit ericwall.ninja/disclosures/ for an exhaustive list. Most notably, I am an investor in Fuel (optimistic rollup), L2Beat and a board member of Starknet Foundation (zkrollup). In addition, I am a delegate on Optimism.

I do not have any financial exposure to zkrollups (no tokens/equity).

[Castun]

Name: Castun Mutorcs

ENS: Castun.eth

Tally Profile URL: Tally | castun.eth

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• Public Goods funding
• Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO: As a supporter of decentralization, my primary goal for the DAO is to promote decentralization, transparency, and efficiency. Liquidity mining can be a useful tool to achieve these goals, but it should be implemented carefully to avoid centralized control over the network.

Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview

• Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
• For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
• This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

1. How would you vote?
   For
   Against
2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

For the Uniswap Flipside proposal, I would vote against it in its current form. Giving one service provider too much control over allocation and oversight of the program undermines decentralization and could lead to conflicts of interest. To address this issue, I would recommend amending the proposal to include other analytics service providers and distribute decision-making power more equitably among all involved parties.

The tradeoff between centralization and efficiency is delicate and depends on the context. In the case of Uniswap’s proposal, prioritizing decentralization over efficiency is necessary to avoid centralization of power.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Issue Overview:
Overview Link 1
Overview Link 2

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

1. Full Reimbursement
2. No Reimbursement
3. Split Reimbursement
   Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.

In the FEI RARI hack reimbursement issue, parties affected by an exploit should be reimbursed to some extent, depending on the circumstances. The decision to reimburse should be based on factors such as the severity of the exploit, the impact on the network, and the level of responsibility of the affected parties. Without knowing all the specifics of the hack, it is difficult to determine whether or not to reimburse. However, I would be inclined to support partial reimbursement rather than full reimbursement, as full reimbursement could incentivize bad actors to engage in malicious behavior.

Languages I speak and write: English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
To ensure that decisions are made in the best interest of the network and its users, it is critical for delegates to affirm that they do not have any conflicts of interest that could influence their judgment when making decisions that impact the Arbitrum ecosystem. With that being said, I do not think I have any sort of conflicts of interests with the DAO or Arbitrum ecosystem. My only goal is help things grow in a positive manner and keep things fair.

[0xWicked]

Name (organization): Abracadabra DAO

Wallet Address or ENS: 0xA71A021EF66B03E45E0d85590432DFCfa1b7174C
Tally Profile:
Twitter profile: @MIM_SPELL

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
As Abracadabra DAO, we believe that our overall goal is to continue to foster innovation and growth in the DeFi space. We have seen the success of Arbitrum in taking on market share by attracting teams to build on top of their platform. We believe that this strategy needs to be continued, and as such, we plan to actively assess new projects and teams to help them jump start their platform on Arbitrum itself.

Collaboration and partnership are key to continuing growth, and we are committed to fostering an environment that encourages these values.

Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. How would you vote?

As Abracadabra DAO, carefully reviews each of the proposal and conducts its own thorough analysis of the potential risks and benefits of such proposal. In the case of Flipside, we would be inclined to vote against it in its current form, given the concerns about centralization of power and favoring of one service provider over others.

2. Against

3. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

We would suggest reducing Flipside’s control over allocating UNI to these bounties and increasing the involvement of other analytics service providers in the proposal. A 3/7 seats allocation towards Flipside is far too imbalanced and should be amended to reduce Flipside to 1 seat and give the other 2 seats to other analytics service providers.

Revising the oversight committee to ensure a more equitable distribution of power makes sense as well. Might remove Flipside from this committee completely and add a more neutral party.

4. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

We believe that a balance must be struck. While it’s important to have clear lines of authority and decision making to ensure efficient execution of plans, it’s equally important to ensure that power is not concentrated in the hands of a few individuals or entities.

During periods of growth, it may be reasonable to adopt a more centralized approach, as long as there are clearly defined timelines for when decentralization will occur. This enables even DAOs to quickly and systematically introduce new initiatives, with a clear plan for gradually reducing centralization over time.

As a DAO ourselves, we prioritize transparency, inclusivity, and decentralized decision making. We would strive to ensure that any proposal we support aligns with these values and promotes the long term growth and success of Arbitrum and the broader DeFi ecosystem.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

1. Split Reimbursement

As a DAO that governs a DeFi protocol, Abracadabra believes that security is of utmost importance in the DeFi ecosystem.

Regarding the issue of reimbursement, we believe in taking a case by case approach. While we understand the sentiment behind full reimbursement, we also recognize that it may set a precedent that incentivizes risky behavior and lacks accountability. On the other hand, a blanket policy of no reimbursement discourages future participation and could inhibit growth.

In case of the Rari hack, we would take into account any security measures that were in place at the time of the hack and the level of responsibility of the parties involved. Based on this thorough evaluation, we would consider a split reimbursement as a potential solution.

Overall we believe that there are certain instances where reimbursement may be appropriate. A balance between covering damages for the user but still leaving enough funds to further improve the project is of the utmost importance.

2. Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.

Reimbursements can be appropriate in certain instances, as long as they do not completely deplete the treasury of the protocol. It is important for the protocol to be able to withstand a reimbursement and still have enough funds to function, grow and improve its security measures. If a full reimbursement would leave the protocol with no funds to continue operating, it would be doomed to fail and would not be a viable option. In such cases, a partial reimbursement may be more appropriate to balance the needs of the users and the sustainability of the protocol. Ultimately each situation must be evaluated on a case by case basis, taking into account the specific circumstances and the long term implications for the protocol.

Languages we speak and write:

English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

• Abracadarbra is a DeFi-focused protocol, and we have a vested interest in the growth and success of the DeFi ecosystem on Arbitrum.
• Abracadabra may hold positions in Arbitrum and other protocols

[gnat777]

Name: Gnat

Wallet: 0x95d50631c0b4cf4b14a6753df6cc56dd31f6c814

Tally: https://www.tally.xyz/profile/0x95d50631c0b4cf4b14a6753df6cc56dd31f6c814

Areas of Interest:
DeFi development on Arbitrum
Improving Governance participation
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
I believe that the main goal of the DAO is to make better use of available resources for the benefit of Arbitrum by transferring governance into the hands of the community. As for liquidity mining, I think that DAO should not take aggressive actions because Arbitrum has a serious competitive advantage over its competitors - such as a large number of unique projects – and in the near future able to grow sustainably without it.
Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. Against
2. We should not allow power to be centralized in the hands of a narrow circle of people who are poorly accountable to the DAO. I would suggest putting more people on the oversight committee and making the Allocation Commission more accountable to them.
3. I believe that the primary tasks of the protocol should be handled by the development team to increase the speed of realization and efficiency. While secondary tasks such as grant distribution and user acquisition programs should be handled by the DAO. In this case the protocol will be competitive due to proper distribution of powers.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Full Reimbursement

I believe that in the case of a hack, developers should prioritize refunds to their investors and users. If developers do not do so, they not only harm their community, but also undermine overall trust in cryptocurrencies and DeFi, which is unacceptable to members of our community. Moreover, it is a well-known fact that Fei Protocol developers had such an opportunity but chose to earn money themselves rather than reimburse the funds. This is unacceptable and we should condemn such actions.

Languages I speak and write:
English, Ukrainian, Russian
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
No conflicts of interest.

[Romano]

DAO Profile on Tally

[0xShanHe]

Name: 0xShanHe

Wallet Address or ENS: 0xf969076e53Efd774994051e147DBC6aF604c5521

Tally Profile URL: Tally | 0xShanHe

Areas of Interest:

Public Goods funding;
Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the Layer2 Arbitrum DAO:

As a passionate supporter of the Layer2 Arbitrum DAO, I believe that the main objective of the DAO should be to foster decentralization, promote innovation, and prioritize the security and sustainability of the platform. It is crucial to take a balanced approach towards achieving these goals while being aggressive in liquidity mining.

Sample Voting Issue 1: Allocating Funds for Community Grants and Incentive Programs

How would you vote?

For

Against

I would vote for allocating funds for community grants and incentive programs. As an active member of the Layer2 Arbitrum DAO community, I understand the importance of community engagement in the growth and development of the project. The allocation of funds will encourage the community to contribute to the project and will help in building a strong and supportive community.

Sample Voting Issue 2: Establishing a Decentralized Governance Forum for Open Community Discussions and Proposals

I strongly believe that it is crucial to establish a decentralized governance forum for open community discussions and proposals. This will enable the community to engage in discussions and share their ideas, and will lead to a more transparent and inclusive decision-making process. As a professional in the blockchain industry, I understand the importance of customized governance solutions that meet the specific needs and requirements of the project.

In addition, I believe that Layer2 Arbitrum is a powerful platform that has the potential to transform the DeFi ecosystem. I am committed to contributing to the growth and development of the Layer2 Arbitrum DAO and ensuring that it remains a leading player in the industry. With my expertise in the blockchain industry and my passion for decentralized governance, I am confident that I can help lead the Layer2 Arbitrum DAO towards a bright and prosperous future.

Languages I speak and write:

Mandarin,English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

NONE

[KingWar]

Name : PhongNguyen
address : 0xEd36bf0b2b17768E782Db2ece6A327055b2f3e9C

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• NFT development on Arbitrum

Sample Voting Issue 1:

• This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

1. How would you vote?
   Against
2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Issue Overview

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

3. Split Reimbursement

[CrazySSSquirrel]

Name: Anton (Individual)

Wallet address: 0xFC21C100f01340852F752D35de54A4f89789473d

Tally: https://www.tally.xyz/profile/0xfc21c100f01340852f752d35de54a4f89789473d

Areas Interested in Contributing To:

• Public Goods Funding
• Improving Governance participation
• Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
• Supporting Infrastructure

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

DAO is expanding in many areas, it will aim to create a transparent, decentralized platform through which people will jointly make decisions to achieve a common higher goal. Therefore, it makes it easier for the community to participate in organizational decision making.
I believe this is a project that will move the world in the best direction.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. Against

2. Transparency

3. It often happens that compromise is the best solution.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

It is necessary to understand the reasons for this action, if it was due to the problems of the owner of the network, then I consider a full refund necessary, otherwise the community is not responsible for individuals

Languages I speak and write:

• English
• Russian

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
No conflicts of interest to operare in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem!

[qualip]

Name: Artem (Individual)

Wallet address: 0xFC21C100f01340852F752D35de54A4f89789473d

Tally: https://www.tally.xyz/profile/0xfc21c100f01340852f752d35de54a4f89789473d

Areas Interested in Contributing To:

• Public Goods Funding
• Improving Governance participation
• Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
• Supporting Infrastructure

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

DAO is expanding in many areas, it will aim to create a transparent, decentralized platform through which people will jointly make decisions to achieve a common higher goal. Therefore, it makes it easier for the community to participate in organizational decision making.
I believe this is a project that will move the world in the best direction.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. Against

2. Transparency

3. It often happens that compromise is the best solution.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

It is necessary to understand the reasons for this action, if it was due to the problems of the owner of the network, then I consider a full refund necessary, otherwise the community is not responsible for individuals

Languages I speak and write:

• English
• Russian

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

No conflicts of interest to operate in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem.

[jeanm]

Name: MUX Protocol

Wallet address: 0xe43ac79951b7ba9f8d06478377ae652ca593281b

Tally: Tally | 0xe43ac79951b7ba9f8d06478377ae652ca593281b

Areas of interest:

• Support infrastructure
• DeFi development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

The goal of DAO is to realize sustainable and decentralized development of the rollup. Different expertise and insights need to be considered to achieve such goals, including the tech side for security and engagement from all parties. Sustainability is the key that involves balanced development from all stakeholders.

As that being said -

• Liquidity Mining can only serve as a goal to bootstrap the liquidity and a short-term incentive for users to get familiar with a protocol. It shouldn’t be used as a long-term strategy.
• Grants handle the engagement for builders and users. It also need to be handled carefully for builders / protocols to demonstrate accountability and deliverables.

Sample Voting Issue 1 - UniSwap/Flipside Bounty

• How would you vote?
  For
• What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

Nothing for now.

• How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

This Problem is inevitable during the development of DAO. so the centralization entity should be under the supervision of DAO and need to act as transparently as possible.

Sample Voting Issue 2 - Rari Hack Reinbursement

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

Partial reinbursement

Since hacks are one the most critical concerns users have when onboarding on chain. So partial coverage of the hacks is necessary. I won’t recommend full coverage, especially to those protocols that have been damaged and can no longer run.

Languages I speak and write: By order of preference - English, Mandarin

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
MUX Protocol is a decentralized leveraged trading protocol. This means that we will automatically abstain from any discussion that might involve perps.

[evilpax]

name: evilpax
twitter: @evilpax1
Wallet Address: 0x4eDc47Af2e55e10AEAd73488e228B78fD45EFA2F

DAO Profile on Tally

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• NFT development on Arbitrum
• Gaming development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
Regarding the overall goals of a DAO, they can vary depending on the specific DAO and its members. Some common goals may include promoting decentralization, transparency, and community-driven decision-making. Other goals may be more specific to the DAO’s purpose, such as supporting a particular blockchain ecosystem or promoting a specific use case for decentralized technology.

In terms of liquidity mining, this is a strategy that many DAOs use to incentivize liquidity providers to supply liquidity to their platform. The goal of liquidity mining is typically to increase trading volume and liquidity on the platform, which can in turn attract more users and generate revenue for the DAO. The aggressiveness of liquidity mining strategies can vary depending on the specific goals of the DAO and its risk tolerance.

As for issues that have been raised in other communities, it would depend on the specific issues being discussed. However, some common issues that have been raised in the past include concerns around governance and decision-making processes within DAOs, regulatory compliance, security risks, and scalability challenges.

Here are three reference URLs that provide more information on these topics:

1. “What is a Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO)?” - Coincentral.com - https://coincentral.com/what-is-a-decentralized-autonomous-organization-dao/
2. “Liquidity Mining: A Beginner’s Guide” - Binance Academy - https://academy.binance.com/en/articles/liquidity-mining-a-beginner-s-guide
3. “The Pros and Cons of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs)” - Blockgeeks.com - https://blockgeeks.com/guides/decentralized-autonomous-organizations/

However, the proposal was met with controversy due to concerns over the level of control that Flipside Crypto would have over the allocation of UNI tokens, which are the native token of the Uniswap platform. Some members of the Uniswap community felt that giving Flipside Crypto too much control over the program could potentially lead to centralization and undermine the principles of decentralization that underpin Uniswap.

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Despite these concerns, Uniswap ultimately decided to move forward with the bounty program in partnership with Flipside Crypto. However, they made some changes to the original proposal in order to address some of the concerns raised by the community. For example, they reduced the amount of UNI tokens that would be allocated to Flipside Crypto for their role in overseeing the program

Against

The tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done is a complex issue that requires careful consideration. On one hand, centralization of authority can lead to more efficient decision-making and implementation of policies. On the other hand, it can also lead to a lack of diversity in perspectives and a concentration of power that can be easily abused.

To approach this tradeoff, it is important to consider the specific context and goals of the organization or project in question. In the case of Flipside, their goal was to create an allocation committee that could effectively distribute funds to different projects within the cryptocurrency ecosystem. In this context, having a centralized committee with clear decision-making authority may have been necessary to ensure that funds were distributed fairly and efficiently.

Split Reimbursement
Regarding the question of whether parties should be reimbursed for an exploit, it would depend on the specific circumstances of the situation. However, in general, full reimbursement may not be appropriate.

Firstly, if a party knowingly exploited a system or engaged in fraudulent behavior to gain an advantage, they should not be reimbursed. This would only incentivize unethical behavior and undermine the integrity of the electoral process.

Secondly, even if the exploit was unintentional, parties have a responsibility to ensure the security and accuracy of their campaign activities. If they failed to take reasonable precautions or neglected to address known vulnerabilities, they should bear some responsibility for any negative consequences that result.

That being said, there may be situations where partial reimbursement could be appropriate. For example, if a party was unaware of a vulnerability and promptly reported it to authorities once discovered, they may deserve some compensation for their cooperation in resolving the issue.

Languages I speak and write: English

Disclosure of conflicts of interest is an important aspect of governance in any ecosystem. It helps to ensure that decisions are made in the best interest of the community and not influenced by personal gain. In the context of the Arbitrum ecosystem, conflicts of interest may arise when delegates have a financial or personal stake in a particular decision.

To address this issue, the Arbitrum team has implemented a code of conduct that requires delegates to disclose any conflicts of interest they may have. This includes any financial interests, relationships with other members of the community, or any other factors that may influence their decision-making process.

The code of conduct also encourages open and honest debate among delegates, even if they hold opposing views. This is important for ensuring that all perspectives are considered and that decisions are made based on the best available information.

[Thuyngo]

wallet : 0xC28D2fDFE6d5a482d32f855457Bb5F8cAcdB32b1
name : ThuyNgo

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up tot wo tags :

• NFT development on Arbitrum
• Gaming development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO :
There is also concern that no other analytics service provider is involved in the proposal. if the intention is to be managed by Uniswap. DAOs must be able to refer their control to other parties to operate efficiently.

Sample Voting Issue 1 :

• Against
• agreed with all decisions regarding Uniswap which has provided liquidity to the decentralized market, may also add sushiswap to future DAO projects.
• I hope that on the arbitrary network not many MEV bots can act, because they are like bribing miners to get frontruns.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
As a delegate, I believe that the Rari hack replacement situation is a complex issue that requires careful consideration. I believe it’s important to weigh the potential advantages and disadvantages.

Languages I speak and write:

• English

[brincnomics]

Name: Brinc finance (Brinc.fi)

Wallet Address or ENS

0x30d5D30e43b6167a345f3D71d61673464e16d711

Tally Profile URL

Tally

Brinc.fi’s DAO Profile

DAO memberships, votes and proposal

DAO memberships, votes and proposal

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags

• DeFi development and ecosystem on Arbitrum
• Improving real Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO

We believe that the Arbitrum DAO should primarily focus on two areas:

1. Supporting the development of new and needed applications
2. Helping onboard new users who would benefit from the applications on Arbitrum

As a project that is aiming to solve some of the fundamental problems in defi surrounding value. Brinc.fi is looking to onboard massive user adoption by creating real intrinsic value for users via its yield vaults exclusively on Arbitrum.

Sample Voting Issue 1

1. Against
2. This proposal is asking for UNI tokens from treasury to be deployed to generate yield. I would reject this proposal as it looks like a plan to generate additional income from existing treasury without providing enough information on exactly what the yield forecast is and how it will actually be achieved. In the proposal they “assume” a 30% APR rather than providing data and analyses on how the 30% would be generated i.e. historical yield rates.
3. As an alternative to deploying UNI to external defi apps to generate yield, I would propose that UNI increase its LP fees on users so that it is generating real yield.

Sample Voting Issue 2

The first vote should have triggered a trustless execution of the hack repayment. It’s unclear what to do after two such votes when neither had executable code tied to their outcomes. Thus, we would never put such a monumental vote to governance without the executable code attached.

The reimbursement amount should be determined by the token holders as they have the long term interest of the project in mind. If executable code had been attached to the first vote, they would have fully reimbursed the hack victims. If token holders directly voted for this code to be executed, it would have been the right outcome.

Our Response: Full Reimbursement

Given that the DAO had the funds to repay the victims it should do so immediately. Also, the first vote should not have been overturned to the detriment of the victims; this goes against the immutability for DAO votes. The first vote should have also triggered a trustless execution of the hack repayment. I feel that significant changes should have been made to the executive committee at FEI as they did not handle their ICO nor this hack with proper diligence and execution.

Languages I speak and write

English, Korean