Delegate Statement Template

Name: MUX Protocol

Wallet address: 0xe43ac79951b7ba9f8d06478377ae652ca593281b

Tally: Tally | 0xe43ac79951b7ba9f8d06478377ae652ca593281b

Areas of interest:

  • Support infrastructure
  • DeFi development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

The goal of DAO is to realize sustainable and decentralized development of the rollup. Different expertise and insights need to be considered to achieve such goals, including the tech side for security and engagement from all parties. Sustainability is the key that involves balanced development from all stakeholders.

As that being said -

  • Liquidity Mining can only serve as a goal to bootstrap the liquidity and a short-term incentive for users to get familiar with a protocol. It shouldn’t be used as a long-term strategy.
  • Grants handle the engagement for builders and users. It also need to be handled carefully for builders / protocols to demonstrate accountability and deliverables.

Sample Voting Issue 1 - UniSwap/Flipside Bounty

  • How would you vote?
    For
  • What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

Nothing for now.

  • How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

This Problem is inevitable during the development of DAO. so the centralization entity should be under the supervision of DAO and need to act as transparently as possible.

Sample Voting Issue 2 - Rari Hack Reinbursement

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

Partial reinbursement

Since hacks are one the most critical concerns users have when onboarding on chain. So partial coverage of the hacks is necessary. I won’t recommend full coverage, especially to those protocols that have been damaged and can no longer run.

Languages I speak and write: By order of preference - English, Mandarin

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
MUX Protocol is a decentralized leveraged trading protocol. This means that we will automatically abstain from any discussion that might involve perps.

1 Like

name: evilpax
twitter: @evilpax1
Wallet Address: 0x4eDc47Af2e55e10AEAd73488e228B78fD45EFA2F

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

  • NFT development on Arbitrum
  • Gaming development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
Regarding the overall goals of a DAO, they can vary depending on the specific DAO and its members. Some common goals may include promoting decentralization, transparency, and community-driven decision-making. Other goals may be more specific to the DAO’s purpose, such as supporting a particular blockchain ecosystem or promoting a specific use case for decentralized technology.

In terms of liquidity mining, this is a strategy that many DAOs use to incentivize liquidity providers to supply liquidity to their platform. The goal of liquidity mining is typically to increase trading volume and liquidity on the platform, which can in turn attract more users and generate revenue for the DAO. The aggressiveness of liquidity mining strategies can vary depending on the specific goals of the DAO and its risk tolerance.

As for issues that have been raised in other communities, it would depend on the specific issues being discussed. However, some common issues that have been raised in the past include concerns around governance and decision-making processes within DAOs, regulatory compliance, security risks, and scalability challenges.

Here are three reference URLs that provide more information on these topics:

  1. “What is a Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO)?” - Coincentral.com - https://coincentral.com/what-is-a-decentralized-autonomous-organization-dao/
  2. “Liquidity Mining: A Beginner’s Guide” - Binance Academy - https://academy.binance.com/en/articles/liquidity-mining-a-beginner-s-guide
  3. “The Pros and Cons of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs)” - Blockgeeks.com - https://blockgeeks.com/guides/decentralized-autonomous-organizations/

However, the proposal was met with controversy due to concerns over the level of control that Flipside Crypto would have over the allocation of UNI tokens, which are the native token of the Uniswap platform. Some members of the Uniswap community felt that giving Flipside Crypto too much control over the program could potentially lead to centralization and undermine the principles of decentralization that underpin Uniswap.

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Despite these concerns, Uniswap ultimately decided to move forward with the bounty program in partnership with Flipside Crypto. However, they made some changes to the original proposal in order to address some of the concerns raised by the community. For example, they reduced the amount of UNI tokens that would be allocated to Flipside Crypto for their role in overseeing the program

Against

The tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done is a complex issue that requires careful consideration. On one hand, centralization of authority can lead to more efficient decision-making and implementation of policies. On the other hand, it can also lead to a lack of diversity in perspectives and a concentration of power that can be easily abused.

To approach this tradeoff, it is important to consider the specific context and goals of the organization or project in question. In the case of Flipside, their goal was to create an allocation committee that could effectively distribute funds to different projects within the cryptocurrency ecosystem. In this context, having a centralized committee with clear decision-making authority may have been necessary to ensure that funds were distributed fairly and efficiently.

Split Reimbursement
Regarding the question of whether parties should be reimbursed for an exploit, it would depend on the specific circumstances of the situation. However, in general, full reimbursement may not be appropriate.

Firstly, if a party knowingly exploited a system or engaged in fraudulent behavior to gain an advantage, they should not be reimbursed. This would only incentivize unethical behavior and undermine the integrity of the electoral process.

Secondly, even if the exploit was unintentional, parties have a responsibility to ensure the security and accuracy of their campaign activities. If they failed to take reasonable precautions or neglected to address known vulnerabilities, they should bear some responsibility for any negative consequences that result.

That being said, there may be situations where partial reimbursement could be appropriate. For example, if a party was unaware of a vulnerability and promptly reported it to authorities once discovered, they may deserve some compensation for their cooperation in resolving the issue.

Languages I speak and write: English

Disclosure of conflicts of interest is an important aspect of governance in any ecosystem. It helps to ensure that decisions are made in the best interest of the community and not influenced by personal gain. In the context of the Arbitrum ecosystem, conflicts of interest may arise when delegates have a financial or personal stake in a particular decision.

To address this issue, the Arbitrum team has implemented a code of conduct that requires delegates to disclose any conflicts of interest they may have. This includes any financial interests, relationships with other members of the community, or any other factors that may influence their decision-making process.

The code of conduct also encourages open and honest debate among delegates, even if they hold opposing views. This is important for ensuring that all perspectives are considered and that decisions are made based on the best available information.

1 Like

wallet : 0xC28D2fDFE6d5a482d32f855457Bb5F8cAcdB32b1
name : ThuyNgo

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up tot wo tags :

  • NFT development on Arbitrum
  • Gaming development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO :
There is also concern that no other analytics service provider is involved in the proposal. if the intention is to be managed by Uniswap. DAOs must be able to refer their control to other parties to operate efficiently.

Sample Voting Issue 1 :

  • Against
  • agreed with all decisions regarding Uniswap which has provided liquidity to the decentralized market, may also add sushiswap to future DAO projects.
  • I hope that on the arbitrary network not many MEV bots can act, because they are like bribing miners to get frontruns.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
As a delegate, I believe that the Rari hack replacement situation is a complex issue that requires careful consideration. I believe it’s important to weigh the potential advantages and disadvantages.

Languages I speak and write:

  • English

Name: Brinc finance (Brinc.fi)

Wallet Address or ENS

0x30d5D30e43b6167a345f3D71d61673464e16d711

Tally Profile URL

Tally

Brinc.fi’s DAO Profile

DAO memberships, votes and proposal

DAO memberships, votes and proposal

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags

  • DeFi development and ecosystem on Arbitrum
  • Improving real Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO

We believe that the Arbitrum DAO should primarily focus on two areas:

  1. Supporting the development of new and needed applications
  2. Helping onboard new users who would benefit from the applications on Arbitrum

As a project that is aiming to solve some of the fundamental problems in defi surrounding value. Brinc.fi is looking to onboard massive user adoption by creating real intrinsic value for users via its yield vaults exclusively on Arbitrum.

Sample Voting Issue 1

  1. Against
  2. This proposal is asking for UNI tokens from treasury to be deployed to generate yield. I would reject this proposal as it looks like a plan to generate additional income from existing treasury without providing enough information on exactly what the yield forecast is and how it will actually be achieved. In the proposal they “assume” a 30% APR rather than providing data and analyses on how the 30% would be generated i.e. historical yield rates.
  3. As an alternative to deploying UNI to external defi apps to generate yield, I would propose that UNI increase its LP fees on users so that it is generating real yield.

Sample Voting Issue 2

The first vote should have triggered a trustless execution of the hack repayment. It’s unclear what to do after two such votes when neither had executable code tied to their outcomes. Thus, we would never put such a monumental vote to governance without the executable code attached.

The reimbursement amount should be determined by the token holders as they have the long term interest of the project in mind. If executable code had been attached to the first vote, they would have fully reimbursed the hack victims. If token holders directly voted for this code to be executed, it would have been the right outcome.

Our Response: Full Reimbursement

Given that the DAO had the funds to repay the victims it should do so immediately. Also, the first vote should not have been overturned to the detriment of the victims; this goes against the immutability for DAO votes. The first vote should have also triggered a trustless execution of the hack repayment. I feel that significant changes should have been made to the executive committee at FEI as they did not handle their ICO nor this hack with proper diligence and execution.

Languages I speak and write

English, Korean

Name: s6k Labs

Wallet Address: 0x7A5e35d066B96BD8896f4EdC293607fbA64979d6
Tally Profile URL https://www.tally.xyz/profile/0x7a5e35d066b96bd8896f4edc293607fba64979d6
Website: https://www.s6klabs.com/
What area are you most interested in contributing to?

  • NFT development on Arbitrum
  • Gaming development on Arbitrum
  • Improving Governance participation
    how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?
    While we believe that liquidity mining can be a useful tool in certain cases, we do not necessarily view it as the primary goal of us. Our focus is on building and supporting robust, decentralized projects for the Arbitrum ecosystem.
    Sample Voting Issue 1 - UniSwap/Flipside Bounty

How would you vote?
For.
I share the idea that delegation of voting power is necessary for any DAO to function efficiently in the long term
2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
I would suggest amending a bit.

  • First, I believe that the grants should be separated into quarterly distributions rather than being divided into Year 1 and Year 2. While I understand that half of the allocation was going to employing staff and they would prefer to have the reserve upfront, I think it would be wiser to have more frequent distributions to ensure greater accountability and oversight.
  • Secondly, I would recommend introducing checkpoints across the delegation period to ensure that the DAO is comfortable with the allocation and to encourage increased accountability and accountability reports from the grantee. This would involve routine votes to review the progress of the program and to ensure that the allocation is being used in accordance with the DAO’s objectives.
  • Overall, these amendments would help to increase transparency and accountability while still allowing for efficient delegation of voting power within the DAO.
    Overall, these amendments would help to increase transparency and accountability while still allowing for efficient delegation of voting power within the DAO.
  1. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
    This is a complex issue that requires careful consideration.
    On the one hand, centralization can allow for quicker decision-making and more efficient execution of tasks. On the other hand, a more decentralized approach may be preferable, such as in situations where broad participation and input from stakeholders is needed to achieve long-term sustainability.
    Ultimately, the specific approach will depend on the specific situation and the goals of the organization or project.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
Split reimbursement may be the most reasonable option to consider. Users trust the protocol with their savings, and if it is hacked, a lack of reimbursement would be unethical. However, the amount of reimbursement should be carefully evaluated based on the extent to which the protocol was affected by the hack, as well as the operational costs required for the protocol to survive.

Languages I speak and write: English, Vietnamese

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: No conflicts of interest

Name (organization or individual)

Wallet Address or ENS

  • 0x2580181E77feeC62486A06C314DD9BFcAE1a6946

Tally Profile URL

Neutra Finance aims to make risk-hedged, sustainable investment strategies easily accessible for anyone, anywhere through automated strategy vaults. We strive to make this process simple and easy so that anyone who wants to protect their funds and earn stable returns in any market condition can do so. Upon depositing their capital into our vaults, users can sit back and earn APY above market standards on high-performing DeFi products while the strategy will do the rest, such as optimizing returns, rebalancing, and managing liquidation risk.

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

  • DeFi development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

  • The Arbitrum DAO should be growth-oriented in choosing to build and work with partners that are going to bring users, transactions, and volume to the ecosystem. Rather than distributing the tokens for the sake of distributing them, liquidity mining should occur in extremely targeted ways and spend then as wisely as possible.
  • Arbitrum already has products that people care about, and traction that other chains cannot follow. The launching of the $ARB token would be an opportunity to bring more users and more products that could integrate themselves with the already-existing infrastructure. These money legos will prove themselves the potential to build a castle, and only with that goal in mind should Arbitrum enable its voters to delegate and vote with the newly-launched token.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  • Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
  • For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
  • This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.
  1. How would you vote?
    • For
  2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
    • There are two approaches that could be taken to build consensus: (1) add additional third parties to the allocation and Oversight committees, or (2) reduce the funding for the program with the understanding that it will be increased if the program is successful. The first option reduces the reliance on one partner, while the second option would allow the partner to show they are good stewards and should be trusted to have more control.
  3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
    • It is not practical to have a DAO vote on every matter, so some centralization of authority is necessary at some level. The DAO can provide some limited authority to committees that allow them to spend up to a certain level, engage with new partners, take emergency actions, etc. Committees are ultimately accountable to the DAO and the authorities and funding for a committee or project should reflect that.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Issue Overview:
FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

  1. Full Reimbursement
  2. No Reimbursement
  3. Split Reimbursement
  • While proactive security measures are always preferable to being hacked and losing funds, history has shown that attacks and hacks have become as more cunning and clever as the security measures have become. The protocol that loses the users’ funds is ultimately responsible for that loss and should work to reimburse users.
  • However, full and immediate reimbursement may not always be in the best interests of the protocol, depending on the amount of funds lost. One possibility is to reimburse affected users over time, so the damage to the viability of the protocol is limited.
  • By taking a balanced approach, projects can demonstrate their commitment to their users while also reinforcing the importance of risk management in the DeFi space.

Languages I speak and write: English, Korean, Russian, Japanese

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: No conflict of interest.

Name: jonstone

Organization or Individual: graphiste.eth

Wallet Address or ENS: graphiste.eth

Twitter : @jondesigner

Tally Profile URL: https://www.tally.xyz/profile/graphiste.eth

Areas of Interest :

NFT development on Arbitrum
Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Overall Goals for the DAO: I believe the DAO should strike a balance between aggressive growth and long-term sustainability. Liquidity mining should be used strategically to foster a thriving ecosystem without risking instability. The main goal of the DAO should be to continuously innovate, support, and promote a decentralized, secure, and user-friendly platform for various applications, with a focus on creative and artistic projects.

As a French-speaking web developer and graphic designer, I bring a unique perspective and skill set to the community. My expertise in design and development can help shape the visual and functional aspects of the platform, making it more appealing and accessible to a diverse audience.

Sample Voting Issue:

I believe Split Reimbursement is the best option. In general, reimbursements should be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the specific

Name : PhongNguyen
Wallet : 0xEd36bf0b2b17768E782Db2ece6A327055b2f3e9C

Arbitrum DAO should focus on advancing mass adoption of web3 technologies and should encourage and fund projects/teams that make it easy to board the next wave of Web3 users
While focusing on supporting core areas like DEFI, NFTs & Gaming a key focus area should be to encourage and reward projects/teams that can make onboarding web2 users and developers to Arbitrum easier
Arbitrum DAO should provide sufficient liquidity across all key exchanges to ensure the price of ARB token is not prone to artificial manipulation. It is important for Arbitrum DAO to hold a sufficient share of liquidity pools to ensure that bad actors do not use this as a way to acquire large amounts of ARB tokens through Liquidity mining and manipulate the token price & DAO governance adversely.

Name (organization or individual)

  • Leon Liu

Wallet Address or ENS

  • broleon.eth

Twitter:

Tally Profile URL

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

  • DeFi development on Arbitrum
  • NFT development on Arbitrum
  • Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

  • I think it’s very important to explore how to make the Defi ecosystem on Arbitrum pave its own way and support some great and meaningful social practices. For example, it would be valuable to use DAOs to create innovative funds to support interesting early-stage projects. I have seen similar initiatives on Polygon before. However, due to language and cognitive barriers, many of my Chinese fans find it difficult to participate in such processes. But if we can conduct voting through popular platforms in China such as WeChat/Weibo and in Chinese language, it would be a convenient and feasible way for them to get involved.

Languages I speak and write:

  • English, Chinese.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

  • no conflicts of interest

Graviton Inc

Graviton is a prominent WEB3 development company headquartered in Puerto Rico. Our organization has successfully launched Xeenon, a cutting-edge WEB3 Media Platform, on Arbitrum. Our long-term strategy includes integrating this platform directly into WEB3 gaming, while utilizing decentralized tools to provide creators with monetization opportunities for their content.

0x7561A77172BF3a82127b2a61B6f5A264B42E6e84

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

  • NFT development on Arbitrum
  • Gaming development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
eg — how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?

How aggressive should we be in liquidity mining and what is the goal of the DAO:

As an experienced member and co-founder of several DAOs across various fields, ranging from DeFi to NFT Marketplaces, I have observed that the level of aggressiveness with which a DAO should engage in liquidity mining their token largely depends on their goal. Therefore, I believe that the primary goal of any DAO should be to remain adaptable and responsive to the ever-evolving needs of the user base of the L2, including companies building on top of the decentralized protocols and the protocols themselves.

Given this stated goal, an aggressive liquidity mining strategy is essential for several reasons. Firstly, it can help attract early adopters, incentivize liquidity provision, and create a positive feedback loop that drives adoption and usage of the protocol. Additionally, it can provide a liquidity cushion for the DAO in case of market volatility, which is particularly relevant in the current DeFi landscape.

Moreover, an aggressive liquidity mining strategy can increase the token’s visibility and value proposition in the market, which can lead to higher trading volumes and liquidity on exchanges. This can ultimately lead to more opportunities for the DAO to collaborate and form partnerships, thus increasing the overall utility of the protocol and the potential for future growth.

In summary, an aggressive liquidity mining strategy is crucial to achieve the primary goal of a DAO, which is to remain adaptable and responsive to the needs of the user base. It can attract early adopters, provide liquidity cushions, increase visibility and value proposition, and ultimately lead to more opportunities for growth and collaboration.

On the flip side while an aggressive liquidity mining strategy can have numerous benefits, it is important to carefully consider the potential pitfalls and risks associated with such a strategy. Token dilution, market distortions, short-term speculative investors, and centralization are all potential challenges that need to be taken into account when implementing a liquidity mining program.

It will be important to really understand market sentiment once the token has been out in the wild for awhile but I think aggressive in our current market is the way to go unless something radically changes.

Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Sample Voting Issue 1: Issue Overview 317

Prompts to Answer:

  1. How would you vote?
    Against
  2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
    One potential amendment to the proposal could be to reduce Flipside’s control over the program and increase the involvement of other analytics service providers. This could include redistributing seats on the allocation and oversight committees to other providers or creating new committees specifically for other providers.
  3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
    Another approach to the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done could be to establish clear checks and balances within the program. This could involve creating additional oversight committees or requiring regular reports and updates from Flipside to ensure that they are operating in the best interest of the Uniswap ecosystem.Ultimately, it will be up to the Uniswap community to determine how to proceed with the Community-Enabled Analytics program and whether to approve the proposal as-is or with amendments.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Issue Overview:Overview Link 1 948Overview Link 2 132

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

Split Reimbursement
I would choose to handle this situation with a Split Reimbursement approach. This decision is based on the following factors:

  1. Financial sustainability: A full reimbursement may not be feasible for the long-term financial health of the project. It is essential to strike a balance between compensating affected parties and ensuring the project’s sustainability. A split reimbursement can help maintain this balance by compensating a portion of the losses, making it less burdensome on the project’s resources.
  2. Shared responsibility: In the world of decentralized finance, users should be aware of the risks involved in participating in these platforms. While projects should strive to ensure the highest level of security, users must also understand that there is no absolute guarantee against exploits and hacks. A split reimbursement recognizes this shared responsibility, compensating users without creating a moral hazard.
  3. Encourage better security practices: Partial reimbursement can serve as a reminder to users and the project team to remain vigilant in securing their assets and continually improving security measures. This approach helps create a sense of accountability for all parties involved.
  4. Case-by-case basis: A split reimbursement approach allows for flexibility in determining the appropriate reimbursement level for each specific situation. Factors such as the severity of the exploit, the project’s financial state, and user behavior can be taken into consideration to decide the most suitable reimbursement percentage.

In conclusion, a split reimbursement approach balances the need for compensation with financial sustainability and encourages better security practices in the decentralized finance ecosystem. By evaluating each case individually, it is possible to make fair decisions that take into account the unique circumstances

Delegate: Fju_ry
Wallet
Tally Profile

Two areas I’m most interested in are:

  • DeFi development on Arbitrum
    and
  • Improving Governance participation

My Delegate statement

From my participation in the governance of many crypto projects, I drew several conclusions:

  1. Delegating voting power from centralized teams to thousands of users worldwide gives them great power.
    I have been actively participating in the governance of many crypto projects - Optimism, Stargate, Shell Protocol, AAVE, Lido, Goldfinch, 1inch, Gitcoin, CowSwap, and Hashflow.

Conclusion 1: The protocols with more equally distributed voting power allow truly decentralized governance and are more transparent in the decision-making.

  1. The users must fully realize the great responsibility the protocols give them by mechanisms of governance.
    Since being actively involved in the decentralized crypto space since September 2021, I have examined and voted on more than 100+ proposals in the abovementioned protocols.

Conclusion2: Delegation of the Voting Power alone will only benefit protocol if Delegates vote regularly and deliberately.
As Arbitrum Delegate, I would study each proposal and vote on it with all my best knowledge.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  1. Against. It is much easier to transition from decentralization to centralization than vice versa.
  2. I would propose an amendment limiting the number of seats (something like "one entity should not get more than 20% of the seats).
  3. My approach is to make another vote with an explanation of the pros and cons of these decisions.

(Similar case happened in the Stargate DAO in January 2023. The community decided on one entity’s OTC purchase of STG tokens, which could be financially lucrative but not necessarily beneficial for the protocol’s development.)

Sample Voting Issue 2:

I prefer the Split Reimbursement method*.* Such big hacks undermine the stability of the protocol, and there should be a compromise between users and the protocol and further search for solutions.

Languages I speak and write: English, German, Ukrainian, and Russian.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: I don’t have any Conflicts of Interest but will state if any arise during the duration of the delegation.

Name: Cryptorell (individual)

Wallet Address or ENS: 0xd304D6028e5C3e235A43De2005AF563914A2Cd22

Tally Profile URL: Tally | Cryptorell

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

  • DeFi development on Arbitrum
  • Gaming development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
eg — how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?

My primary focus would be to help the DAO achieve its goals efficiently, effectively and securely while attracting and maintaining an engaged and active community in order to maintain a strong and engaged community in developing high-quality and innovative DeFi platforms. quality… My main objectives for the DAO would be the following:

DeFi Platform Development at Arbitrum: One of my goals would be to work with the Arbitrum development team to create a robust and reliable DeFi platform that provides users with an exceptional user experience. I would make sure that the platform has advanced security features, a user-friendly user interface, and a wide range of investment options.

Effective DAO Governance: Another of my responsibilities would be to work with DAO members to ensure effective governance. We would establish clear processes and procedures to make decisions fairly and transparently. I would also make sure that DAO members have a say in decision making, and that decisions are made for the benefit of the community at large.

Active and Engaged Community: Building an active and engaged community is critical to the success of the DAO. I would make sure that the community feels heard and appreciated, and that their ideas and suggestions are taken into account.

Regarding the development of DeFi platforms at Arbitrum, I will focus on building tools and resources that allow developers to create high-quality applications and smart contracts more easily and efficiently. This will include creating open source libraries and organizing hackathons and community events to encourage innovation and collaboration.

In addition, I will work closely with other members of the Arbitrum community to ensure that security and privacy best practices are integrated into all DeFi platforms built on the network. I will also ensure that the DAO has the necessary resources to conduct regular security audits to ensure that the platform is protected against any potential threats.

Finally, I will focus on making the DAO attractive and accessible to the community, promoting inclusion and diversity. This will include creating developer incentive programs and promoting DeFi education so the community can better understand and participate in building these platforms.

In summary, my focus will be to build and maintain a strong and engaged community, foster innovation and collaboration, integrate security and privacy best practices, and promote inclusion and diversity.

Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview

  • Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
  • For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
  • This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

In this case, it seems that there were concerns about centralization of power and the favoritism of one analytics service provider, Flipside, in the Uniswap bounty program. Specifically, the allocation and oversight committees had a majority of members from Flipside, which raised concerns about the allocation of UNI tokens and the overall transparency of the program.

To address these concerns, one possible solution could be to increase the representation of other analytics service providers on the committees to ensure a more diverse and decentralized decision-making process. Additionally, implementing a transparent and public system for allocating UNI tokens and overseeing the program could help ensure fairness and prevent any potential abuses of power.

Ultimately, any program that relies on incentives and bounties should prioritize fairness, transparency, and decentralization to ensure that it aligns with the principles of decentralized finance (DeFi) and promotes the growth of the ecosystem.

Prompts to Answer:

  1. How would you vote?
    Against
  2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

Based on the concerns raised, I would suggest the following amendments to the proposal:

  1. Increase the number of seats on the allocation committee and oversight committee for other analytics service providers. This would ensure that the program is not favoring one service provider and that there is fair representation from all parties involved.
  2. Decrease the number of seats on the allocation committee for Flipside. While it’s important to have their expertise in the decision-making process, they shouldn’t have an overwhelming amount of power in the allocation of UNI bounties.
  3. Create clear guidelines and criteria for the allocation of UNI bounties. This would ensure that the allocation committee is making decisions based on objective factors rather than personal biases or preferences.
  4. Increase transparency around the program’s decision-making process. This could be achieved through regular reporting and public disclosure of the program’s activities and decisions. This would increase trust in the program and ensure that all parties involved are held accountable.

By implementing these changes, the proposal would address the concerns raised about centralization of power and favoritism towards one service provider. Additionally, it would create a more transparent and fair allocation process that benefits all parties involved.

  1. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

It’s a complex issue that requires a thoughtful and nuanced approach. On the one hand, centralization of authority can lead to quicker decision-making and efficient execution of tasks. On the other hand, it can lead to a concentration of power and potential abuse of that power.

One way to approach this tradeoff is to strive for a balance between centralization and decentralization. This means delegating decision-making power to multiple stakeholders, such as community members, developers, and service providers, and ensuring that no one group has too much control or influence. It’s also important to establish clear guidelines and protocols for decision-making, and to ensure transparency and accountability in the process.

Additionally, it’s important to regularly reassess the distribution of decision-making power and adjust as necessary. As the needs and dynamics of the ecosystem evolve, so too should the governance structure. This requires ongoing dialogue and collaboration among stakeholders to ensure that the system remains fair, efficient, and effective.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

The first step would be to assess the circumstances of the hack, the extent of the damage caused to the affected parties, and the impact on the overall ecosystem.

If it was determined that the hack was a result of a vulnerability in the smart contract or protocol, steps would need to be taken to address the vulnerability and prevent future hacks. This could involve updating the smart contract code, conducting a security audit, or implementing additional security measures.

In terms of reimbursing those affected by the hack, it would be important to ensure that the reimbursement process is fair and transparent. This could involve setting up a process to verify the extent of the damage suffered by each affected party and determining an appropriate amount of reimbursement based on that.

In general, it would be important to prioritize the security and integrity of the ecosystem, while also taking into account the needs and interests of the affected parties. It may also be helpful to engage with the broader community and seek input and feedback on how to best address the situation.

i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

  1. Full Reimbursement
  2. No Reimbursement
  3. Split Reimbursement
    Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.

I would select Split Reimbursement for those affected upon manual review. Full reimbursement can’t be done because this would lead to another hack. No reimbursement would lead to loss of trust in the ecosystem

Languages I speak and write: English (C1) and Spanish (Native)

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
Diversity of opinions is critical to making progress and determining the future direction of the
Arbitrum ecosystem. We recognize and celebrate the fact that delegates will have diverse views and we both encourage and anticipate good-faith debates in the governance process. That being said, it’s critical that all featured delegates are operating with Arbitrum’s best interest in mind, so please affirm that you don’t have any conflicts of interest that would prevent you from using your best judgement to operate in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem.

Name (organization or individual) Deeney

Wallet Address or ENS 0x01142DBBc871A09Bac7A26E9AAdc9744828A2f91

Tally Profile [( Tally | Deeney)

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

  • Public Goods funding
  • DeFi development on Arbitrum
  • Improving Governance participation
  • Supporting Infrastructure
  • Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
  • IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

Overall, the goals of a DAO and the approach to liquidity mining should be aligned with the needs and priorities of its community. DAOs can benefit from incorporating feedback and input from community members to ensure that their strategies and goals reflect the values and interests of the wider ecosystem.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  1. How would you vote?

for

  1. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

None for now

  1. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

Well for DAOs it gets impossible to govern properly when it’s decentralized because, the more decentralized the more difficult it is to agree, but I feel that the committees or delegates fulfill that vital function of representing the voice of many in order to optimize the governance processes.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

  1. Split Reimbursement

A DAO must ensure the best environment for its members and also take into account their survival, therefore it will depend a lot on the cases and the type of hack, by literally draining their funds I do not think they can pay.

That’s why I think the best thing to do, and depending on the case like FEI, is to return money to those affected, maybe under a vesting system or the DAO can get down to work to look after the interests of its users.

Languages I speak and write: english

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

I am confident that I have no conflicts of interest that would not allow me to perform my role in the best possible way.

Name (organization or individual)

  • Sheni Ogunmola

Wallet Address or ENS

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

  • DeFi development on Arbitrum
  • Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

  • My main concern is project development and ensuring that everything is being done to secure the network from internal and external security threats. I would like to see this project focus on providing blockchain solutions like lower gas fees, speedy and secure transactions. I would like it to create dAPPs that allow people to swap tokens across all chains cheaply and securely. I would also like to be able to stake or liquid stake my tokens like people are able to do on LIDO and to farm my tokens as well.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  1. I would vote no on this proposal
  2. I don’t think that any amendment could make this proposal better.
  3. I agree with this solution reputational avatars , which solves most if not all DAO participation and token-weight voting problems.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
This depends on where the reimbursement funds are going to be drawn from.

Languages I speak and write:

  • English.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

  • I have no conflicts of interest.

Name: Nick
Address: 0x5c183b6b02444977c7db8498bd608a9add62924a [cryptoinvestiter.eth]
Tally profile
My interests: 1) Public Goods funding 2) IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

DAOs have multiple goals and objectives, and these goals can evolve over time as the project matures and the needs of the community change. Ultimately, the goals of a DAO should align with the project’s mission and values and be driven by the needs and interests of the community. Therefore, I would answer briefly - my views as a potential delegate should be focused on such things as the desire of the entire DAO community, as well as acting in the best interests of the project as a whole.

Voting issue first:
1) I would vote against
2) The Uniswap project is supposed to be built on the principles of decentralization, transparency, and fairness, and any proposed amendments should align with these principles. For example, the allocation and oversight committees should be composed of a diverse group of stakeholders, and other analytics service providers should be involved in the proposal to avoid favoritism towards one provider.
3) Project’s values are centered around decentralization and community-driven decision-making. As such, any decision regarding the proposal should aim to preserve and enhance these values. It is essential to ensure that the Uniswap community is involved in decision-making, and that there is transparency and accountability in the allocation of UNI bounties.

Voting issue 2:
1) Full Reimbursement

My decision is based on the principle of protecting users and restoring trust in the project. Full reimbursement would signal to users that the project takes security seriously and is willing to take responsibility for its shortcomings. Additionally, it could help to mitigate the financial losses incurred by those affected by the hack and prevent a loss of confidence in the project’s ability to protect user funds.

However, full reimbursement would also come with its own risks and challenges. It could set a dangerous precedent, potentially leading to further exploitation or abuse by bad actors. It could also pose significant financial challenges to the project, potentially limiting its ability to continue operating in the long term.

Therefore, while full reimbursement may be an option in some cases, DAOs must carefully consider the specific circumstances of the hack and the potential risks and benefits of each option before making a decision. Ultimately, the goal should be to protect users, promote the long-term sustainability of the project, and maintain the trust and confidence of the project’s stakeholders.

Languages: English, Ukrainian, Russian
Conflict of interest: I believe that it is critical for all delegates to operate with the DAO’s best interest in mind and disclose any potential conflicts of interest that may arise. Transparency and integrity are essential to the success of any governance process, and the disclosure of conflicts of interest is an important part of ensuring that the process is fair and equitable for all stakeholders involved.

Name : gumi, inc.

Wallet Address : 0xCeA31C6A5ddb5334675D35E8ca1a6f1359EC5f21

Tally Profile URL : Tally | gumi, inc.

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

  • DeFi development on Arbitrum
  • NFT development on Arbitrum
  • Gaming development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

DAO is an ecosystem design driven by incentive cycle to perpetuate a service as a protocol for society.

Therefore, all the decision makings must not disrupt the incentive cycle.

Also, all the participants have to understand the principle of self-responsibility.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  1. Against

  2. While this proposal sets out reasonable objectives and means to achieve them, there are ambiguities about committee decision-making and execution, so we should add information that can resolve the following questions:

    a. How many seats is necessary for making decision in Allocation Committee?
    b. It says token operations will be automated, but what exactly is the Allocation Committee’s Multisig Wallet used for?
    c. I think the Oversight Committee’s decision will be made by a 2/3 vote, but it’s natural for Flipside to want to continue, so I think they can make the decision to continue regardless of the outcome just by persuading or buying vote from either Nic or Boris, so why not increase the number?
    d. Is Flipside’s process for determining bounty winners centralized?
    e. Flipside is expected to provide the analysis on which the Oversight Committee will base its discussion, but is there any room for fraud in this analysis?

  3. I think it is fundamental to design services so that the centralized elements and its risks can be monitored publicly. In the case of this proposal, if we need to monitor the process of any possible fraud within Flipside’s services, we should make clear the logic for visualize all the analysis results applied for the bounty program and the process for determining the winner.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Ans. 3 Split Reimbursement

Basically, I believe that the use of DeFi should adopt the principle of self-responsibility, so I believe that these victims should also be held accountable for their losses. On the other hand, DeFi is also an application, so we understand that customer compensation is necessary from a credit acquisition perspective. The key here is not to disrupt the Tokenomics in the refund process, and the policy of splitting it up and refunding it over time is not so bad.

Languages I speak and write:

English & Japanese

Name Bilal khan

Wallet Address :0x08c53F01F42F08579fd56C6c1B2d3Add5A0E8715

Tally | 0x08c5...8715))

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

  • Public Goods funding
  • DeFi development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
Liquidity mining is a process where users can earn rewards for providing liquidity to a particular decentralized finance (DeFi) protocol or platform. It involves users depositing tokens into a liquidity pool, which is then used to facilitate trades on the platform. In return, users are given rewards in the form of additional tokens or other incentives.

The level of aggression in liquidity mining should be determined based on an individual’s risk tolerance and investment goals. It’s important to understand the risks involved in liquidity mining, such as impermanent loss and market volatility, and to carefully assess the potential rewards.

The goal of a DAO, or decentralized autonomous organization, is to create a community-driven, decentralized governance structure. DAOs are designed to be transparent, open, and democratic, allowing members to participate in decision-making processes and have a say in the direction of the organization. The specific goals of a DAO can vary widely depending on the community it serves, but typically include promoting the adoption of a particular blockchain technology, developing new decentralized applications, or creating new financial instruments that are accessible to a wider audience.

As for the issues raised in other communities, without more specific context it’s difficult for me to comment. However, DAOs and DeFi platforms are still relatively new and rapidly evolving, and it’s important for communities to actively engage in constructive dialogue and collaboration to address any concerns and promote the growth of the ecosystem.

Prompts to Answer:

  1. How would you vote?
    For
    r
    2.Nothing more
    3.The tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done is a common challenge for any organization, including DAOs. On one hand, centralization of authority can provide clear leadership and decision-making, leading to faster execution and more efficient use of resources. On the other hand, too much centralization can stifle innovation, limit participation, and lead to decision-making that does not reflect the needs and priorities of the wider community.

  2. Full Reimbursement
    i speak engklush urdu punnjabi hindi

Name: Justin Stables (Individual)

ENS: justinstables.eth

Tally: Tally | Justin_Stables

Areas of interest:

  • Public goods
  • DeFi ecosystem development on Arbitrum
  • Ethereum ecosystem health

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
The purpose of governance for the Arbitrum DAO is to enable community members to collectively make decisions about the future direction and management of the Arbitrum network. As a group, we are responsible for managing the development, maintenance, and upgrades of the Arbitrum network - and for its affects on the Ethereum ecosystem as a whole.

Through our governance activity, we community members of the Arbitrum DAO must propose and vote on changes to the network’s protocol, such as upgrades or improvements to the smart contract language, transaction fees, and other key parameters.

In addition to technical decisions, the Arbitrum DAO’s governance process should also address broader strategic issues, such as network expansion, partnerships, and community outreach. Ultimately, the goal of the Arbitrum DAO’s governance process is to ensure that the network remains secure, reliable, and accessible to all users while also growing and evolving to meet the changing needs of our stakeholders.

Sample Voting Issue 1 - UniSwap/Flipside Bounty

How would you vote?
For
It has been my personal experience, contributing to various DAOs, that operational effectiveness relies upon a DAO community’s willingness and ability to safely and routinely delegate power to committees of trusted individuals. Centralization is not our ideal, however so long as such delegations of power are made with clearly defined mandates, limitations, oversight, and duration it is something I support.

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

  • Add a change management process to handle alterations to the committee composition as a result of DAO vote, normal turnover, illness, etc.
  • Smaller time-periods. This committee should have a 1-year mandate and should be responsible for quarterly oversight rather than yearly. Community should vote to renew after 1 year, or to make alterations to the mandate.
  • Mandate for reporting on a quarterly basis.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

The ultimate vision for DAO governance is fully transparent, 24/7 onchain governance. However, with the current tools we have this is not possible for nearly any DAO or protocol. In the short term, reliance on centralization of authority in the form of DAO-voted empowerment of individuals or committees to pursue the DAO’s interests and goals is an acceptable compromise.

In order to make this compromise safe for a DAO it is important to have good-governance principles enshrined in whatever structure governs the individuals or committees voted into power - including time limits on the empowerments made. Nothing should ever be forever, except immutable code.

Sample Voting Issue 2 - Rari Hack Reinbursement

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.

i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

Split Reimbursement

Whether or not victims of the Rari Finance hack should have been reimbursed for their losses is a complex question that depends on several factors, including the terms of use and service agreements of the Rari Finance platform and the specific circumstances surrounding the hack.

In general, DeFi platforms like Rari Finance and those that operate within the Ethereum and Arbitrum DeFi ecosystems, operate in a largely self-regulated environment, and other DAOs, protocols, and users are typically responsible for their own security and risk management. Therefore, it is not necessarily the responsibility of the platform to reimburse users for losses resulting from hacks or other security incidents.

That being said, it is both ethical and the operational best practice for DeFi platforms to have established insurance funds or other mechanisms to compensate users in the event of losses due to hacks or other security incidents. Insurance products for users did exist at the time, most notably via Nexus Mutual. So users affected by the hack did have the opportunity to mitigate their risk through purchase of cover. However, it is my personal belief that Rari Finance did not have adequate best practices in place and that its users were entitled to feel mislead as to the safety of using the protocol.

Regardless, users of a protocol governed by a DAO must accept the decisions of that DAO’s governance process - or participate themselves in order to advocate for their own preferences or interests. This is the only way to resolve such disputes. I would advocate for partial-reimbursement to be considered via DAO governance and ultimately hope that the DAO agreed that it bore some responsibility.

Ultimately, the decision of whether or not to reimburse victims of the Rari Finance hack would be up to the platform’s management team and/or community governance structure. They would need to weigh the potential benefits of reimbursing victims, such as maintaining the platform’s reputation and retaining users, against the potential costs, such as setting a precedent for future reimbursement requests and the financial burden of compensating victims.

Languages I speak and write: By order of preference - English, Spanish, Alien

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I am an independent contributor to the Lido DAO, working on promoting the expansion of the DeFi utility of stETH.

Please respond to the submission template below by replying with your answers.

Name (organization or individual)
Alp

Wallet Address or ENS
daoplomat.eth

Tally Profile URL (create a profile here )

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

I am looking to contribute to;

  • Public Goods funding
  • Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
  • Improving Governance participation
  • Supporting Infrastructure

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

The Arbitrum ecosystem has seen significant growth and participation from active DeFi users, which has led to deep liquidity in the protocol. As a delegate in the ecosystem, my goal would be to focus on projects and builders that can ease DeFi participation for average users, rather than solely relying on liquidity mining strategies to attract DeFi natives.

While liquidity mining can be an effective way to attract users and liquidity, it can also lead to inefficiencies and slow down progressive decentralization. Instead, my focus as a delegate would be on primitives that can onboard non-DeFi native users to maintain the growth of the ecosystem.

Some of the key areas that I would prioritize include de-risking of IL, which can help to reduce the potential losses for users in the ecosystem. Additionally, I would focus on proposals that can ease user-journey via one-click batch transactions, one-sided staking initiatives, liquidity book and dAMM scalability, KPI-based reputation and funding systems, and other user-centric features.

By focusing on these areas, we can ensure that the Arbitrum ecosystem continues to grow and attract a diverse range of users and use cases. This will not only increase the overall value of the ecosystem but also help to promote greater decentralization and resilience over time.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. How would you vote?

Before voting I would like to understand the roadmap in detail; success metrics, if the team is willing to be flexible to further decentralize the reward distribution process, and especially if they are willing to work with other service providers if they were to reach out for support.

In this particular case, as a delegate, I would vote “AGAINST” the Uniswap proposal as it currently stands, since I don’t see any roadmap to what it is that will be delivered, what are the success metrics/KPIs of those deliveries, who are accountable for ensuring the success of the project, and what is the roadmap to progressively decentralize the accumulated distribution power moving forward.

2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

I’d like to see a pretty clear explanation of the roadmap and understand if they are planning to decentralize after PoC’ing the proposal and I would ensure those are stated for the community more clearly.

In general, I would most likely vote for proposals that have clear asks for milestone-based or KPI-based funding, which ensures trust and accountability.

3. How would you approach the tradeoff between the centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

Decentralization is not just an end goal, but an ongoing process of collaboration and coordination among different nodes in a network. I believe the process can be implemented to get things done while ensuring the decentralization at the set standards by the community. Building a culture of accountability will enable a maturity level growth for the entire ecosystem.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

I was paying attention to the situation when it was occurring and even during those times I was weighing the options of Full Reimbursement versus Split Reimbursement. During those times, given the political climate within the Fei/Rari/Tribe ecosystem, I would’ve advocated for Full Reimbursement for the following reasons:

1. The presence of centralized and potentially malicious actors exerting significant influence on the voting process.
2. The misalignment of core-builder teams, resulted in diminished motivation to develop and deliver on their project commitments.
3. The importance of respecting the outcomes of past proposals, as this is crucial for maintaining a well-functioning governance system.

Languages I speak and write:

English, Turkish, and Italian.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

I do not have a conflict of interest that would prevent me from using my best judgement to operate in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem.

Good project number one