Delegate Statement Template

Governance Delegate Statements
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1141

Cal Blockchain Arbitrum Delegate Profile

Name (organization or individual): Blockchain at Berkeley

Wallet Address or ENS: calblockchain.eth

Tally Profile URL: Tally | Blockchain at Berkeley

Links: Website

What area are you most interested in contributing to?
DeFi development on Arbitrum
IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

Delegate Statement

Blockchain at Berkeley is a student organization at UC Berkeley that has been founded since 2014. We actively participate in governance on Aave, Compound, dYdX, Optimism, and Uniswap and we are expanding our governance focus to more protocols. We are experienced in on-chain governance and protocol design and we are very interested in the Arbitrum ecosystem. In 2022, UC Berkeley was ranked by CoinDesk as the #1 university to study blockchain in the United States and #3 in the world.

We believe that a fast-growing protocol needs a diverse team of delegates and continuous nourishment of the next generation of designers, developers, educators, and entrepreneurs. Blockchain at Berkeley is in a perfect position to supply talent from the student community to study the latest updates on Arbitrum, to foster engagement, to introduce learners to Arbitrum, and to build on Arbitrum!

In the past, we created a proposal(Compound #89) to lower the minimum proposing threshold on Compound to increase inclusivity for proposal creation. For more about our justifications for our governance votes, please check our Twitter!

Blockchain at Berkeley has departments including consulting for leading web3 projects, blockchain education on edX, blockchain accelerator program, and research. Our governance department is in charge of protocol research and voting and. We dedicate at least one lead to each protocol and include all governance members to make decisions on all proposals. The governance department meets weekly to discuss the latest updates and presents analysis on proposals and we ensure voices of all members are considered before making a decision. The voting process within the department is democratic to balance knowledge from seasoned members and thoughts from younger members.

We appreciate your consideration for us to be your delegate. We believe that our experience and dedication will greatly complement the other participants in the Arbitrum governance ecosystem. We are always happy to go in depth with decision making and analysis so you can be assured that your delegation is efficient in the system.

Overall Goals for the DAO

Sample Voting Issue 1 - Uniswap and Flipside Crypto:

How would you vote?
For. We believe this proposal has great potential to enrich the Uniswap community with useful tools to navigate the complex AMM landscape on V3. Further, we appreciate this proposal’s strategic approach that allows Uniswap-native mechanisms to generate the usable funds in this proposal can serve as a model for future grants.

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
The main gripe we had with this proposal was the lack of competition allowed for the role of service provider. We believe that if there was a competitive aspect to this proposal where multiple service providers could bid for the right to run this program, it could have been much better.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
While we recognize the fundamental value of decentralization, we also believe that there this proposal strikes a good balance between having Uniswap remaining largely decentralized and improving the ecosystem.

Sample Voting Issue 2 - FEI Rari Hack Reimbursement

How would you vote?
No Reimbursement

As previous delegates for the FEI protocol, Calblockchain voted no reimbursement on a related proposal(TIP-112).

Our reasoning was as follows:
We don’t believe this is the proper use of PCV. Fei needs all the defenses necessary, and shouldn’t be responsible for repaying the complete sum of Rari losses during an unprecedented market downturn. Rari positions carry smart contract risk, and while we believe in a future where Rari can provide compensation to users who lost out from a hack, it’s an unwise choice to put the stable coin at risk for complete repayment. Falling collateralization to ~120% is not an option: Fei still has exposure to stEth, and repayement would primarily reduce exposure to stablecoins (90% → 70%). This risk portfolio is not safe in any market, especially this one. We support alternative solutions to repay hack-affected users - such as a safety staking pool - but do not support the use of PCV to repay for the attack. Fei peg is of the highest priority to us.

We still believe that this was the right stance to take, even after a different proposal for full repayment of the Rari hack passed. As we all know, FEI protocol shut down shortly after and the reduction to PCV was a large reason why. PCV was not meant to act as a backstop and thus we have never considered it to be a backstop.

Languages we speak and write:
Cantonese, Chinese, English, French, German, Hindi, Punjabi, Russian, Spanish, Telugu, Turkish

Conflicts of Interest
We are governance delegates for Aave, Compound, DYDX, Optimism, and Uniswap.

Waiver of liability: By delegating to Blockchain at Berkeley, you acknowledge and agree that Blockchain at Berkeley will participate on a best efforts basis and will not be liable for any form of damages related to participation in Arbitrum.

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Name: Pepe

Wallet: 0x8C4d7d482780CCB799e2415F25b767250887e580

Tally Profile: 0x8c4d7d482780ccb799e2415f25b767250887e580

What area are you most interested in contributing?

  • long term: DeFi Development on Arbitrum, since it will set us free from deeply unfair traditional banking system.
  • short term: Gaming development on Arbitrum, since it will pull in a lot of people that will then expand their experience into the whole ecosystem. Masses go always the fun way the easiest.

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

A DAO is a structure used to give the many a voice by making governance accessible and transparent. Therefore it forms a strong community of individuals that be part of something big.

Liquidity mining is a proven strategy to bootstrap a DeFi ecosystem. However, the aggressiveness of liquidity mining strategy should be carefully evaluated to make sure it aligns with the DAO’s overall goals and financial sustainability.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

The D in DAO stand for “decentralized” so the answer should be clear.

If you give individuals too much power they tend to play the game selfish. It is what it is.

On the other hand maybe you want to give good players enough power to push positive developments faster, but still this distribution of power should be subject of the DAO itself.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Full reimbursement. People have to feel safe as possible using crypto to get mass adoption speeding up. So for the greater good we should make whole what we can.

Language I speak and write:

English, German

Disclosure of Conflicts of interest:

I want Arbitrum to win, so no conflict here.

1143

Name: RockX
Institutional-grade blockchain nodes so you can build, scale and stake with ease.

**Wallet Address: ** 0xe86a4923c4cd3bcd0060d4606541d1fb2930eb36

**Tally Profile URL: ** Tally | RockX

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

  • Gaming development on Arbitrum
  • Improving Governance participation
  • Supporting Infrastructure
  • Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
We believe DAO stands for healthy, transparent, and decentralization.
We plan to strongly participate in issue discussions and governance voting to align the needs and priorities of the community.

Sample Voting Issue 1:
As a delegate, transparency and decentralization are key priorities, but from an institutional point of view, centralization does have its perks of speed and promptness of decision-making. My point is against this.
I would amend the proposal to have as much transparency that allows delegates to oversee, review and get involved.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
In this situation, partial reimbursement may be most feasible. In any decision, transparency is key and community input must be inputted as one of its priority.

Languages I speak and write: English, Chinese (Mandarin), Korean, French, Romanian, Hindi

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
No conflict of interest

How you can reach us:
Twitter

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Name (Dego Finance)

Wallet Address 0x880539B0d982b76AE6F018aEa29a9b8Df4d4EE77

Dego Finance Profile URL (here )

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

  • DeFi development on Arbitrum
  • NFT development on Arbitrum
  • Gaming development on Arbitrum
  • Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

DEGO is the LEGO in the DeFi world which differs from MAKER DAO, COMPOUND, YFI and even the recent SUSHI in diversity, creativity and fairness. We hope that DEGO will be a work of art in the blockchain world representing freedom, equality, openness and innovation.

DEGO team is entirely grateful and feels more motivated by the numerous investment offers we have received from VCs and angels even though we could not accept them due to our community governance mechanism. Apart from the Presale and the 1% airdrop, any other DEGO token can only be used after the approval of DEGO DAO governance. DEGO is a complete governance token and we hope that it can spread around the world. Everyone can participate in DeFi equally and be a part of DEGO ecosystem.
DEGO ARB Contract Address: 0xe38FB850D5E122c387a2Cc7997a90BcE68AD2cED

Dego DAO(Voting):
Vote

Dego reopened the DEGO Inflation Model after the agreement of our community.

Languages I speak and write:

  • English, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Russian

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
Diversity of opinions is critical to making progress and determining the future direction of the Arbitrum ecosystem. We recognize and celebrate the fact that delegates will have diverse views and encourage and anticipate good-faith debates in the governance process. That being said, it’s critical that all featured delegates are operating with Arbitrum’s best interest in mind, so please affirm that you don’t have any conflicts of interest that would prevent you from using your best judgment to operate in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem.

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Name (individual)

thinkDecade

Wallet Address or ENS

thinkdecade.eth

Tally Profile URL

Areas of Interests

→ Public Goods funding

→ Improving Governance participation

→ IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

eg — how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?

Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining

When it comes to liquidity mining, am all for strategic implementation that balances user acquisition and sustained growth. As we have seen, Liquidity mining plays a crucial role in attracting users to Ecosystems/DeFi platforms. However, it’s essential to implement it strategically to ensure long-term sustainability and avoid negative consequences like short-term, yield-chasing behavior and unsustainable token emissions.

Key considerations for a strategic approach to liquidity mining may include:

→ Gradually tapering rewards to encourage long-term commitment and discourage short-term behavior.

→ Offering targeted incentives for specific pools or token pairs to prioritize strategic partnerships and attract committed users.

→ Involving users in governance and decision-making processes to foster a sense of ownership and loyalty.

→ Continuously monitoring and adapting liquidity mining programs to balance user acquisition and long-term sustainability.

By adopting a strategic approach, the DAO can leverage liquidity mining to build a strong foundation for lasting success.

Stance on Voting Issues:

UniSwap/Flipside Bounty: Against

I would vote against the proposed UniSwap/Flipside Bounty. While I acknowledge the importance of democratic decision-making, I believe that the particular approach in this proposal may not be the most effective way. Instead, I would advocate for a more structured and collaborative approach that fosters meaningful engagement among community members and encourages diverse opinions while still maintaining an efficient decision-making process.

Rari Hack Reimbursement: For

I believe in full reimbursement for affected parties in cases where a bug or exploit has caused significant losses. It is crucial to maintain customer trust and ensure the platform’s long-term success. However, the extent of the reimbursement should be determined based on the severity of the loss and the exploit’s impact. Additionally, it is essential to implement measures to prevent similar incidents in the future.

Languages I speak and write

English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

None

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[quote=“Lemma, post:1, topic:31”]
Name (organization or individual)
individual

Wallet Address or ENS
0x535BCafbD5C9De7C8cF60Cd841df96977D72bCe3

Tally Profile URL (create a profile here )

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

  • Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
  • DeFi development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
What is the goal of the DAO?

Languages I speak and write:
Catalan
English
French
Spanish

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
None

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delegatesde

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Name (organization or individual)

Boiler DAO (Purdue University)

Wallet Address or ENS

eth:0x2345F4E0CdF00D427D773413Dd4617d0156c29A9

Tally Profile URL To be updated (we are having issues with Tally for profile creation through multisig)

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

  • Improving Governance participation
  • IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
eg — how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?

A DAO represents one of the first company-like structures that prioritizes distributing control rather than concentrating it. In our opinion, the key objective of a DAO is to maintain this decentralized manner, striving for a fully or nearly fully distributed structure.

It can be argued that additional activities, such as fostering a robust community, offering a platform for constructive discussions, and enabling profit through liquidity mining, are the byproducts stemming from the establishment of a decentralized DAO.

While Arbitrum may profit from engaging in liquidity mining, the intensity of this approach depends on the overall risk tolerance of the Arbitrum DAO. Boiler Blockchain, being a DAO itself, cannot accurately determine the exact risk appetite for Arbitrum’s DAO. Nevertheless, if the community opts to pursue liquidity mining, the DAO should maintain maximum transparency and openness (e.g., disclosing the percentage of the treasury allocated for liquidity mining, the expenses or tokens awarded to project users participating in the $ARB pool, etc).

Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview 1.3k

  • Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
  • For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
  • This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

  1. How would you vote?
    For
  2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

The proposal needs to consider two factors: committee structure, and the value of the proposal itself. Based on the proposal, Uniswap will rely heavily on Flipside to manage the payout of $UNI for bounties. However, this would pose a problem since Flipside would have a 4/10 or 2/5 voting power of the total $25M.

This exact problem is another common dilemma the DeFi community faces. We believe that lack of competition is the issue here. If there were multiple service providers that would bid on the right to attain a position to control this program, it could have been a much better situation overall.

A possible solution to the lack of competition while being dependent on Flipside to be the “major” decision maker is to reduce its voting power to a maximum of 1/3 of the total seats available. This could mean that Flipside would have 2/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the oversight committee.

  1. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

Centralization eases the decision-making process by coordinating and implementing changes quickly, but more often than not it can lead to a concentration of power and lack of transparency. On the contrary, decentralization promotes transparency and a democratic decision making process, but may lead to difficulty in coordination and implementations effectively.

We could suggest that introducing another step in the voting process could be effective. In this approach, significant proposals (such as public goods funding or liquidity mining) would undergo a two-step voting process:

  1. A standard delegation phase, where voting power correlates with the number of tokens held by a user, and;
  2. A unique round, during which each user receives only one protocol token.

By implementing this dual-phase voting system, the likelihood of a significant holder exerting undue influence on the vote is minimized, whilst still maintaining optimal efficiency.

Ultimately, there is no best all-in-one approach to tackle this issue. The choice between centralization or decentralization depends on the specific situation, needs, and goals for a community. It is of the utmost importance to be open to feedback and flexible to adapt towards the circumstance.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Issue Overview:
Overview Link 1 3.6k

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hack was brought forward, this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

  1. Full Reimbursement
  2. No Reimbursement
  3. Split Reimbursement
    Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.

The Fei Protocol/Rari Capital hack reimbursement was a controversial incident. We could argue that Fei should be responsible for the damages caused by what might be a purely unintentional mistake for not following the check-effect-interaction pattern when sending a value to an address. It is the right thing to do and this would certainly make everyone happy. However, we do not agree with the means of reimbursement source since it would place the stablecoin at risk. In addition, affected parties should also be aware of the risk that smart contracts pose.

While we believe that the team has done the calculations that would both compensate the user and maintain protocol longevity, we would agree for full reimbursement only if the payment method is replaced (i.e. % of fees given to users weekly; or anything that does not use Fei’s stablecoin operation lifeline). Otherwise, it’s just a short term solution that leads to a long term problem.

Languages I speak and write: English, Hindi, Bahasa Indonesia, Spanish, French, Mandarin, German

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

We currently manage governance delegations for Optimism and dYdX.

Waiver of liability:

By working together with Boiler Blockchain, the club reserves the rights to not be responsible for any kind of harm and losses in relation to the participation in Arbitrum. Arbitrum acknowledges and understands that by delegating to Boiler Blockchain, we will give our best contribution and participate proactively to make this project successful.

Stanley Tejakusuma, Boiler DAO

1153

Name: Donna
0x66F9428417e15d5A29C4d52Db9192e432A4105E3

DAO memberships, votes and proposal

What area are you most interested in contributing to?
IRL Arbitrum community gatherings
Public Goods funding

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
I am a staunch advocate for decentralization, particularly within the realms of DeFi and cryptocurrency. Cryptocurrency empowers stakeholders to govern and direct without relying on external authority, enabling individuals to develop wealth-generating apps, service projects, and life-changing/saving protocols like those within the Arbitrum ecosystem. While only a small fraction of the world’s population is currently invested in crypto, I firmly believe that its benefits should not be restricted to the wealthy. On the contrary, I view crypto as a potent tool for underprivileged and developing countries, capable of serving as a means of payment to address numerous societal challenges. It is imperative to give back to the community and assist those in need, whether through financial support, knowledge sharing, or services, and empower them to help themselves. Furthermore, I believe that fostering connections with the brilliant minds supporting crypto and the Arbitrum ecosystem could significantly accelerate progress. Therefore, as a delegate, I fully endorse a governance system comprised of socially-minded individuals with expertise in finance and the future of the world. Such a system would enhance communication, service and platform development, project onboarding, asset and service sharing with the public, and crisis management if necessary.
Sample Voting Issue 1:

  1. How would you vote?
    For
  2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
    I believe that the proposed partnership with Flipside risks deviating from decentralization and veering towards a more centralized structure, thereby granting excessive control to a single entity. The contention for the limited available seats suggests that the proposal disproportionately benefits privileged stakeholders of Flipside. As a delegate, I would propose modifying the proposal to include multiple partners or empowering Uniswap to veto allocation decisions. Additionally, I would advocate for requiring Flipside to provide regular proof of work, subject to review by Uniswap governance, to determine the continuation of collaboration or the need for alternative steps.
  3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done? While ensuring decentralization remains a central tenet of web3, I acknowledge that during the current developmental stage, certain centralized decisions may be necessary to lay the foundation for a decentralized future. However, such decisions should only be made as a last resort and with a clear focus on advancing decentralization in the long term. Striking a balance in this regard is indeed challenging, but we must delegate some authority in good faith until it is no longer necessary.
  4. Since this is a new space, everyone is taking risks while building and creating, including users who are seeking to profit from the protocols. While web3 projects/companies may offer refunds at their discretion, the responsibility for faults ultimately lies with the protocol. In cases where flaws in Arbitrum’s code lead to exploits, appropriate remedies must be considered. However, such remedies should not come at the expense of the treasury or the Arbitrum community
    5.Languages I speak and write:*
    english
    6.Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:*
    SheDao, BIO Dao, Cannabis Genome DAO
1154

Name: Arbitrum I Turkey (from L2 Planet)

ENS: l2planet.eth

Tally Profile: Tally | l2planet.eth

Areas of Interest;
-Public Goods Funding
-Improving Governance Participation

It is one of the safe areas for rewarding mining in liquidity, and it is one of the frequently used choices for rewarding the community. Since liquidity mining has more than one derivative, the strategies may change according to the periods.

The purpose of DAOs is to ensure the functioning of management and administration in a transparent manner. As a result of the decisions taken thanks to us and our supporters, the funds of people who support Arbitrum may be indirectly affected, just to increase their funds away from the event. When I look at it, I see a chain of responsibility.

How would you vote?
-Against

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

-If there is no balance here, there will not be much difference from one-man management, this balance should be observed.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
-I think the main problem here is the inadequacy of decentralization. First of all, the number of participants should be spread over a more transitional area. By including different factors of voting power among users, the distribution scale can be expanded.

Split Reimbursement;

The choices here have a different significance to me.

The state of the DAO management should always be considered, a full payback period can seriously affect the structure of the DAO.

I do not find it right to pay directly without taking into account different factors, if necessary, a period should be set aside to monitor this.

Languages I speak and write:

Turkish,English and little bit German

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
Even if someone who is far from the subject looks at us and does not see the DAO decisions as necessary, I believe that the work we do is very important and effective. I can make the analogy of a fully functioning restaurant. I promise to do my best.

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Name: Soby

Wallet: 0x9808e45c613eba00ba18fb3d314dc4d4712c4a85

Tally: Tally | Soby

Areas I’m interested in contributing to:
NFT development on Arbitrum
Gaming development on Arbitrum

My stance on overall goals for the DAO:
Broadly speaking to grow the Arbitrum ecosystem through sustainable methods and decisions. Thanks to the DAO receiving sequencer revenue, Arbitrum DAO already has sustainable revenue streams coming in. Key considerations I’ll be making when voting are: will this create a meaningful increase in sequencer revenue, user onboarding, the impact of token emissions, and development of consumer centric applications that will result in an increase of important chain metrics.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  • Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
  • For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
  • This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

I would vote AGAINST

Amendments I’d make: I would either remove the student organizations from these allocation committees or expand them to include groups who I think better represent the interests of the ecosystem. I personally believe too much governance power is given to elite institutions which seems counter to decentralization.
Flipside as a single analytics company has too much power in the proposal as is. I would suggest removing 2 of Flipsides seats on the allocation committee and giving 1 to Dune Analytics and another to the Graph. The oversight committee should also be expanded to just beyond analytics companies in the ecosystem as to provide some check on their actions.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
I think authority sits within token holders hands but we need to delegate/vote for representatives on our behalf so things can get done. I’m a strong believer that we do not need to re-invent corporate governance structures. Electing committees/boards with checks and balances in my opinion is the optimal solution for balancing central authority vs the ability to get things done.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

Split Reimbursement

Hacks and technical exploits are frequent occurrence in crypto. While the average smart contract is much safer than it was a few years ago, protocols can find themselves being tested by blackhats and even state level actors. I believe it is important to consider partial reimbursements in most cases, while full reimbursements in most cases likely cause too much damage or inflation to protocols partial reimbursements should at least be considered at times where full dont. I’d also like to suggest protocols educate whales to consider purchases smart contract insurance. Onchain data supports the stance that majority of TVL is usually due to a small number of users, if those users can hedge their risk adequately then protocols can reasonably issue reimbursements when hacks/exploits happen to majority of token holders.

Languages I speak and write:
English Speak/Write
Punjabi Speak

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

My company Ex Populus works with Offchain Labs.

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Announcement to the Arbitrum community from the governance team at FranklinDAO.

As part of an effort to strengthen our internal organization and operational security, we’re migrating our delegate profile (franklindao.eth) to a hard wallet at 0xCc878369b26127BD4bC1B0B465bC8bE9b92a4c62.

Our old address (0x070341aA5Ed571f0FB2c4a5641409B1A46b4961b) will remain active in protocol governance for the next month until June 15, 2023, so as to give everyone ample time to re-delegate their tokens.

We appreciate all of the holders that have entrusted us with their voting power and look forward to meaningfully improving the projects we all use on your behalf.

We are always accessible via the forums or Twitter @franklin_dao for any questions!

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Name: BlockLand DAO
ENS: blocklanddao.eth
Tally Profile URL: Tally | blocklanddao.eth

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

BlockLand DAO is a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) aiming to bring together a community passionate about the blockchain and crypto industry in Turkey. We operate under the leadership of Tobby Kitty and have more than 6,000 active members. Our aim is to assist each other, participate in various events, and be competent in the field of blockchain and cryptocurrency in Turkey.

  • Improving Governance participation
  • Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

What is a DAO?

A DAO is a community-led organization managed by smart contracts/ off-chain voting, without a central authority. Members make critical decisions such as technical updates and allocations in the treasury by voting on proposals. Alignment of incentives is part of this framework, and members are encouraged to approve proposals that serve the best interests of the protocol.

How does a DAO work?

The rules of a DAO are set by a core team of community members using smart contracts/ off-chain signatures. Funding is usually obtained by issuing tokens/NFTs, and token/NFT holders have proportional voting rights. Once the funding is complete, the DAO is ready for distribution. DAOs can provide grants to various projects and make investments. Voting on these issues depends on the decision of all DAO members, and an effort is made to create a decentralized, transparent, and sustainable environment.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

Against

  • What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

Probably the best thing to do here would be to oppose the proposal but revise it. With the condition of preventing the monopoly of Flipside, it can become possible to provide grants with a more decentralized distribution.

  • How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

We want to believe that most organizations in the field are well-intentioned. But you have to look objectively at everything in this field, as we said, we emphasize the decentralization of DAOs but because Uniswap also needs to use its funds to spread to a larger area, we can consider the possibility of this in smaller grants but in larger grants we expect it to be distributed to different analytical firms, different communities, balance the grant distribution, and reduce the control authority to be given.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Split Reimbursement

The purpose of reimbursement is based on trust and logic. In the FEI RARI hack, if all funds have disappeared and only the governance token is in the treasury, a full refund should definitely not be made because in this case, trying to refund all funds for the victims who have already accepted their risk can result in a bigger disaster.

Therefore, a comprehensive plan should be created for the loss sufferers without victimizing the governance token holders, and a split refund should be made and as we said, you should do this fairly and by preserving the health of the protocol otherwise a full refund does not solve the problem, it complicates things.

Of course, if the protocol is in a situation where it has enough liquid funds to pay the victims, we can certainly expect a refund but whether to pay all the funds or not depends on the situation at the time, if there is not enough liquid fund left in the treasury after the fund paid to the victims, this would not be a very reasonable solution because it would affect the future plans of the protocol, probably the health of the protocol would decrease, and token holders would be victimized.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

BlockLand DAO has no conflict of interest. We only have partnerships with projects that we share transparently with our community. We are committed to acting in line with the interests of Arbitrum and our delegates and will not engage in any activity that could jeopardize our integrity or the trust of our community.

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Chronos Exchange

0xe0eb3609bed5487ce8f44d162e2acd523c77e336

www.tally.xyz/profile/0xe0eb3609bed5487ce8f44d162e2acd523c77e336

Areas we are most interested in contributing to:

  • DeFi Development on Arbitrum
  • Public Goods Funding

As the network’s governing body, Arbitrum DAO’s focus should be on supporting programs, designing initiatives, and making decisions that affect the network as a whole, but that are outside of the scope of the individual network participants. The DAO is neither a rule-making nor a rule-enforcing body, and it should have no ability to restrict, control, eliminate, or in any way hinder growth and innovation on the network. Furthermore, it should have no ability to offer incentives in a way that creates an unfair advantage for any individual or individual type of network participant.

The DAO’s activities should be limited to network-wide improvements in the form of infrastructure upgrades, digital “public-goods” and other services, and open, publicly-agreed upon and auditable incentives that are designed to equitably benefit all ecosystem participants as well as attract new participants to the network.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1.1 Against

1.2 It is clear that the reason for the contention is due to the perception of a conflict of interest, moreso than the value of the Flipside service. As it stands, it certainly seems that the path for Flipside to reach a simple majority is far too easy; they only require one sympathetic vote on both the Allocation and Oversight Committees to pass measures; even in the case that the committees were to behave perfectly ethically, we think there would always be tension created due to the ease with which the vote could be skewed in Flipside’s favor.
In this case, we would recommend reducing Flipside’s representation in the Allocation Committee to no more than 2 out of 5. We would also recommend increasing the Oversight Committee to 5 total members, with Flipside’s representation being no more than 1.

1.3 Decentralization is by no means a requirement for an organization. There are a variety of reasons that an organization may choose to centralize its decision making; as long as the organization is forthright about this, we see no issue. However, if an organization purports itself to be decentralized (or to have a decentralized governance process), then we feel that the organization should adhere to whatever rules and definitions it has put in place for itself.
In general, we feel that the decision whether, and to what degree, an organization relies on its members for making decisions should be well-understood and transparent. Whether this is communicated clearly in the organization’s bylaws, whether it emerges naturally as the result of defining roles for participants within the organization, or whether it is generally understood based on the parameters for making and passing proposals will differ from one organization to the next. In general, however, the level of decentralization should, in most cases, be supported by free market activity of the participants. If, for example, participants feel they are not being represented proportionally in the decision-making process, and do not feel that they have a reasonable avenue for increasing their level of engagement, they should have the right to demonstrate their dissatisfaction by selling tokens and exiting the DAO at any time and without penalty.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

2.1 No Reimbursement

2.2 In general, I’m opposed to refunds or reimbursements following an exploit. In almost all cases, these sorts of reimbursement plans lead to a “race for the exits” among investors anyways, which results in further harm to the protocol and holders; a reimbursement is only a reimbursement for those who manage to sell first.

Part of the reason that crypto investors enjoy such outsized returns is because of the inherent risks involved with deploying capital into nascent, often experimental protocols. Unless it can be proven that a hack is the result of malicious intent on the part of the development team (inside job), then a hack is something for which the team is a victim as well; there should be no expectation that the victims of an exploit compensate other victims of the same exploit.

However, in the event that funds are able to be recovered, every effort should be made to do so, and to compensate the victims of the hack accordingly.

Languages We Speak and Write:

  • English
  • Spanish

Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest:

At this time, we are aware of no conflicts of interest that would keep us from voting in a way that is impartial and in the best interests of the Arbitrum Network as a whole. We affirm that we are neutral parties, and are not subject to undue influence by any external party or organization.

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Name: Honey Labs on Behalf of the Honey DAO

Wallet Address or ENS: http://honeyprotocol.eth (or 0xBBf376fAA11aA40dDb71aB5Ac69350f61e918Ccb)

Tally Profile URL :Tally | Honey.finance

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

NFT development on Arbitrum

DeFi development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

The DAO should be at the center and heart of an ecosystem. It is a democratic and fair way to grow and develop a financial system and protocol completely enchain.

The DAO should have the ability to govern over everything, as well as appoint trusted members of the community to committees or positions of power to move with more speed (DAOs tend to have a slower decision making process then an individual).

The goal of any DAO should be to develop a powerful community, returning value to its members. It should have incentives to push members to contribute to its growth and reward those that bring the DAO closer to its goals.

The DAO in our opinion is one of the most powerful tools for the individual and community in modern times.

Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Sample Voting Issue 1:

Issue Overview 896

Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.

For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.

This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

How would you vote?

Against

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

We would amend the proposal to remove the oversight committee seat (putting it up to a vote from the DAO).

We would also look to give flip side 1 seat on the allocation committee ( as they were running a majority of the infrastructure as per the governance proposal) and have the other two seats be open to other analytics providers by means of a vote.

Flipside could end up being all of the votes but they should be voted in not appointed. A DAO must govern, and these committees should be put on a 12 month revue should things change in community sentiment.

Uniswap is one of the major pillars of DeFi and their investment program is even more important! However no one group should have concentrated power over this fund.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

I personally believe that with the proper financial, social, and strategic incentives people can be more or less inclined to “get things done.” Flipside would have received a majority of the traffic for these bounties. Members of the Uniswap DAO should decide if this is sufficient incentive for Flipside.

If it doesn’t end up being enough and flip side does not wish to setup this bounty system with an investment fund. They most likely aren’t the right partner with the DAO and someone will step up to fill that gap. If nobody does in time, the incentives should be reviewed and re-proposed.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Issue Overview:

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

Full Reimbursement

Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.

We believe that it is always important to return the voice to the members of the DAO. Should the members decide that it is best to reimburse the victims of a hack this is what should occur, without cause for a second vote.

As $FEI was a stable coin I believe that this puts the protocol in a peculiar position. As issuers of the stable-coin I believe that it is your duty to always allow holders of your token to redeem as much value as possible (up to parity) in the event of an attack. Normally I wouldn’t vote to repay the lost funds as this is the inherit risk we choose every day when we enter the world of DeFi. We are pioneers in this new financial space, we profit from the risk we take but are not immune to loses and pitfalls.

In the end it comes down to what the protocol itself stated. Should this be any other DeFi products, take Aave lending pools, Uniswap LPs, or even NFT marketplaces such as Opensea we as their users take on risk.

As we all expected the American government to make depositors whole (one shouldn’t have to worry about depositing cash in a bank! Right?), it is only right that the protocol allows redemptions for the FEI token, and to make users whole.

What they do with the remaining cash is up to the members of the DAO. They can look to also redeem TRIBE tokens for the remainder of the value and sunset the protocol, or look to build back up again, stronger.

Languages we speak and write:

  • English, French, Spanish, Dutch, Italian, Norwegian.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

  • We have no conflicts of Interest. The DAO and Honey Labs do not hold $ARB.
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Our updated Arbitrum delegation address is

arb1:0x11cd09a0c5B1dc674615783b0772a9bFD53e3A8F

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1161

Name: Petko Yankov

Wallet Address or ENS: 0x7d545f040190fE710F86402ef52d502d00809132

Tally Profile URL: https://www.tally.xyz/profile/0x7d545f040190fe710f86402ef52d502d00809132

Hi, My name is Petko, I am passionate about decentralization and social entrepreneurship .
I have been involved with web3 since 2020, currently working and study crypto technology. I have been fully supporting Arbitrum and its ecosystem since the start, and are looking forward to further boosting its development.

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

  • Public Goods funding
  • Supporting Infrastructure
  • Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

The ArbitrumDAO is tasked with the critical role of sustainably developing and growing the Arbitrum ecosystem while embodying the community values stated in the Constitution.

Liquidity, for example, is a critical factor for any chain/L2, as it benefits all the projects deployed and kickstarts a positive flywheel that attracts more developers, users, and funds.
Traditional forms of liquidity mining, however, have proven to be very short-sighted and to attract only mercenaries. Considering that Arbitrum is already leading the L2 ecosystems in terms of value and liquidity attracted on the chain, smarter mechanisms that use incentives to attract long-term liquidity and to further distribute the governance power can be designed to join sustainability and liquidity targets.

Sample Voting Issue 1: Uniswap & Flipside

How would you vote? Against

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any? I believe any protocol that wants to act as public good needs to maintain a high degree of objectivity and neutrality.
If the choice falls between 2 (or more) protocols where the differences can be attributed to objective factors such as their technology or their values (for example, where one is centralized and the other is focused on trust-minimization), then it’s fair to select only one entity.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

Analyze in depth, research and act.

Sample Voting Issue 2: FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement:

Full Reimbursement
I believe a DAO and its protocol are ultimately responsible for the safety of its users.
In case of a hack, it is the responsibility of the DAO to wholly refund users whenever possible, especially in these early stages of the industry.

If treasury funds are not enough to repay users, then new mechanisms can be designed (vesting system, fee-driven refunds) with the objective of creating an income stream for those affected.

Languages I speak and write: Bulgarian, English, Russian

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

I don’t have any conflicts of interest that would prevent me from using your best judgement to operate in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem.

1 Like
1162

Name: (Individual)
Amber

ENS: abuchtela.eth
0x0B58857708a6f84e7EE04BEAEF069a7E6D1D4A0b

Tally: abuchtela

Areas of interest:
*community involvement
*expanding ecosystem

  • Public goods funding
  • DeFi development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
First the purpose of a DAO is to allow for the healthy and decentralised development of the rollup.
And I believe that’s was essentially the goal
Sample Voting Issue 1
Vote : for
Sample Voting Issue 2
Split reimbursement because essentially you do acknowledge there are “risk” involved when putting your money out there “but” you should have trust in that you would be reimbursed due to no fault of your own.
Languages I speak and write - English

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A. Name (organization or individual): Savvy DAO (Organization)

B. Wallet Address or ENS: savvy-treasury-arbitrum 0x4f54Cab19B61138e3c622a0bD671C687481eC030

C. Tally Profile URL: Tally | @SavvyDeFi

D. What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

  • DeFi development on Arbitrum
  • Improving Governance participation

E. Stance on “Overall Goals for the Arbitrum DAO”:
The Arbitrum DAO should champion progressive decentralization, echoing our ethos. These are based on the Savvy DAO Guidelines (Commonwealth) where we aim to cultivate an environment where self-regulation thrives through both on-chain and off-chain avenues.

  1. Empower the Community: Emphasize community-driven proposals and voting, ensuring every member feels integral to the DAO’s direction.
  2. Sustainable Incentivization: Prioritize long-term ecosystem growth over traditional liquidity mining, aligning with the broader vision of the Arbitrum chain.
  3. Collaboration Over Competition: Foster synergy and collaboration, leveraging the collective strength of the Arbitrum chain.
  4. Innovation and Technical Excellence: Stay at the cutting edge, from integrating new layers to supporting diverse programming languages.
  5. Holistic Ecosystem Growth: Beyond incentives, focus on projects that contribute to the Arbitrum ecosystem’s comprehensive growth, weighing each decision against its long-term impact.

In essence, the Arbitrum DAO should be a beacon of innovation, growth, and collaboration, inviting all to partake in shaping the future of the Arbitrum chain.

F. Sample Voting Issue 1:

How would you vote?
Against

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
Drawing from the collective insights of the delegates, I’d propose reducing Flipside’s seats on the allocation committee and expanding the oversight committee to five seats, retaining Flipside’s single seat. This ensures a balanced representation without giving undue influence to one entity. Additionally, a staggered rotation for electing members to the committees would be introduced, allowing the community to reassess and make changes as needed.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
The essence of a DAO is decentralization. While efficiency is crucial, it shouldn’t come at the cost of centralizing power. Introducing layers of delegation, periodic elections, and activity requirements can strike a balance. Delegation with accountability ensures that while tasks are efficiently executed, the broader community’s interests remain at the forefront.

G. Sample Voting Issue 2:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
Full Reimbursement

Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.
The DAO’s decisions should be binding and consistent. If a vote for reimbursement was ratified, it’s essential to uphold that decision to maintain trust within the community. However, it’s also crucial to set clear precedents. While early adopters and supporters should be protected, it’s vital to ensure that the DAO doesn’t set an expectation of risk-free returns. Compensation mechanisms, like debt-like instruments or vested tokens, can be explored to align long-term interests and ensure the platform’s continued success post-incident.

H. Languages we Speak and Write:

Savvy DAO has members from all over the world that are fluent in the following languages:

  • English
  • Spanish
  • Russian
  • Arabic
  • Hindi

Savvy DAO’s Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest Answer:

Savvy DAO is a decentralized organization with a foundational commitment to the Arbitrum ecosystem. Our operations and growth are deeply intertwined with the success of Arbitrum, and our primary objective is to enhance its decentralized and community-driven nature. As a DAO, our decisions are made through our multisig treasury wallet, which requires a consensus among signers. Furthermore, our vast community of $SVY token holders, who are also active Arbitrum users, play a pivotal role in shaping our stance on various proposals. This is achieved through both formal voting mechanisms and informal community feedback channels. While we are dedicated to the Arbitrum ecosystem, we ensure that our decisions are made without bias and in the best interest of the broader Arbitrum community. We are, first and foremost, representatives of this community.

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