Name (organization or individual)
Boiler DAO (Purdue University)
Wallet Address or ENS
eth:0x2345F4E0CdF00D427D773413Dd4617d0156c29A9
Tally Profile URL To be updated (we are having issues with Tally for profile creation through multisig)
What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:
- Improving Governance participation
- IRL Arbitrum community gatherings
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
eg â how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?
A DAO represents one of the first company-like structures that prioritizes distributing control rather than concentrating it. In our opinion, the key objective of a DAO is to maintain this decentralized manner, striving for a fully or nearly fully distributed structure.
It can be argued that additional activities, such as fostering a robust community, offering a platform for constructive discussions, and enabling profit through liquidity mining, are the byproducts stemming from the establishment of a decentralized DAO.
While Arbitrum may profit from engaging in liquidity mining, the intensity of this approach depends on the overall risk tolerance of the Arbitrum DAO. Boiler Blockchain, being a DAO itself, cannot accurately determine the exact risk appetite for Arbitrumâs DAO. Nevertheless, if the community opts to pursue liquidity mining, the DAO should maintain maximum transparency and openness (e.g., disclosing the percentage of the treasury allocated for liquidity mining, the expenses or tokens awarded to project users participating in the $ARB pool, etc).
Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:
Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview 1.3k
- Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
- For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
- This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.
Prompts to Answer:
- How would you vote?
For
- What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
The proposal needs to consider two factors: committee structure, and the value of the proposal itself. Based on the proposal, Uniswap will rely heavily on Flipside to manage the payout of $UNI for bounties. However, this would pose a problem since Flipside would have a 4/10 or 2/5 voting power of the total $25M.
This exact problem is another common dilemma the DeFi community faces. We believe that lack of competition is the issue here. If there were multiple service providers that would bid on the right to attain a position to control this program, it could have been a much better situation overall.
A possible solution to the lack of competition while being dependent on Flipside to be the âmajorâ decision maker is to reduce its voting power to a maximum of 1/3 of the total seats available. This could mean that Flipside would have 2/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the oversight committee.
- How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
Centralization eases the decision-making process by coordinating and implementing changes quickly, but more often than not it can lead to a concentration of power and lack of transparency. On the contrary, decentralization promotes transparency and a democratic decision making process, but may lead to difficulty in coordination and implementations effectively.
We could suggest that introducing another step in the voting process could be effective. In this approach, significant proposals (such as public goods funding or liquidity mining) would undergo a two-step voting process:
- A standard delegation phase, where voting power correlates with the number of tokens held by a user, and;
- A unique round, during which each user receives only one protocol token.
By implementing this dual-phase voting system, the likelihood of a significant holder exerting undue influence on the vote is minimized, whilst still maintaining optimal efficiency.
Ultimately, there is no best all-in-one approach to tackle this issue. The choice between centralization or decentralization depends on the specific situation, needs, and goals for a community. It is of the utmost importance to be open to feedback and flexible to adapt towards the circumstance.
Sample Voting Issue 2:
Issue Overview:
Overview Link 1 3.6k
FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hack was brought forward, this time it was not passed.
Prompts to Answer:
Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)
- Full Reimbursement
- No Reimbursement
- Split Reimbursement
Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.
The Fei Protocol/Rari Capital hack reimbursement was a controversial incident. We could argue that Fei should be responsible for the damages caused by what might be a purely unintentional mistake for not following the check-effect-interaction pattern when sending a value to an address. It is the right thing to do and this would certainly make everyone happy. However, we do not agree with the means of reimbursement source since it would place the stablecoin at risk. In addition, affected parties should also be aware of the risk that smart contracts pose.
While we believe that the team has done the calculations that would both compensate the user and maintain protocol longevity, we would agree for full reimbursement only if the payment method is replaced (i.e. % of fees given to users weekly; or anything that does not use Feiâs stablecoin operation lifeline). Otherwise, itâs just a short term solution that leads to a long term problem.
Languages I speak and write: English, Hindi, Bahasa Indonesia, Spanish, French, Mandarin, German
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
We currently manage governance delegations for Optimism and dYdX.
Waiver of liability:
By working together with Boiler Blockchain, the club reserves the rights to not be responsible for any kind of harm and losses in relation to the participation in Arbitrum. Arbitrum acknowledges and understands that by delegating to Boiler Blockchain, we will give our best contribution and participate proactively to make this project successful.
Stanley Tejakusuma, Boiler DAO