Feel free to share your questions or comments about the new iteration of the Delegate Incentive Program in this thread.
All contributions here will serve as a resource for shaping the “Bible” of the DIP v1.5.
Feel free to share your questions or comments about the new iteration of the Delegate Incentive Program in this thread.
All contributions here will serve as a resource for shaping the “Bible” of the DIP v1.5.
Hey, I have a question regarding Shielded voting on Snapshot. Should a delegate disclose on the forum what they voted for, if the vote is shielded? It kind of defeats the purpose of a secret vote then
I haven’t disclosed it, as like you said it wouldn’t make sense. But still should be considered a rationale
Hi guys
As @EzR3aL said, we won’t ask anybody to disclose who has voted for, but we will still ask for the Rationale.
On a separate note: Votes are visible now because the encryption ends at the same time as the voting.
I think Entropy gave an explanation on this.
They thought there was no problem with expressing one’s opinion on the secret vote, because it could encourage other delegates to learn new arguments and make a better decision.
The purpose of secret voting, it seems to me, is to hide the overall result, not its components (it can be assembled into a whole, but any delegate can change their vote during the voting)
I have a question regarding the Delegates Feedback parameter. In the Karma dashboard for delegate compensation, it says that this parameter considers a “Presence in discussion multiplier”. However, given the subjective approach of qualifying the variables, if a delegate comments too often, there is a bigger probability of obtaining a lower score. I see some delegates with 4 valid posts getting a score of 19.5 while other delegates commented in 14 threads obtaining only 14.02. Wouldn’t commenting less often be detrimental to the spirit of the program which is supposed to incentivize delegate participation?
I would also like to know what considerations are taken to qualify some comments with a score of zero instead of just marking them as invalid. If marked invalid, the score is unaffected, if marked with a zero, this lowers the average score.
Since the Delegate Feedback parameter consists of 30 points weight, I believe this is an important part to communicate to delegates so that they can avoid malpractices further down.
I can only imagine the amount of work to keep this initiative rolling, thanks for your work @SEEDGov, and thanks for your attention!
Cheers.
Hey @Juanrah, thanks for your questions.
As the proposal explains, a delegate can achieve a better score with fewer comments because the Delegate Feedback parameter prioritizes QUALITY over QUANTITY.
The purpose of the rubric is to encourage delegates to provide feedback only when they have something valuable to contribute, rather than trying to game the program. If a delegate attempts to increase their “Presence in discussions” multiplier with low-value comments, their score will likely be negatively impacted.
On the other hand, if a delegate offers meaningful contributions, his score will reflect that, and the multiplier will reward them accordingly. This could position him above another delegate who provides equally good feedback but participates in fewer discussions.
It’s important to note that this is the first month of this system. There are still details to refine, and we’ve already started working on improvements for this specific parameter. We’re committed to iterating on the program to perfect the framework as much as possible.
Comments marked as invalid could be due to:
Comments marked as valid but scored with zero are those that the program administrator deems irrelevant to the discussion. As you pointed out, this negatively impacts the scoring. The goal is to discourage spammy, repetitive, or shallow comments—such as those generated using AI tools.
To this end, we remind delegates that while a comment may have good “timing” and “clarity,” the merit of feedback lies in its relevance and reasoning. To improve scores, we recommend:
We completely agree with your point. All participants in the program have the opportunity to inquire about the scoring criteria and receive guidance on areas for improvement.
That said, we’re currently working on the DIP “Bible” and expect it to be ready later this month. This document will consolidate the best practices expected from delegates and include all relevant information about the DIP—both from version 1.0 and the updates in 1.5.
Hey @SEEDGov, I have some questions.
Is this still relevant for DIP v1.5?
If the DIP application has been approved, is it necessary to send data for KYC?
And say please: how long must the delegate have >50k ARB voting power?
Is this still also relevant for DIP v1.5?
Please, answer the questions above
And I have one question more about CR.
Communicating Rationale - is the reason why we vote this way, which we write during voting in the window where we sign the transaction? Or should we have a reason why we vote on the forum under the proposal and not in the window where we sign the transaction?
Hi Daniel, sorry our late replies. Will be tackling your questions right now:
Yes this is. KYC is only needed after a delegates qualifies to receive compensations. We don’t ask delegates to do compliance before that to avoid the unnecessary ones.
This is still relevant. According to the 1.5 proposal, things not specified in the 1.5 remain the same as in 1.0.
Communication Rationale can be described as -the justification of your vote-. It can be posted on both the forum or Snapshot/Tally. However, it’s important to clarify that we’ll be looking for is quality rationales and not plane answers.
Thanks @SEEDGov for this update [DIP v1.60] Updates Thread - #3 by SEEDGov
I appreciate your contribution to the ongoing improvement of the Delegate program. I have carefully read the new post and have some feedback.
It seems to me that the introduction of a coefficient will lead to the fact that delegates who have less than 500k ARB (because every 500K give you only +1,5 points) will be forced to write a lot of comments in order to score 17 points and receive compensation. Wouldn’t such a division lead to even more empty comments - exactly what we wanted to avoid?
If earlier comments did not have such a strong influence on reaching the threshold of 65 scores, today for small delegates they will be vitally important, which is why there may be too many feedbacks that do not bring any value.
I have an idea. If we increase compensation by 7 times and only for those delegates of DIP who have a voting power of less than 1 million. Then we will not have to wait 7 years
Please, leave a link to telegram.
Thanks in advance for your answers!
@danielM reach out to me on Telegram @paulofonseca1987 to get into the Arbitrum Delegates private telegram group, where we have a topic dedicated to the DIP.
Hey Daniel, thanks for your feedback!
The thing is:
More comments ≠ a better score (unless all your comments are good). Remember that the Delegates’ Feedback parameter doesn’t depend on the quantity of comments but on their quality. In practice, posting many comments can be counterproductive for the scoring if they are of low quality since the Delegates’ Feedback score is an average of all comments.
Earlier comments only have influence or impact if they’re good. Not the opposite. If your comment was early + generated changes in the proposal or addressed a real issue, then you’ll have a good score and then there’s a high chance of you reaching the 65 points threshold (if you’re also voting everything).
About v.1.60
In fact, we have top 10 delegates with more than 130 million ARB.
This means that the assumption that top 50 delegates will have about 200 million ARB is not entirely correct.
We need to assume that the remaining 40 delegates must collect at least
200-130 = 70 million ARB
This means that the maximum value for the coefficient in the formula should be
70/40 = 1.75 million ARB
If we count a larger number (for example, top 20), the amount will be even less.
The end result is a system where active delegates with a small amount of VP cannot physically reach Tier 1, but delegates with a lot of VP can skip a few votes and still remain in Tier 1.
So the principle that with great power comes great responsibility does not work for top delegates.
Of course, I have a conflict of interest in this matter, but it seems to me that:
They have enough funds for their activities and motivation of several thousand dollars does not help to make them act.
Hi @cp0x,
First of all, thanks for your feedback.
In this case, it is not a specific “assumption” per se, but rather a theoretical scenario used to establish a cap.
The idea is something like: If the DIP had 50 delegates in the program with an average of 4M ARB each, it could facilitate the DAO reaching the constitutional quorum.
This implies that those below this threshold should get (in some way) more VP to generate a meaningful impact on the DAO through their voting activity.
As for those above this threshold, it’s important to consider that not all of them participate in the program. Additionally, relying on this data to define the cap could be counterproductive if there are significant shifts in VP distribution.
For this reason, it is more practical to imagine a scenario based on an average VP that benefits the DAO. It also serves as a target—if we had 50 delegates with 4M ARB each (even without considering those exceeding this amount), the DAO would be close to reaching the constitutional quorum without relying on “whales.”
Under the new structure, a small delegate with 50K VP can reach Tier 1:
Total Points (TP): 92.4
Additionally, small delegates can also receive BP for outstanding contributions.
Any delegate aiming for Tier 1 must actively contribute to the forum even if they vote on everything. A big delegate who votes on everything will still need 30 DF points in addition to reach Tier 1. If they skip votes, that gap widens.
Our goal is for Tier 1 to be reserved for excellence and a high level of commitment.
What is this claim based on?
From our side, we have received feedback from big delegates confirming that the budget is useful—whether for hiring an assistant or dedicating more time to Arbitrum. In fact, since the approval of version 1.5 with improved incentives, large delegations have joined, which contradicts this claim.
Continuous review is necessary to improve the program step by step—especially considering it lasts for an entire year. As far as we understand, nothing has changed for delegates in terms of their responsibilities: they still need to vote, engage in discussions, and participate in the DAO as they always have. The only difference is in how they are evaluated and rewarded.
It’s important to understand that most of the complexity is handled by the PM, and ideally, delegates should be able to abstract themselves from it and avoid overanalyzing the framework.
That said, stability is ensured through the implementation of three tiers, each with a fixed USD-denominated compensation range. Additionally, since large delegates have not experienced major changes in the scoring methodology, we believe they will still be able to hire personnel if necessary.
Also, if we, as PMs, had to put every adjustment to a vote or public consultation, we would face unnecessary bureaucracy and an undesirable overload of delegates. They would need to analyze and decide on every minor adjustment—time that would be better spent providing insights on other proposals. A committee would lead to a similar outcome, making the process even more costly. (It is worth mentioning that the DAO has given us the mandate as PM to make these adjustments only by giving notice in the forum as we have been doing).
Finally, it’s worth noting that any delegate is free to propose a vote on any parameter included in the DIP (this almost happened last week). If there is a strong sentiment from the DAO regarding the need for a specific change within the framework we will be happy to implement it.
Thanks for the detailed response!
Even though I disagree with you on some points, I like that we can discuss it here honestly and openly.
Hello @SEEDGov!
I know that at least @Gianluca @MinistroDolar and @axlvaz_SEEDLATAM.eth are part of your team, correct?
But could you clarify who are the individuals from your team that are working on the DIP program?
Specifically the ones that are responsible for the more qualitative part of the assessment, that determine the scores of the Delegate Feedback and the awarding of Bonus Points?
Hey Paulo!
Yes, that’s correct. We also onboarded Suka and there are more people involved with the Delegation.
@Gianluca is the main responsible for the more qualitative part of the assessment, which determines the scores of the Delegates’ Feedback and the awarding of Bonus Points. The rest of the team usually acts as a consultant if needed in this regard, so in the end, evaluations are usually the result of collective deliberation by the team.
Hello @SEEDGov.
For January I will receive my first compensation for DIP. I would like to know more information about KYC process.
Thanks in advance for answers!
Hello! I’m putting this in here as there was a few discussions about this topic in this thread. I want to put here in the forum the same feedback I presented in the Delegates TG about the VP multiplier:
While I understand the reasoning of wanting to tie VP with any type of metric within the program, the actual introduction of this metric created a “penalty” to delegates with lower VP, with the logic this would be the most cost-effective option.
While I can’t argue against this, as lowering the scores of the delegates will indeed lower the cost of the program, a better alternative to “incentivize” or “reward” delegates that have a higher VP (by being able to convince more holders to delegates to them) would be to introduce the multiplier starting at x1 and going up to x1.2, for instance.
That way, you keep analysing the delegates by their contributions/votes (without slashing) and introduces a bonus to the ones that have a higher VP.