[DIP v1.6] Delegate Incentive Program Results (February 2025)

[SEEDGov]

Hey @chamadao

@chamadao

Stylus budget: Said it was far too expensive and made suggestions about how better to propose these large budgets in the future.

We would like to quote your rationale in this case:

@chamadao

There were no clear deliverables and goals, which is why we voted against then. Now, there is a further proposal to extend the budget. This suggests there was no clear budget as well for the original program. This is not how the DAO should be spending funds, and is another example of what we have been regularly saying: “too much spending with too little impact.”

We are voting AGAINST this proposal.

There are several points to consider:

• The analysis lacks depth. This is a grant program for builders. Stating that “there was no clear budget because more funds are being requested” is reductive. The proposer explicitly mentioned that the grant demand exceeded initial expectations and that the original budget was simply insufficient to cover the high-quality applications received.
• We do not understand the claim that “there were no clear deliverables and goals.” Just by reading the proposal, its objectives become evident. In this case, the deliverables are even clearer than in the original proposal (back then, it was impossible to define them as the specific projects to be funded were unknown—this is where we highlight the lack of analysis).
• It is also important to consider that this was comment number 55 in the post. By that point, many other delegates had already raised budget-related questions, and the proposer had addressed them. Given this, we do not see the impact of this comment on the decision-making process.

A similar pattern is seen in other cases. For example, in the OpCo proposal, an unreasonable comparison is made (AAVE vs. Arbitrum), considering that Arbitrum is a blockchain while AAVE is an application. Additionally, leaving aside that the rationale was posted in an old thread, the budget concerns had already been raised (and addressed by the proposer) multiple times over the past few months in that discussion.

@chamadao

Further we have joined a large number of calls including GRCs, open discussions, the Arbitrum Audit call, and the general DAO calls where we participate and provide feedback on proposals. However, we have just 1.25 bonus points (seems to be counted for attending two calls) and none of that work is applied to the delegate feedback section.

We noticed that you disputed the calls last month, and we responded, so we will quote our previous answer:

@SEEDGov

Hi @chamadao

Currently only the following calls award Bonus Points:

@SEEDGov

Additionally, Bonus Points were awarded to several delegates for their attendance at the “Arbitrum Governance Report Calls” and the “Open Discussion of Proposal(s) - Bi-weekly Governance Call.”

• For the GRC calls, 1,25% BP will be awarded for each attendance.

• For the Open Discussion of Proposal(s) - Bi-weekly Governance calls, 1.25% BP will be awarded for attending each call.

This was established at the time of voting on the proposal on Tally and then the allocated percentage per call was modified in this announcement.

We are aware that there is more activity beyond these two calls and we are currently looking for alternatives to make the framework as comprehensive as possible.

@chamadao

It just seems very hard to know what is getting counted here and not, and which proposals/threads to focus on during a month as often the proposal discussions spans across many weeks.

We remind you that you have access to the DIP Bible, which will help you better understand the current framework.

Additionally, we find this statement somewhat curious. It is not the responsibility of the PM to tell you which threads to focus on during the month since ALL DISCUSSIONS IN THE FORUM are considered within the framework. You should focus on engaging in those where you feel you can provide a unique and valuable perspective capable of impacting the decision-making process. This should happen organically—otherwise, we would be encouraging participation in threads solely to obtain scoring in the program.

@chamadao

We understand there was some change to the scoring again, but going from full. marks last month to 0 this month doesn’t make sense, especially when we have increased our participation in the DAO this month.

We do not understand this statement. Last month, you obtained 7.5 out of 30 points in DF. The reason you obtained the full 10 points in CR is that rationales were not being evaluated qualitatively; rather, it was simply required to “complete the task.”

@chamadao

It has been very difficult as a small delegate and a team that has limited resources when trying to participate in the DAO. We spend a lot of time doing calls, writing feedback responses, and keeping up on the latest. Not to mention voting and the rest. It seems really bad incentives to then penalize the small delegates with less voting power and reward very large delegates who likely have more resources, etc. to participate because they are at large companies or are “professional delegate” organizations.

We disagree with the claim that is difficult for small delegates to participate in the DAO and receive compensation. Looking at this month’s results, 12 out of 24 incentivized delegates have less than 1M VP (and 10 of them have less than 100,000 ARB)

In fact, two individuals who participate in the DAO alone—without employees or external help—are in the Top 3. This demonstrates that if enough time is dedicated to Arbitrum, it is possible to be among the top delegates of the month.

@chamadao

The system before made some sense because if you voted on 100% of items in the month, you could get the minimum score needed for compensation.

This was precisely one of the issues with the previous framework. Currently, chamadao has 61,690 ARB delegated. If the DAO had to pay the base compensation (3k) to every delegate with this amount of VP just for voting and justifying votes, about 2,000 delegates would be needed to reach the quorum on a non-constitutional proposal. This would cost approximately $6,000,000 monthly.

The key point is that small delegates do not significantly impact the DAO’s ability to reach quorum. This is why it makes sense to expect other types of contributions from them and why is not enough for them to qualify to receive incentives only by voting and justifying their votes

As a suggestion for the future, we have noticed that most of your interactions in discussions come after dozens of comments from other delegates. A better approach might be to spend additional time keeping up with the forum so that you can engage earlier in discussions and provide insights that have not yet been mentioned.

—–

A Final Note to All Delegates:

It is true that the framework has become more demanding, but the goal of this change is for Arbitrum to succeed. To achieve this, we all must raise our level of commitment.

Raising the bar means setting higher standards of participation. This is a natural progression in any organization. To prevent Arbitrum from stagnating against its competitors, delegates must push themselves to improve, even if this leads to challenging adjustments.

Additionally, the DIP should not be isolated from the current context. In recent weeks, a strong narrative against excessive and inefficient spending has gained traction, which we support. In this sense, the DIP must naturally evolve into a program that supports professional delegates who are willing to dedicate as much time as possible to ensuring Arbitrum’s success.

We acknowledge that the process is not simple. The framework has changed, and we have worked to reduce friction through documentation and ongoing communication with delegates. SEEDGov is open to suggestions for improving the framework, and we have already received several in the dedicated thread.