Delegate address: 0x28341f64084e4dc4e5ca51b749d32340f294f46e
Forum Usernames: @GensDAO
Oct. 24
Arbitrum Token Swap Pilot Program
Proposal: (Snapshot)
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote AGAINST this proposal.
Premise: The 3-month lock-up on swapped tokens seems insufficient to secure long-term stability. Also, the incoming tokens may lack the robustness of ARB, meaning potential risks to the DAO treasury. Given the brief monitoring phase, we remain unconvinced of this proposal’s capacity to deliver sustainable value.
Nov.24
Adopt a Delegate Code of Conduct & Formalize Operations
Proposal: Snapshot
Decision: After consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote IN FAVOR of this proposal.
Premise: We believe that adopting a Delegate Code of Conduct is essential for enhancing professionalism and integrity within ArbitrumDAO, which is what we aspire to achieve as a community.
Establishing a DAO Events Budget for 2025
Proposal: Tally | Arbitrum | Establishing a DAO Events Budget for 2025
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote IN FAVOR of this proposal.
Premise: At GENS Collective, we support the proposal not only because we know how useful events are on both an advertising and community level, but mainly because of the transparency and responsibility shown in the proposal. The promise of post-event expense reports is what ultimately convinced us to vote in favor.
Arbitrum Research & Development Collective
Proposal: Tally | Arbitrum | (V2) Arbitrum Research & Development Collective
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote IN FAVOR this proposal.
Premise: We support this proposal due to the success of the first phase, which positively impacted the ecosystem. The team has demonstrated merit and deserves renewal.
Treasury Management v1.2
Proposal: [Snapshot ]
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote AGAINST this proposal.
Premise: Considering the number of players in the Arbitrum ecosystem engaged in Treasury Management, we believe that the expert committee should be broader and have a greater plurality of voices on it. The proposal combines the creation of new initiatives with specific appointments and, as it stands, presents a number of unresolved operational risks. In the absence of further details, is why we vote against it.
Restitution For Extensively Delayed ArbitrumDAO Minigrant Winners
Proposal: Snapshot
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote AGAINST this proposal.
Premise: We are unable to accept this proposal because it identifies fundamental issues with the programme. A significant number of suspicious applications were identified, many of which appeared to have been created for the sole purpose of accessing funds without providing tangible value. Furthermore, the judge selection process was insufficiently rigorous, enabling individuals without the requisite qualifications to become judges, which created opportunities for Sybil attacks. While some projects may be legitimate, it is not feasible to verify their legitimacy after such a lengthy period. Rather than allocating funds indiscriminately, we believe it is wiser to protect the integrity of the DAO.
Hackathon Continuation Program
Proposal: Snapshot
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote IN FAVOUR (yes onchain) this proposal.
Premise: This programme helps Arbitrum create long-term value from short-term successes like hackathons. Hackathons are good for attracting talent and ideas, but often lack support for turning concepts into projects. This is addressed by providing follow-up and support.
It also shows the value of supporting projects at the start. If done well, this will strengthen the Arbitrum ecosystem and help projects in the network succeed.
Dec.24
[Non-consitutional] User Research: Why build on Arbitrum?
Proposal: https://snapshot.org/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x107fc8aecc6054725266830cd9097b7ff71f632c708c5ca39e58c5be88f46f14
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote AGAINST this proposal.
Premise: While the proposal demonstrates good intentions and a commendable focus on understanding the builder ecosystem, it falters on several fronts. Below, we outline the key areas that ultimately led to our decision:
- Duplication of Efforts:
The tasks outlined in this proposal overlap significantly with the ARDC’s mandate to conduct research and support the ecosystem. While the proposal suggests that the ARDC lacks user research expertise, feedback from ARDC applicants indicated that they are indeed capable of handling such research. Rather than outsourcing this task, the DAO should focus on strengthening the ARDC’s internal capacity to manage these initiatives. Approving this proposal would introduce redundancy, inefficiency, and an unnecessary additional layer of complexity, which contradicts the DAO’s objective of streamlined governance.
- Budget Concerns:
The proposed budget raises questions about cost-effectiveness. The inclusion of a discretionary bonus adds unnecessary financial risk without clear accountability. The milestones for payment also lack specific performance criteria, making it difficult to ensure value for the DAO.
- Stakeholder Council Complexity:
Although the Stakeholder Council is intended to guide the research process, its structure introduces operational complexity. Its compensation remains ambiguous, and its necessity for this specific project has not been adequately justified, particularly given that such oversight could be managed within existing DAO structures like the ARDC.
- Precedent for External Funding:
Funding this initiative externally undermines the ARDC’s role as the primary entity for research and development. We believe the DAO should avoid creating a precedent where external proposals are funded without first exhausting the ARDC’s capacity or receiving its explicit endorsement.
- Insufficient Process and Transparency:
The proposal moved to Snapshot without sufficient discussion and failed to address key questions raised during the deliberation phase. This lack of engagement and transparency weakens trust in the governance process and raises concerns about the readiness of the proposal for funding approval.
We believe that leveraging ARDC’s existing structure and improving its capacity would yield better outcomes for the ecosystem. For these reasons, we cannot support this proposal.
Designing and operating the reporting and information function
Proposal: https://snapshot.org/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x6f6ad0d74853f8d37a53bbb49c9747072b5e21d885391f5d2d4c41663dca516c
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote AGAINST this proposal.
Premise: While the need for a reporting function in the DAO is evident, this proposal fails to address critical concerns. The $263,260 cost, including retroactive payments and grants, is excessive given the scope of the tasks outlined. The absence of clear KPIs makes it difficult to evaluate the impact of the initiative, and the rushed nature of the submission left limited room for community discussion and feedback. A more streamlined and cost-effective approach would better address the DAO’s needs.
Arbitrum Hackathon Builder Continuation Program
Proposal: (Tally | Arbitrum | Arbitrum Hackathon Builder Continuation Program)
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote AGAINST this proposal.
Premise: The proposal, while well-intentioned in its goal of supporting innovative post-hackathon projects, has significant shortcomings that warrant a vote against it. The total cost of $60,980 USD lacks a detailed breakdown to justify its size, with a substantial portion (35%-42%) allocated to administrative expenses rather than directly benefiting grantees. Furthermore, the plan is unclear in critical areas such as customer validation methods, selection criteria, and success metrics for progression between phases. There is no clear timeline, oversight framework, or defined structure for the investment committee, leaving significant gaps in how funds will be managed and projects monitored. Additionally, the proposal appears rushed into the on-chain voting stage without sufficient refinement following initial feedback. While the intent to foster ecosystem growth is commendable, the lack of detail and planning makes it infeasible to support this proposal in its current form.
Treasury Management V1.2
Proposal:Tally | Arbitrum | Treasury Management V1.2
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote IN FAVOUR this proposal.
Premise: We are voting in favor of this proposal as it lays a strong foundation for treasury management, crucial for the DAO’s sustainability. The milestone-based payment structure ensures accountability and progress, while the proposal’s focus on due diligence and clear task alignment reflects thoughtful planning. Although minor adjustments—such as guardrails for selling ARB and extending the timeline—could further strengthen it, this initiative effectively balances operational efficiency with long-term goals.
Arbitrum D.A.O. Domain Allocator Offerings) Grant Program - Season 3
Proposal: https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x052d7e9872192f46bfb4e0a2aabd07035d0842811ca1c82d654307b5d96e2e25
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote RENEW WITH 5 DOMAINS this proposal.
Premise: Renewing the program with five domains is a strategic decision that strengthens and expands the Arbitrum ecosystem. By incorporating the Orbit Chains domain, we address a clear need identified by delegates and align ourselves with the natural evolution of our technology and Offchain Labs’ roadmap. This addition allows us to test modular solutions that position Arbitrum as a leader in innovation while remaining efficient with the budget, as no extra operational costs are required. Excluding this opportunity would risk delaying critical progress, whereas embracing it now unlocks scalable impact and new pathways for developers and projects within the Orbit space.
[NON-CONSTITUTIONAL] Arbitrum Onboarding V2: A Governance Bootcamp
Proposal: https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xb5bbd23c20a480dc46f750112b6cc8f1d1825e40cdd0fc12f4ac3642b18f6740
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote IN FAVOUR this proposal.
Premise: We vote for this proposal because it addresses the lessons learned from the pilot program while building a stronger framework to enhance the DAO’s governance in the long term. The V2 program is not just about attracting new participants; it establishes a structured path to train, evaluate, and position the most qualified individuals in key roles within the DAO. This ensures that decisions are made with greater knowledge and context, contributing to the sustainability and effectiveness of Arbitrum.
Furthermore, the focus on diversity and inclusion broadens the pool of participants, bringing varied perspectives that will enrich discussions and future proposals. The clear metrics and a plan to measure long-term impact demonstrate that this proposal is results-oriented and strategically designed for the growth and professionalization of Arbitrum’s ecosystem.
Unifying Arbitrum’s Mission, Vision, Purpose (MVP)
Proposal: https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xf5fdce242b85134153397754d25a43a49611a3e8a1c73b2e11a67e864c56e022
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote IN FAVOUR this proposal.
Premise: We are voting in favor of this proposal because it represents a well-thought-out first step towards creating a coherent and unified vision for the Arbitrum DAO. The proposed MVP provides clarity by defining the DAO’s purpose, mission, and vision, establishing a foundation on which future strategies can be built. While we acknowledge that the MVP may feel abstract and could benefit from more immediate, concrete actions, it successfully sets the stage for a more structured and measurable approach in the subsequent Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) process. This proposal’s focus on purpose and long-term vision, coupled with the strategic goal-setting process, will help ensure the DAO can sustainably grow, manage resources, and maintain its core values, all of which are crucial for its future success.
Partner with ETH Bucharest 2025
Proposal: https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x04c5984e2e2b8270a793bfb1bbe35c2c8a360429e2e1a5e72a3917215c51144d
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote FOR, without POAP this proposal.
Premise: We support this proposal because it offers a unique opportunity for Arbitrum to gain significant exposure at ETH Bucharest 2025, a prominent event in Eastern Europe’s Ethereum community. The sponsorship package includes a prime exhibition booth, a main stage speaking slot, and a pre-hackathon workshop, all of which will help showcase Arbitrum’s Layer 2 solutions and Stylus technology to a diverse and engaged audience of developers and Web3 enthusiasts.
While we acknowledge the potential of the POAP activation to enhance community engagement, we believe that the core benefits of this sponsorship—such as visibility, networking opportunities, and direct involvement in the hackathon—are already strong enough to make this a valuable investment for Arbitrum. The proposal’s focus on impactful, real-world use cases in the hackathon aligns with Arbitrum’s mission to support scalable, innovative projects, without the need for the added complexity of the POAP initiative.
OpCo – A DAO-adjacent Entity for Strategy Execution
Proposal:
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote IN FAVOUR this proposal.
Premise: We are voting in favor because, after carefully analyzing this proposal, we are convinced that it strikes a precise balance between ambition and responsibility—exactly what our DAO needs to move forward. The creation of OpCo not only strategically addresses the current operational challenges but also offers thoughtfully designed and realistic solutions, such as the establishment of an adjacent legal entity capable of acting with agility and efficiency in key areas.
We are particularly encouraged by the focus on resolving critical issues, such as the lack of continuity in important initiatives and the barriers to hiring specialized talent. The proposed structure, with a clear oversight framework through the Transparency Committee (OAT), strengthens our confidence that OpCo will operate in alignment with the DAO’s values and strategic goals.
Moreover, we appreciate the financial prudence embedded in the design, ensuring efficient use of resources while minimizing risks.
Dec. 24 (ARDC V2 voting arc edition)
ARDC (V2) Supervisory Council Election
We vote for:
- 99% for jameskbh (Communications Role): We support jameskbh due to his extensive experience in governance and communications within the DAO ecosystem. His strategic vision, proven leadership, and focus on transparency make him an ideal candidate to strengthen the ARDC’s communication frameworks and ensure alignment with ArbitrumDAO’s objectives.
- 1% for Tamara Benetti & Entropy Advisors (Operations Role): We support Tamara’s candidacy for her operational expertise and proven success in DAO governance with Lido and other ecosystems. Her collaboration with Entropy Advisors offers a robust combination of granular task management and strategic alignment, ensuring ARDC operations remain efficient and transparent.
ARDC (V2) Supervisory Council Election
We vote for:
- 100% Blockworks Advisory: We support Blockworks Advisory due to their proven track record during ARDC V1, including recovering over 3.7M ARB in unallocated funds and providing valuable insights through comprehensive data dashboards. Their proposed scope of work for ARDC V2 demonstrates a deep understanding of the DAO’s needs, with impactful initiatives such as the Unified Incentives Framework, Orbit Chain Strategy, and a Financial Audit of the Arbitrum Grants Program.
ARDC (V2) Security Election
We vote for:
- 100% for OpenZeppelin: We support OpenZeppelin for their unparalleled expertise in blockchain security, their successful contributions in ARDC V1, and their comprehensive scope of work focused on enhancing governance, technical decision-making, and security resilience for the DAO.
ARDC (V2) Risk Election
We vote for:
- 100% for Vending Machine: We are voting for Vending Machine due to their extensive experience in token design and economic mechanisms, using a rigorous and proven approach. Their proposal for Arbitrum, including design, simulations, and addressing governance threats, meets key DAO needs. Additionally,we belive that their transparency and ongoing collaboration with the community ensure an effective and well-informed process.
Jan. 25
[Constitutional AIP] Activate Arbitrum BoLD + Infura Nova Validator Whitelist
Proposal: Tally | Arbitrum | [Constitutional AIP] Activate Arbitrum BoLD + Infura Nova Validator Whitelist
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote IN FAVOUR this proposal.
Premise: We vote in favor of this proposal because it offers a solid technical response to relevant challenges in the security and governance architecture of Arbitrum. The modular design of BoLD appears capable of enhancing the system’s resilience by introducing a functional separation that could facilitate the identification and resolution of potential vulnerabilities without compromising the network’s overall operation.
Additionally, the implementation of the “Censorship Timeout” emerges as a mechanism that could balance validators’ autonomy with the need to prevent prolonged blockages, providing an operational framework that might optimize the continuity of operations in adverse scenarios. Moreover, the incorporation of an external actor like Infura—while introducing a degree of dependency—appears to be a strategic decision aimed at diversifying validators and reducing concentration risks.
And also because the proposal does not represent any cost to the DAO.
Non-Constitutional: Stable Treasury Endowment Program 2.0
Proposal: https://snapshot.org/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xcbf1ea37e0665a44f7b880736333984d3e0672e93231df5ab0d2a8a5b844a73d
Decision After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote IN FAVOUR this proposal
Premise: The success of the first edition of STEP demonstrates the viability of this program, as it not only diversified $30 million into stable, liquid, and yield-generating RWAs but also established Arbitrum as a leader in supporting this rapidly growing sector.
The proposal’s focus on maintaining rigorous due diligence and selecting providers through a competitive and transparent process ensures that the DAO retains control over treasury diversification without relying on external managers, thereby avoiding unnecessary fees. Additionally, the yield generated from these RWAs will help cover operational expenses, strengthening the DAO’s financial stability even in bear markets.
By building on the proven principles of STEP 1 and setting a clear roadmap for the next phase, this proposal reinforces Arbitrum’s commitment to sustainable growth, financial prudence, and ecosystem development. For these reasons, we fully support the allocation of 35 million ARB to STEP 2.
The Watchdog: Arbitrum DAO’s Grant Misuse Bounty Program
Proposal: Link
Decision After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote IN FAVOUR this proposal
Premise: We voted in favor of this proposal primarily due to the potential to recover misallocated funds. With over 422M ARB in circulation, it is crucial to establish a mechanism that encourages the identification and reporting of resource misuse. The implementation of “The Watchdog” not only enables the recovery of diverted funds but also strengthens transparency and accountability within the DAO.
Arbitrum D.A.O. Season 3 Elections
Arbitrum D.A.O. Season 3 Elections - Dev Tooling on One and Stylus
Proposal: https://snapshot.org/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x7241843c0a1ab87a5703335f28bb34ba190e31a9c294fc4d977116eaeb25f1db
Decision After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote 100% for ANDREIV
Premise: We believe Andrei was the strongest candidate for the “Dev Tooling on One and Stylus” domain due to his technical background and relevant experience. As a seasoned software engineer with a proven track record in developer tools, he demonstrated a deep understanding of the complexities in creating effective dev tooling. His firsthand involvement with the Arbitrum ecosystem, through the grant program and the Stylus Hackathon, further validated his capacity to assess proposals from both a technical and practical perspective. Andrei’s emphasis on quality over quantity in developer tools aligns with the strategic needs of this domain, making him a well-suited choice for the role.
Arbitrum D.A.O. Season 3 Elections - Education, Community Growth, and Events
Proposal: https://snapshot.org/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x0ce496fc0e16be46842dff38be15b831cde3099b7ce1e90ee3c941f5adb6aaee
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote 100% for SEEDGOV
Premise: We voted for SEEDGov as the Domain Allocator for this vertical based on their extensive history of contributions and proven expertise within the Arbitrum DAO and other decentralized governance ecosystems. Their track record in managing grants, fostering community growth, and establishing transparent evaluation frameworks positions them as a reliable and capable team to oversee this domain.
SEEDGov’s application highlights their practical experience in governance and grant management, specifically within the Arbitrum ecosystem, including roles such as Domain Allocators in Seasons 1 and 2, Stylus Sprint Evaluators, and Delegate Incentives Program Managers. Their contributions to improving processes, such as implementing Discord-based transparency measures and developing structured proposal evaluation frameworks, demonstrate their commitment to operational efficiency and community engagement.
Also, SEEDGov’s multiregional approach and focus on initiatives that align with Arbitrum’s long-term goals, such as hackathons, educational outreach, and high-quality developer content, reflect their strategic understanding of the ecosystem’s needs. Their proactive measures to verify proposers and combat fraudulent activities further underscore their diligence and responsibility.
Given their established reputation and ability to deliver results, we believe SEEDGov is the ideal candidate to lead this domain successfully.
Arbitrum D.A.O. Season 3 Elections - Gaming
Proposal: https://snapshot.org/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xe52ab17d41249186c4dc54afdb481e120572102ad222d4e2af13a92791d72344
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote 100% for FLOOK
Premise: We vote in favor of FLOOK for the Arbitrum DAO Grant Program, Season 3. FLOOK’s extensive experience in Web3 content creation and project management, particularly bridging Web2 creators to the Web3 space, aligns perfectly with Arbitrum’s goals. Their proven success in growing audiences across multiple platforms like Twitch and Instagram demonstrates their ability to drive engagement. Adam’s leadership in the Gaming Domain and strategic focus on onboarding Web2 creators will contribute to expanding Arbitrum’s ecosystem. The FLOOK’s approach promises to bring viral content and substantial growth to Arbitrum’s gaming sector.
Proposal for Piloting Enhancements and Strengthening the Sustainability of ArbitrumHub in the Year Ahead
Proposal: https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x959fb55d9887a68d3df6647e55010692777cc40e5c9b131dfdb3eedb8970dc6a
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote AGAINST this proposal.
Premise: The Arbitrum Foundation already has a platform for informing developers and builders. While ArbitrumHub claims to be “broader,” it does not clarify how its content (governance, events) justifies a parallel project with high costs. Instead, it could be integrated as a section within the existing platform, avoiding redundant expenses.
The proposed budget is inflated for a pilot. They request $230K annually for a “limited” initiative, yet roles are only part-time (e.g., 2 hours per day for design/development). This raises concerns about work quality and whether the team is genuinely committed. Additionally, they do not justify why such a large amount is needed for basic maintenance.
Their metrics are vague and lack clear impact. The KPIs focus on activities (e.g., “five social media posts per week”) rather than outcomes. They do not define what success looks like—more active users? Better retention? Influence on governance proposals? Without this clarity, it is difficult to assess whether the project adds value to the ecosystem.
The request for retroactive funding is questionable. Asking for $40K for past work without prior DAO approval sets a risky precedent, potentially encouraging others to request retroactive payments without transparency. Given that the budget is already high, adding this request makes it even less justifiable.
The proposal does not demonstrate an urgent need. The problem it aims to solve (lack of centralized information) could be addressed by improving the Foundation’s platform or using simple tools like a community wiki. There is no data proving that ArbitrumHub is indispensable or that the community demands it at scale.
It scales poorly with limited resources. If the DAO has tight funds, investing in an expensive, unproven project diverts resources from more critical initiatives (e.g., security, technical development). It should first be tested with a minimal budget and scaled only if it proves effective.
Arbitrum Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) – Defining the DAO’s Interim Goals
Proposal: https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x6baef084d47cb0e0f5788449e0d6fafd6312a69f65b550d62d5b6772297b8695
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote IN FAVOUR this proposal.
Premise: By setting short- and medium-term goals with measurable outcomes, accountability and progress evaluation are improved—both essential in a decentralized environment. The annual review ensures flexibility in response to market changes, while ARDC’s quarterly reports maintain transparency. A goal-linked budget structure optimizes capital allocation, and while external proposals are allowed, the social contract encourages strategic consistency. Inspired by successful models like Lido.
FEB 25.
Request to Increase the Stylus Sprint Committee’s Budget
Proposal: https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x45513bb63946582432afa7213bcb2677e877dabbd5722210efd5eaf45797031c
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote IN FAVOUR this proposal.
Premise: We believe this proposal is a considerable opportunity. Yes, 4 million ARB sounds like a lot, but these are projects that have already passed a rigorous filter and are literally the “second wave” of talent ready to build on Stylus. Do we really want teams like Trail of Bits (blockchain security benchmarks) or Pyth Oracle (critical infrastructure for DeFi) to end up developing these solutions in competing networks for lack of support?
The committee is not asking for a blank check: these are concrete initiatives, with defined scopes and aligned to a program that already has review and transparency mechanisms. Furthermore, by using the existing Stylus Sprint structure, we avoid bureaucracy, accelerate deployment and ensure that funds are used with accountability.
It’s simple: if Arbitrum wants to be the leading Ethereum layer, it needs to invest in its technical advantage today, not when the competition has already closed the gap. This $4 million is not an expense, it’s an accelerator to move Stylus from a promise to a vibrant, self-sustaining ecosystem.
[CONSTITUTIONAL] AIP: ArbOS Version 40 Callisto
Proposal: https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x7cc26491a070c74c1a4ec5a9892571d31eb690015936a35b52c0d3a97bd5497f
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote IN FAVOUR this proposal.
Premise: We voted in favor so as not to slow down progress, we believe that by voting against it we only force developers to migrate to chains that are up to date.
Security is not an expense, it is the basis of everything.
The BLS12-381 precompile is not a technicality: it is 50% more security in digital signatures (120+ bits vs. 80).
The Stylus fix (correct cache of non-existent contracts) and the efficient storage of historical hashes (EIP-2935) are like “tuning the engine” of Arbitrum: they improve the development experience without breaking what already works. And the best part: without requiring massive redeploys.
The process already includes Trail of Bits audits and testing in Sepolia, with that we save quite a lot of risk, everything aims to be a tested update, aligned with Ethereum core, and avoiding unnecessary changes (like CL EIPs or blobs, which don’t apply to L2s).
Arbitrum Growth Circles Event Proposal
Proposal: https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xab1a7ff1a294882315f3beaa77fa0d4b2ec68633792046b941714108209ce737
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote IN FAVOUR this proposal.
Premise: The Growth Circle is not a generic mentorship program. It is designed to identify and scale organic leaders within the ecosystem, turning successful projects (such as AVI graduates) into next wave mentors. This reduces reliance on recurring DAO funds and creates a self-sustaining knowledge flywheel.
We celebrate your tight budget and clear metrics. At only $67k, ROI is measured in concrete connections: protocols onboarding in Orbits, Stylus adoption, and “sticky” liquidity. KPIs-such as 50% of participants achieving their relationship goals-are verifiable and aligned with Arbitrum’s technical vision.
The team already ran the AVI Pilot with +60 consulted protocols. This is replicating a proven model, avoiding the costly learning curve. If it fails, the damage is minimal; if it works, it scales with community funding.
Approve the Nova Fee Sweep Action
Proposal: https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xbd77b4faf99e06c7b4117e5dafaf5bb8f873bcffbb5c9d414a7ff745b6849f3a
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote IN FAVOUR this proposal.
Premise: this proposal is an automatic yes: moving 1,885 ETH from an obsolete contract to the Treasury DAO is not debatable, it’s common sense. With the Nova Fee Router already approved, holding these funds in an address with no active use would be like having money under the mattress.
Consolidating all ETH into the central Treasury avoids fragmentation and improves accountability, plus The infrastructure already exists and is audited; it’s just running a script.
Arbitrum Audit Program
Proposal: https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xebbcad364ae7f02797b9cd7f30c668907d479d4bb5ba7f5d775849822297a01d
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote IN FAVOUR this proposal.
Premise: Do we really want promising projects releasing code without audits due to lack of funding? Every bug exploited in DeFi not only damages the project, but Arbitrum’s reputation. $10M USD for 100 audits is cheap vs the billions in LTV they protect.
The committee does not give away money: it filters projects with real potential, ready to be audited and launched. It is a quality filter that ensures that funds are used in serious teams, not vaporware ideas, auditors pass due diligence and price competition. In addition, by inviting those from the ADPC Security Fund, we avoid monopolies and ensure transparency.
The ROI is clear and round, if 10 of the 100 subsidized projects become leaders like GMX or Radiant, Arbitrum gains in adoption, fees and liquidity. And if there is budget left over, the remainder goes back to the DAO.
Non-Constitutional: Stable Treasury Endowment Program 2.0
Proposal: Tally | Arbitrum | Non-Constitutional: Stable Treasury Endowment Program 2.0
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote IN FAVOUR this proposal.
Premise: we believe that Approving STEP 2 is doubly strategic: it diversifies the Treasury DAO and positions Arbitrum as the leading RWA hub.
82% of TVL in RWA from Arbitrum came without subsidies, but STEP accelerates the network effect: projects choose Arbitrum knowing that the DAO invests in their vertical.
RWA yield will cover DAO operating expenses, reducing pressure to sell ARBs. Diversifying is not spending, it is shielding.
To vote against it would be to ignore an exploding sector and let chains such as Polygon or Base capture the momentum.
Arbitrum D.A.O. (Domain Allocator Offerings) Grant Program - Season 3
Proposal: Tally | Arbitrum | Arbitrum D.A.O. (Domain Allocator Offerings) Grant Program - Season 3
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote IN FAVOUR this proposal.
Premise: Renewing this program means betting on a proven model that has already incubated successes such as Pear Protocol and Mountain Protocol, while strategically expanding to Orbits. The results speak for themselves: in the first season, 86% of the funds were executed, with projects that today generate volume and LTV in Arbitrum. In addition, more than 200 initiatives were approved in two seasons, many of which have scaled up to larger programs such as the GCP.
The transparency and scalability of the program are unquestionable. The entire process, from applications to disbursements, is completely public on Questbook. The milestone and KYC system ensures that only verified deliverables are paid for, avoiding capital leakage.
Looking ahead, the inclusion of the Orbit vertical ($750k) represents a strategic bet on the rise of L3s without committing key resources to Gaming or Dev Tooling. In addition, the retention of 10-20% of funds until post-evaluation reinforces the commitment of the projects, ensuring that they do not disappear after receiving funding.
In terms of cost, $6.75M may seem significant, but it represents only 0.02% of the DAO treasury for a program that has proven to be a hotbed of innovation. If we want Arbitrum to continue to be the most diverse and builder-friendly L2, this is not an expense: it is an investment in community muscl
MAR 25
TMC Recommendation
Proposal: https://snapshot.box/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xc37793b67f39a6af9e9434003205b1d9b67dd6f75638329045257be823da4f18
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote Deploy Both Strategies this proposal.
Premise: We have chosen to vote for the first option of “Deploy Both Strategies” because we believe it balances growth and stability, the Only Deploy Stable Strategy option while considerable (and was ultimately the winner) we believe it prioritizes caution by sacrificing key opportunities:
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ARB strategies offer up to 30%+ returns (vs. 0% by not deploying), offsetting risks with diversification (50/50 between managers) and dynamic adjustments (e.g. option strikes).
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Stables (8-12%) are safe, but concentrating everything on them ignores ARB potential and exposes the DAO to depeg or low demand risks in DeFi.
Strategic diversification:
Combining stables (low risk) and ARB (high risk/reward) protects against volatility and leverages multiple scenarios (e.g. ARB upside + yield in stables).
Voting for Only Deploy Stable Strategy loses this synergy, betting only on a stable scenario.
We also consider that there may be “hidden costs” when voting for Only Deploy Stable Strategy:
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Selling 15M ARB to stables could depress their price, harming the DAO and the ecosystem.
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Keeping 10M ARB idle generates inflation or depreciation losses, with no performance trade-off.
For all these reasons, voting for Deploy Both Strategies is not “risky”, but strategic: it maximizes resources with active management, diversification and alignment with Arbitrum’s growth.
[CONSTITUTIONAL] - Adopt Timeboost + Nova Fee Sweep
Proposal: Tally | Arbitrum | [CONSTITUTIONAL] - Adopt Timeboost + Nova Fee Sweep
Decision: After some consideration, GENS Collective decided to vote IN FAVOUR this proposal.
Premise We voted FOR Mainly for resource optimization, but in addition, this proposal combines two key actions to improve Arbitrum:
Timeboost reduces harmful MEV.
- as it eliminates latency/spam races from “MEV seekers” through fair auctions for an express lane.
- Generates revenue for the DAO (in ETH), with 3% earmarked for development.
- The DAO controls parameters (pricing, currency) and can disable it if necessary.
In addition the Nova Fee Sweep recovers 1,885 ETH for the Treasury.
Transfers historical funds stuck in an obsolete contract to the Treasury from the DAO using secure, audited infrastructure.