July 2025 voting
Snapshot votings
Audit Committee Technical Expert Elections
Vote: 60% Gustavo, 40% Andrei
I don’t have a strong preference and think both candidates have the right background and will fulfil the role very well. I have slightly skewed vote toward Gustavo due to his past with Trail Bits and how Trail Bits has always had a strong relationship with Arbitrum.
Extend AGV Council Term and Align Future Elections with Operational Cadence
Vote: Yes
Arbitrum Research and Development Collective V2 - Extension
Vote: Don’t Extend
Voting to not extend the ARDC.
The value provided I think was good. I am a huge fan of a researches, and of the ability for stakeholders to be able to come and ask complex questions and get well thought answers. It’s what we need just because we are in such an experimental field that we will have a lot of questions and answers might just not be trivial. But I do agree with all parties involved that the current structure doesn’t create the proper incentives for smooth operations, specifically
- prepaid allocated hours with a fixed time term means that SP (and the DAO) will be pushed to use these hours regardless of real needs
- it is hard to see proper followup and the researches more times than not becomes siloed as such (which still has value, but less than what we want).
I also think the equivalent of an R&D department is HIGHLY needed in our DAO, and I do agree with whoever mentioned, here or in voice calls or meetings, that up to some degree every AAE should have his own department.
At the same time, is impossible for all AAEs to have the expertise necessary to cover all the important questions that might arise. Defining an on-call model, with several service providers whitelisted, a preallocated budget from the DAO from which a delegate can query an AAE that takes the task of selecting the SP and negotiate with it, and even the ability for any AAE to use its own internal budget for researches, is probably the model that we need, with some check and balances over time to understand and rate the quality of these SPs and know if the company X, Y or Z did a good/bad job and so we know if we want to engage again with them or not.EDIT I want to make a clarification to this because is important. I think @Juanrah, @Entropy, all the service providers, all the people previously involved in ops and comms, they all did a GREAT job. I do see a situation in which all these parties in future can either re-facilitate this initiative or even better knowing we want a different structure another, because they proved themself worth it.
My personal vote against, and likely the vote of others, is not about the people but the structure of ARDC. Utilizing and customizing the provisioning framework created by ADPC is potentially a good first step to move forward and rework everything.
Entropy Advisors: Exclusively Working with the Arbitrum DAO, Year 2 and Year 3
Vote: For
Below there is one of the few messages I left in the thread. Not reporting everything to avoid complexity of reading, after this message some stuff changed specifically
- 15M bonus being split in 5M bonus + 10M managed by OpCo through KPI and other measures
- Entropy having OpCo as counterparty.
These two changes make the proposal better; a reason more for me to vote in favour.
Thanks for the proposal, was about time.
First, a small premise.
I have had the pleasure to work with Entropy in different degrees through different initiatives, either with an official role like in the Stylus program, or in a non official role/capacity as a delegate that just tries to chime into initiatives that I deem important. I specifically worked with Pruitt (even before in LTIPP), i have always found in Brick a counterparty willing to explain his vision, even when very different than mine and during weekends. I have spoke extensively with both Sam and Matt. And also clashed, privately, with Matt, more than I would like to admit cause we both have a certain personality, but is the type of clashes that comes from having strong opinions driven by a vision. Is the good type of clashes.
I have also grown appreciating the work of the Data team (Tom, Ali) that have always been open to suggestions.
All to say: i have confidence in my judgments, which are both related to Entropy, the entity, and the people working in Entropy. And that is why I see myself supporting them in this renewal.I want to loosely comment on a few things. I am going to focus on what might be deemed by some controversial, and analyze past initiatives that might have not created the outcome the DAO wanted, and show why these imho have no material weight in the renewal.
2 years mandate
I think this is quite logical. In the program I run, the D.A.O. grant program, I moved the terms from 6 months to 1 year. I think initiatives that have a broad consensus and are perceived as important need to extend over time the time term because is the easiest way to allow the team to operate focusing on the mission, and not on the fact that in 12 months they will have to go all over this again.
Managing an initiative that moved from 6 months to 1 year, the above explains why having a longer term would be preferred. I also don’t see this as a deal breaker: either we renew entropy or we don’t, and them running for 1 or 2 years is less important than the DAO accepting them.Budget: $2.5M to $3M per year
This is a bump on base cost of 20%. 1 year ago, in Bruxelles, the team was made by Matt, Sam, Pruitt, and if I recall Brick was recently onboarded or soon to be. Unsure if Tom was already there.
We now have double the personnel and a clear stated goals of hiring more people, accordingly to the infochart with one that is basically here and another 5 that are planned and might come.
Knowing how consultancy work, and even more how it works in crypto, I think the budget is extremely lean, even underpriced. But is partially compensated by the vesting bonus (see below). I won’t for sure push Entropy to ask for more capital, but I think they could have easily asked for $3.5M seeing how they are scaling.Budget: 15M ARB bonus
I have never been a fun of the DAO voting on bonuses on people (not only on entropy). Yes, the DAO can evaluate if someone did the work it was supposed to do up to some degree. But voting on assigning/non assigning a bonus is tricky because it becomes an issue about quality of the job, if the people involved pushed into the last mile and more vs doing just the homework etc. I don’t think the DAO is well equipped to do this because is extremely difficult to be able to see the outcome as a function of the work behind, just like for an iceberg is easy to see the tip but you can only imagine the size of the submerged part. All of this to say: I think is fair to move to a bonus that is vested.
On the amount. This is quite difficult for me to asses. As it is today, the bonus corresponds to around $4.5M so 1.5 times the yearly budget. But this will be all available in 4 years, and in 2 years from now the amount of unlocked supply of arb should be 50% more than what it is now excluding DAO spending, with around 30M arb unlocked per month. It’s a fool’s game to try and project the notional dollar value. But let’s assume we have 15 people in entropy: it would basically mean an average of 1M bonus each after 4 years; of this, 333k would be unlocked in 2 years.
Comparing the numbers to OpCo, and knowing that Entropy has still a private nature so it can justify a premium to have them around exclusively for further 2 years, I don’t think the number is unreasonable. I will also let other speak on this number.GMC/TMC proposal
This is explicitely mentioned by Entropy itself in the list of things from which there are mistakes from which they can learn from. Of the last proposals we have had, one of the biggest critique has been around the lack of flexibility and allocation in these proposals, and how protocols could have benefit from a broader framework.
I have been the first one expressing loudly this point. Was there margin for a better execution? Yes. Could Entropy have had this broader vision at day one and be put in the condition of executing this vision right away? Yes and no. The main problem was tied to not only a conservative vision (which is not necessarily a problem honestly, more like a different angle), but mostly on the outreach terms for protocol. If protocols have to take the time to create proposals, explain their strategy and then they get rejected, there is inevitably a bitter feeling as a consequence which also increases the negative sentiments. Entropy would have benefit from better communication with stakeholders like OCL that could have suggested (and I am not sure if this happened or not) allocations that were more oriented toward growth; they would have also benefit from the contributions of very entrenched, defi native people able to contribute to their team and program. All of this is likely solvable in the next iterations: we do have a lot of ETH to spend and this was the first programmatic initiative that weaponized our treasury and opened the path to several other in future. Expecting the first iteration to be already perfected and tailored to our collective needs is a bit unrealistic; plus, the other side of the coin is that our DAO has been live for 2 years (with the chain been live for 3.5 years) and there has been no other party trying to spin up an initiative such as this one.
TLDR: can we have objective critiques on the expectation vs actual outcome of the GMC proposal? Yes. At the same time, we should recognize how this initiative would have not even existed in the first place, how is a first 6 months iteration, and how it made us learn a lot on what we can do and in what areas we can improve.
Of the above mentioned, I think none is material through a renewal that takes in account the following points:
- first treasury program that directly utilizes the eth we have. While imperfect, it bootstrapped the initiative
- opco: everybody and their grandma in the dao now is eagerly expecting opco to be operating. This would not have happened without entropy. Worth noticing, them pushing for opco is a testimonial of their neutrality since they even voted against.
- Converge: while most of us was not aware, Ethena launching on top of our stack is an important milestone. Entropy having a role, with first the data unit and then bd work on the ground is notable
- Data and dashboard. I honestly haven’t seen this type of dashboard in any other ecosystem at least not at this level of detail and heterogeneity. I will state the obvious: neither the foundation, nor ocl, nor anybody else did create this data for us which is key to properly measure our operations and allows external parties to asses how good our stack and ecosystem is
- sos proposal (previously: MVP): while this proposal was “immaterial”, I can’t think about anything else beside the detox discussion spearheaded by l2beat that had as much involvement from delegates
- i could mention a few other stuff: CoC and calendar that allows for smoother operations and some breathing room during december, the stylus program to push for the adoption of the technology (being an insider i can testify that a lot of the passed proposals are key, for OCL, to push the adoption of the tech), the drip program (tbd on that one but we have a different approach and we come from a year with no real practical consensus on how to do incentives).
These are the material results; is a bit subjective and in general hard to understand the immaterial results and second order effect that Entropy manifested in the DAO. Two are worth mentioning:
- we have raised the bar in term of professionalization compared to 1 year ago, and this is highly needed if we want the DAO to be a positive component of the Arbitrum ecosystem
- Entropy has become a de fact public face of the DAO in a moment in which we didn’t had (and still don’t have) one.
The question becomes: were the $2.5M we paid a good price tag for what we obtained in the last 12 months? My answer as of today is a big yes.
I also don’t want to sound like a cheerleader. Everybody has margin of improvement here and Entropy is not an exception. Specifically, it can benefit by a lot of things. One of the pitfall we likely had, and is quite common in crypto, is a team that is not only extremely motivated, but also quite young. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but the lack of experience can sometimes create shortfalls that could have been easily avoided. This was noticeable, for example, in certain occasion, during communications with the rest of the DAO or some protocols.
As of today, not only Entropy operated for 1 year in crypto (which, like dogs’ years, is equivalent to 7 years of professional life somewhere else), but they will now have a series of other counterparties, either new (opco) or new in term of willing to be more active (ocl), that will make their life probably easier due to their scope being now narrower compared to the initial mandate.
Entropy would also benefit by diversifying a bit their team through hiring people that are “closer to the trenches” to put it bluntly, and the list of future hires does indeed indicate that.
Entropy is growing in the DAO alongside all of us, this is clear to me.\
Since we are here I want to also give my educated opinion on the above post from Tane, not because his opinion is wrong but because the approach/angle should be a bit different imho.
How will Entropy ensure that its exclusive mandate does not crowd out alternative contributors or foster dependency if priorities shift or performance falters?
OpCo is a good testimonial on how Entropy did facilitate other entities to rise in Arbitrum. They literally voted against because they thought: we, alongside foundation and OCL, can do enough here. And their opinion in this sense was overturned by the overall DAO vote despite them being the biggest delegate.
We also have seen at the same time initiatives still coming out in an horizontal landscape, such as ARDC v2 and D.A.O. Grant Program.
On priorities shift: to me is pretty clear the fact that, as a DAO, we adapt over time. This is both in term of what entropy does, what we decide about what entropy should do, and in general any initiative of the DAO. Think about opco, was devised 1+ year ago, and we are currently voting to change scope. This is the natural and dynamic process of a DAO, that while slowly constantly reasses scope and goals based on new information, through votes and collective decision.Please outline review gates or competitive checkpoints that allow the DAO to reassess exclusivity at regular intervals.
I am a bit puzzled by this point honestly. Having a provider working exclusively for us is something positive, not negative. It means that they will focus 100% of their energy toward our goal, and that we can align the outcomes in an easier way (re: 15M arb bonus for example). Should we for example in 8 months just vote and say “no, entropy should not be exclusive anymore”? I don’t think so. If we come to that point, the question is likely “should entropy still operate for the arbitrum dao”.
Arbitrum already coordinates Offchain Labs, the Foundation, and the emerging OpCo, so overlapping mandates can easily turn into a bureaucratic cost center without contributing to the actual project’s progress.
Unsure what you mean when you say “Arbitrum coordinates” but will just assume you mean the DAO. The DAO so far has not specifically coordinated OCL; on the contrary, OCL has posted to us their work and we have validated it from time to time. Same with the foundation, up to a lesser degree because the dialague is way more open (and both should improve over time).
OpCo will indeed act as coordation; this coordination has partially being executed by all parties involved. I honestly don’t see the point on this.
On the overlap: it has been clear now that we are really segmenting operations over time. Entropy is posting about treasury, incentives, data just to name three. None of these 3 are verticals that, so far, were managed by the foundation or ocl, nor by the dao independently (except, maybe, incentives with LTIPP and STIP/STIP.b, but the overall consensus in the last year has been to move on from that modus operandi).A granular cost breakdown—headcount by role, salary bands, data-infrastructure spending, travel, and contingency—will help delegates judge whether the budget matches market rates and expected value delivered.
The cost breakdown (without going into the single salary numbers) has always been outlined afaik in their quarterly reports here: Entropy Advisors Updates - Arbitrum.
The headcount, is literally in the slides presented above, with 7 full time members, one part time, and further hires ahead. Knowing that the budget has been increased by 20% with a 100% increase of people, is easy to have the granular breakdown because it will be very close to what we have today already.A two-year mandate brings welcome continuity, yet it may also reduce flexibility. Why is a single two-year tranche preferable to a one-year renewal structure tied to performance milestones?
I personally answered in length on the above. But the point is that to build fundamentally strong initiatives we need to start thinking on the long term.
Arbitrum as a DAO has had 2 years now to figure out his identity. We have tested a lot of things in a lot of ways and I am glad we did, it really helped us understand what worked for us. We are now at a point in which we need to double down onEDIT rereading i realized my point toward Tane is not clear. More than discussing “guardrails, kpis, etc” which are fine but also details in the grand scheme of things, to me we should instead answer the following questions: did entropy do a good job in the past 12 months? Was the job worth the price tag? if the answers to the previous questions are both positive, is the new proposal something that puts them in condition to do a work that is at least of the same quality if not above?
This is not because KPIs are not important. But they can be a way to make us feel like we are doing proper DD, make us feel “good” about our “data driven” decision, while instead we miss the forest for the tree.
We can discuss a lot if the price tag is correct, if the term is correct, if the bonus is correct, what kpi to add. To me this is secondary to the most important questions highlighted above. And as I showed (fwiw, i am just a single cow delegate), the attached numbers feels correct, but that is also a personal take.
[CONSTITUTIONAL] Register $BORING in the Arbitrum generic-custom gateway
Vote: For
Support the expansion of teams in Arbitrum, since also there is no blocker from a technical and security standpoint
[Constitutional] AIP: Update the Upgrade Executors
Vote: For
According to the proposal, it should make some technical operations easier to manage and less prone to errors.
Updating the Code of Conduct & DAO’s Procedures
Vote: For
All the updates make sense:
- extending the trial period instead of putting it in the constitution makes it more agile and less set in stone. It was a mistake in the first place to suggest it going in the constitution, but a mistake in goodwill due to being a good idea on paper
- extending the shield for election, is good. Reduces the burden on delegates being lobbied
- removing the responsible voting: while this pains me a bit, is the right choice, in the end it can’t be enforced and anything that can’t be enforced on chain while likely create issues going forward. But I personally do expect delegates to keep voting in a responsible manner going forward.
[Constitutional] AIP: Disable Legacy Tether Bridge
Vote: For
I don’t love that we have to rely on a third party bridge for USDT0 in Arbitrum (but I do love stargate). That said the decision was basically already made by the Tether team and the token has been setup as an OFT, we are just approving their internal choice here and partially improving UX for users.
Consolidate Idle USDC to the ATMC’s Stablecoin Balance
Vote: For
Voted in favor.
Knowing that funds send back to the treasury means having them idle in whatever assets they were sent in the first place, is quite easy to choose to instead put the capital at work, even more if this happens as form of growth of Arbitrum protocols and liquiidity.
That said, as others mentioned, we do need rules to make this process straighforward. When a program ends and stable funds are left over, we have the following options:
- send funds back to treasury
- send funds to TMC
- roll over the funds into the next iteration of the same program.
In my opinion the management of these 3 choices should be straightforward and not require a vote. In the same fashion we just voted to update the Code of Conduct to manage a team member leaving/getting removed in case it was not specified by the initiative itself, we should also implement such measures for stable funds. Specifically:
- for any initiatives having stables, assume that leftover stables will be sent to the TMC initiatives at the very end, minus any amount that should be retained for possible expenses, payments and others
- any initiative can specify, when approved in the onchain vote, the optionality of retaining the stables remaining from their initial funding for a continuation of the program if/when this further iteration will be voted; assuming there would be uncertainty on renewal, or maybe just a window of time that is “large enough”, the funds could be sent at interim to the tmc. But, in this case, we would rely on the program manager of that initiatives for the decision: it might just not make sense for example to send the equivalent of 50k USDC for a single month to the tmc.
The same framework should be utilized in case initiatives hold ETH, to be sent to the GMC initiative, albeit this seems a very hedge case.
I want to also stretch this forward and put up a practical example. Entropy asked me to gather info on remaining funds of Questbook Season 2. While I am not the program manager for that initiative, I did try to come up with the number of how much fund we can send back vs how much we should retain to finance on going initiatives (we are at the natural end of the program but a few milestones still need to be paid). With several members of the team being OOO, it was impossible to gather an answer in time to include also season 2 in this package, and we are now in the situation of either sending funds back to the treasury or put up a new vote.
All of this to say: we do need to have clear rules on
- team management (hiring, firing, leaving)
- fund management (leftover mostly; asking for more would require a change of scope and so a new vote regardless)
My question for Entropy and for the whole dao is: a rule like the above, where should be put? The code of conduct seems like a stretch, but maybe is the only answer. Have thought about the question, but not the answer honestly.
Tally votings
[Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction
Vote: For
Confirming the snapshot vote
[CONSTITUTIONAL] Register the Sky Custom Gateway contracts in the Router
Vote: For
Confirming the snapshot vote, also the proposal should be technically correct now