The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
After reviewing the applications to STIP Bridge and the qualitative data on their performance shared by Blockworks after their research in the context of ARDC, we have decided to vote in the way outlined below.
Our decisions were made based on a combination of past performance during STIP and our ability to assess it based on the available data, the violation (or not) of the rules of either STIP or STIP Bridge, as well as whether or not a team adequately addressed the concerns raised in the challenge of their protocol’s application.
MUX - For
While Mux’s request was among the biggest in the STIP Bridge, we voted in its favor because there were no significant concerns related to their incentive mechanism or their performance during STIP.
Stargate - For
Stargate ran into complications with KYC during STIP and did not receive their allocated ARB. We see their application to STIP Bridge as a second opportunity at STIP. We voted in Stargate’s favor, given that we had no specific concerns regarding their application.
Solv - For
Solv achieved impressive growth during STIP, and the protocol met the KPI goals that it had set in its original STIP application. We voted in their favor, but we would like to see better reporting from the team from here on forward, as they failed to provide any updates other than the final report.
Sanko GameCorp - For
Sanko saw solid growth during the STIP, which it managed to maintain even after the incentives ended. There were no immediate concerns with their STIP Bridge application, and therefore, we voted in its favor. As with Solv, however, we’d like to see Sanko do better with reporting, as they failed to provide any update during STIP.
Tide - Against
Tide is requesting 120% of the ARB they received during STIP, which is against the rules outlined in the STIP Bridge proposal. Additionally, the protocol still controls 15,000 ARB (18,5%) from their STIP grant that hasn’t been distributed. Since the team did not a) reduce their STIP.B request and b) did not address the leftover funds, we have decided to vote against their application.
KyberSwap - For
KyberSwap was exploited in November 2023 and had to halt the distribution of incentives from their STIP allocation. Their original grant was for 1,500,000 ARB from which they only distributed 69,871 ARB (428,572 claimed - 358,701 returned to the treasury). While we understand that there are no metrics with which to evaluate KyberSwap’s performance during STIP, we also appreciate the team’s approach of requesting 450,000 in STIP.B (or 30% of their original allocation). We believe it’s a fair meet-in-the-middle request, and as a result, we have voted in its favor.
Gains - For
Gains achieved strong growth during STIP, and the primary concerns raised from the data by Blockworks have been adequately addressed by the team in their response to their addendum being challenged. We have decided to vote in favor of their application to STIP.B.
Boost (Rabbithole) - Against
Boost had an extremely high sybil ratio, and the structure of the incentive mechanism itself was prone to farming. Furthermore, although Boost clarified that they didn’t use the funds from STIP to pay for operational expenses directly, the funds ultimately ended up with Boost Guild and were used to reward contributors.
Thales - Against
While Thales addressed some of the concerns, including their distribution mechanism and why they still have 110,000 ARB from STIP, they did not address the fact that they seemingly used 30,000 ARB from STIP to pay for a Layer3 marketing campaign. Using funds from STIP to cover any operational expenses, including marketing, goes against the rules of the original proposal. As a result, we have voted against their application.
Savvy - Against
Savvy changed their STIP incentive distribution mechanism halfway through the program and allocated more than half to their new bond product, which involved selling ARB to acquire protocol-owned liquidity. Selling the ARB allocated by the STIP was strictly against the rules of the original proposal. Although their approach is now different, as stated in their addendum, we also believe that their request is relatively big compared to their TVL, accounting for roughly 25% of it at the time of writing. As a result, we have decided to vote against their application.
Stake - Against
Stake still has over half of the ARB allocated to them during STIP since complications during KYC prevented them from starting the distribution in time. With that in mind, their request from STIP Bridge should have been much smaller and should only act as a buffer to the amount they’d need to last them until the end of the STIP.B distribution window. The team, however, requested an amount that we cannot justify, and as such, we have decided to vote against their application.
Furucombo - Against
Furucombo is requesting more than five times their STIP grant, which goes against the STIP Bridge’s application rules. In addition, the funds from their STIP allocation are unaccounted for after they were transferred to a centralized exchange, for which Furucombo hasn’t offered any clarification. As a result, we have voted against their application.
Socket - Against
Socket’s reporting during STIP was lackluster, to the extent that we feel we could not properly assess their performance and the effects the incentives had. While the team has returned the ARB that was left over from STIP, we cannot, in good conscience, vote in favor of their application without being able to assess their performance. As a result, we have voted against their application.
Angle - Against
Angle’s reporting during STIP was lackluster, to the extent that we felt we could not properly assess their performance and the effects the incentives had. With the information we did have at our disposal, the results weren’t as encouraging as we would have hoped. As a result, we have decided to vote against their application.
OpenOcean - Against
OpenOcean’s incentive structure was somewhat unclear, which made it difficult to assess STIP’s effectiveness in the protocol. While we appreciate the team’s responsiveness under their addendum, we have decided to vote against their application.
Thetanuts Finance - For
Thetanuts had a decent increase in their TVL during STIP, and although there were concerns that they might have farmed their incentives through protocol-owned liquidity, they offered clarifications, which we felt adequately addressed the concerns. As a result, we voted in favor of their application.
Dolomite - For
Dolomite’s growth was impressive during STIP, although the incentive mechanism could be perceived as questionable. Dolomite hasn’t addressed the concerns raised in the challenge, so making an informed decision was difficult. Ultimately, taking into account their impressive growth metrics we decided to vote in favor of the continuation of this incentive program.
Umami - For
Umami addressed the concerns raised in their STIP Bridge challenge and clarified using oARB. Furthermore, they have changed their incentive structure for their addendum to a direct distribution. With that in mind, we have voted in favor of their application.