The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
We recognize that evolving the DIP is essential as Arbitrum DAO grows, governance processes become more mature, and the role of delegates continues to shift. The move to introduce Tier X for high-voting power delegates, to recalibrate compensation reflecting a lower overall governance workload, and to make feedback assessment more transparent and objective are all clear signals that the DIP aims to adapt to a changing ecosystem.
However, as delegates with less VP, we are especially sensitive to how program changes can influence the inclusiveness and diversity of everyone. Our experience matches the sentiment that insightful questions, research, and onboarding energy frequently emerge from smaller delegates who may not hold large amounts of voting power but have a significant investment in the DAO’s quality and long-term success. We have seen, time and again, that Arbitrum benefits when the tent remains open to these perspectives.
It is for this reason that we particularly echo the concerns raised by other delegates, like @0xDonPepe mentioned, regarding the stringency of the DF scoring and its compounded effect when combined with the voting power multiplier. With only around 12% of delegates presently clearing the DF bar under the current, less strict system, increasing the difficulty and combining it with a high voting power threshold risks closing the door to smaller and independent delegates. At a time when the DIP is one of the last open doors for such participation and recognition, we worry about inadvertently entrenching governance around the largest holders and institutional actors, to the detriment of dynamism and decentralization.
While we recognize the logic for introducing Tier X (appreciate the thinking of the team to focus on increasing voting in DAO) and for focusing incentives and program energy where the most voting power can be activated, we urge caution so that these changes do not inadvertently diminish the existing pipeline for new and diverse delegates. The 40% reduction in compensation is significant and, while the justification is grounded in lower overall proposal workload and increased institutional involvement, we recommend ongoing review to avoid discouraging the participation of contributors whose involvement is critical, especially as new delegates start contributing in Arbitrum DAO. Rewarding voting activity alone for large delegates, while increasing the requirements for smaller ones, should be regularly reassessed to ensure it does not yield a disengaged or lopsided ecosystem.
On the subject of vote-buying platforms, we agree that exclusion from DIP incentives is a sound decision until there is consensus and a robust framework to ensure meaningful alignment. The language that leaves the possibility for future inclusion if proper controls are in place demonstrates an appropriately measured approach.
In summary, we vote FOR DIP v1.7, acknowledging the thoroughness of the process, the clarity of documentation, and the clear need for DIP to remain responsive and sustainable as Arbitrum grows. Our support comes with genuine encouragement to keep inclusiveness and diversity of delegate voices as a core priority, to normalize DF scoring wherever possible to the actual best performer each month rather than an impossible ideal, and to ensure that the program’s gates do not shut out newer and smaller contributors who are essential for a thriving DAO. Our decision today is a vote of confidence in the process, paired with a commitment to ensuring Arbitrum’s governance remains open, legitimate, and robust.