Transfer 6,000 ETH and Idle Stablecoins from the Treasury to the Treasury Management Portfolio (On Chain)
We voted For: In favor of the transfer over to earning assets, in line with our Snapshot vote.
Approve Release of Frozen ETH (Snapshot)
We voted For: Shoutout to the team for executing this and we’re very happy these funds were recovered.
[Constitutional] AIP: Amended Release of Frozen ETH Pursuant to Court Order (On Chain)
We voted For: In line with court orders, we hope this situation can be resolved quickly and efficiently.
[Constitutional] AIP: Minimize Arbitrum Nova (Snapshot)
We voted For: In favor of minimizing the Arbitrum Nova deployment. No concerns here as the handoff seems adequately handled.
Continued Funding for the Arbitrum Foundation (Snapshot)
We voted For: In favor of the renewal of the Arbitrum Foundation. While the budget does seem quite high, we strongly see the need for the Foundation.
Continued Funding for the Arbitrum Foundation (On Chain)
We voted For: In line with our prior Snapshot vote. The budget remains on the high side, but with 54% of the request going to technical costs for running the network and the ask intentionally sized below projected 2027 expenses with the Foundation’s balance sheet covering the shortfall, we continue to see the Foundation as clearly necessary. The added clarity in the thread on G&A composition and milestone-gated partnership spending was helpful, and we would echo other delegates in wanting a clearer 2027 responsibility map across the AAEs as that picture firms up.
[Constitutional] AIP: Transition Arbitrum One ordering policy to Priority Gas Auctions (PGA) (Snapshot)
We voted For: We support retiring Timeboost in favor of a priority gas auction, which replaces the ahead-of-time express lane with per-transaction priority fee bidding in 125ms rounds and lowers the barrier to entry for emerging primitives like propAMMs and for the searchers and CEX-DEX arbitrageurs already familiar with this model on other EVM chains. The structural case is sound, since Timeboost participation thinned as builders exited and its ahead-of-time design fit poorly with primitives that need cheap, frequent, low-latency priority inclusion. We are reassured that the change keeps the sequencer’s private mempool intact, so it does not introduce sandwiching or frontrunning, and that the anti-starvation boost gives low and zero priority fee transactions a path to timely inclusion so revenue capture does not come at users’ expense. Routing 97% of priority fees to the DAO treasury and 3% to the Developer Guild preserves the revenue stream Timeboost established, and the two-year operator discretion over the K round parameter is bounded to a 1 to 10 range with the DAO retaining full control to reconfigure or disable. As a constitutional change this is the temperature check, and we expect to confirm in line on the subsequent on-chain vote.
Extending DRIP’s Mandate (Snapshot)
We voted For: This extends the DRIP mandate end date by a year to July 1, 2027 with no new funding and no other changes to the program, so the practical effect is to keep the remaining ~63.7M ARB available for deployment rather than have it returned while Season 2 is still being designed. The track record earns that runway, since Season 1 posted an adjusted cost-effectiveness ratio of 51 (76 on USD assets), the highest of any major Arbitrum incentive program to date, alongside yield-bearing stablecoin supply on Arbitrum growing from $130M to over $1B. We agree with the committee’s judgment that deploying 15 to 20M ARB into a misaligned campaign is a worse outcome than waiting to align Season 2 with the strategic developments they reference, and the downside of the extension is limited given the funds remain with the Foundation and are still gated by Season Selection Committee approval. Our one substantive ask is transparency: now that the mandate runs another year, we would like to see a concrete Season 2 timeline and design as soon as the in-flight developments allow.
AGV Wind-Down: Structured Transition & Return of Capital to the DAO Treasury (Snapshot)
We voted For: We support winding down AGV’s forward investment activity and returning the unused capital to the DAO treasury. Returning roughly 143.7M ARB of the original 225M allocation is a meaningful recovery of idle capital that is no longer aligned with the DAO’s current priorities, and narrowing AGV’s remaining scope to managing the existing portfolio plus selective follow-ons is the right way to preserve the value already deployed without committing fresh capital to a consumer and gaming venture thesis the ecosystem has moved past. Tasking OpCo under OAT oversight to effectuate the wind-down keeps execution inside the established accountability structure rather than standing up a new one. We would want the reserves retained for portfolio management and outstanding obligations through the end of 2026 reported transparently, with any further surplus returned to the treasury as it is freed up.
[Constitutional] AIP: Automate Timeboost Proceeds Split (Snapshot)
We voted For: This automates the already-ratified 97/3 Timeboost proceeds split on Arbitrum One and Nova by routing bid proceeds through a fee splitter, with 97% to the DAO treasury and 3% to the Arbitrum Developer Guild, rather than requiring a separate 30-plus day on-chain vote each time the ADG’s share needs to be transferred. The split was approved with the original Timeboost adoption, so this is an operational cleanup that removes recurring governance overhead and the risk of a manual distribution being delayed or missed. We see no downside to automating a distribution the DAO has already committed to, and routing the ADG portion to the Foundation-controlled address keeps the existing oversight intact. As a constitutional change this is the temperature check, and we expect to confirm in line on the on-chain vote.
Fast Feed: Constitutional AIP (Snapshot)
We voted For: This establishes the Fast Feed, a paid, authenticated stream that lets subscribers see transactions and their relative ordering after the sequencer has ordered them but before the full block is emitted, packaged as a subscription product for latency-sensitive participants like searchers and propAMMs. The design is careful where it matters, since the feed is read-only and strictly post-ordering, so it introduces no new sandwiching or frontrunning surface, changes nothing about ordering, inclusion, or the fees anyone pays, and access is permissionless behind the subscription rather than reserved for whoever can co-locate. Routing 97% of subscription revenue to the DAO treasury and 3% to the Developer Guild through the audited RewardDistributor follows the same framework as Timeboost and the PGA transition we supported, converting a latency advantage that would otherwise accrue privately into recurring DAO revenue. The two-year parameter adjustment rights for Offchain mirror the PGA arrangement, with the DAO alone retaining control of the revenue split. As a constitutional change this is the temperature check, and we expect to confirm in line on the on-chain vote.
OAT Elections (Snapshot)
We voted 20% each to Jojo, A.J. Warner, Rika Goldberg, Alex Netto, and Varit Ruangsiri: We split our weight evenly across the five candidates we consider the strongest fit for the Oversight and Transparency Committee, based on their governance track record and their capacity to scrutinize execution, spending, and reporting independently. The OAT’s value comes from members who will hold process and disbursements to account rather than rubber-stamp them, and this slate carries that mix of experience and rigor. We spread our weight equally rather than concentrating it to give each of our five the best chance of securing a seat under the weighted count.
[Constitutional] AIP: Ratification of Security Council Election Process Improvements (Snapshot)
We voted For: This ratifies four of the five Security Council election process improvements from the September 2025 temperature check, ahead of the on-chain vote. Moving the cohort duration from one to two years and halving the election frequency addresses the real voter and candidate fatigue of running the process every six months, lowering the Nominee Selection threshold from 0.2% to 0.1% of votable ARB keeps the candidate pool from thinning as active voting power shifts around, and letting candidates and sitting members rotate keys during the compliance phase and their term removes an operational friction that previously required emergency actions. We are comfortable that the one omitted change, letting re-applying incumbents skip Nominee Selection, was dropped in response to delegate feedback, and that a full Trail of Bits audit of the changes was completed. As a constitutional change this is the temperature check, and we expect to confirm in line on the subsequent on-chain vote.
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[Constitutional] AIP: ArbOS 61 Elara (On Chain)
We voted For: This activates the ArbOS 61 Elara protocol upgrade on Arbitrum One and Nova, a standard Nitro version bump we are comfortable supporting. The version was moved from ArbOS 60 to 61 after Sepolia testing surfaced two interacting bugs in the gas refund logic whose fix touches the State Transition Function and so required a fresh version, and since ArbOS 60 was never activated on One or Nova, neither chain was ever exposed. We are comfortable that Dynamic Pricing, the multidimensional gas feature, is deliberately left disabled here, since Offchain Labs and Entropy Advisors concluded it is better to align Arbitrum’s implementation with Ethereum’s eventual multidimensional gas spec, EIP-8037 targeted for the Glamsterdam hardfork, to keep the long-term Geth diff and maintenance burden manageable, and there are real performance tradeoffs at 100ms blocktimes. The scope is otherwise identical to the reviewed Elara release, and catching and cleanly re-versioning the gas-refund issue on testnet before mainnet is exactly the release discipline we want, so we support the upgrade.
[Constitutional] AIP: Ratification of Security Council Election Process Improvements (On Chain)
We voted For: The on-chain ratification of the Security Council election process improvements, in line with our temperature-check vote. It adopts the four changes from the September 2025 review, moving to two-year cohorts with annual elections, lowering the Nominee Selection threshold to 0.1% of votable ARB, and allowing key rotation during the compliance phase and mid-term, all backed by the completed Trail of Bits audit. With the omitted incumbent-bypass change already dropped in response to delegate feedback, we are comfortable confirming this on-chain.
Arbitrum Security Program (Snapshot)
We voted For: This continues the Arbitrum Audit Program, which delivered on its mandate by surfacing and remediating real vulnerabilities before mainnet and bringing a high share of net-new teams to Arbitrum, and evolves it into a broader Arbitrum Security Program spanning AI-assisted screening, audits, the bug bounty, and Security Council support across the full security lifecycle. It carries no new treasury request, funding the next twelve months from the roughly $1.76M USDC and 25M ARB already held by the Foundation, and adds sensible operational refinements like right-sizing the technical retainer to $2.5k per month, a lightweight optimistic approval for program changes, and quarterly transparency reporting. Continuing a proven, subsidised-security program that removes a real cost barrier for early teams without asking for fresh funds is exactly the kind of ecosystem investment we support.
[Constitutional] AIP: Authorize Priority Gas Auctions and Establish the Fast Feed (On Chain)
We voted For: This constitutional AIP bundles two changes into one atomic on-chain vote, each of which already cleared its own Snapshot temperature check: transitioning Arbitrum One’s ordering policy from Timeboost to Priority Gas Auctions while sunsetting Timeboost on Nova, and establishing the Fast Feed, a paid, authenticated stream that delivers ordered transactions and metadata to subscribers ahead of the per-block sequencer feed. We support moving both on-chain together, since Priority Gas Auctions tie transaction ordering to transparent, per-transaction priority fees rather than the Timeboost auction, and the Fast Feed turns low-latency ordered data into a permissioned revenue stream for the chain. Both mandates were separately vetted through their temperature checks, so we are comfortable with the single combined execution payload, and would want the implementation updates folded in since those votes to be clearly documented.
Banning projects identified in the high-severity Watchdog Program cases - Good Entry (Snapshot)
We voted FOR - Ban Good Entry: On-chain analysis found 142,839 ARB distributed to 1,032 ineligible users during and after the STIP period, alongside evidence of self-farming by wallets connected to the team’s own addresses, and Good Entry refused to cooperate when the committee asked for clarification. That combination, incentives routed to ineligible recipients plus a suspected self-sybil cluster, is squarely the deliberate large-scale misuse the high-severity bar was written for, and the refusal to engage removes the benign explanations we would otherwise want to weigh. The project was given a week to present its case on the forum thread and did not, and the funds were not returned. Since Good Entry has ceased operations the ban reaches the founders rather than a live team, which is the right scope if the standard is to mean anything the next time the same people apply.
Banning projects identified in the high-severity Watchdog Program cases - Limitless (Snapshot)
We voted FOR - Ban Limitless: This is the most clear-cut of the three cases, since the team swapped 75,000 ARB of LTIPP grant funds to USDC and bridged the proceeds to Base, taking the capital out of the Arbitrum ecosystem entirely rather than deploying it into the incentive program it was awarded for. Converting a grant to stablecoins and moving it to another chain is not an accounting error or a reporting failure, it is the deliberate removal of DAO funds, and the committee was unable to reach anyone on the team to hear a different account. No response came in the week provided and nothing was returned. We support the ban on that record, and with the project no longer operating the effect is to hold the founders to it.
Banning projects identified in the high-severity Watchdog Program cases - APX Finance (Snapshot)
We voted FOR - Ban APX Finance: This is the largest of the three cases at 239,714 ARB, and it stacks three distinct failures: a substantial share of LTIPP funds left sitting in team treasury addresses rather than the distributor contracts, distributions that did reach those contracts arriving late, and on-chain evidence tying a sybil cluster back to team addresses. Any one of those might invite a process argument, but together they describe a team treating an incentive grant as its own balance sheet, and no clarification was offered when the committee tried to make contact. The week for a reply passed without one and the ARB was not returned. We note this is the one case of the three where the project is not described as defunct, so the ban carries real forward effect rather than attaching only to founders, and on this record we think that is warranted.