Proposal: AGV Council Compensation Calibration: Benchmark for Next Term & Startup-Phase Bonus

I’m voting Abstain on the retroactive rewards

I value what the AGV is doing in finding strong potential candidates to lead the gaming efforts on Arbitrum. The thing is we are not there yet… competing for the gaming ecosystem is a huge opportunity, but not an easy task. I see the great work being done and want to acknowledge those efforts. Which is why I’m on the fence here, and won’t vote against.

I would support this for sure if the council showed a stronger long term commitment with longer vesting periods as @zeptimus mentioned in his comment on snapshot. Maybe 5 years with a 2 year cliff? 1 year seems like it will go by too fast.

OR, even better, would be KPI based vesting … like when one of the games you supported hits x revenue in on-chain fees… or something, then the ARB is released to you… That would be an easy one to support.

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gm, voting ABSTAIN on the retroactive rewards.

The current council has earned $30k per year for working ~10 hours per week (per the presented table), equivalent to $120k annually for a full time role.

While that seems more than reasonable to me, I trust the other AAEs and delegates who have had the opportunity to monitor the work more closely.

I share the concerns raised above:

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After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation decided to vote FOR on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.

Rationale

We would like to begin by noting that the DAO recently supported increasing the future compensation for the upcoming AGV Council to $50,000 per year for Council Members and $100,000 for the Investment Committee seat. Based on the 40 hours per month budgeted in the table for the start-up phase, this translates to slightly over $100/hour in the first case and around $200/hour in the second. If we add the 60,000 ARB bonus vested over 6 months, at current prices, that represents an additional $70/hour.

In this proposal, with a 90,000 ARB bonus vested over 12 months, the hourly rate would increase by $52.50, considering that the previous rate was $62.50/hour ($30,000 per year ÷ 12 months ÷ 40 hours per month), resulting in $115/hour in total. From our perspective, the hourly rate paid so far does not reflect the level of seniority and background required for these roles, nor is it consistent with what the DAO has previously approved.

From this standpoint, the requested bonus seems reasonable. While we understand some delegates’ concerns regarding the expected impact of the AGV, in this particular case we are discussing a retroactive payment for the initial phase of an entity whose core purpose is to operate as a VC, meaning that tying this payment to measurable impact would be an overreach, as the true outcomes of such initiatives can only be observed after the initial phase.

With all due respect, we disagree with this idea in this particular case. We are discussing a retroactive payment for a Council whose composition in January 2026 (less than two months from now) remains uncertain — some of the members who are supposed to receive this bonus might not continue in their roles and would therefore have no control over what happens with the AGV afterward. For this reason, the 12-month vesting period already appears more than generous under the current agreement.

That said, we would support this type of approach for future payments, provided that Council members receive a degree of stability or tenure guarantee that ensures a fair alignment of incentives


Conclusions

In summary, the committee has had to perform more tasks than initially expected during the bootstrapping phase. The proposed hourly value is consistent with what was approved for the future in Proposal A, and still remains below the rate outlined in the original scope (approximately $150/hour, based on $2,500 for 16 hours per month).

Regarding vesting, we again find the proposed structure reasonable, since this is compensation for work already completed. If the DAO wishes to ensure greater accountability and long-term alignment through longer or KPI-based vesting schemes, we should also consider extending the Council members’ terms to at least two years. It would be inconsistent to demand long-term alignment in payments without providing a degree of stability, especially when dealing with a VC-style initiative that inherently operates with a long-term vision.

Finally, we want to emphasize again the importance of stability in these structures. Gaming, in particular, is an industry that requires time, and we believe that the best results are yet to come. We value that the team is now complete and have high expectations for Michael Chang as General Manager.

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The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members. Committee member Atomist was not involved in this discussion, as he is temporarily on leave.

The GMX Governance Committee is voting in favor of the proposal. The council members appear to have put in significant time and effort beyond the job scope initially outlined. Although a retroactive payment increase is not ideal, we believe commensurate compensation is warranted.

The AGV is one of the most important DAO-funded initiatives, and it feels reasonable to compensate the sitting council members for stepping up to ensure the AGV foundation is solid.

As others have noted, the AGV’s results so far fall short of initial expectations, but it is a long-term vision. And crypto gaming in general is currently a struggling sector. There’s a case to be made for the AGV’s mandate to be expanded to investments in domains outside of gaming. This, however, is a separate discussion.

Thanks again for this one!

Having seen this discussion running for a long period and having read carefully every comment I do agree with @tamara that

I listened carefully to what was said in Tuesday’s meeting to gain a deeper understanding of this proposal, as I do every time, but even if I understand more, this is a field in which I am not primarily focused.

Also, I will say again that

especially considering that AGV is part of the DAO that not only consumes capital but also contributes back to it.

Also, I saw that @paulofonseca’s concern was taken under consideration. I do realize that there are still concerns like those @cp0x mentioned, but up to this moment and according to my understing I see no reason for opposing this proposal.

That’s why I am going to vote FOR.

We’ll be ABSTAINING from this vote.

Our concern is not with the proposed compensation increase or performance bonus for Council members, but with the procedure that allows modifying or canceling proposals with a simple majority approval (>50%) rather than a 3% quorum threshold, as mentioned here.

While we recognize the operational convenience this framework brings, it introduces a governance security vulnerability, allowing substantial modifications after initial approval.

We are therefore abstaining, in disagreement with the process, but not with the AGV team’s intent or the substance of their proposal.

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The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.

We voted FOR.

We understand that the inaugural AGV Council took on a far greater workload than initially anticipated, building the program’s operational, legal, and investment foundations from the ground up. Until some time ago, @krst had been closely following some of these developments. Sometimes, simply discussing progress and potential ways forward took more than the assumed 10 hours per month for Council members. We can only imagine how much more work this required in practice.

Therefore, we see this one-time bonus not as an actual bonus but rather as a retroactive compensation for the extra work that has been delivered.

However, we agree with some delegate comments that the communication on the Council side was far from ideal. While we had a view on the additional work needed during the startup phase, we understand that many delegates lacked this insight. Our support assumes that AGV will continue to improve transparency and reporting. Going forward, we expect regular updates on program performance and Council operations so the DAO can better evaluate their impact.

Voting “For” as I know that the workload was far greater then initially anticipated and believe it is fair to provide this benefit

this is not true.

this proposal mentions specifically, on the Snapshot proposal body text, that:

For this proposal, the 3% quorum at the 23739805 Ethereum block is ~143.58M ARB. This vote achieved the 3% quorum since it got 152.5M ARB casted on the For + Abstain vote choices

Good to see you here JoJo, the work you guys have done is remarkable to me and I can compare it to other blockchain gaming grant systems, you are the most professional I have seen.

I voted for in the part B of this proposal. As several commented, the workload was way bigger than anticipated. I thank them for their effort and wish that, from now on, we have a more structured program running as it matures.

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voting Against in this offchain vote because I haven’t seen enough proof of results to justify this bonus.