Proposal - Delegate Incentive Program (DIP)

Proposals
61

Thank you very much for the new proposal. I’m surprised by the rubric. I think the work it demands is phenomenal, but it would be a great experiment to see how the evaluation of contributions turns out.

On the other hand, I’ve been thinking a bit about the new incentives scheme proposed and the program’s objective.

The new participation requirements modify the historical rate of voting to participation within the last 90 days. This shows that the program aims to incentivize new delegate participation.

In this regard, the program already has an established base of delegates, with incentives provided to between 30 and 35 delegates.

Additionally, the August results show that although 34 delegates were compensated, 48 meet the voting requirements to qualify. Therefore, there’s little room for new incentivized delegates to enter if those already participating reactivate under this new proposal.

I understand that what follows might generate different perspectives, and I’d love to hear the opinions of other delegates to enrich the debate. This is an RFC (which could eventually evolve into an RFC or a separate proposal), and I’d like to hear feedback.

From the same August results, I notice that a large portion of the delegates who currently or potentially qualify for program incentives are also receiving income from the DAO for other roles. Many hold positions on various committees, provide direct services, hold roles in the multiple exiting multisigs, or somehow earn from the DAO.

This situation raises a valid concern: are DAO roles chosen based on popularity contests, or are the most qualified candidates objectively selected for each position? In a system where service providers are selected by vote, this is entirely possible.

Now, is it possible to mitigate this risk?

I believe so: by limiting compensation for their role as delegates for those who are already paid by the DAO for other services.

I understand this is delicate because fulfilling the role of delegate takes time. And in reality, they are working and being paid for different things. That’s why I’m not proposing a complete exclusion of payment, but rather a partial reduction (tbd if supported).

The accumulation of roles in the DAO by certain actors with greater voting power presents a systemic risk, as it could lead to implicit or explicit collusion. Reducing payments for those already receiving income from the DAO is a preventive measure that reduces the incentive to concentrate power in a few hands.

I believe that by limiting payments to those who already benefit from the DAO, several advantages can be achieved:

  • Protect the DAO from being captured by influential delegates.
  • Protect the DAO from situations of collusion or the occupation of multiple roles due to popularity by reducing incentives to obtain those positions.

A good example of this is how @BlockworksResearch offered to collaborate with a paid working group, but without receiving additional income for that role. There are more examples of people waiving payment.

At the same time, the funds retained from this could expand the number of incentivized delegates from 50 without additional costs to the DAO. This would create incentives for new delegates to participate and stay active. @SEEDGov could even experiment with allocating resources to small delegates who have completed specific tasks and contributed value

By expanding the number of incentivized delegates, the DAO not only diversifies its voices but also reduces dependency on a few key actors, promoting more pluralistic governance and making it less susceptible to capture by influential parties.

To be clear: I recognize the great work of the current delegates and their commitment to the DAO. My proposal is not intended to question their contributions but to ensure that the incentive system is more inclusive and sustainable in the long run.

This “RFC” seeks to strengthen the DAO in the long term, preventing incentivized payments from concentrating in the hands of a few and ensuring greater diversity among delegates.

7 Likes
62

As we have already discussed in the telegram group:

Decentralizing reviews sounds interesting although we have some concerns about this:

  1. It is difficult to maintain unified criteria even with a rubric and pre-established parameters.

  2. The most qualified reviewers are likely to be delegates already participating in the program (this creates possible COIs) and if we create a committee especially dedicated to this that is renewed monthly, it could create friction in the participation of the delegates in the program, since by fulfilling a role as evaluators they could not participate in the program as delegates or vice versa.

  3. The frequent rotation of reviewers will cause bureaucratic problems and increase the difficulty as mentioned earlier of maintaining consistent criteria between each month/iteration.

  4. While we have mentioned that decentralizing the program somewhat can help both scale the program and mitigate the risks associated with having a single administrator, we are trying to take the program one step at a time. We feel that we should first test v1.5 and make sure that there is consensus in the DAO about the rubric and the criteria for scoring (this is something that is confirmed only in practice). We would say that in the first instance it will be very important to get feedback from the community to improve this aspect prior to any attempt to decentralize the administration of the program.

While 48 delegates met the minimum requirements to participate in August, it is also true that only 34 received compensation, indicating that the remaining 14 did not meet the requirements to be eligible for compensation. Additionally, according to our metrics, over these six months, there were an average of 31 delegates per month eligible for compensation, this indicates that there is room for new participants to join the program considering that in the original proposal there are 50 delegates that can be compensated per month.

However, if these registered delegates who do not meet the minimum TP are reactivated and we have new delegates competing for the remaining seats to be compensated, the DAO could evaluate increasing the number of incentivized delegates.

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To be honest, we don’t agree that we should somehow limit compensation for the role of delegates. We understand that in several situations there are delegates (who devote time as you rightly say) to fulfill that role and who are also devoting extra time to specific initiatives so we don’t see why anyone should receive less compensation for (ultimately) dedicating more of their time and effort to the DAO. At the same time, we would create a disincentive to participate in the program or apply for other initiatives since the delegate would have to evaluate what is best for him/her.

We believe that it should be up to each delegate to decide whether they receive additional compensation or not, and this is an example of that. In any case, the DAO may also evaluate if it wishes to select a particular role or position for a delegate already receiving remuneration for the DIP.

2 Likes
63

I want to express my idea once again.

Let’s spend a couple of months reporting on both proposals and understand how objectively we can evaluate the delegate’s contribution, and also understand how difficult it is to monitor this and how much time it takes.

Thus, based on the results of the test period, a decision will need to be made.

4 Likes
64

Call to action

We would like to announce that we will be hosting two special calls to explain details about the proposal and answer questions prior to publishing this proposal on Snapshot.

The first call will be on Monday, September 16, 2024 - 16:00 UTC

Link to the call: https://meet.google.com/sai-nbcx-iki

The second call will be on Wednesday, September 18, 2024 - 22:00 UTC

Link to the call: https://meet.google.com/otu-phpy-iyb

Both calls were added to the ArbitrumDAO Governance Calendar

After these calls, the proposal is expected to be sent to a Snapshot vote on September 19, 2024.

6 Likes
65

We are in full support of the Delegate Incentive Program v1.1. This proposal represents a meaningful step towards improving delegate engagement and participation within the Arbitrum DAO. By introducing a well-structured incentive program, it encourages delegates to remain active and committed, which in turn strengthens governance and ensures more thoughtful decision-making.

As a non-funded delegate group, Castle Capital dedicates several hours each week across multiple contributors to stay informed, perform research, reach consensus, and actively participate in the governance process. We meet regularly to review proposals, discuss them in detail, and vote responsibly with our community multisigs. This program acknowledges the effort and time invested by delegates like us, ensuring that those who contribute meaningfully to the ecosystem are fairly compensated for their work.

Key elements, such as the use of the Karma Score to track delegate contributions and the tiered reward structure based on performance, provide a fair and transparent method for recognizing valuable participation. The minimum delegation requirement of 50,000 ARB tokens strikes an appropriate balance between inclusivity and ensuring that delegates have a significant stake in governance.

We believe this program will help foster long-term commitment from delegates, create accountability, and enhance the overall health of the DAO. While we understand concerns around sustainability, we trust that this incentive program has been carefully designed to align with the DAO’s goals and resources.

We look forward to seeing the positive impact of this initiative on Arbitrum’s governance and encourage further community feedback to refine the proposal before a formal vote.

3 Likes
66

just to summarize here the feedback that I gave on the call that just happened so that this comment can be highly scored in a potential future DIP =)

  1. I think that the difference between the 1.1 option and the 1.5 option is much more than what is being represented by the difference in budget for the 2 options. For the 1.5 option the budget is roughly 1,7x higher than the 1.1 option, but it looks to me that option 1.5 is 3x, or 4x, or maybe even 5x the work to implement, for a program with a 1 year duration. This budget for option 1.5 doesn’t seem reasonable to me and in comparison should be much higher or there will be some serious chances that this program fails and the managers will need to ask for more budget midway, or close the program.
  2. It looks to me that requiring only 60% of vote participation for onchain votes is not high enough. For example, in the past 90 days there were only 10 onchain proposals in Arbitrum DAO. So asking these delegates to vote 10 times in 3 months is totally reasonable and allowing them to miss 40% of the votes is too benevolent in my opinion. I think the 60% of vote participation criteria should be much higher, maybe even 100%. And also, if delegates are worried about missing a vote, they can just subscribe to nice proposal reminders in proposals.app and they will get a wonderful email whenever they need to vote on an Arbitrum proposal, for both onchain, and offchain votes. And it’s free ninety nine! =)
  3. in the 1.5 option, for a delegate that has their monthly compensation slashed because their comments on the forum were graded on the rubric as lower quality then expected, that delegate will for sure demand knowing which were the specific comments and in which rubric they were scored lower. So the dashboard would need to be able to show that information, for every single comment, so that delegates get a fair grading and understand why their monthly compensation diminished from what their expectation was. Also, I think this will inevitably create a risky dynamic where the program managers would be policing the actual discourse on this discourse forum, by grading higher certain types of comments and grading lower another types of comments, since their own biases will always be at play. I personally wouldn’t like to be this type of police nor to be policed like this, in this forum.

and also another suggestion/idea:
I’m not sure how this program will interface with the ARB staking program but it wouldn’t shock me if this program would morph into being the DIP for the delegates that have between 50k and 500k ARB, and bigger delegates would get their compensation only from the staking mechanism. This upper 500k ARB limit is just a number chosen at random, but if we’re gonna have staking rewards for those with the most ARB, maybe the DIP would become the program that compensates the smaller delegates that wouldn’t be able to professionalize otherwise. Since honestly, the bigger delegates are already kinda professionalized.

7 Likes
67

If I could, I would demonstrate the efficacy of my qualitative grading methodology by grading and publishing the quality of feedbacks on this discussion thread - it’s only 67 of them and only one proposal :slightly_smiling_face:

3 Likes
68

well actually that makes me think of a great idea!

what about the SeedGov team would run the qualitative process of option 1.5, for the last month or the last 3 months, and would publish the amounts the delegates would have received if option 1.5 would be already live? this can be prototyped in some spreadsheets and we would have real data to inform if 1.5 is a better, fairer system than 1.1

4 Likes
69

seeing-is-believing-the-black-hokage

3 Likes
70

Looking at the data we collected during the first 3 months of the program (March, April, and May), the delegates registered in the program contributed 65.64% of the VP of voting in Tally during the 3 months.

You can also see in the following table the high level of delegate participation in the first 3 months. We hope that the metrics will still be promising given that in order to be eligible for compensation it will be necessary to obtain 65% or more of TP. Considering that the voting parameters cover 60% of the score (between PR, Snapshot, and Tally) it isn’t easy to receive compensation if you are not a consistent voter.

As we discussed on the Monday call, initially the rubric and report will be publicly available on the Karma dashboard, although the analysis will be provided in a general way. We expect to be able to go into more detail in the short/medium term with the help of the tools that Karma will provide. It should be noted that this version (if approved) will be treated on an experimental basis initially.

We are interested in aligning both proposals, but the staking is at a preliminary stage and we believe it is a discussion that can happen later. However, there is a working group already created by @Frisson that you can join if you want to deepen the discussion.

2 Likes
71

We would like to thank @SEEDGov for their efforts on this initiative. We recognize the significant challenges involved in designing a system that accommodates various complexities and stakeholders. While both proposed systems have their trade-offs, we believe each is an improvement over the current one. However, we believe that further iterations are still necessary to enhance their effectiveness.

We believe that v1.1 falls short of achieving the goal of driving quality contributions compared to v1.5. Our primary concern with v1.5 is the subjectivity in scoring. For instance, if someone receives a Level 2 (acceptable) score for clarity, what differentiates a score of 35% from 45%? This ambiguity can lead to discrepancies in individual grading. We recommend implementing a more objective scoring system to reduce variability. Instead of using percentage grades, we suggest assigning 1 point for each level, with a max of 4 points for each criteria and a maximum of 20 points total for the first 5 criteria (initial score).

Additionally, we believe that the criteria for Presence in discussions should carry more weight in evaluating contributions. We need to consider what constitutes a healthy level of presence in discussions. We would argue that a target closer to 50% is more appropriate, therefore anything less than that should be a reducing factor.

Here’s an example of our proposed changes to the scoring to demonstrate what we mean.

Proposed multiplier change:
Less than 25% presence in discussions: 0.9x multiplier

25-50% presence in discussions: 1x multiplier

50-75% presence in discussions: 1.1x

75%+ presence in discussions: 1.2x

To visualize (using the same example provided but with the revised scoring):

  • Relevance: Level 3 - Scoring achieved = 3
  • Depth of Analysis: Level 2 - Scoring achieved = 2
  • Timing: Level 4 - Scoring achieved = 4
  • Clarity and Communication: Level 2 - Scoring achieved = 2
  • Impact on Decision-Making: Level 3 - Scoring achieved = 3

Initial Score/Average: 70% or 14/20 or 2.8/4

  • Participation in Discussions: Level 3 - Multiplier assigned: 1.1x

Final Score: 70% x 1.1 = 77% or 23.1/30 Delegates’ Feedback points.

Lastly, it would be helpful to demonstrate how the current system would assess three delegates using the rubric and scoring methodology. This would provide delegates with a clearer understanding of the expected level of participation and effort under the new system.

7 Likes
72

gmgm

I would like to provide some final feedback, as I understand the proposal will go to Snapshot today. I’m beginning to feel concerned about the trend where absolutely all DAO proposals are denominated in USD rather than ARB.

I understand that the main reason for this shift is to ensure payment to various external service providers who are not immediately connected to the DAO, so they can be properly compensated for their services.

Although it’s debatable whether the DAO is currently in a position to guarantee such payments (it still doesn’t generate—will it ever?—enough USD-denominated revenue, and there hasn’t been a debate on what to do with the $ETH accumulated from chain revenue), I believe it could be justified for certain external service providers.

However, what is less clear to me is the justification for other programs, which I would categorize as governance and operations management of the DAO by its own governance participants.

In the initial token distribution, the DAO was allocated approximately 35% of the supply, which represents both an opportunity to significantly increase the circulating supply to cover DAO expenses, and a significant responsibility to maintain the token’s value, first for security and second for the interests of users and investors.

I believe that denominating payments in USD for governance participants creates a disincentive to protect the value of ARB, since the value received by those benefiting from the programs will remain the same regardless of whether the decisions made benefit the DAO and its long-term sustainability.

I understand that a significant part of ARB’s price action since the TGE is related to the token unlocks. (ty @karpatkey for the awesome report which I continue checking. when v2 btw):

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However, at this point, we are all fully aware of this situation, and no one should be surprised by this distribution scheme or the strong likelihood that those with unlocked tokens may decide to profit from it.

As a DAO, rather than shielding ourselves from a situation we already know exists and guaranteeing short-term benefits for participants, I believe we should focus on aligning incentives to strengthen the token and, in turn, the DAO’s security.

I think that denominating payments in USD works against that goal, as it misaligns incentives. On the other hand, denominating payments in ARB reinforces active participation in governance and the long-term stability of the token, as recipients are economically incentivized to ensure this happens.

Specifically, the delegate incentives program creates an economic incentive that stems directly from the dollar valuation of the reward. Today, I can acquire the ARB needed to participate in the program for around 27K USD, while the program offers up to 7K USD per month in rewards for 12 months (or 9, if you require 3 extra months for qualifying). Do the math. The fact that these 7K USD per month are guaranteed by the program results in a clear economic incentive to meet only the minimum requirements to qualify for the payments, which undermines the program’s intended purpose of professionalizing delegates.

This misalignment encourages delegates to meet the minimum thresholds necessary to receive payments, rather than striving for high-quality contributions that truly benefit the DAO in the long run. If the goal is to professionalize delegates, the incentive structure should promote excellence. USD-denominated payments undermine that goal.

One of the guiding principles of the Arbitrum DAO is sustainability:

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Denominating payments in ARB rather than USD would better align with the DAO’s core principle of sustainability. By doing so, we can ensure that both governance participants and the broader ecosystem work towards the long-term health and value appreciation of the ARB token, which is crucial for the DAO’s future security and success.

I am very much in favor of this proposal. I only ask that the denomination of payments in USD be reconsidered.

3 Likes
73

We note that sometimes it is assumed that fixing payments in ARB guarantees that the decisions are the best around sustainability and taking care of the value of ARB. Still, the price went from 1.75 to 0.55 in the last six months, even with delegates being incentivized in ARB. The price of ARB depends on a mix of issues (which include DAO decisions) but there are also other factors outside the DAO itself, such as ARB unlocks, market liquidity, or even macroeconomic decisions in various countries (such as a rate cut or rate hike).

That said, it is incorrect to deny any alignment in our proposal. There is a cap in ARB for each tier, and that implies that delegates must be interested in sustainability and value generation; otherwise, their compensation could be affected sooner or later.

Today the program is paying a maximum of $2,750 for 100% TP, which we believe is a relatively low amount for the volume of assignments currently at ArbitrumDAO. The idea of offering predictable incentives is that delegates will devote more time to ArbitrumDAO, professionalize to increase quality, have assurances that their efforts will be properly compensated, and continue to choose ArbitrumDAO over other attractive alternatives that will eventually appear.

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Currently, there are some inactive delegates with significant VP. This may be due to many factors; however, several delegates have expressed that they are unable to dedicate time to the DAO because they are busy with other work. This is alright, but how can we get these delegates to devote time to the DAO? How can we get them reactivated? These may be the questions we need to ask.

Here, we leave a series of tweets linked to the point we are trying to explain:

There is no such guarantee of getting 7k per month. Having the 50k ARB does not guarantee compensation, even voting in all proposals. Even if they managed to obtain even the minimum score by voting and justifying their votes, we would be talking about 3K per month for nine months, resulting in the same 27K you mention, considering the risk of ARB volatility + the fact that the scoring methodology could change (making this kind of speculations less predictable) makes the scenario you mention somewhat unfeasible.

Your argument could be reversed here: Why cover the service providers and not the delegates who are so important to the DAO? From a DIP POV, we believe that delegates are the most important SPs as they are the ones who have the VP that secures ArbitrumDAO and its ecosystem.

On the other hand, if the token goes up, isn’t it in the DAO’s best interest that we save ARB instead of continuing to pay the same amount?

I think most of the arguments against fixing in USD are geared towards scenarios where ARB goes down, but there is no mention of the inefficiency in fixing values in ARB for cases where it goes up. I’ll give you an example, assuming we set cap at 16,500 ARB today, would you think it fair/viable to keep paying the same amount in 6 months if the token did x3?

Thank you for this feedback. We have been discussing this internally, and we think you are right, so we will introduce the proposed changes prior to the Snapshot vote, with one caveat.

The Presence in discussions parameter will look like this:

Less than 25% presence in discussions: 1.0x multiplier

25-50% presence in discussions: 1.05x multiplier

50-75% presence in discussions: 1.1x multiplier

75%+ presence in discussions: 1.2x multiplier

While we agree that this is an important criteria and that a high level of presence is healthy, we prefer to avoid penalizing delegates who are not present in more than 25% of the discussions with a 0.9x.

Regarding the methodology’s testing, if v1.5 is chosen, this scoring system will be in a testing phase, and we, as Administrators, commit to submitting it to the DAO for consultation after three months of running the program.

4 Likes
74

Based on the feedback received from several delegates (@paulofonseca @JoJo @BlockworksResearch @KlausBrave @WintermuteGovernance @cp0x @maxlomu and others who attended the calls) regarding the administrative budget and also about the suggestions made by @404DAO, we are incorporating some changes before sending the vote to Snapshot:

  • Although the proposed administrative budget is sufficient in both versions, we understand that if there is a considerable increase in registrations, the workload would increase significantly. That is why we will incorporate a clause where if the program exceeds 65 participants (which is the number that we believe we could cover with the budget requested) we will reopen discussions in the forum on the budget, also considering the possibility of increasing the number of delegates incentivized.

  • Regarding the rubric, the changes proposed by @404DAO are incorporated almost in their entirety, leaving the scoring system as follows:

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Monthly Evaluation Process

1. Data Collection: At the end of the month, the complete set of contributions by each delegate across all discussions on the forum is reviewed.

2. Overall Evaluation: The rubric is used to assess the delegate’s overall performance on each criterion, based on a holistic view of their participation.

3. Score Assignment: A level of 1 to 4 is assigned to each criterion, based on the consistency and quality of the delegate’s contributions over the month. Each level has an assigned score, from 1 to 4.

4. Monthly Report: A qualitative and quantitative report summarizing the delegate’s performance over the month is then produced.

Scoring Methodology

Each rubric criterion has levels with an assigned score, from 1 to 4, depending on the level achieved.

The initial score is obtained by adding the first five criteria, while the final score results from applying the “Presence in Discussions” multiplier to the initial average score. The maximum Initial Score is 20 points and 30 points for the Final Score.

For illustrative purposes, here’s an example:

  • Relevance: Level 3 - Scoring achieved = 3

  • Depth of Analysis: Level 2 - Scoring achieved = 2

  • Timing: Level 4 - Scoring achieved = 4

  • Clarity and Communication: Level 2 - Scoring achieved = 2

  • Impact on Decision-Making: Level 3 - Scoring achieved = 3

Initial Score/Average: 70% or 14/20 or 2.8/4

  • Participation in Discussions: Level 3 - Multiplier assigned: 1.10x

Final Score: 70% x 1.1 = 77% or 23.1/30 Delegates’ Feedback points.

Also if v1.5 is chosen, this scoring system will be in a testing phase, and we, as Administrators, commit to submitting it to the DAO for consultation after three months of running the program.

We would like to thank the more than 30 delegates who attended both calls. Your input has been significant and we have noted a strong interest in the incentive program.

7 Likes
75

This only adds up to 70% TP, where is the other 30% coming from? What are we missing?

So if we attend both bi weekly calls, is it 5% BP or 2.5% for attending BOTH (both or nothing)?

Thanks for the update! Overall, we are happy to see all of the new updates and are in favor of version 1.5 more than 1.1. This main option we are in favor of is the changes to how communication is recorded, mainly how it will be holistic instead of a more “gameable” system.

3 Likes
76

Here is the Parameter Summary. Your quote is from tl;dr and only includes changes (parameters like Tally Voting didn’t change).

It’s 2.5% for each call. If you attend to all calls (three in total, two from bi-weekly calls and one for the monthly) you get 7.5% BP.

4 Likes
77

After all the, feedbacks here, feedbacks in the call and private feedbacks, voting “For” on DIP 1.5.

Is gonna be a mess, seed is gonna have the hardest time of their life, and I am pretty sure a lot of folks will initially complain about having that 0.75 points more in this or that category.

But often times than not the hardest path is also the path that leads to the biggest growth, and I think evaluating not only the votes, but a big part of the arbitrum governance life, is what we need. We literally need to put all delegates in the position of interacting, and interact in a meaningful way.

A few things here

  1. we are going to have to obviously trust the seed gang here. I won’t quote Uncle Ben here. But you know where i am going with this
  2. that said, if I had to trust one delegate on a massive program like this, it would be seed. Having had the pleasure to work with some of them, and meet a few of them, I see them as a force of good that is pushing more than others for adoption of crypto not to speculate but to solve specific problems. I quote this because is easy for some, as we saw in the call, to think that there could be too much power concentration. While is true, is also necessary since a public mechanism for evaluation would be not only extremely unfeasible, but won’t be consistent over time. TLDR: I trust seed latam, a lot, to run this in the fairiest way possible
  3. As suggested, I think the spread of costs between 1.5 and 1.1 of around 40k is too small. We could find ourself to have a (positive) explosion of delegates presence between this program, the staking program and all the initiatives we have. The amount of work is almost linear with the amount of delegates we have, and since this program is a 1y long one my strong suggestion is to add a clause, on the tally vote, for which that if we will be above X amount of delegates, they might ask for some further funds to cover opex, which is mostly manual labour
  4. in the previous iteration, seed if i recall was not able to enroll in the program to avoid conflicts. I think this be removed for 1.5. To make the participation fair and agnostic, the evaluation of seed governance could be only about the amount of votes, onchain and offchain, plus call particpation. for the rest of the evaluation, subject to interpretation, it could just be the median of the score of all delegates involved in the program, or maybe the median of the second lower half.

Yes, in all of this I am saying that seed should be able to ask more and enroll in the program, thus incresing overall cost. While aware of this, I also understand the enormous amount of workload this program will bring to their shoulders, being a cow that reads all the posts and comments in the forum: if i imagine myself not only reading all, but also evaluating all, and knowing how much this program will probably be relevant for the arbi staking proposal, I really want for seed to have all the ability to do the best job possible here. And here it means being able to onboard all the people they think are needed to have a consistent evaluation over the next 12 months.

6 Likes
78

I voted FOR - DIP V1.5 because this is one of the most experimental and innovative delegate incentive programs I’ve seen. And I think it’s worth trying it out.

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80

The proposal is now live in Snapshot!

https://snapshot.org/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x1326cb522a74b29fb12d52bb302b245180c2b8f6e1fe8f295c4447bd96a5bacd

1 Like
81

The past six months of the Delegate Incentive Program have demonstrated that it is indeed an effective governance plan, even though I personally have not received rewards every month. Nevertheless, the program has successfully motivated most delegates. Although the incentives are not large, they serve as recognition of the delegates’ work. No one wants their efforts to go unnoticed or unappreciated, and excellent work deserves positive feedback. So I fully support this proposal.

4 Likes