September 2024 voting
Snapshot votings
[Constitutional] Extend Delay on L2Time Lock
Vote: For
STIP-Bridge Operational Budget
Vote: Abstain
[Replace Oversight Committee with MSS] Delegate to Voter Enfranchisement Pool — Event Horizon
Vote: For
ArbitrumDAO Procurement Committee Phase II
Vote: For
[Pyth Network] Arbitrum LTIPP Extension Request
Vote: Against
Synthetix LTIP Grant Extension Request
Vote: Against
Thank you for this detailed feedback.
I am, unfortunately, voting against this and all the other extention requests in Arbitrum.
I would have normally been in favour if it wasn’t for the detox proposal just recently presented, and passed, in our DAO; but that proposal is an extremely important signal about 1) trying to see what happens to our chains with no incentives 2) give the time to the DAO to best reflect how to weaponize these programs in future. There is also the secondary point, not necessarily as important but indeed important, about competitive advantages of protocols asking for an extention versus protocols that just finished in LTIPP or about to finish in STIP.But I also want to add a few things. I really feel you about first, the excitement of participating to this program, and then the constant small delays of integrations and tech development that turn out to be eating more and more week over week on the timeline, up to the point you had to come here to ask for this extention; I have seen this happening, and even in the protocols i work for we had to take hard and complex decisions due to delay of partners’ integrations.
As you already partially mentioned most of the issue would be addressed by a longer program, in which of course we need to embed a process for these and other similar situations: if you have 1 year, and you need to skip the first three months for technical issue, you will still have a way in.Finally, i want to commend the effort the synthetix team made to come to arbitrum. You decided to go for a specific push in our chain, with an ad-hoc application and obviously a lot of work behind it, on a product level, strategic level and marketing level, and what did happen is indeed unfortunate but also something quite common in the tech world. For this reason, in the next program, I will be one your stronger supporter fwiw.
Enhancing Multichain Governance: Upgrading RARI Governance Token on Arbitrum
Vote: For
Seconding blockworks, gauntlet and others, support in a proposal that in future can potentially be replicated and tailored to basically allows the onboarding of more protocols over time in arbitrum.
Voting for.
Fund the Stylus Sprint
this proposal makes sense. Voting in favour: pushing stylus, from adoption and marketing standpoint, can only increase the strength of technical positions of Arbitrum as a chain, which hopefully will also reflect on the economics down the road. Stylus is a strategic advantage we have.
Now, a few points worth discussing.
Not sure if this would be outside the idea of a “sprint”, but maybe is worth discussing @Entropy.
The amount of the program is non trivial, and the minimum amount suggested, 50k is non trivial either. For a budget of $750k in new protocols and ideas i received 84 proposals in 4 months. While here is more scoped, the combination of only an 8 weeks application + a relative high budget might create a rush of application which, while indication of success, might not be the best organic answer you might be looking for. Suggestion could be a cohort type of approach like the one we had in the UAGP program, potentially here alternative a 4 weeks application + feedback with a 4 weeks evaluation, and repeat for 3 seasons, covering the first 6 months of the program. And this would also mean putting at budget a little bit more than what was posted due to operations extending for further 4 months.
Due to also how the committee is structure and the length of the program, I suggest you to either select in the committee a program manager or add one when you go to tally. There will be plenty of decisions or complex situations along the way such as
- evaluating diversity of application from a higher point of view
- keeping consistency in modus operandi of reporting and communication
- being the ultimate decision maker, in case of disagreement of the commission, on changes from protocols’ developments along this long year, non expected outcomes from protocols and other circumstances that are just too heterogeneous to be mentioned here.
As you described it, entropy could be that program manager, but I also see you listed as advisor; might be worth clarifying.On the milestones:
Milestone distribution will function as the following are achieved:
- 10% - Planning + Building: Creation of a Development Plan, Architecture Design, Prototyping, Implementation, Optimization.
- 30% - Deployment: Testing, Auditing, Deployment. *Projects will be eligible but not guaranteed admission into the subsidy program per the ADPC
- 25% - Checkpoint 1
- 25% - Checkpoint 2
This makes a lot of sense theoretically but might just not be practically doable based on previous experience. You should try to integrate this in the template/framework for protocols, but you should also be flexible to other type of structures, because is extremely likely that other needs will arise.
As a final note, i am TOTALLY in favour in a non election type of the committee. In general, while a dao should be open for roles, there are several situation in which the knowledge to be part of a committee is just too vertical that elections are just detrimental. This program, and the ADPC, are clear examples.
Hope this helps, and sorry for not providing this feedback earlier before the snapshot.
[Aave DAO] LTIPP Grant Extension Request
Vote: Against
Voting against. Let me first report a previous feedback released for synthetix, and still relevant here.
I am, unfortunately, voting against this and all the other extention requests in Arbitrum.
I would have normally been in favour if it wasn’t for the detox proposal just recently presented, and passed, in our DAO; but that proposal is an extremely important signal about 1) trying to see what happens to our chains with no incentives 2) give the time to the DAO to best reflect how to weaponize these programs in future. There is also the secondary point, not necessarily as important but indeed important, about competitive advantages of protocols asking for an extention versus protocols that just finished in LTIPP or about to finish in STIP.But I also want to add a few things. I really feel you about first, the excitement of participating to this program, and then the constant small delays of integrations and tech development that turn out to be eating more and more week over week on the timeline, up to the point you had to come here to ask for this extention; I have seen this happening, and even in the protocols i work for we had to take hard and complex decisions due to delay of partners’ integrations.
As you already partially mentioned most of the issue would be addressed by a longer program, in which of course we need to embed a process for these and other similar situations: if you have 1 year, and you need to skip the first three months for technical issue, you will still have a way in.And I’ll be honest, I am quite said of not seeing the full fledged program about GHO going live in arbitrum, especially after being the LTIPP advisor for AAVE. I can see value + utility for the ecosystem.
My strong advice here, is prepare in the next quarter everything that is needed, from a tech/audit standpoint on the GHO ecosystem. Whatever the next iteration of the program is going to be, I don’t see AAVE not being part of it as one of the main lender, and not being part of it as stablecoin facilitator in the ecosystem, including GHO. I think it will be a no brainer a collaboration between arbitrum and AAVE, also on the diffusion and adoption of gho and increase of stablecoin liquidity in the ecosystem.
So, while I understand this vote can be a frustrating, I am definitely keen to see AAVE here as a constant presence in crypto and in Arbitrum specifically, as well as an important participant to any relevant incenive program we might spin up in future.
Constitutional AIP: Proposal to adopt Timeboost, a new transaction ordering policy
Vote: Collect bids in ETH to treasury
Confirming my previous take, I am voting for collecting the fees in eth.
While the buyback and burn would create some sort of upward pressure, this will be dwarfed by the unlocks; considering we are on track to also approve the arb staking proposal, to me it makes more sense, for now, to just collect everything in eth.
I can also see the dao going back to this decision after a few years to reasses.
Terms of Tenure for STEP program manager
Vote: Earmark Funds from existing, Have a new elections, Run the program for only 6 months, Liquidate the program, Abstain
exploiting for shortening reasons the response from Pennsylvania University cause i voted in the same order (earmark funds, new elections, only 6 months, liquidation of the program, abstain)
Goal is to find the funds to pay Steakhouse for a whole year, to me anything else is unacceptable knowing the effort that was done to create this program growth oriented. Let’s find the money to keep the program running please.
PS please, for the future, write the options in the snapshot in a better way. I understand that there are characters limitations, but a simple option a / b / c etcetera with an explanation of each option in the test would make everything clearer. Took me a few minutes to understand how to properly vote in the way I wanted.
ArbitrumDAO Off-site
Vote: IRL/conference/no scholarships
Voting as per the below
I’m in favour of meeting people, but with a series of caveat.
IF we have to do it, to me would be key to have it on major conferences: despite all the fun and giggles, this event or conferences are de facto job travels, and would like to keep it at minimum if possible.
I am also not a fan of scholarships in a case like this one, so it was not my first choice.
As a final note, I think online would not be meaningful nor different from the calls we do on a day to day basis.Would also like to add that while i can generally support the idea, a potential tally vote to me is dependent on the initiatives that will be moved forward by the GovHack team, that I would favour over this one due to the previous track record.
GovHack Devcon in Bangkok - Hack Humanity
Vote: FOR
This is proposal is something I am really glad came in our forum.
It has several stuff that either we did succesfully in the past (the govhackaton) or stuff that naturally came in during previous govhacks that the dao and delegates ned (core day).
I told this klauss in a call, when people come to govhack, since it is the first event that gathers people in the arbitrum ecosystem, it naturally transforms (also) in a BD event, with delegates jumping between helping teams and tracks vs personal meetings with others; but this latter part happens without a dedicated time and space, thus creating and inefficient situation.
While I understand that some might ask themself why the addition of core, this is the exact reason: satisfy a need that happens naturally cause of the dynamics described above.
Some more details are likely needed to lay down the proper rules of this new part, but these can be decided together in the next 2 months.
Full support to this initiative, especially cause is quite contained in price.
consistently with this, voting a strong FOR on this initiative.
I really appreciated GovHack at ETHcc, and Klauss was able to go around and gather feedbacks on how to improve.
The initial core day i think is quite important because of the timeline dynamic we see, and is perfectly complementary to the event as we know it. Plus, the budget is somehow contained compared to similar initiatives currently in discussion/vote.
[Non-Constitutional] Arbitrum DAO Delegate Incentive Program
Vote: FOR DIP 1.5
After all the feedbacks here, feedbacks in the call and private feedbacks, voting “For” on DIP 1.5.
Is gonna be a mess, seed is gonna have the hardest time of their life, and I am pretty sure a lot of folks will initially complain about having that 0.75 points more in this or that category.
But often times than not the hardest path is also the path that leads to the biggest growth, and I think evaluating not only the votes, but a big part of the arbitrum governance life, is what we need. We literally need to put all delegates in the position of interacting, and interact in a meaningful way.
A few things here
- we are going to have to obviously trust the seed gang here. I won’t quote Uncle Ben here. But you know where i am going with this
- that said, if I had to trust one delegate on a massive program like this, it would be seed. Having had the pleasure to work with some of them, and meet a few of them, I see them as a force of good that is pushing more than others for adoption of crypto not to speculate but to solve specific problems. I quote this because is easy for some, as we saw in the call, to think that there could be too much power concentration. While is true, is also necessary since a public mechanism for evaluation would be not only extremely unfeasible, but won’t be consistent over time. TLDR: I trust seed latam, a lot, to run this in the fairiest way possible
- As suggested, I think the spread of costs between 1.5 and 1.1 of around 40k is too small. We could find ourself to have a (positive) explosion of delegates presence between this program, the staking program and all the initiatives we have. The amount of work is almost linear with the amount of delegates we have, and since this program is a 1y long one my strong suggestion is to add a clause, on the tally vote, for which that if we will be above X amount of delegates, they might ask for some further funds to cover opex, which is mostly manual labour
- in the previous iteration, seed if i recall was not able to enroll in the program to avoid conflicts. I think this be removed for 1.5. To make the participation fair and agnostic, the evaluation of seed governance could be only about the amount of votes, onchain and offchain, plus call particpation. for the rest of the evaluation, subject to interpretation, it could just be the median of the score of all delegates involved in the program, or maybe the median of the second lower half.
Yes, in all of this I am saying that seed should be able to ask more and enroll in the program, thus incresing overall cost. While aware of this, I also understand the enormous amount of workload this program will bring to their shoulders, being a cow that reads all the posts and comments in the forum: if i imagine myself not only reading all, but also evaluating all, and knowing how much this program will probably be relevant for the arbi staking proposal, I really want for seed to have all the ability to do the best job possible here. And here it means being able to onboard all the people they think are needed to have a consistent evaluation over the next 12 months.
[Non-Constitutional] Funds to Bolster Foundation’s Strategic Partnerships Budget
Vote: FOR
I am voting “for” on this proposal.
As stated above, I think the idea of the foundation having a fund to foster growth for specific deals, is what is needed, especially for orbit expantion.
I partially second the voices of folks calling for more transparency; I also understand that not all details should be disclosed and, in some cases, some details can’t be disclosed due to either specific agreements or just business logic.
We have several gaps here due to the status of Foundation, as the most important stakeholder in our ecosystem. And I don’t think anybody wants to challenge this status, nor thinks it doesn’t hold true. But potentially, this is not for example a way to disclose some information to the dao (re: foundation grant program, while we can see the end protocol getting the grant, I don’t think there is a public list of the amount or scope for each grant request, just to give an example).So, while the above could be a bit off topic here, would be a solution similar to the one adopted for the GCP be useful?
In there we have a council, under NDA, that can have full knowledge on the operation behind, and can alert the DAO in case something is wrong, and potentially claw back funds (paging @Djinn for confirmation here). I don’t think we should gun necessarily for this specific type of dynamic, nor I do think the DAO should claw back funds from the foundation. But a certain degree of oversight/collaboration, even if under NDA, could be useful, and in general could be a good tool to leverage the operation of DAO and foundation. This council can indeed steer the convo of dao’s initiative toward specific ones that would benefit on going deal of the foundation, and the council could be part of the transparency semestral report (or, add an indepedent section all together).I am spitballing ideas here, and I am open to a feedback that is: all of this is just nonsense, is non applicable, doesn’t solve problems, does only introduce friction.
But since the foundation is coming to the dao, and since we should enhance the synergy between the dao and the foundation in general because we all have the same goal, this initiative could be a start.
Tally votings
Funds to bootstrap the first BoLD validator
Vote: For
Confirming previous snapshot votes about letting foundation run the first Bold validator and financing potential third parties.
ARB Staking: Unlock ARB Utility and Align Governance
Confirming previous snapshot vote; I also think the new details on the technical implementation (the unistaker module, ability to introduce a small timelock and others) make a lot of sense.
Vote: For
[CANCELED] Delegate to Voter Enfranchisement Pool — Event Horizon
Vote: Against
Vote cancelled due to the wrong details in the proposal, voting against
Delegate to Voter Enfranchisement Pool — Event Horizon
Vote: For
- confirming the Tally vote here. I think this is a very cool experiment, to have a distributed delegated. We will see the frequency of votes and the alignment of votes. I think is worth seeing the results, and I think it would help addressing the rising quorum since my expectation is a 100% presence in all votings, both in snapshot and tally.
- voting in favour for the addition to the MSS to the program in the snapshot vote. As part of the MSS i am glad projects are getting onboarded, the more the better, to save costs and increase security.
Security council
Nominee Selection
Vote: Dedaub (100% of the weight)
I am a poor cow with just about 50k votes.
For this reason, i decided in this round to just push for Dedaub.
Not only they are an audit firm but, more than others, thanks to the ADPC program, are more entrenched in the arbitrum ecosystem. I think we should double down on people and entities committed in our blue chain, and I think that their experience plus their tailored role in here will be helpful in the security council.