Proposal: Include LPs in Gov Voting

Category: Non-Constitutional AIPs

Submitted by: Ceazor


This document proposes that a list of accepted Liquidity Positions starts to be compiled with the ultimate goal of including them as legitimate votable positions.


DeFi is the life line of any chain. And forcing governance tokens to be held in spot is not only behind the times, but also weakens the durability of the token itself. We should encourage the deepening of the ARB token liquidity, but be selective on what is a valid position.


  • Positions that deepen liquidity but don’t force the selling of the ARB token should be considered.
  • Protocols that are both native and migrated should be considered.
  • Track records of protocols need to be considered to avoid rug risk.

Steps to Implement

1. Compile the list

This list will need to grow with the development on the chain. So there needs to be adaptability as well as a team that will maintain this endeavour.

2. Solidify the voting venue

Without a certain voting venue, ie Snapshot, Tally, it becomes wasteful to implement the list if the venue were to change on a regular basis.


This would certainly be ongoing.


Time spent by the team, should be compensated in some regards, but the amounts I leave open for discussion.


Thanks Ceazor! Indeed would be interesting to see this approach to governance. Is there any other example of a chain/protocol doing the same? A few things at first make me doubt on the approach:

  1. We could unintentionally benefit at first some protocols and make the DAO not neutral by encouraging some protocols over others.
  2. I’m not sure of how hard is to integrate the logic that would allow this functionality. We have to think that this should work for any LP and not in favor of special type of tokens/pools.
  3. I feat that this seems to people not related with the DAO as “sponsoring” some protocols and that the image of the DAO can be damaged by hacks, rugs, …

Many smaller projects do it with snapshot strategies. Even one of my own uses many positions to allocate voting power.

  1. I agree, but creating a list 1st doesn’t grant the power, but it does creating bullish sentiments
  2. It’s quite easy in snapshot using strategies like erc20-balance-of-weighted and masterchef-pool-balance But this is my first interaction with Tally and am not aware of his capabilites.
  3. But the DAO should support the use of projects on the chain, but it does need to be unbias to our own personal bags, so we can’t just start with a few of our favourites.

I support this proposal.

This issue has been seen time and time again in other defi ecosystems. It would be good for us to get ahead of this and begin to build support. Let me know if you want help compiling the list.

With regards to voting venue: we should leverage a combination of both Snapshot and Tally
Snapshot for low-impact decisions that can be off-chain and sentiment checks before on-chain votes
Tally for all high-impact decisions and those that must be on-chain


i like this idea…

snapshot for adding positions to list. and tally for implementing the list.

Perhaps we start a list here, or maybe a gSheet with addresses… but before significant work is done to make the list and prepare the strategies, be best to have a vote either for or against this


I would support this proposal as well as we too will be shifting some assets over to ARB pools.


All of the LP positions with $ARB are token holders who own governance rights. I don’t think selectivity is fair or legitimate to attach to voting rights. I would support using Flexible Voting.

As for the intention of rewarding LPs in a selective way, we could do an AIP asking for 365k $arb and use quadratic voting to decide which LP positions to reward. This is just an off the top of my head idea, but i like it better than being selective in this way about voting rights.


I could definitely get behind this. It would keep from having to break LPs and solidifying your IL at that moment, instead of finding the exit you want.

are you sayign that LP positions, such as ARB:ETH on uniswap, already is granting voting power?

i know people already “delegated” when they claimed, but what about the people that buy from the market to get voting power?

there was no intention to reward LPs in a selective way, just to be selective on which contracts were valid LPs to hold for voting power. but its not a bad idea to consider this, it would just be outside the scope of this AIP.


Yeah. I think my suggestion is that I wouldn’t support this AIP, but I appreciate its reasoning and general direction. My suggestion is only a half-baked alternative to consider if this one doesn’t pass.

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Hi, we are currently using a simple solution for our initial governance Arbitrum: Empyreal Governance Arbitrum (egARB) Token Tracker | Arbiscan . This allows us to create an LP and have the users’ funds delegated to our project.

We also have a reference implementation of a token that could be flexible for all projects. This could be used to create liquidity for the main Arbitrum pairs. In doing this, we would be able to have a liquid ERC20 token for trading, but still preserve the governance capabilities of ARB.


Looks like an interesting approach although the protocol is an infancy period. I support and will follow this to see how it continues


we always ask “Wen VE” but we never ask “How VE”. :stuck_out_tongue:


Agree! It will incentive people to hold token and also do more participation on dao!


this is very sensible proposal

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While I don’t disagree with the concept entirely in its current state this does not warrant an AIP.

If the purpose is to compile a list of LPs this can be done without an AIP. If the goal is to create a discussion around the viability of this there are better boards to do this other than #proposals (e.g. #general). There is very little substance in this proposal as is.

Aside from the act of compiling viable LPs not requiring an AIP this proposal already pre-assumes that LPs being allowed to vote is a valuable thing to the ecosystem. The merits of this should first be argued and proposed and, if a consensus is reached on that, a list of positions can be proposed along with a budget, grant request and a proper path for implementation.

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Have you any thoughts on why it may or may not be a good idea to presume that LPs should be allowed to vote?

Perhaps some ideas on how to further this to what would be deemed worthy of the AIP tag?

This “AIP” proposal has been up for 24 days, as of now, for discussion and arguing the merits of making it into something of a full fledged AIP.

I could be wrong, perhaps semantics of titling are important, but I do not see it necessary, to move the discussion to general. If there is enough desire, thought, and input, as well as people willing to lend their expertise to this idea, then so be it. It can move forward. It hasn’t been put to a hasty snapshot vote.


I also support this proposal, you wouldn’t have to choose between keeping governance power or generating yield on your $ARB.


I agree. This should be a given for the liquidity providers are very important and should now be penalized.

Uniswap recently came up with “Uniswap Agora” that is running Delegate Race.
This is a good way for Delegates to create profiles, share their vision with the community and the community can delegate the votes to them.
I think a similar solution for Arbitrum with $ARB tokens will be really successful.
I see a lot of LP managers creating Delegate profiles such as DefiEdge who got recently voted into the LM Rewards Distribution of $OP Tokens with Uniswap Foundation.