Proposal [Non-consitutional]: Top-up for Hackathon Continuation Program

[maxlomu]

gm, reasonable solution to the current issue.
Making sure we keep our promise with builders on a reasonable timeline should be the priority.

Thanks

[gauntlet]

While we voted against the original proposal, this operational shortcoming should not have occurred and occurred on behalf of the Arbitrum Foundation and MSS operations rather than the grantee’s failure to convert ARB in a meaningful manner. As such, we support the grant’s funding to completion as agreed upon in the post.

[Sinkas]

The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.

From our perspective, the proposed solution is likely the most frictionless way to provide the already approved initiative with the necessary resources to continue as originally planned. While we can understand any concerns about setting a precedent with such a move, we are more concerned with the DAO spending the next two months debating what the right solution is.

If anything, the fact that the program needs a top-up in the first place is an excellent example of the operational inefficiencies the DAO is facing. There’s no need to compound those by spending a lot of time and mind share on a problem when there’s an easy way to address it.

Hopefully, once it is established, the Opco will be able to address these kinds of situations and ideally help prevent them from happening in the first place.

[dragonawr]

Happy to support this with my votes as no extra funds are needed from the DAO, however, regardless of the AF’s clarification on past ARB conversion, I think @Tane makes a fair point to consider moving forward to streamline all decision-making problems highlighted in the proposal.

[KlausBrave]

I’m in favour of approving this proposal as an interim solution and not a setting of precedent.

The balance of risk sharing between counterparties is not correct imo, this needs to get solved DAO wide with a long-term solution.
At minimum for now proposal authors can protect themselves by defining their proposals in USD equivalent and procedure for conversation, however my preference is this gets solved with policy and procedure by Arbitrum Foundation to ensure proposals can viably and reliably fulfill their mandate.

[Jonezee]

The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee:

We acknowledge the challenges service providers face in managing funds in ARB, including the fluctuations in ARB token price and the conversion to stablecoins. While some of these fluctuations and potential shortfalls might be somewhat anticipated, we recognize the complexities and constraints that come with this process.

The delay here appears to have primarily been a result of the desire to work with the Arbitrum Foundation on an improved fund management system for the DAO. So there’s a good rationale for the delay, shortfall, and this request for a budget top-up.

The need for timely funding for the involved HCP projects is genuine. A lot rests on these distributions, they are time-sensitive, and further delays could have very negative and unjust consequences.

Given the limited budget and the urgency of the situation, we’re in favour of authorising the one-time use of the leftover funds from Domain Allocator season 1. We’ll vote for Option A.

[web3citizenxyz]

Thanks danielo, this proposal makes sense to keep supporting builders and ensure operations for the program. We support this proposal.

[0xAlex]

I have voted "YES to both " as I support this proposal. I hope in the future the new structure involving OpCo, TMC, and greater AF involvement in the DAO will address these inefficiencies. Ideally, Service Providers could be paid in stablecoins for dollar-denominated proposals to prevent such issues.

[danielo]

Voted abstain due to conflict of interest (a bit grey zone but anyhow)

[JoJo]

@JoJo

hello, let me chim in. I was reached out first from @Brick that mentioned to me this problem Daniel had, and if it was viable to utilize old funds.
We were in the (rather slow) process of gather leftover funds from Season 1 regardless, to send them back to the DAO, and took a while due to the setup of the safes of each domain. As of today, this is the current situation of the aforementioned safe

Being that these funds were either assigned to protocols that didn’t complete their grant path, or did forfeit that grant, or just unassigned, reallocating to other projects doesn’t affect in any chance any operation.

I don’t think this is should be framed as a “precedent”: the amount the Hackaton need is rather small for the amount the DAO is used to handle to initiative, and at the same time is key for them to finish the initiative and for us to understand if this type of new initiative is viable (grant as investment with intermediate judgment from commission).
Personally would say that not allocating some of these leftover funds to the Hackaton would indeed create more disruption than doing it. So totally in favor of the initiative.

Quite unrelated, it could make sense to pass the net remaining part of stablecoins, after funding the hackaton, directly to the TMC for the stablecoin management: we have assets such as bridged usdc, nowadays kinda deprecated, that would need a conversion regardless. At this point let’s just put it to use. Food for thoughts.

For the reasons mentioned above, voting in favor of both topping up and moving remaining funds in hands of TMC. I think we remove friction, allocate spare funds to a treasury program, and also avoid to devote any more mindshare to issues that are in my opinion secondary to other important things we need to achieve.

[Bruce]

I support option B (yes to both: top-up the HCP and leftover funds to the TMC). My reasons are as follows:

Addressing Short-Term Needs and Long-Term Reserves: Currently, the HCP projects face a shortfall, and it is crucial to replenish these funds promptly to prevent builders in our ecosystem from migrating to other ecosystems. Simultaneously, allocating the remaining funds to the TMC stablecoin pool would establish a buffer mechanism for similar future risks, enhancing the DAO’s financial resilience.

Optimizing Capital Efficiency: The mechanism proposed by the TMC, “based on using the yield of this reserve” to cover service provider shortfalls, will require time for yield to accrue. Option B accelerates this process through a one-time capital injection while avoiding the inefficient operation of returning idle funds to the DAO.

[Zenithiaa]

After reading the proposal and valuable comments provided, I am voting for option B (top-up the HCP and leftover funds to the TMC). Nothing to add beyond what’s been said.

[Hawheik]

I voted “Only top-up the HCP”, for two reasons:

1. I appreciate and support the idea of covering the shortfall in the Hackathon budget.

2. Adding another diversion of the remaining funds into to the TMC, for which a much much larger portion of funds is earmarked through another proposal, adds complexity to this proposal and housekeeping to TMC that doesn’t seem “worth it”. Returning the leftover funds to the DAO keeps things simple and makes it easier to track what funds went where, for what reason.

[Euphoria]

The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

We are voting “Yes to both” in the Snapshot voting.

We are in favour of both topping up and moving leftover funds into the hands of TMC. As we’ve previously expressed, we view this reallocation as a practical response to a time-sensitive funding shortfall, made even more reasonable by the fact that it utilizes unspent, already-allocated funds, avoiding the need to convert additional DAO capital in a volatile market.

That said, this proposal highlights an important operational lesson, the need for standardized, pre-approved mechanisms, such as those that can potentially be handled via the TMC, to address minor or urgent funding gaps without requiring full governance cycles.

[Zeptimus]

I’m voting “Only top-up the HCP”. The original agreement was made in stables, and with ARB’s value fluctuation, it’s only fair to honor that commitment to get to see the results after the experiment.
As Klaus pointed out, we’re creating too many parallel funding processes when we should be optimizing through OPCO. We need to focus on the long-term governance solutions coming with OPCO rather than creating more bureaucratic layers.

[lobbyfi]

LobbyFi’s rationale on the price and making the voting power available for sale for this proposal:

We regard this proposal as one potentially benefiting more than one party + there are no new funds that would leave the DAO treasury - so the auction will be on.

The instant buy price will be set at 1% of the $233k that are subject of the proposal—1.3 ETH.

[EzR3aL]

Voting YES. The amount if fairly low but contined hacking is needed to identify problems or risks. Its making this space safer.

[danielo]

Thanks Hawheik for your vote and comments

@Hawheik

Adding another diversion of the remaining funds into to the TMC, for which a much much larger portion of funds is earmarked through another proposal, adds complexity to this proposal and housekeeping to TMC that doesn’t seem “worth it”. Returning the leftover funds to the DAO keeps things simple and makes it easier to track what funds went where, for what reason.

As clarification, part of the argument against sending the funds to the DAO is that some are denominated in USDC.e a largely deprecated token. The TMC could convert these tokens to the new USDC easily, while the DAO would need a forum post, snapshot vote, then onchain vote… so a lot of work that no one is accountable for individually and so risk of never happening and the funds being kind of lost (not fully lost but rendered unusable)

[danielo]

@Zeptimus please see above for comment.

Thanks for your vote and rationale

[Zeptimus]

Reducing that bureaucracy work is something I would vote for. The thing is, that’s not what the vote says—it states that TMC Stables will serve as a reserve for service providers (and yields). And I believe in not creating precedents; that’s something the OpCo should manage. There is a reason we have processes.