Should the DAO Default to using Shielded Voting for Snapshot Votes?
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “For Elections Only” on this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
SEEDGov welcomes the implementation of the shielded voting specifically for elections, as it can help mitigate the bandwagon effect, which often turns elections into popularity contests. However, we have some reservations regarding how this could impact initiatives such as ‘Should the DAO Create COI & Self Voting Policies?’. In cases where self-voting policies are adopted, shielded voting could prevent the community from knowing if a delegate has self-voted until after the vote is over. This could damage the DAO’s ability to take corrective action during the vote itself. For instance, if delegates disapprove a certain delegate’s conduct, they may want the chance to shift their vote to another candidate.
On the other hand, we are cautious about extending shielded voting to all types of votes. Transparency and the sharing of rationale behind votes have proven to be valuable in guiding other delegates in their decision-making process. While shielded voting doesn’t prohibit a delegate from publishing their rationale during the vote, it may reduce the incentive to do so.
That said, we view the use of shielded voting as a test, and this trial could open the door to expanding its use in the future, depending on its success.
Proposal to Temporary Extend Delegate Incentive System.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “ABSTAIN” on this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
Considering that we are the proposers and that there are economic interests involved, we believe that it is ethically correct to abstain in this vote.
# ArbitrumDAO Off-site
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
At SEEDGov, we have observed that in-person work instances, such as EthCC, have had a positive impact on governance by fostering proposal generation and discussions. We believe that organizing an off-site event presents a valuable opportunity to replicate this kind of productive experience. We appreciate that the proposer has chosen to first gauge the DAO’s sentiment on this initiative before proceeding with the original proposal
Should the DAO Create COI & Self Voting Policies?
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “FOR: Responsible Voting Policy and FOR: Disclosure Policy” on this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
Thanks @Entropy for bringing this topic back into the discussion.
In addition to the examples mentioned above, we also want to emphasize the importance of ensuring the disclosure of potential conflicts of interest (COIs) by members of Councils, Committees, and other gov positions. For instance, if I am a member of the LTIPP Council and have potential COIs with certain protocols, it is expected that I should disclose such situations before any vote is taken.
Sounds interesting. If a code of conduct is approved, it would make sense for the program to only accept delegates who agree to abide by what the DAO has voted on. This could be seen as a non-negotiable condition for participating in the DIP. In the event of a potential violation, the DAO could decide via Snapshot vote whether a delegate has breached the code of conduct and, consequently, whether they should lose the right—either temporarily or permanently—to participate in the DIP.
That being said, we welcome the idea of establishing a code of conduct that includes guidelines on disclosing conflicts of interest (COI) and implementing a responsible voting policy. As mentioned earlier, disclosing COIs is ethically sound from our perspective. While we already observe responsible voting practices in action, formalizing it in a future code of conduct could add clarity and consistency.
However, we have reservations about adopting a strict self-voting policy, as it could restrict both the delegate’s and their delegators’ freedom to vote in the best interest of the DAO.
An (EIP-4824 powered) daoURI for the Arbitrum DAO
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
While SEEDGov has consistently upheld the importance of respecting due process and voiced our concerns when proposers have rushed to submit votes prematurely, in this particular situation, we do not believe it justifies voting against a temperature check simply because the submission was placed in the wrong section of the forum.
Now, the proposal in question addresses an existing problem, is pre-funded by a grant from the foundation, and incorporates highly useful tools for research and data mining.
We regret that this mistake occurred as we see significant value in this initiative and we hope that if it’s not approved the proposer persists with the proposal.
Strategic Treasury Management on Arbitrum
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “AGAINST” on this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
As mentioned in our initial response, at SEEDGov we believe the proposal is well-directed, and we acknowledge Karpatkey’s extensive experience in Treasury Management. We agree that the DAO needs to diversify its assets, rebalance the mix of its holdings—by increasing liquidity and reducing non-liquid investments—and we particularly understand the urgency of addressing ARB’s liquidity depth issues.
However, there are several concerns that prevent us from supporting the proposal in its current form:
- We have noticed that none of the extensive feedback provided by delegates has been incorporated. While the proposer is free to submit the proposal as originally written, it’s hard to believe that among all the comments, not a single modification was deemed necessary.
- Like other delegates, we are uncomfortable with the fixed management fee. Despite Karpatkey’s explanation, it seems evident that a performance-based fee would be better aligned with the DAO’s interests, especially given the total amount requested. We would also accept a mixed structure—where a base fee covers expenses tied to the proposal, while a performance-based fee acts as the vendor’s “profit.”
- We would have preferred more flexibility regarding the capital allocated to this proposal by adding options to the Snapshot vote. The same sentiment could apply to the fee structure.
- Lastly, we emphasize our doubts about the program’s effectiveness unless the STMG administrator has oversight authority over the majority of the treasury’s ARB expenditures. We believe that such an initiative should be part of a comprehensive treasury management plan, rather than an isolated proposal.