Pilot Phase: M&A for Arbitrum DAO
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote FOR this proposal at the Temperature Check and the Tally Vote.
Rationale
As we have stated in the initial discussions on this initiative, there may be opportunities (especially in terms of acquisitions) for Arbitrum DAO and it seems to be a good approach to be prepared for this.
We feel more than aligned to support this initiative and we are excited about its progress and hope that value can be added to the ecosystem.
STIP Addendums and STIP-B Challenges
MUX STIP Bridge Challenge
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “Approve funding” in this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
While they are back to the pre-incentives protocol metrics, we see that there are weekly reports on the previous incentives and also good reflections in the STIP addendum. They are also requesting 2M less than the maximum they could request (3M).
We believe this is a protocol strongly linked to Arbitrum, which considering what is explained above leads us to support the request.
Stargate STIP Bridge Challenge
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “Approve funding” in this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
Considering they had no previous incentive programs (because they have claimed KYC issues) and are one of Arbitrum’s top bridges not only in volume but also in integrations with protocols, it is worth giving them a try. It should be noted that the incentive mechanisms are in line with the suggestions of the Council in LTIPP.
Solv STIP Bridge Challenge
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “Approve funding” in this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
There is not much to mention in this case, the metrics were good and they managed to maintain them after the end of the incentives, which is not easy.
Sanko GameCorp STIP Bridge Challenge
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “Approve funding” in this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
Its metrics are good and the product is innovative. They have also expressed interesting thoughts in the addendum, which makes us feel aligned with the team’s vision.
Tide STIP Bridge Challenge
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “Reject funding” in this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
We are doubtful about the potential impact of these incentives, there is a lot of competition in this type of platform. On the other hand, there is a Defi user burnout concerning this type of task campaign, so we consider that allocating capital again could be counterproductive.
KyberSwap STIP Bridge Challenge
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “Reject funding” in this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
There is a not-very-pleasant combination of factors here. Not only is there fierce competition in the Decentralized Exchanges market, but Kyberswap has unfortunately suffered a severe exploit, which has affected both its reputation and its on-chain metrics on Arbitrum.
Gains Network STIP Addendum
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “Reject funding” in this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
While this protocol is native to Arbitrum, we have observed that after the end of STIP its metrics have declined significantly, showing considerable difficulty in maintaining its level of activity organically.
After internal discussion we have decided to vote against it, as we are not sure about the sustainability of providing incentives without a clear retention strategy.
Boost (Prev. RabbitHole) STIP Addendum
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “Approve funding” in this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
Boost is a promising protocol that we believe will continue to generate traction in Arbitrum.
They have laid the groundwork for growth through significant integrations and we believe the metrics during STIP have been overwhelming enough to provide them with a new round of incentives.
Thales Protocol STIP Addendum
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “Approve funding” in this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
Thales’ metrics are good enough to support a second round of incentives; they have performed excellently even against competitors in other chains. In addition to this, the amount requested is low considering it is a protocol that can generate a lot of traction.
Savvy DAO STIP Addendum
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to Abstain in this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
Despite the good metrics (there was even some growth post-STIP), we are concerned that they have used part of the ARBs to incentivize their token, so we are not 100% sure we would support another round of incentives.
Stake DAO STIP Addendum
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “Reject funding” in this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
Given that the team has agreed to delay the proposal until the remaining ARB from the first round of incentives has been distributed, we have voted against this proposal.
Furucombo STIP Addendum
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “Reject funding” in this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
Given the review published by Blockworks and that indeed there seems to be consensus in the DAO on the poor utilization of funds during the first round of incentives, we have decided not to go along with this proposal although Furucombo is a great product.
Socket Bridge STIP Addendum
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “Reject funding” in this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
As the Blockworks report indicates, the Socket team appears to have failed to deliver on what was promised in the first round, not only are there incentives still to be distributed (a large amount) but the reporting and communication from the team was very poor.
Angle DAO STIP Addendum
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to Abstain in this proposal at the Snapshot vote
Rationale
We believe it is a protocol with difficulties in generating traction for its own narrative, despite some positive metrics we have noticed a strong allocation of ARB to pools with low utilization or low attraction of TVL. On the other hand, the changes proposed by the team for STIP Bridge are interesting and denote some learning from past mistakes.
In this case we are not sure whether to reject or support, so we have decided to abstain.
OpenOcean STIP Addendum
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “Reject funding” in this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
In general we agree with what Blockworks reported, it is difficult to measure the performance of the campaign accurately due to the lack of information but it is clear that it is a protocol that has not been able to capture the user’s attention so the activity/metrics are not encouraging.
Thetanuts Finance STIP Addendum
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “FOR” in this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
As we have detailed in our previous comment, the results of the incentive campaign carried out by Thetanuts have been really positive, being able to sustain the metrics even post-STIP showing stickiness of the TVL.
It is also interesting that the protocol wants to incentivize the LRTs narrative, which has generated significant traction for Arbitrum.
Dolomite and Unami STIP Addendum
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “Approve funding” in both proposals at the Snapshot vote / Snapshot vote 2.
Rationale
Both protocols have shown excellent performance during STIP, both have novel mechanisms (oARB) and are strongly aligned with the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Despite the doubts raised in the Blockworks report, we believe it is essential to continue supporting them for this second round of incentives.
Arbitrum Multi-sig Support Service (MSS)
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “FOR: Implement MSS and Reporting” in this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
We are broadly in favor of this proposal in general, believing that it not only represents a significant cost saving but also orders the outflow of funds from the treasury, provides it with greater security (since the DAO is choosing people in whom it places its trust), increases transparency and facilitates accountability.
Despite our initial concerns with the reporting and our belief that there is room for further improvement in this process, we see this as a major step forward in the management of the DAO’s processes and resources.
Streamlining the LTIPP Bounties
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “FOR” in this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
We support the proposal for one simple reason: using existing resources and teams instead of overburdening the delegates with tasks and votes, especially when we are talking about a low-value bounty, is an excellent idea.
We see no drawbacks in giving more autonomy and authority to the Council, especially if we consider that the DAO voted for them as the experts on incentives, this positions them as the ones to select the researchers.
Kwenta x Perennial: Arbitrum Onboarding Incentives
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “FOR” in this proposal at the Snapshot vote and Tally vote.
Rationale
From SEEDGov we always emphasize that one-off applications are not a desirable practice for DAO, however, this proposal is not only well formulated and one of the most comprehensive but also comes from a renowned protocol such as Kwenta. Exceptions exist as we have seen with Curve’s case.
We understand the team’s approach not to apply via STIP Bridge and we also find it attractive to add a competitor to the segment, as this promotes innovation and could drive the arrival of new users to the ecosystem.
Set up a Sub-Committee for the Security Services Subsidy Fund
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “AGAINST” this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
The reason for voting against is quite obvious: ADPC has the competence and expertise to tackle this task.
Having said this, from SEEDGov we intend to discourage the excessive formation of teams/committees without them adding value in an obvious way, not only because this may be inefficient in practice, but also because today it will already be quite a challenge for the DAO to exercise control over existing structures, we see no sense in adding complexities.
AIP: Nova Fee Router Proposal + Activate Stylus + Support RIP-7212 for Account Abstraction Wallets (ArbOS 30)
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “FOR” in those three proposals at the Snapshot vote 1 / Snapshot vote 2 / Snapshot vote 3.
Rationale
As for the Nova fees proposal, considering that the suggested changes only seem to bring advantages, without drawbacks and that the implementation comes from Offchain Labs/Foundation, we see no reason not to support this initiative.
Regarding Stylus, it’s clearly an upgrade that excites us and we believe it can have a significant impact in terms of reaching the entire universe of devs in the crypto ecosystem.
Finally, supporting the KIP-7212 is a resounding yes, and we welcome any improvement with the user’s perspective in mind. It is a big step forward in terms of security and UX.
Election of STEP Program Manager
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to cast our vote 50% in favor of Avantgarde Finance and 50% in favor of Steakhouse Financial for the Arbitrum STEP Program Manager position.
Rationale
Both candidates are perfectly suited for the position.
Steakhouse has extensive experience in the RWA market and is aligned not only with Arbitrum but also with other major DAOs in the ecosystem.
Avantgarde has deep expertise in diversification strategies. risk monitoring and has also worked with major players in the crypto market.
In our opinion, both options are equally good, in terms of costs we don’t see significant enough differences for this to be a determining factor in the decision.
Pilot Phase: Arbitrum Ventures Initiative
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “For [No IRL Event]” in this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
We agree with most delegates that there is an overlap of functions with several existing proposals.
However, as this is a research phase, we don’t see it as a bad idea to open several fronts in this regard. Competition enriches and in general, the pilot phase in any project is often shaped by “sunk costs”.
Our main concern for the future lies in the $1B target that was proposed in the original proposal. We expect this estimate to be revised given that, as we have stated in the “Strategic Treasury Management on Arbitrum” proposal, there would potentially be more than 58% of treasury going into illiquid investments (at current prices). (This is taking into account M&A, GCP, and AVI).
Finally, we don’t understand why the costs in this case are somewhat higher than those of M&A which included an IRL event, but as we do not consider it necessary, given the niche to be investigated, we have decided to go for the No IRL Event option.
AIP: BoLD + Funds to bootstrap the first BoLD validator - Bond and Operational Cost sentiment.
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “FOR” in those three proposals at the Snapshot vote 1 / Snapshot vote 2 / Snapshot vote 3.
Rationale
BOLD is a leap in quality in almost every sense.
Arbitrum seeks to align itself as closely as possible with Ethereum, by openly allowing all stakeholders to act in providing security to the network. A new permissionless validation system with well-delineated incentives is a win-win for the network and those honest parties looking to lock up capital safely.
This update brings security improvements, provides solutions to existing problems, has 0 negative implications for the user, and elevates the participation of individuals and institutions in the functioning of the network, so it’s definitely a YES to all.
Of course, being fully in favor of this update, the logical thing to do is to promote the creation of the first validator for BoLD, so we support this initiative 100%.
Pilot Stage – Treasury Backed Vaults research and development
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “AGAINST” this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
Although TBV could be a novel idea, we believe that the risks of such a strategy are very high.
On the other hand, we are concerned about the lack of a clear plan on how to unwind the position (since selling ARB is not an option and trading OTC is time-consuming and not straightforward). Not to mention that as the price of ARB goes down or as the DAO’s expenses increase, this would demand more and more locked-in ARBs to hold the position increasing the DAO’s exposure to a risky position that is difficult to unwind.
[Non-Constitutional] Betting on Builders: Infinite Launchpad Proposal
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “AGAINST” this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
In general, we value the proposal and believe that it is oriented in the right direction.
However, we consider that the administrative/salary costs are too high and difficult to justify.
We see no correlation between investing $1.6m in grants and paying $1.4m to the grant administrator, for example. This far exceeds the costs of any other program proposed or approved in the past.
Another aspect that concerns us is the lack of control mechanisms for the DAO, given that it is an initiative that should last more than one year.
Finally, we believe that there is an overlap of proposals related to illiquid investments that the DAO must avoid to become a bad spender.
ArbitrumHub Evolution: The Next Step in Streamlining Information Access and Raising Awareness for Arbitrum DAO
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “AGAINST” this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
We appreciate the ability to have the DAO information unified in one place. We believe they have done a great job with ArbitrumHub, however we share the concerns of the rest of the delegates regarding cost.
Despite multiple clarifications made by the proponents, they have not been able to reasonably justify the requested budget. We believe that it is too high in some items (such as weekly reports) and is somewhat duplicative (items 1 and 4). We also don’t see any sense in having incentives for the community.
We hope that the team won’t give up and review their cost structure to give continuity to this platform.
Multisig Support Service (MSS) Elections
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote for the next twelve candidates in this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
8.3% for PGov, 8.3% for JoJo, 8.3% for Griff Green, 8.3% for Cattin, 8.3% for Defipm / 0xCasio, 8.3% for Ultra, 8.3% for Sinkas, 8.3% for DAOplomats, 8.3% for StableLab, 8.3% for Disruption Joe, 8.3% for Frisson, 8.3% for 404 DAO.
Rationale
The selection of candidates is based on the 12 applicants that we consider to be among the most committed to Arbitrum DAO.
This combination of candidates makes the ideal team that the DAO can rely on to manage the funds for each proposal that arises from day-to-day business. Whether through their contributions to various proposals or their interventions in the forum, they all represent active members of governance who bring value to it in their own way.
We celebrate the wide diversity of voices that have been raised in Arbitrum and congratulate @Entropy on the large number of candidates who have applied in this initiative.
Approval of STEP committee recommendations
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “FOR” this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
The point of having established a committee on this matter is not only to avoid that the delegations carry the burden of analyzing all the service providers that have applied, but also that this reasoning be carried out by a team of professionals who have been given a mandate by the DAO.
We believe that the recommendations made by the committee are appropriate and are perfectly in line with the purpose of the program, and we have therefore decided to support this proposal without hesitation.
Improving Predictability in Arbitrum DAO’s Operations
The @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “Improving Predictability and approval process” this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
Here we’re going to quote our comment in the forum post:
<[quote=“SEEDGov, post:13, topic:25136, full:true”]
At SEED, we strongly support this proposal as it has the potential to streamline the work and assessments conducted by delegates, resulting in more organized and professional insights.
We also agree with selecting Thursday as the starting day for voting, as the variables considered in this decision seem appropriate.
Additionally, we want to emphasize the importance of being mindful of the “holidays” period. In other DAOs, this time has sometimes been exploited to push through proposals—occasionally malicious ones—due to reduced engagement.
To help encourage delegates to take on this additional responsibility, as part of the delegate incentive program a bonus point can be awarded to delegates on Karma who approve a proposal that eventually passes on Snapshot or Tally. This is just a suggestion and something we will leave to the discretion of the @seedlatam team.
Regarding delegates signaling before posting on Snapshot, we are aware of the trade-offs and potential outcomes involved. This type of signaling has been effective for other DAOs, resulting in implicit but effective prioritization and, at times, more professional proposal writing. In those DAOs, it is not necessarily linked to specific incentives, so we need to find proxies, other variables, or a way to ensure it remains a thoughtful and professional decision rather than merely an incentive for farming.
Using the delegates program and complementary tools to enforce and promote better engagement with this type of social contract seems reasonable.
Regarding @GFXlabs suggestion:
One suggestion, to help delegates be aware of the calendar and “soft” enforce it, is to ask Snapshot and Frisson/Tally if a brightly colored banner or message can indicate when a proposal has been submitted outside the official calendar. Then delegates can easily choose to vote against or ignore without any additional work.
We are highly supportive of this implementation. If feasible, it should be implemented as soon as possible.
Also ask the SEED Latam folks who administer the delegate incentive program to confirm that proposals posted outside approved times don’t count towards participation.
Both of the above would let us lean into the natural tendency to minimize work, since there’s not an easy way to enforce this at the smart contract level.
We support this initiative because we are currently exploring improvements for the delegates program. The timing for commenting and voting is being considered to encourage early engagement and feedback, and to evaluate contributions more precisely. This approach would not only reduce workload but also enhance policy-making and the quality of proposals.
Thanks @entropy for considering our feedback and putting this proposal together!
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