The DAO Incentive Program
Vote: For
Rationale:
I support this proposal because it makes governance participation more practical and fair. It clearly separates delegates from contributors, which reflects how people actually participate in the DAO. Delegates are rewarded for voting and explaining their choices, while contributors are recognized for the real work they do to support proposals and strengthen the ecosystem.
The system is simple enough to follow but flexible enough to reward meaningful effort. Voting rewards are predictable and transparent, and the peer recognition process gives credit to work that usually goes unnoticed. The vouching system also adds accountability and helps keep participation human and genuine.
The budget approach is sensible since it uses existing funds, includes regular reporting, and runs for a fixed period before being reviewed. Overall, this feels like a natural improvement on the previous program and a reasonable way to encourage better, more thoughtful participation in Arbitrum governance.
AGV Council Compensation Calibration
Voting: For
Rationale:
I’m voting yes on this proposal because it reflects the reality of the work being done. The AGV Council is not just advising in the background. They are actively managing major responsibilities, including oversight of significant assets, investment reviews, and strategic direction.
Paying them fairly is not about extra rewards, it’s about matching responsibility with compensation. The proposed amounts are reasonable for the level of work involved, especially since there is no equity or long-term upside attached to these roles.
Importantly, this does not ask for new DAO funds and helps retain experienced contributors without stretching the budget. Supporting this proposal is a step toward more serious, accountable, and sustainable governance.
Transfer 8500 Eth from the Treasury to ATMC Eth Treasury Strategies
Vote: Against
Rationale:
I’m voting against this proposal, not because activating idle ETH is a bad idea in principle, but because this specific approach feels rushed and insufficiently grounded in DAO-level oversight.
First, 8,500 ETH is a very large share of the DAO’s non-ARB treasury. Moving that amount under active deployment without an open process or clearer constraints concentrates too much discretion in a small group, even with OAT checks in place. At this scale, the DAO should be more directly involved in defining risk limits, allocation ranges, and acceptable downside scenarios before funds are moved.
Second, the yield argument is weaker than it appears. A projected 2–2.5% return is modest when weighed against smart contract risk, protocol risk, and coordination risk across multiple DeFi venues. The headline numbers assume smooth execution and stable conditions, which history has shown cannot be taken for granted. For a treasury of this size, capital preservation should clearly outweigh marginal yield gains.
Finally, aligning treasury deployment with DRIP is conceptually attractive, but it also blurs the line between incentive programs and treasury risk management. These objectives should be coordinated carefully, not bundled by default.
I would support a revised version that phases deployment, tightens DAO-defined guardrails, and includes a more open and transparent selection process. As written, this proposal moves too much, too fast.
AIP: Raise the gas target, min L2 base fee, & implement improvements to the Pricing Algorithm
Vote: For
Rationale:
I support this proposal because it directly addresses a real pain point for users and builders: sudden and extreme L2 gas spikes during periods of high demand. The data shared shows that the current gas model reacts too aggressively, and the proposed targets and longer adjustment windows would have meaningfully reduced fees during recent congestion events.
The approach is careful rather than reckless. Changes are introduced gradually, bounded by DAO-approved limits, audited, and still subject to on-chain governance. Granting Offchain Labs limited, time-bound authority makes sense here, since gas management requires fast, technical adjustments that are hard to handle through frequent DAO votes.
The small increase in the minimum base fee is reasonable, helps reduce spam, and does not meaningfully impact regular users. Overall, this proposal improves fee stability, protects network usability, and supports long-term scaling without compromising DAO oversight.
Reward Active Delegates (RAD) Program
Voting: Against
Rationale:
I’m voting against this proposal because it focuses too much on rewarding activity rather than improving the quality of governance decisions. Voting and posting a rationale are already core responsibilities of delegates, not extra work that should be paid per action. Incentivizing these basics risks turning governance into a box-ticking exercise where participation is driven by payouts, not judgment or long-term thinking.
The structure also favors large delegates by setting a high minimum voting power, which makes it harder for smaller or newer voices to meaningfully participate. That works against decentralization, even if unintentionally. Measuring success by votes cast and dollars per vote also feels reductive, since not all proposals deserve the same level of attention or urgency.
Finally, giving OpCo broad discretion to change budgets, eligibility, and rewards concentrates too much control in one place for a program meant to strengthen DAO governance. Before spending more treasury funds, the DAO should first explore ways to improve proposal quality, delegate accountability, and decision outcomes without tying basic participation directly to financial incentives.