[SOS Submission] {Merged: TBD} – Strategic Objectives

This SOS proposal includes objectives from all SOS submissions which had the most overlap and were also favored by other stakeholders, including delegates and representatives of Arbitrum Aligned Entities (AAEs).

The objectives in this submission directly support Arbitrum’s long-term vision of being home of the universal shift onchain, especially in areas such as user acquisition and distribution (Objective 1), onboarding institutions (Objective 2), and expanding into verticals beyond DeFi (Objective 5).

At the same time, these objectives uphold Arbitrum’s purpose of defending and guiding the ecosystem by maintaining leadership in DeFi (Objective 4), operating efficiently (Objective 6), bringing utility to the ARB token (Objective 7), and managing the DAO treasury responsibly (Objective 8).

Lastly, the proposal aligns with Arbitrum’s mission of empowering people with the freedom to build their best onchain world, as shown in our focus on supporting builders (Objective 3) and exploring new verticals (Objective 5).

Objective 1: Arbitrum has best-in-class distribution and user acquisition channels

Length: 2-year objective

To remain competitive and drive sustained onchain growth, Arbitrum must have best-in-class distribution and user acquisition channels.

Effective distribution means making it easy for users to onboard, engage, and stay active, which in turn increases liquidity and attracts builders.

Most users don’t understand protocol level differences between blockchains. They want fast transactions, low fees, and simple and intuitive user experience, especially on mobile.

That’s why improving Arbitrum’s mobile experience is crucial. This means integrating Arbitrum into existing mobile apps, including non-crypto apps. In some cases, users wouldn’t even need to know a blockchain is being used in the background.

We should also explore the possibility of building our own Arbitrum-dedicated mobile wallet. This would allow us to own a distribution channel (and reduce dependence on third-party platforms), as well as control the user experience on that channel.

Beyond mobile, we should explore distribution through social media and chat platforms. This includes awareness and engagement campaigns on social media, as well as integrating Arbitrum into chat apps and social networks using AI agents and mini apps. These agents could help users send and swap tokens, use DeFi, and even do things like copy trading, all within familiar platforms.

We should also consider incentive programs similar to DIP, but focused on awareness and engagement. These could retroactively reward those who meaningfully contribute to growing Arbitrum’s presence and bringing new users to its dApps.

Finally, we should not forget other user acquisition channels such as onboarding people at in-person events and conferences, with more focus being put into non-crypto events than it was so far. We should research and test our various distribution and user acquisition channels to see which ones work best.

Key results:

KR 1.1: Arbitrum is easily accessible via (or being used in the background of) many mobile apps, through user-friendly interfaces that provide simple user onboarding.

KR 1.2: Many users interact with Arbitrum through social media and chat apps, using AI agents and mini apps.

KR 1.3: Arbitrum has improved awareness across social media using various approaches (e.g. incentives programs etc.)

KR 1.4: Arbitrum has solid user acquisition channels which bring new users to existing dApps on Arbitrum.

Risks:

  • Failing to build sustainable distribution channels which can work even without huge capital expenditure.
  • Too big reliance on third-party controlled distribution channels which can be shut down without much notice, or could switch allegiance to a competitor.
  • Moving too slow in the very competitive and rapidly changing user acquisition space.

Non-capital resources:

  • Software development
  • UX specialists
  • Specialists in marketing, user acquisition, and communication
  • Specialists in the social media space (both distributon channels as well as tech)

Objective 2: Arbitrum is the number one choice for enterprises

Length: 2-year objective

With a friendlier regulatory environment, more traditional institutions (especially in finance) are seriously exploring blockchain integrations. This creates a major opportunity for Arbitrum to position itself as the go-to solution for enterprises looking to enter the onchain world.

Institutions could integrate Arbitrum-based DeFi protocols to offer their clients yield-earning opportunities or enable direct onchain crypto trading without relying on centralized exchanges. Beyond integrations, they could also launch their own onchain products in areas like real-world assets (RWAs), remittances, cross-border payments, and tokenized credit instruments.

To make this happen, we should actively engage with institutions and get them onboarded to Arbitrum One.

This includes organizing enterprise-focused hackathons, networking at non-crypto conferences, and leveraging the personal connections that many contributors already have from previous roles in large institutions.

These efforts will help us build trust, showcase what Arbitrum can offer, and bring more institutional activity onchain.

Key results:

KR 2.1: Efforts of all entities (AAEs, working groups) within Arbitrum DAO in institutional business development are properly coordinated to increase efficiency and prevent collisions.

KR 2.2.: At least five enterprises integrated Arbitrum-based dApps or protocols into their businesses.

KR 2.3: At least two institutions launched their own products on Arbitrum.

Risks:

  • Moving too slow, because there’s too much time spent on coordinating, and too little on doing actual business development.
  • Not having the right products for institutions to use, or not being able to translate the needs of institutions to requests for proposals for builders.

Non-capital resources:

  • Business development specialists.
  • People with working experience and connections in big enterprises, especially TradFi.
  • Time spent networking and presenting at events where institutions are regular visitors (which is mostly non-crypto events and conferences).

Objective 3: Arbitrum is the home of builders and innovation

Length: 2-year objective

The number one incentive that attracts builders is a thriving ecosystem with active users. Because builders want to build where users are.

But beyond user activity, we also need to support builders with the right infrastructure and resources. This includes things like audit programs, angel investor networks, grants, venture capital, incubators and accelerators, educational materials, and help with marketing and engagement.

While many crypto ecosystems focus on attracting builders from other chains, Arbitrum should also prioritize bringing in builders from outside the crypto space. New web3 developers with fresh perspectives can lead to new use cases and innovation.

Some builders have also expressed in their feedback a desire for a clear request-for-proposals (RFP) list, to help them understand what’s most needed on Arbitrum.

In addition to attracting more developers to build dApps, we should also find ways to grow the number of contributors working directly on Arbitrum’s core infrastructure.

Empowering builders, whether new to crypto or long-time contributors, will help cement Arbitrum’s position as the leading ecosystem for innovation.

Key results:

KR 3.1: Builder support programs such as an audit program, angel investor program, grants, venture capital, incubator/accelerator programs, education, marketing/engagement support, etc.

KR 3.2: An RFP list with ideas for builders, evaluated and edited on a quarterly basis.

KR 3.3: Increased number of builders on Arbitrum coming directly from non-crypto backgrounds.

KR 3.4: Increased number of contributors to the Arbitrum core stack.

Risks:

  • Spending time and money on builder education, and then they leave to a competing ecosystem.
  • If we disregard distribution and user acquisition, builders may face a lack of users once they deploy on Arbitrum.

Non-capital resources:

  • Educational material and workshops.
  • Attending and networking at non-crypto developer events and conferences.
  • Post-launch support for builders, especially in marketing and user acquisition.

Objective 4: DeFi is the core pillar of Arbitrum

Length: 2-year objective

Arbitrum One has established itself as one of the top blockchains in terms of liquidity, with over $10 billion in TVL. A large portion of this liquidity is tied to DeFi applications, making DeFi a core pillar of Arbitrum’s ecosystem.

Becoming a leader in DeFi is not easy. Many blockchains try to attract liquidity through aggressive incentive programs, but often struggle to retain it once the rewards dry up.

Arbitrum One, on the other hand, has lots of sticky liquidity even without incentive programs. But this position should not be taken for granted. To make sure Arbitrum remains a leader in DeFi, we must work closely with existing DeFi protocols and actively bring new ones to the platform.

By staying proactive in supporting DeFi development, we can reinforce Arbitrum’s position as the go-to blockchain for decentralized finance. This includes building relationships with DeFi projects, innovating new financial products, and continuing to attract liquidity from a diverse range of sources.

Key results:

KR 4.1: Arbitrum One is Ethereum’s most attractive liquidity venue for trading popular assets such as ETH, BTC, and stablecoins.

KR 4.2: Arbitrum One is the leading blockchain for remittances and cross-border payments.

KR 4.3: Arbitrum has a diverse ecosystem of perpetuals, leverage-based products, and other innovative DeFi products.

KR 4.4: Arbitrum One reaches $30B in TVL.

KR 4.5: Arbitrum One is the leader in tokenized real-world assets, with $1B+ RWA TVL reached.

Risks:

  • Spending capital on attracting liquidity, which then leaves after incentives end.
  • Inefficient allocation of capital.

Non-capital resources:

  • Specialist in finance, especially in DeFi products and yield opportunities.
  • Risk assessment specialists.

Objective 5: Arbitrum is a leader in other (non-DeFi) verticals

Length: 2-year objective

While DeFi remains Arbitrum’s core strength, there is a clear opportunity to become a leader in other verticals as well. The DAO has already made a strong commitment to gaming through the creation of the GCP Foundation, and this vertical should continue to be supported.

Beyond gaming, other promising areas include DePIN, Social, AI, trusted execution environments (TEE), collab tools, supply chain, logistics, enterprise software, and others. These verticals are still emerging, and it’s not yet clear which will have the strongest fit with Arbitrum’s ecosystem.

The first step should be to research these verticals, engage with promising teams and projects, analyze the market landscape, and evaluate where Arbitrum can offer the most value. This exploration phase will help identify which areas to prioritize. Once narrowed down, targeted initiatives such as grant programs or requests for proposals can be launched to support growth in the selected verticals.

Key results:

KR 5.1: Crypto verticals are properly researched (and publicly discussed with delegates) by a designated AAE or a working group, with the most promising verticals narrowed down.

KR 5.2: Selected verticals are pursued with various initiatives, e.g. grant programs or requests for proposals.

Risks:

  • Focusing on too many verticals and spreading ourselves thin.
  • Failing to identify the right verticals to focus on in the upcoming couple of years.

Non-capital resources:

  • People with experiences from various verticals.
  • Research specialists.

Objective 6: Arbitrum DAO operates with efficiency

Length: 1-year objective

The new vision proposed by the Arbitrum Foundation brings a new operational model centered around Arbitrum Aligned Entities (AAEs). These entities will be responsible for carrying out the DAO’s strategy and executing proposals approved by governance. Initially we’ll have five AAEs, but more may be created over time.

To support this evolving structure, the DAO needs clear frameworks and guidelines for how new AAEs and working groups are created, operated, and eventually sunset if necessary. There may also be cases where none of the existing AAEs can take on a task. In those situations, the DAO should retain the ability to form ad hoc working groups with limited scope and duration to fill the gap.

To efficiently oversee the work of both AAEs and working groups, the DAO needs a framework and guidelines for how AAEs and working groups report progress, including how to handle sensitive information without compromising negotiations or deals. With strong governance practices in place, the DAO can operate more efficiently, reduce bottlenecks, and make faster, more coordinated progress.

Key results:

KR 6.1: A framework and guidelines for launching new AAEs and working groups, as well as ways to properly shut them down.

KR 6.2: A framework for overseeing the work of AAEs and working groups.

KR 6.3: Quarterly strategic planning sessions with leads from all DAO-funded programs and AAEs to synchronize goals, budgets, and execution timelines.

KR 6.4: Research on alternative decision-making systems (e.g. futarchy, quadratic voting, reputation system, etc.)

KR 6.5: The majority of objectives and key results set in the SOS proposal are successfully achieved after being worked on by AAEs and working groups.

Risks:

  • The DAO becomes more reliant on specific contributors.
  • Optimizing and standardizing the new operational structure will take some time.
  • Transforming vendors into AAEs for verticals that require high specialization might be difficult.

Non-capital resources:

  • People with experience in setting up organizational structures, frameworks, and guidelines.
  • Active and sustained participation of delegates and contributors.
  • Specialists in alternative decision-making systems.

Objective 7: ARB token has additional premium and utility

Length: 2-year objective

The ARB token plays a crucial role in Arbitrum DAO, but its declining price poses potential security risks for the governance. To strengthen the token’s value and encourage greater participation, it’s important to explore ways to give it a premium and increase its utility.

This objective focuses on researching new approaches to enhance the ARB token’s usefulness and attractiveness to holders. It also aims to identify strategies to increase participation in DAO governance, especially when it comes to reaching voting quorums.

Since this objective involves many unknowns, the emphasis should be on conducting thorough research that can lead to actionable solutions down the line.

Key results:

KR 7.1: Research on how to give more premium and utility to ARB token.

KR 7.2: ARB liquidity is increased in DEX pool pairs, lending pools, etc.

KR 7.3: Research on how to increase participation in DAO voting.

KR 7.4: Increase in the average voting participation in Arbitrum DAO proposals.

Risks:

  • Inefficient capital allocation.

Non-capital resources:

  • A group of specialists in areas such as tokenomics, governance, and finance.

Objective 8: Arbitrum DAO treasury is well managed and has multiple revenue streams

Length: 2-year objective

The Arbitrum treasury currently benefits from a few key revenue streams, primarily from Timeboost and other financial investments like STEP and the Treasury Management program.

To ensure long-term sustainability, it’s important to not only continue and expand these initiatives but also explore additional sources of revenue.

Our objective is to achieve compounded growth through multiple, diverse revenue streams that strengthen the treasury’s position. By doing so, the DAO can better support its ongoing operations and strategic goals with a steady and growing financial foundation.

Key results:

KR 8.1: Set short- and long-term profitability targets and establish annual budgets.

KR 8.2: Consensus on target portfolio composition and management strategies.

KR 8.3: Standardized process for converting and managing ARB and related assets allocated as working capital.

KR 8.4: Research on promising new revenue streams.

KR 8.5: Decision on when to start using revenue to cover expenses.

Risks:

  • Smart contract risks
  • Custody risk
  • Inefficient allocation of capital where management fees exceed yield returns

Non-capital resources:

  • Specialist in finance, especially in DeFi products and yield opportunities.
  • Risk assessment specialists.
5 Likes

Notes on this SOS submission revision

Looking forward to your feedback

I’m looking forward to constructive feedback from everyone in the replies below.

If you think any objective or key result should be changed, please suggest an alternative wording (unless you believe it should be removed entirely).

Merging existing submissions

The title of this SOS matrix currently says {Merged: TBD} because it’s still open for others to join (it’s a combination of objectives and key results from all submissions).

If you’d like to be included in the merged title, please mention it in the replies. Just note that doing so means your original submission will not proceed to the final vote.

Objective 1 (Arbitrum has best-in-class distribution and user acquisition channels)

The content of Objective 1 draws inspiration from SOS objectives proposed by TempeTechie, @MaxLomu, @Gabriel, @Tnorm, and @Entropy, as well as a One-Off submission by Tekr0x.eth.

The idea of having a presence at non-crypto events has long been championed by Krzysztof from L2Beat. Additionally, onboarding people at in-person events was suggested by Patrick McCorry during the Arbitrum Foundation SOS Discussion call.

Objective 2 (Arbitrum is the number one choice for enterprises)

Onboarding institutions was the most commonly suggested objective, proposed by @0xDonPepe & @JuanRah, @Gabriel, @MaxLomu, @Tnorm, @Entropy, @404DAO, and TempeTechie. The content in this proposal draws on their submissions, as well as feedback from other delegates.

Organizing hackathons for enterprises as a marketing and educational tool was proposed by Krzysztof and by @JuanRah during his and @0xDonPepe’s SOS Discussion call.

Objective 3 (Arbitrum is the home of builders and innovation)

The name of this objective comes from @MaxLomu’s SOS proposal.

The content is based on SOS submissions by @404DAO, @MaxLomu, @Gabriel, and @Entropy, along with feedback from builders such as 1a35e1 from Lighthouse Labs (RFP list), CupOJoseph (audit program, angel investors), andreiv (grants, funding), kamilgorski (marketing/engagement support), and Patrick McCorry during the Arbitrum Foundation SOS discussion call (regarding increasing the number of contributors to the Arbitrum core stack).

Objective 4 (DeFi is the core pillar of Arbitrum)

The name of this objective comes from @Gabriel’s SOS proposal.

The content and key results are based on SOS submissions by @Tnorm, @0xDonPepe & @JuanRah, and @Gabriel.

Objective 5 (Arbitrum is a leader in other, non-DeFi, verticals)

This objective was first suggested by DanielO in his SOS One-Off.

Additional verticals were also mentioned in SOS submissions by @Dragonawr (DePIN), @Gabriel (gaming, social, DePIN), @MaxLomu (AI, privacy, DePIN), @0xDonPepe & @JuanRah (supply chain, logistics, enterprise software), and in the SOS One-Off by Tekr0x.eth (social).

Objective 6 (Arbitrum DAO operates with efficiency)

The name of this objective comes from @Entropy’s Objective 1.

The content (including key results, risks, and non-capital resources) is based on SOS submissions by @Entropy, @SEEDGov, and @MaxLomu, as well as the vision post by the Arbitrum Foundation and the surrounding debate.

Objective 7 (ARB token has additional premium and utility)

This objective (giving premium to ARB) was first suggested by @MaxLomu in his SOS submission, with additional ideas contributed by @Tnorm.

Objective 8 (Arbitrum DAO treasury is well managed and has multiple revenue streams)

The content of this objective is based on SOS submissions by @Entropy and @Tnorm, as well as feedback from @ajwarner90 and Steven during their SOS discussion call. The key results are primarily drawn from Entropy’s Objective 2.

How will objectives be executed?

Under the new organizational vision, AAEs will be responsible for most (if not all) of the execution.

Once the final SOS proposal is approved, OpCo will assign objectives to the appropriate AAEs. Delegates will oversee progress toward the key results defined for each objective.

If none of the current AAEs can take on a specific objective (or if an assigned AAE isn’t making any progress) there may be a need to create a new AAE or expand the scope of an existing one (which could include hiring new people).

In some cases, a working group established by the DAO might step in to work on an objective or part of it. Over time, that group could evolve into a new AAE or merge with an existing one.

5 Likes

Hi @TempeTechie

Thanks a lot for taking the time and creating this overview - love the structure and the concise framing of objectives.

Some questions:

  1. Are the objectives ranked in order of importance(or is that something we should vote on additionally)? I have no opinion at this point but I believe that together with the final SOS we should have an order of importance in case of trade-off decisions
  2. 7/8 objectives’ time horizon is 2 years - if we are aiming to achieve them all, we might get to 50% with each of them; maybe less is more in this case? (Or we rank them - see point 1 - and agree that we need to hit the top 3 ones in 2 years)

Generally I am excited that we are getting closer to finalizing SOS & looking forward to having a North Star🚀

1 Like

Hey @tamara, thanks for taking a look at the objectives!

No, there’s no particular order, although some things are placed one after the other for a better reading flow (e.g. the “other verticals” objective is placed after the “defi as core pillar” objective).

Yeah, having 1 vs 2 year framing at all feels a bit odd to me. I think we should work on all objectives in parallel over the full 2 years (which is the total length of this initial SOS). And I think the work on most of these objectives never really ends (we will never stop working with institutions, for example).

I’d love to hear how these objectives (or key results within each objective) could be mapped to 1-year and 2-year horizons. If there’s a good alternative, I’m open to update the proposal accordingly.

Hi @TempeTechie,

took another turn :slight_smile:

1. Reducing number of overall objectives, simplifying comms
To avoid seeming to “boil the ocean” and actually trying to do everything at once, I believe the objectives could be structured as below.

2. Tight and concurrent timelines

With regards to my 2nd concern of trying to achieve all of them within two years my main worry is the current capacity & capabilities of the AAEs. Each AAE can ramp up/onboard other contributors/service providers, but it takes time to build a quality team (as we are seeing with the AGV and OpCo).

This being said I do not know whether the 2 year timeframe for most objectives is too short or actually achievable but believe a short exercise mapping objectives vs capacities could help. A starter could be the below screenshot, to map out objectives with AAE owners and trying to figure out if we are putting too much on a single AAE’s plate.

Disclaimers:

  • I filled this with my (limited) knowledge (more than happy to edit, discuss etc)
  • Probably each objective has more AAEs collaborating, but final ownership should not be shared
  • I see the OpCo’s role in this as resolving disputes, identifying prioritization issues (in case of any competing objectives), tracking objectives and holding AAEs accountable; obviously tbd if the OAT @Frisson @pedrob @ajwarner90 @stonecoldpat agree :slight_smile:
  • Other experienced SPs column is empty by choice (don’t want to force anyone to collaborate) but could imagine @CastleCapital , Reverie @Federico, @Areta and others here; who have enough context & skills to support and might make tighter timelines feasible

Again @TempeTechie thanks so much for putting this together hope my thinking helps.

4 Likes

I’m glad you’ve raised this question, because I’ve seen some people being overly concerned by this (much more than you though), so my response here is really more for them, though I’ll take this opportunity to address it here, and perhaps start a debate about caution vs ambition with it.

First off, we don’t actually know whether the current AAEs are truly unable to tackle all of these objectives (to be honest, even the AAEs themselves can’t predict that with certainty). So I don’t think we should limit ourselves based on these assumptions.

The point of setting up strategic objectives is to define what we think is necessary to do for Arbitrum to win.

Whether we can do it with current capabilities or not, is something we’ll figure out afterward, as we go.

If we start lowering the bar now, we’ll end up setting mediocre goals. And mediocre goals lead to mediocre results. Mediocrity doesn’t win.

Instead, we should be ambitious and aim high.

Of course, aiming high means we’ll have a few misses. We’ll have some objectives or key results that we won’t be able to achieve. But at least we’ll know then where our shortcomings are, and where we need to improve.

In my view, being overly cautious is a bigger risk than being too ambitious.

That said, I would like to hear what others think, especially people from AAEs, e.g. @ajwarner90, @pedrob, @Frisson, @stonecoldpat, @Arbitrum, @raam, @Entropy, @swmartin, @MattOnChain, etc.?

1 Like

Great work on the mapping!

I think the AAE owner for Objective 1 should be the Arbitrum Foundation (AF), since, as far as I know, they already have a large marketing team, and managing distribution and user acquisition channels largely falls within the marketing domain.

For the technical tasks in Objective 1, I believe the best approach would be to execute them through RFPs or grants. Some of these could potentially be handled via the existing D.A.O. grants program managed by @JoJo.

Objective 2 (enterprises) is something that both AF and OCL are already working on. This objective is mainly about establishing key results that can be used to evaluate success. I doubt it will create much additional work for them. It’s more about giving them a clear north star to align their priorities with.

Objective 5 (other verticals): As you noted, AGV (ex. GCP) is already covering part of this. The research on other verticals could potentially be done by a working group established by the DAO. Also, there are already some non-DeFi projects on Arbitrum (e.g. Huddle01), and if I’m not mistaken, AF serves as their main point of contact.

Objective 7 (ARB token) also needs research that could be done by a working group established by the DAO.

2 Likes

Hi @TempeTechie

Agree that there is the risk if being too cautious. At the same time by showing a path to implementation (which AAE owns it, who could support it, who owns the tracking process etc) SOS submissions might get more support & delegates the confidence that they will be acted upon (making them willing to vote on them).

Especially important given recent developments wrt pushing out the timeline.

2 Likes

Great work @TempeTechie and @tamara, I think we are on the right track here to make a polished version of this SOS submission.

This simplified view is great. It gives a person who was not active in the SOS preparation (or DAO in general) a simple and clear view of what we are thinking about for the future of Arbitrum. Kristof mentioned a story about how he tried to explain SOS to a person from the Arbitrum project, and it was just too much stuff to digest. I would like us to create a simplified version of this SOS for exactly this kind of case.

Here is what has been done until now:

  • With this submission, TempeTechie posted a merged version of all SOSes that had the most overlap and were also favored.
  • Tamara started working on a simplified view of all the objectives.

Next step

I would suggest including some more concrete KR (when possible) because this gives a clear understanding of what each objective is and what it tries to do. Also, I suggest we include KR directly in the Notion page. Here is an example of a measurable result for each objective with a measurable KR:

KR 1.1: 10+ mobile apps using the Arbitrum chain.
KR 1.2: 10,000+ users across all integrated bots, agents, and mini-apps.
KR 1.3: Double (2x) our social media reach.
KR 1.4: Double (2x) the number of unique addresses on Arbitrum.

KR 3.1: Five or more active builder support programs
KR 3.2: /
KR 3.3: Onboard 500+ non-crypto builders
KR 3.4: Double (2x) the number of contributors to the Arbitrum Stack.

KR 4.1: No. 1 in TVL
KR 4.2: No. 1 in trade volume
KR 4.3: No. 1 in DeFi TVL
KR 4.4: 30B in TVL
KR 4.5: $1B+ RWA TVL

KR 5.1: 3 new verticals.
KR 5.2: 100M ARB allocated to new verticals.

KR 7.1: /
KR 7.2: Double (2x) ARB liquidity.
KR 7.3: /
KR 7.4: Match voting participation with a quorum increase.

KR 8.1: /
KR 8.2: /
KR 8.3: /
KR 8.4: Double (2x) revenue streams for the DAO and a 100% increase in revenue of existing streams.
KR 8.5: /

Most of the key results can be verifiable through open data sources like this:

If you think my input makes sense, you can include it in the Notion page. Also, any feedback and comments are more than welcome.

2 Likes

Thank you for aggregating the various proposals into a unified strategy – we appreciate the thoughtful effort behind this work. It’s clear that the strategic objectives have evolved meaningfully over time, and we now have a stronger set of guiding pillars for the DAO.

That said, it’s essential to prioritise and organise the work around these objectives effectively. A few thoughts from our side:

  • Objectives 1 & 2: If the DAO proceeds with the Arbitrum Aligned Entities (AAE) structure proposed by the Arbitrum Foundation, we believe these objectives should fall under the remit of the AAE Arbitrum Foundation. The Foundation already has established mechanisms for communications and partnerships, and was recently funded by the DAO specifically for initiatives aligned with distribution, user acquisition, and enterprise onboarding. Assigning these objectives to the AAE Arbitrum Foundation would make efficient use of existing resources and funding.
  • Objective 4: As our previous SOS comments highlighted, we view DeFi as a foundational pillar of Arbitrum’s growth strategy. While we believe the number of AAEs should remain limited, we strongly advocate for creating an AAE focused solely on DeFi.
  • Objective 8: Treasury management and sustainable revenue streams are critical for the long-term health of the DAO. As kpk, we previously submitted a Strategic Treasury Management proposal estimating that an initial 250M ARB tranche could establish a sustainable treasury framework and provide two years of runway, based on FY23-24 expenses (~$97M). Given the price movements in ARB and additional DAO-approved spending (e.g. 200M ARB via GCP and 250M ARB for AF strategic partnerships), the capital requirements have only grown. Current treasury initiatives, such as the 15M ARB stablecoin strategy, while a step in the right direction, are not sufficient to meaningfully strengthen Arbitrum’s financial position. We therefore view Objective 8 as a top priority and urge both delegates and AAE Entropy Advisors to give it the strategic weight it deserves.
2 Likes

Hey @Tekr0x.eth - thanks for sharing these ideas for improving the key results!

Could you add verification sources next to each key result (where applicable)?

Some of the key results you mentioned aren’t covered by the sources you’ve listed below (e.g. the number of core contributors, ARB liquidity etc.), so we’ll need to find the correct sources, otherwise they cannot be included in the SOS.

3 Likes

I added KR to each verifiable source. Note: Not all KR are included yet.

1 Like

Adding to the discussion here, some time back I had proposed the idea of business clusters, which translated to org design is basically creating Catalysts like the Gaming one that can do:

  • hire service providers (idea via grants or service contracts) for developing network goods like useful research for said vertical, developer tooling and vertical specific infra, etc.
  • investments & builder support
  • partnerships

@karpatkey is advocating for the creation of what I’d call a “DeFi Catalys” or similar organisation here. And I strongly believe that’s the way forward.

The Catalysts structure represents a change but allows us to better coordinate efforts around each vertical. We can have two catalysts for DeFi and Gaming with significant funding, and then “emergent catalysts” for new verticals. This allows us to execute on objectives 1 to 5

The foundation could transfer the DeFi-focuses staff and functions to the DeFi Catalyst and same for Gaming staff to the Gaming Catalyst. The domain allocator could also become more deeply aligned with the Gaming Catalyst (AGV). There would also be the Enterprise Catalyst that the @Arbitrum foundation can operate.

The Catalysts can prioritise some transversal objectives like e.g. advancing mobile/accessibility, and they would do so with having direct connection with builders, deep context about how that should play out in their specific vertical.
This approach of having entities with deep context of on the ground realities but still alignment to macro-objectives gives us the best setup to effectively deliver.

In addition to the Calaysts, we then need a few transversal functions and operational functions, e.g. Objective 6 ( Arbitrum DAO operates with efficiency), Objective 7 (ARB token has additional premium and utility) and Objective 8 ( Arbitrum DAO treasury is well managed and has multiple revenue streams). A lot of this is work where @Entropy can come in handy.

The org design structure above is compatible with the OKRs kind of thing the SOS is setting. As precisely OKRs as a methodology are designed to mobilise an organisation across teams that otherwise have specific functions. My recommendation having been through both success stories and horror stories setting up OKRs in large and small organisations, is that we need to enable multiple revision points for the OKRs. It takes a while for an organisation to figure out what makes sense and what doesn’t here. But especially, Arbitrum still needs to restructure.

Important to note that the Catalsyst org design is also compatible with the idea of AAEs, as catalysts can be operated by such entities via:

  • giving an existing AAE control over a Catalyst e.g. consolidating DeFi grants, investments, etc., under a well structured catalyst entity.
  • setting a new one e.g. like with the GCP/AGV
  • investing in an existing one e.g. like an LP or token/equity investment like I hope can happen with RnDAO one day to setup the B2B tools aka CollabTech Catalyst)

The structure proposed above can give us the means to operationalise the Objectives, hopefully mitigating concerns that @krst and others have raised

2 Likes

An Important consideration here is how to avoid the DAO dying and Arbitrum becoming only 4 or so AAEs operating behind closed doors, effectively killing all outside-in innovation.

Some keys to avoid that I see are:

  • AAEs should operate with a lot of transparency
  • AAEs should work more like orchestrators i.e. open, instead of closed agencies that want to do everything inhouse and behind closed doors. In a way, we could say the DAO-level is too big for small players to interact and propose, but the AAEs should have mechanisms for small players to propose innovations to them and collaborate.
  • The DAO should have a strong system to hold AAEs accountable, including more clear mandates/scopes of work (this could evolve based on the SOS objectives and the Calaysts).

Currently, most AAEs don’t have virtually any of the systems for transparency and open-innovation setup. And I don’t know if there’s even a willigness towards decentralisation. This is understandable given the many horror stories of doing decentralisation poorly. However, there are also powerful success stories in Web2, and we could quickly learn from those. The key is having the willigness to keep the DAO alive and even grow it (while increasing execution capacity and focus).

3 Likes

I can see the tremendous work that went into developing these strategic objectives and appreciate the effort of bringing them all together @tempe.

At the same time, I truly believe that this is a lot of information to digest for anyone trying to engage and will prevent key stakeholders from being part of it. We need to have an easier way to engage for the overall goal of SOS. That being said, I love the direction of this post getting into the details and how we will accomplish all our goals. And both processes can complement each other perfectly.

For KR 3.4: To keep adding verifiable sources, we could count the monthly contributors on Offchain Labs GitHub repo. We can see these beautiful charts of each branch activity. However, the 2x target sounds vague to me. I would propose to compare with actual competitors - the reason is that sometimes it’s hard to know the overall ecosystem growth. If Ethereum grows 10x and we grow 2x, that would look like failure to me. We need something that aligns us more with market dynamics.

For KR 7.2: We can check on DeFiLlama as today the total value locked in DeFi is $2,678B. And in the same line as before, “double” sounds vague. I would say the objective should be to be top 1 - let’s aim for the stars, go big or go home.

For specifics of ARB im normally watching Live coin watch. That being said, they don’t give you the borrowed ARB for example - I would use Dune for that.

Imo when we are drafting our mission these metrics need to reflect our actual competitive position in the market, not only internal growth targets.

3 Likes

Thanks for the continued work on this initiative. The Strategic Objectives have now reached a solid level of formalization and clarity, and I believe it’s the right time to start evaluating the SOS initiative in parallel with the newly proposed Arbitrum Aligned Entities (AAEs) structure by the Arbitrum Foundation.

Understanding whether the AAE framework will be effectively implemented is critical for shaping an actionable execution plan for the SOS objectives. In particular, Objective 6—focused on execution mechanisms—should arguably be treated as a meta-objective, given its overarching impact on all others.

On that note, I’d like to share a few thoughts:

  • The number of AAEs should be deliberately limited. We should avoid the temptation to create new AAEs for each initiative, and instead aim to align new efforts within the scope of existing AAEs wherever possible. A practical approach would be to form working groups for experimental or emerging initiatives, and evolve them into standalone AAEs only if truly necessary. Otherwise, we risk replicating the same inefficiencies we’ve seen with the previous council and WG model—fragmentation, unclear accountability, and diluted focus.
  • This is especially relevant when there is already an appropriate AAE that aligns with the initiative. For example, the Agentic Governance Initiative proposes a new AAE, but this falls squarely under the domain of governance, which is already a focus of OpCo. In such cases, expanding the mandate of an existing AAE is far preferable to spawning a new one.
  • It’s important to finalize the AAE structure in tandem with the SOS objectives, as the two are deeply interconnected. For instance, Objective 3 appears to be a logical extension of the Arbitrum D.A.O. Grants Program. If the AAE model moves forward, the most effective path would likely involve direct coordination between the grants program and the relevant AAEs (e.g., Arbitrum Foundation for growth, Offchain Labs for product/engineering). The same applies to Objective 5, where an expansion of the grants program should also be coordinated with these existing AAEs rather than creating a new, potentially redundant entity. Given that this work clearly fits within the remit of the Arbitrum Foundation, adding another layer of structure doesn’t seem justified.

Overall, aligning the SOS execution with a well-scoped AAE framework is essential to avoid past pitfalls and deliver on the strategic vision effectively.

2 Likes

Thanks to the author for combining the SOS projects in one topic.
I went a little further, because it is still quite a long text on many pages.
To make it easier for delegates and those simply interested, I combined the main data in a table

My comments can also be read there for each goal

3 Likes

Awesome overview, thanks @cp0x!

2 Likes

the Agentic Governance Initiative proposes a new AAE, but this falls squarely under the domain of governance, which is already a focus of OpCo

Echoing my comment in the AGI thread:

Do all governance infrastructure improvements fall under the purview of OpCo? Even if it means building an entirely new tech stack? I may be misunderstanding the scope of OpCo but this seems either excessive or not the case. I’m open to being corrected though.

1 Like

First, we’d like to thank TempeTechie and all contributors involved in this merged SOS submission. The structure and alignment with Arbitrum’s mission are clear and thoughtful, and we appreciate the effort to consolidate and synthesize multiple inputs.


KR clarity and accountability

While the long-term objectives are well-scoped, many KRs assume organic follow-through without clearly assigning ownership or proposing next steps. @tamara’s assignation of provisional ownership among AAEs was really on point. We would also love to see clarity on how progress will be tracked and by whom. Introducing a proposal follow-up mechanism, perhaps in collaboration with OpCo and OAT, for structured quarterly reviews that assess KR progress, surface blockers, and refine objectives, would help keep the DAO engaged with the SOS progress while timely identifying challenges to reassess priorities. This loop can also feed into the suggested quarterly strategy syncs in Objective 6.


Effective execution

The proposal sets eight ambitious objectives, but without signaling how they will be phased, it’s hard to understand how the DAO should operationalize these given resource constraints. We suggest a tiered prioritization or execution cadence. For example:

  • Phase 1 (0–6 months): Focus on Objectives 1, 3, and 6 (growth, builders, structure).
  • Phase 2 (6–12 months): Emphasize Objectives 2, 4, and 7 (institutions, DeFi, token utility).
  • Phase 3 (12–24 months): Deepen work on Objectives 5 and 8 (verticals, treasury).

This helps the DAO better allocate attention and funding while ensuring foundational objectives (e.g., DAO efficiency) are tackled early.


Improving Governance Participation

We’d also like to see a stronger emphasis on increasing governance participation, which is increasingly critical to DAO efficiency and resilience. The recent ARDC research highlighted systemic risks in DAO governance, including limited voter turnout and difficulties reaching quorum on constitutional proposals, issues that have prompted discussions about lowering quorum thresholds, which in turn raises new governance risks.

We recommend elevating this as a cross-cutting priority within Objective 6 (operational efficiency) and Objective 7 (token utility). Initiatives like governance staking, delegation tooling, and targeted voter activation programs could help establish ARB as a more actively used and valued governance token, while improving the DAO’s capacity to execute on strategic objectives without delay.


Emphasizing UX as a Growth Lever

Finally, we’d encourage more explicit emphasis on user experience (UX) enhancements to drive the next wave of user onboarding. For Arbitrum to succeed in reaching non-crypto native users, technical innovation alone isn’t enough, intuitive, seamless UX is essential. We see an opportunity to call out Account Abstraction (AA) and similar UX-first improvements more prominently within Objective 1, which could drastically improve onboarding and long-term user retention.

1 Like