Unifying Arbitrum’s Mission, Vision, Purpose (MVP)

I’ll be voting “For” once this goes to Snapshot. I think if I was asked this on day 1 of Arbitrum delegation I probably would not have seen much value. However, over the last year+ it’s been become clearer to me the value of this. Even thought I think most delegates are subconsciously making decisions with these ideas in mind, having the formal blueprint should be helpful. There isn’t really a downside here, so I see no reason not to move forward with this.

I’m not really the type of person whose good at mission statement type things, so I’ll sort of leave feedback to “I think it sounds good!”. But some general thoughts:

  • I agree with others about making this unique to Arbitrum. With really anything, having a really generic purpose sort of leads itself to being low impact.
  • I also appreciate the continued focus on Ethereum. I think this an important ideology to maintain.

Following changes made to this proposal on October 30, several delegates contacted us and provided further feedback. Upon additional conversations, it’s clear that more discourse and potential iteration are needed before moving to Snapshot. Consequently, we will be pushing voting for 1 to 2 weeks.

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;Hi, Drafting a Mission, Vision and Purpose is difficult. Based on the comments in the forum there are many different opinions. Also there are informal meetings in the background, making the drafting harder still.

Attached is a SimScore report.

SimScore uses methods that underpin data science technology: Centroid to determine clusters within the data. Similarity Score determine the similarity of each answer to the central theme…The score is 0-100%, higher scores being most similar. This established a priority list.

Here is the SimScore Analysis.

Entropy can choose which ideas they will incorporate into the proposals Green) and comment on the changes they intend to make. They can also choose ideas they will not incorporate (Red)

This should make everything transparent.

I hope this method moves things along…as the Discourse open discussion along with informal meetings seems to be cumbersome.

Based on SImScorr’s unbiased aggregation, the above statement is #1 priority, it should be the basis for improvements. The mvp needs to tell a story or narrative

The current proposal update by Entropy does not refer to this #1 statement by Clifton. For more clarity look at simscore report above.

Here are some of my loose thoughts on ArbitrumDAOs Mission, Vision and Goals. Before I begin, I’d like to start with a disclaimer that these are my personal thoughts and not L2BEATs. Even though of course I’ve spent a fair amount of time discussing these topics with @Sinkas and other team members they don’t necessarily have to share my views.

TL;DR:

  • the time is running up, we need to mature as a DAO and prove that token governance can effectively manage the ecosystem
  • we need to figure out a strategy to bring value to the token, the security of the ecosystem depends on that
  • the road to future success is through 10x growth and expanding outside of the current crypto markets, we need to prioritize our efforts on that front
  • in order to get there we need to bring the O to the DAO
  • we need to align and coordinate our different initatives to create synergies and make our spending more ROI effective

Most of the things I’m describing here apply to all general-purpose chains (especially L2s), not exclusively to Arbitrum. Most chains have similar goals and should, in my opinion, focus on similar priorities, adjusting specific strategies to the particular strengths of a given chain.

How do I think about the debate on strategic directions

Before we begin, it’s important to address the issue of the DAOs ability to set goals and strategic directions. There have been many initiatives so far that tried to distill one common direction by gathering feedback from a broad range of delegates and other stakeholders (OCL, AF, builders, etc.). All of them eventually struggled with coming to conclusions - ending up either with a set of goals that did not have enough support or with goals so broad and open-ended that literally any initiative could be argued as fulfilling those goals.

I believe this is not necessarily the fault of those trying to distill those goals from the DAO; rather, the issue is in the DAO itself. What if the DAO is so decentralized and made up of so many individuals and entities with so many different, sometimes competing, goals that there is no one overarching set of priorities that suits everybody?

Worse still, what if the people asked to give their views on these objectives have yet to think it all through well enough to have an informed opinion? And what if when they are asked for input, they hallucinate like LLMs, giving answers that sound good and seem reasonable but aren’t backed up by substantial data and/or experience in a given field? I, for one, admit to being guilty of doing this, always in good faith, but still providing “strong opinions, loosely held.” I fear that this is more common than not.

Therefore, while I value all opinions in the DAO, I do not weight them equally. I give more credit to the people who are fully committed to Arbitrum (OCL, Arbitrum Foundation) and those with enough skin in the game (biggest protocols, big investors/token holders, big partners). I don’t mean that these parties are necessarily more correct than the others or that they can’t have ulterior motives or even change their alignment (like TreasureDAO). But they are simply the ones who have spent the most time thinking about the success of Arbitrum in the long term, and they have the most resources to implement their vision of the future, so it is harder and riskier to go against that vision, even if in my opinion it could be suboptimal.

To be clear, I’m not saying I’m one of those whose opinions should be taken more seriously. On the contrary, even though I represent the largest delegate at the time of writing, I would only push for a particular direction or approach if it had the support of people more directly involved in the ecosystem than myself. As a delegate I’m here to help and support them, not to tell them what to do.

Some assumptions

First, to set the stage, let’s start with some assumptions that drive my thinking here.

I strongly believe that in the near-ish future, most financial activity will take place on some sort of crypto rails (actually, the scope is much broader than just financial activity, but let’s simplify for now). Long story short - this belief stems from the fact that the adoption of a mix of public/private blockchain crypto rails will allow companies to significantly reduce the cost of both development and future maintenance as well as offload the risk. I think this belief is quite broadly shared across the industry, justifying the high valuation of infrastructure projects, Arbitrum included.

The vision, mission, and goals all combined

With this in mind, Arbitrum’s goal in general, and ArbitrumDAO in particular, should be to work towards putting Arbitrum in a position that, in the future, where most financial activity is happening on some crypto rails, Arbitrum can capture as big a share of this activity as possible - in terms of daily activity, total value locked, and the variety of use cases covered.

However, it is essential to note that the current crypto market is tiny compared to this projected future. This means that for Arbitrum (or any other chain) to be successful in the long term and secure a significant piece of this future pie, it needs to grow many times over in every aspect - number of builders, number of projects, number of users, number of service providers and (especially for Arbitrum) also in terms of token market cap. Most of this growth needs to come from outside the current crypto industry, and I believe that one of the most crucial factors for the chain’s success will be its ability to grow outside the existing market.

One aspect of this growth requires a separate take - token market cap. Arbitrum’s ecosystem is controlled almost entirely by the ARB token, either directly via onchain votes or indirectly by controlling entities like Arbitrum Foundation or GCP Foundation and driving elections for internal bodies, especially the Security Council. Therefore, the ecosystem growth is, to some extent, limited by the growth of the token market cap. The reason for that is that if the value of the ecosystem (including, but not limited to, the value locked in the bridge) significantly outweighs the value of the token, it incentivizes governance attacks - both direct, like stealing the funds from the bridge, but also indirect, like securing enough voting power to either cripple decision making or tilt it to one’s advantage (e.g., Compound’s Humpy proposal).

So right now, in my opinion:

Arbitrum’s goal should be to secure as large a slice of the future financial activity pie as possible through growing adoption of its ecosystem, while keeping the token price at a level that provides sufficient security for the growing system.

What do we have

First of all, in Arbitrum it can only be done by the DAO. The way things are set up right now, there’s no other entity (including Offchain Labs and Arbitrum Foundation) that has enough power and control to make it happen. So, the way I see it, the DAO has to figure it out (sooner rather than later, as time is ticking), or Arbitrum will either fail or, at least, won’t be nearly as successful as it could be).

Now let’s see what tools ArbitrumDAO has to achieve that goal:

  • DAO Treasury
  • Arbitrum brand
  • Control over Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova
  • Control over entities (Arbitrum Foundation and GCP Foundation), and a tried and tested mechanism for setting up new ones if needed (such as OpCo, CapCo, etc.)
  • A network of experienced professional partners with skin in the game that have a vested interest in Arbitrum’s success (Offchain Labs, Tandem, Entropy Partners, GMX, Camelot, Azuki, XAI, Proof of Play, APEChain, Premia, etc.)
  • An expanding set of Orbit chains as part of the Arbitrum Expansion Program
  • A thriving community of users, builders, protocols, and a DAO with existing processes and structures

However, ArbitrumDAO has lacked the ability to set specific strategic goals and focus on efficient management to coordinate all those resources to achieve those goals. Due to the DAO’s decentralized nature, we ended up with a stream of isolated initiatives that did not support any broader goal or purpose. Furthermore, due to historical, practical, and legal reasons, the Arbitrum Foundation was set up as an isolated entity supporting the DAO and Arbitrum Ecosystem but not interfering with the DAO, executing its own agenda.

All of this is not necessarily bad; the independent and decentralized nature of the DAO spurred innovation and resulted in programs and initiatives that would not be possible otherwise, and therefore it’s crucial to preserve these properties. However, in my opinion, to increase efficiency and alignment across initiatives, we need to add a layer of coordination and oversight with strategic objectives. Simply put, we need to add some centralization to the mix (with decentralized oversight by the DAO) with decision-making power and responsibility for the ecosystem’s performance.

What we should do

Operationalize the DAO

We need to be able to run more focused and dedicated programs as a DAO. Leverage external partners where possible through grants and funded initiatives, but with clearly defined goals and objectives for those partners to meet. Facilitate the creation of dedicated third party teams and initiatives, hiring people directly and building intrinsic organisational value where needed or where it makes more sense. This doesn’t mean that independent initiatives are not possible or welcome; it just means that we shouldn’t rely entirely on independent initiatives to make progress. The long-discussed OpCo proposal is a step in the right direction.

Return value to the token

As I mentioned above, increasing token value is crucial for the security of the growing ecosystem. While I understand and fully recognize that this is a very sensitive and delicate matter, we need a long-term direction and at least some commitment to ensuring that the growing value of the ecosystem is properly reflected in the value of the token. We should start committing to creating mechanisms, processes, and structures that make it possible. I believe that the initiative around ARB staking is a step in the right direction.

Secure more revenue streams

The common expectation across the L2 space is that the sequencer revenue will decline with time. Moreover, it is already clear that there are many other ways through which ecosystems could be profiting besides the sequencer revenue. The DAO is already actively exploring some initiatives (STEP, GCP, AVI Pilot, M&A, GMC&TMC, etc.). I believe there are many more possibilities we haven’t even thought about yet. We can look for inspiration in business models built around Free Software projects that usually explored revenue streams in avenues such as services, consulting, certification, support & maintenance, business licensing, and others.

Outreach program for addressing new markets

As mentioned above, I find it crucial for Arbitrum’s success to be able to grow outside of the current crypto market. That means expanding into new verticals (which, to some extent, was the goal behind GCP and STEP) and getting more adoption for existing projects. Arbitrum is known for its DeFi protocols; we have a strong RWA base, a strong gaming foundation, and many great projects that we should collaborate with to help them gain new users. I believe this to be one of the top priorities for the following year.

But it should not be limited just to what we have right now. We should actively identify areas where we are lacking (an example of that could be a dedicated wallet or smart account solution) and try to address them with targeted initiatives, grants, or investments.

Buidler expansion program

We can only grow if we encourage builders to build new solutions on Arbitrum One and expand with their own chains with Orbit stack. This won’t happen by itself, and it won’t happen just by having the best tech or by just throwing grants left and right either. It will only happen if we commit to making building on Arbitrum as easy and straightforward as possible. We need to actively work with existing and new builders to identify their pain points and address them in a way that makes builders feel cared for.

This means, for example, easy access to infrastructure, easy access to service providers that know the technology and can support with integrating it, access to service providers that can commit to long-term support and maintenance of the stack, and, most importantly, access to the community of users willing to test out new products.

The Subsidy Fund for Security Services and past grant programs were steps in the right direction.

Growth and support program for existing protocols

While I mentioned several times that growth beyond the current crypto market is crucial for long-term success, it will only be possible if we double down and support existing protocols, projects, and partners, strengthening Arbitrum’s position achieved in the past. This support can come in many forms, but it should be clear that the success of Arbitrum is directly correlated with the success of projects building on top of it. I believe that the incentive programs that we’ve been running in the past were steps in the right direction, but they must be improved to fulfill their purpose in the future better.


Many wonderful people have given me feedback on the draft version of this post, I won’t name you all as I take sole responsibility for what I put here, but I want you to know that I am very grateful for all your comments, suggestions and criticism.

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This is an excellent project, carrying more weight and value than may appear at first glance. Speaking from a background in communications, I find this proposal particularly intriguing as it aims to unify the DAO’s mission and vision, which are foundational elements for any organization, especially one as decentralized as a DAO.

One key challenge in a project so dependent on community consensus and shared objectives is the risk of delayed processes. With a diverse group like Arbitrum’s DAO, achieving a solid consensus on a unified mission and vision can be time-consuming, as differing priorities and perspectives often require extended discussions. This can slow decision-making, especially if objectives need repeated adjustments based on ongoing feedback.

Additionally, the democratic nature of the DAO’s decision-making structure—where each phase, such as approving the MVP or setting short- to mid-term goals (SOS), involves community voting—could add layers of complexity and time requirements. While this is valuable for inclusivity, it may also mean waiting for quorums or adapting proposals in response to member feedback, potentially causing delays.

Another consideration is the risk of governance paralysis if significant disagreements arise. In cases of strong division within the DAO, reaching effective decisions can become challenging, potentially impeding the organization’s forward momentum.

This could help consolidate the process without compromising community input. Additionally, maintaining flexibility in the MVP and SOS is important, though with limits on the frequency of changes to ensure stability and avoid excessive recalibration. we’re fully behind this proposal as it provides Arbitrum DAO with a clear, unified direction that we believe will strengthen both its impact and comunity identity.

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Thank you for your articulation of a common DAO problem.

"The real challenge in DAO decision-making isn’t the process itself—it’s the perception of open discussion. Many see open discussion as inherently slow and divergent, but that’s not the case. Open discussions can be structured in a way that drives efficient convergence, ensuring that everyone’s voice is heard without dragging the decision-making process out.

This doesn’t mean removing inclusivity or transparency—it means optimizing how we capture and prioritize input. Adding an unbiased ranking system for replies, for example, can allow us to reach a consensus quickly while preserving the open nature of the discussion.

I’ve been working on this problem since 2005, first with blank boarding and now with SimScore. This isn’t some uninformed approach—it’s backed by years of knowledge, testing, and real-world application. I’m confident that this method will work and solve many decision-making bottlenecks that DAOs face."

We find this proposal to be well-crafted and essential for establishing a clear directional framework for the ecosystem’s future development. The initiative thoughtfully addresses the current lack of unified strategic direction while introducing a structured approach to goal-setting and decision-making.

The proposed three-phase implementation approach is compelling. By first establishing foundational principles (MVP) before moving into more specific strategic objectives (SOS) and eventual budgeting, the proposal creates a logical progression that should enable more coherent ecosystem development.

The proposed 6-month trial period before constitutional inclusion is efficient in ensuring appropriate caution, allowing for refinement based on practical application while maintaining long-term stability through eventual constitutional status.

Key areas that would strengthen the framework’s implementation include establishing sustainable value accrual mechanisms and expanding revenue streams beyond sequencer fees. These aspects deserve deeper exploration and integration into the framework.

Once these elements are solidified and incorporated, the proposal would be better positioned to enhance operational focus and efficiency while maintaining necessary flexibility for future adaptation.

Hello @Entropy and the rest of the Arbitrum DAO community,

We’d like to begin by expressing our full agreement on the need to continue laying the foundation for Arbitrum’s growth. Today, we can say the DAO is advancing, but often without a clear direction or strategic goals, and frequently without certainty as to whether the initiatives under discussion are indeed necessary for the project’s progress.

We’re comfortable with this new version of the MVP and don’t have much to add here, though we’d like to discuss how we believe these objectives should be achieved.

Organization

While the discussion around Mission, Vision, and Purpose is valuable, defining these alone is insufficient if the DAO continues to operate as it currently does—without organization. In this regard, we align with the points made by @krst in this post and @Entropy in the OpCo thread. Currently, the DAO functions as a series of silos, where each proposal is handled in isolation, generating no synergies between them, and with no one fulfilling an oversight role to evaluate the outcomes of the DAO-funded initiatives.

Organizing implies several considerations, among others:

  • Establishment of hierarchies
  • Standardized hiring practices (including competency requirements and compensation negotiations)
  • Introduction of budgetary limits per vertical, sustainability analysis, fund flow reports, and other Treasury Management tasks
  • Possible gatekeeping of initiatives (entailing some “centralization” in which proposals not previously discussed with the OpCo/adjacent entity to the DAO have a low probability of approval)
  • Creation of rules or codes of conduct and conflict resolution systems
  • Implementation of structures enabling appropriate tracking, reporting, and conclusions on each initiative’s outcome
  • Service provider replacement systems and frameworks for procurement processes

These are just a few examples of the outstanding items that remain unresolved by the DAO as an organization per se (with the exception of the code of conduct, which was facilitated by Entropy but approved by the DAO). This shows that DAOs do not inherently resolve or replace the operational needs of an organization; they only change the way decisions are made. Therefore, if we want to realize the MVP and specific goals included in the SOS, it’s essential for DAO members to agree on how to approach each operational requirement.

SOS Proposal

From our perspective, the verticals mentioned by @krst in his comment provide a good starting point for debating the structure of a proposal that would likely establish the DAO’s objectives for the next 12–24 months. We’d like to add a few thoughts:

Treasury Management

It’s been mentioned that the DAO needs to work on generating additional revenue streams to support long-term sustainability and provide value to the token. There’s also an RFC under discussion: [Non-Constitutional] Treasury Management v1.2. However, we want to emphasize that the DAO needs to standardize how it utilizes and manages its treasury.

Currently, each initiative handles its own treasury management in isolation: for ARDC v2, an AERA Vault is proposed; for other initiatives, funds are transferred to the AF for conversion to stables; some initiatives are paid in ARB via MSS; and others have sold ARB directly on the market. Similarly, even the use of stream applications lacks a standard framework, with no set guidelines to determine whether Sablier, Hedgey, Superfluid, or Llamapay should be used.

While we understand that different initiatives may occasionally require distinct procedures, we believe a well-designed, flexible framework could cover most cases in the future, especially if the OpCo proceeds successfully.

There have also been many discussions and proposals related to treasury diversification (including the above-mentioned proposal), but three fundamental questions remain unresolved:

  • What should the asset mix in the treasury be?
  • How much immediate liquidity does the DAO need?
  • How much immediate liquidity does the DAO want? (Enough to cover budgetary obligations for a few years? Some extra for potential changes to our plans? Do we need a contingency fund?)

To clarify, when referring to “immediate liquidity,” we mean stablecoins or highly liquid assets with minimal selling effort (we’re excluding ARB, as its liquidity depth limits short-term sell capacity).

As a final note, it’s important to mention that these last two points largely depend on the DAO’s ability to establish an annual budget—another aspect currently unresolved.

Onboarding New Stakeholders to the DAO

For the DAO to be more resilient to capture, genuinely decentralized in decision-making, and benefit from higher-quality proposals, it must focus on onboarding new stakeholders. This means that while growth programs aimed at expanding to new markets (i.e., new builders and users) are important, equal emphasis should be placed on encouraging DAO participation to grow and diversify alongside the ecosystem. As a community, we should be equipped to face new challenges that arise as a result of growth.

In this regard, both the Staking and DIP proposals are key to aligning the Arbitrum ecosystem with its DAO.

A Flexible Program

Considering the rapid evolution of the crypto ecosystem, even if the SOS program were created solely for the next 12 months, priorities could shift at any moment.

For example:

Even if this tweet is a mere rumor, imagine for a moment what would happen if ETH Mainnet no longer required rollups for scaling…the MVP outlined in this RFC would already be obsolete. The Arbitrum ecosystem does not rely exclusively on endogenous factors, so the DAO must be capable of quickly pivoting to a contingency plan if necessary until priorities can be redefined.

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Hi everyone, I’m just jumping into the conversation now, but I wanted to share some thoughts. I really resonate with this proposal and fully agree that finding a clear “north star” for the DAO is crucial for guiding us in the right direction.

The main objective here should be to set this DAO apart from others, attracting more users, developers, and investors. But how can we achieve that? I think the key to finding our north star is to look back at our roots. I’ve been on Arbitrum since day one, and I’ve seen how things have evolved—and, in many ways, how we’ve lost some of the advantages that made Arbitrum unique.

When Arbitrum first emerged, it offered a rare opportunity: a low-cost, high-speed alternative to mainnet Ethereum where EVM developers could experiment quickly and without paying exorbitant fees for contract deployments. This fostered a culture of rapid experimentation, making Arbitrum the go-to chain for innovation. Many of the successful projects that are still thriving on Arbitrum today were born during this period. But as other low-fee chains began to emerge, promising similar opportunities, we started to lose that unique advantage and culture of experimentation. Arbitrum, once the hub of innovation, became just another option in a crowded space.

The point I want to make is that at the end of the day, users follow opportunities—real opportunities to innovate and make money—not just vague branding or marketing. Focusing too much on marketing may not be the answer, because word-of-mouth and reputation naturally build around solid opportunities and successful projects. While slow, steady growth might not grab headlines, fostering a space where true innovation and experimentation can thrive will ultimately set us apart in the long term.

So, how can Arbitrum stand out in today’s competitive landscape? Should ARB artificially boost incentives to attract users, like through programs like STIP? Or should it focus on positioning itself as the premier chain for innovation—offering programs that reward groundbreaking projects? I believe it’s about creating opportunities for creators to experiment and succeed (or fail) without the fear of financial ruin. One idea could be to introduce retroactive funding for innovative projects, even if they don’t immediately gain traction. This would not only shape the user experience but also introduce new dynamics into the competitive landscape.

Given that we haven’t seen much true innovation in DeFi lately, Arbitrum could take the lead by reigniting that spirit of experimentation. We need to encourage more creators to push boundaries and incentivize them to experiment openly.

In short, I think Arbitrum needs to get back to what made it different from other L2s and lean into that original spirit of innovation. The DAO should play a role in helping steer the chain in this direction, creating a space where new projects and ideas can flourish. If ARB wants to stand out today, it’s all about returning to those roots. Let’s make Arbitrum great again!

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Flexibility should be a core value of Arbitrum’s MVP. In the crypto ecosystem, everything is fast-paced, and if we want not just to keep up but to lead, we need adaptability at the foundation.
I agree with what @SEEDGov and @0x_ultra said; that ability to adjust is key for the DAO to be able to respond to market changes or tech advancements. Whether it’s new approaches or shifts in strategy, we have to be ready to move as the context demands.

A flexible strategy framework and regular review cycles is necessary to assess what’s working, what isn’t, and where we could adjust focus to seize opportunities. If we combine flexibility with solid monitoring and evaluation, the KPIs and milestones we set can act as a constant feedback loop. This way, we can use that data not only to stay accountable but to decide when and where to take the next steps.

As a newcomer to Arbitrum, I was a bit excited to read through the entire article, and the mission, vision, and purpose of Arbitrum to achieve its core goal of “uncompromisingly scaling Ether” was very clear.
As a newcomer and a coin holder, I prefer to look at my perspective from the perspective of actual implementation.
1, to ensure that the proposal will not allow some ecological members (such as core developers, specific projects) to obtain unequal benefits, but to promote the broader ecological equity. DAO is free, flexible, in the future how to ensure that arb can win in the long term in so many layer2, whether to leave enough room for adjustment in the uncertain future market environment. I think this is something we need to focus on and discuss.
2, I think on behalf of the long-term interests of token holders
Judge whether this proposal can bring long-term ecological value growth for Arbitrum, such as more developers, users, and the expansion of ARB’s practical application scenarios. Personally, I am more interested in the empowerment and value-added of tokens with ARB.
3. The proposal provides a clear strategic framework for DAOs, which is helpful for making long-term decisions and promoting the development of the ecosystem in a more efficient and organized direction, e.g. selecting short-term and medium-term goals through the SOS proposal process. However, at the same time, it is necessary to pay attention to whether the MVP is too abstract, which may lead to disputes during the implementation, resulting in a decrease in the efficiency of decision-making, and insufficient leveling is a common problem of many web2 companies.
4, hope to improve more specific landing plan: require the subsequent adoption of the SOS proposal, clear and specific indicators (such as user growth, the number of eco-developers, transaction cost targets, etc.), optimize the efficiency of the process: to shorten the proposal implementation cycle, to avoid the time-consuming too long.

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We thank @Entropy for kickstarting this process, as we believe it is a fundamental starting point to align our long term vision and work all together to reach clear goals for Arbitrum.

We’ve already expressed our views on this matter in our initial vision of Arbitrum:

Furthermore, we’ve also participated closely with Entropy and contributed to this proposal.

While we acknowledge that MVPs may result in broad results, we believe this is due to their nature. Creating more specific direction would probably encounter stronger friction from ecosystem actors, as it would be practically impossible to come to a specific definition that suits everyone.

For this reason, we look forward to more specific SOS, which can then refine the MVP according to Arbitrum’s specific areas or sectors.

@krst provided excellent examples of some of them. We believe SOS allows domain experts to better link with the MVP and improve the effectiveness of proposals.

Among those, we believe that Arbitrum needs to renew its focus on ecosystem growth, as it is losing mindshare as more and more alternative chains launch. The creation of an ecosystem-specific SOS would act strategically as an “ecosystem lead” for Arbitrum, both for native and non-native protocols, to stimulate ecosystem partnerships and act as a point of contact within the ecosystem.

This is but a small example of how MVPs could translate into SOS and thus become more specific and targeted.

2 Likes

The purpose has been altered to “defend and guide the Arbitrum ecosystem” from “Scale Ethereum without compromise” as well as the accompanying text. Much of the same rhetoric is still included as defending arbitrum is akin to scaling without compromise. A key change is the purpose is now largely focused on sustainable growth of the ecosystem and DAO.

This proposal will proceed to Snapshot this Thursday, Dec 12th. Entropy Advisors plans to take the MVP to a constitutional vote, adding it as language to the constitution, after a 6-month trial period. During the initial 6 months, changes can be made to the MVP.

3 Likes

this is… a very big difference.

1 Like

Thanks for this.

Voting For on the proposal.

We have here the natural continuation of the discussion on mission, vision and goals that started a few months ago after EthCC, with a proper formalization and plan here.

We had the chance to discuss some of these topics, live, in Bangkok, and was a pretty awesome discussion, oriented toward what we all collectively think Arbitrum should be from a high level view point up to the connection with strategic key ideas that can be then translated in actual program andi initiatives.

This is not an easy discussion. We are likely all here (in crypto, not necessarily in Arbitrum) because we “believe in something”: financial sovereign, unlockin equal opportuninties, efficiency of capital flow, just name one, there are thousands of reasons. But asking someone “what is Arbitrum for you” and then “ok, now that I have your definition, what is your plan to make that vision that you have happen” would more likely than not not being followed by a proper answer.

What I like here is that we went for an abstract question, with a process to try and translate it into operational plan. When the vision is approved, we will be able to define in a second phase, the sos, strategic goals. From the strategic goals, in a third phase, we will be able to go more concrete by establishing buckets of capital and budget spending to reailze these goals.

The byproduct is that, if we do phase 1 and 2 right, we should be in a position that for every initiave, old or new, we will be able to evaluate if it fits the vision and the underneath strategic goals. This should definitely give us more clarity, and help for example in the definition of stuff like incentive programs for which everybody and their grandma has an opinion, but not necessarily understand the consequences and the effect from a higher point of view.

The MVP should be shared widely to raise awareness among all delegates, participants, and the Arbitrum community. Once the off-chain and on-chain votes are done and the proposal is executed, I think the DAO should post updates so everyone in the Arbitrum community can follow and support long-term growth.

As always, I believe in a decentralized future, which is a key part of the proposal’s mission. To achieve this, we need to avoid the trend of decision-making being concentrated in the hands of a few professional consultants. This discourages individual participation, as their opinions and votes have less impact. We must align incentives to encourage active participation in governance from the broader crypto community. And, I believe that community must be at the core of every DAO. Without giving the community a say in protocol governance, we’re no better than the Web2 companies we aim to replace—companies that view their “community” merely as users to extract value from.

I also want to see the initiatives that align token holders with the protocol, such as revenue sharing or other methods to bring value to the token. Token holders are frustrated with exploitative tokenomics that only benefit early insiders who acquired tokens at much lower prices, leaving no upside for new investors. Without incentives to buy and hold tokens, the attractiveness and health of DAOs decline.

I voted yes on snapshot, and I hope my thoughts add value to the DAO :slight_smile:

1 Like

This proposal outlines an ambitious yet essential plan for aligning Arbitrum DAO’s purpose, mission, and vision (MVP) to create clarity and focus for its future. I fully support the approach of breaking it into phases—starting with defining clear end goals and then moving into actionable strategies and budgeting.

Key strengths are the emphasis on alignment across stakeholders and the inspiration taken from proven frameworks like Lido’s. However, execution will be critical. It’s vital that the DAO actively engages with these principles, ensures participation in the SOS process, and uses the MVP as a guide for all future initiatives. Without this follow-through, there’s a risk of the plan becoming just another document. We have to make sure its visible and followed through out every proposal.

Let’s make sure this effort gets the buy-in it deserves and turns into a strong foundation for Arbitrum’s growth.

I am going to vote YES.

PS: I fully agree with @Ignas that after execution it has to be present everywhere and that we as a DAO have to find ways to make Arbitrum better but also not forget the token, because its one one the crucial parts of Arbitrum and the DAO.

Hey @Ignas thanks for the comment and definitely agree on distribution around the MVP. We will work with existing marketing partners on making sure this happens if and when ratified.

We want to clarify something as we’re not sure if we understood correctly that your comment “decision-making being concentrated in the hands of a few professional consultants” refers to us. Since July, we’ve worked hard to gather feedback from delegates and key stakeholders. Our role has been to synthesize and present this input, but the substance of the proposal has been driven by the DAO, and we feel this response may unintentionally misrepresent the efforts and intentions behind this work.

Regarding the 3rd paragraph, we are excited to hopefully have you as an active participant in the conversation around strategic objectives as part of the SOS, which will be open to all to propose what they believe the key objectives over the next 1-2 years are. That said, in our opinion, it is early to be implementing this idea before having more cemented, clear, and larger revenue streams.

4 Likes

After carefully reviewing the proposal and considering feedback from multiple delegates, I have decided to cast a FOR vote on the Snapshot proposal. Below are my reasons and key areas of focus:

Reasons for Voting

The MVP proposal provides a clear strategic framework for Arbitrum DAO, which is essential for its long-term development. It is worth supporting. However, the future challenge lies in implementing this framework effectively, requiring close collaboration between execution teams and delegates.

Key Focus Areas

  1. Implementation and Execution:After the MVP proposal is approved, I will actively participate in subsequent discussions on the SOS strategic goal-setting process to ensure alignment between the proposal and actual needs. I also believe that during the open feedback window, delegates and the community should be encouraged to fully express their opinions to prevent key objectives from diverging from the majority consensus and to ensure the feasibility of the proposal.
  2. Decentralized Governance:I fully agree with @ignas’s view: decentralization is the core of the DAO, but we must avoid the concentration of decision-making power in the hands of a few advisors. This could weaken individual participation and voting influence, undermining the principles of decentralization. We need to adjust incentive mechanisms to attract broader community engagement in governance and ensure that the community remains at the core of the DAO. Otherwise, the DAO risks becoming similar to a Web2 company, treating users merely as profit sources rather than co-creators.
  3. Tokenomics Improvement:I suggest introducing mechanisms that bind token holders’ interests to the protocol’s success, such as revenue sharing or other measures to enhance token value. Currently, exploitative tokenomics disproportionately benefit early insiders who purchase tokens at significantly lower prices, while new investors often see little return. This discourages holding tokens, ultimately reducing the DAO’s appeal and long-term growth potential.

The MVP proposal is an important first step for Arbitrum DAO, but its success depends on effective implementation and community collaboration. Decentralized governance and improvements to tokenomics must be included in the future agenda to ensure the DAO’s long-term health and success.