November 2024
Adopt a Delegate Code of Conduct & Formalize Operations
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
Rationale
From SEEDGov we provided feedback before this proposal was voted on in Snapshot, and our questions have been adequately addressed.
Regarding the voting outcome on the use of Shielded Voting, although it could be considered somewhat controversial, we believe the DAO has demonstrated support for its implementation, given that the total votes in favor (either option) exceed those against. Taking this into consideration and reflecting on the feedback previously given, we have decided to support this initiative.
Establishing a DAO Events Budget for 2025
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “FOR” on this proposal at the Tally Vote.
Rationale
We voted in favor (without reservations) during the temp check, and since the proposal has not undergone significant changes, we see no reason to alter our voting position.
Here is our prior rationale:
(V2) Arbitrum Research & Development Collective
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “FOR” on this proposal at the Tally Vote.
Rationale
We voted in favor during the temp check, and we note that modifications have been made in the final proposal on Tally that incorporate feedback provided by the community (both ours and other delegates’), making this proposal more robust than when we voted on it in Snapshot.
- We appreciate that the possibility of extending the ARDC term by an additional six months has been included.
- The new compensation scheme better aligns with the ARDC’s dynamic—where, although part of the work will be pre-established, the remainder will be on-demand from the DAO, making it more suitable to pay per report rather than a fixed monthly payment.
- We regret the removal of the Hats implementation, and we understand the reasons provided by other delegates, but we saw it as a promising opportunity for experimentation. We hope this will be considered for future DAO initiatives (e.g., the OpCo, cc @entropy).
Restitution For Extensively Delayed ArbitrumDAO Minigrant Winners
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “AGAINST” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
Rationale
We align with the comments made by other delegates. While we empathize with the builders affected by this situation, we understand that the grants were awarded in ARB. We do not find it feasible for the DAO to bear the burden of token volatility in such agreements.
It’s concerning that in some cases, winners have waited up to seven months to receive their funds. Beyond any delays caused by the KYC process (which we understand from personal experience can sometimes be challenging), we do not believe this is a valid justification for such significant delays. Based on the available forum information, we observed that many of these issues could have been avoided with a more proactive approach.
For these reasons, we do not find the DAO responsible in a way that justifies any disbursement of funds. Once again, we regret the situation experienced by the grantees and hope that, in the future, any individual/entity managing grant programs will take this poor precedent as a learning opportunity.
Hackathon Continuation Program
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “ABSTAIN” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
Rationale
After analyzing the proposal, we believe it is well-articulated and addresses a real issue: winners of hackathons or top projects often lack the resources or time to continue development. We also appreciate that part of the budget will be co-funded with RnDAO.
That said, there are some aspects we disagree with or that require further clarification:
- The on-chain functionality seems unnecessary for tracking a maximum of four grantees. Spending USD 30,000 on something that could be resolved with numerous free tools seems excessive.
- We would like to see a more detailed breakdown of the budget allocated to Program Ops & Comms. Upon reviewing previous versions of this proposal, we noticed that there were more budgetary details in general. The proposer explained to us that this was removed because he received feedback indicating that it generated confusion rather than helped. From our point of view, it should be well-detailed what the money is going to be spent on, especially when there are people involved who will be compensated for their work.
- We agree with other delegates that the administrative and marketing costs seem high relative to the total budget.
- It would make more sense for the capital invested in the projects by both parties to be equitable, potentially adjusting the distribution across other items. This would give both entities shared ownership.
Despite the above points, we want to highlight that SEEDGov has decided to abstain because we were involved in the process of granting the Hackathon in question through the Questbook domain for Education, Community Growth, and Events.
Treasury Management v1.2
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
Rationale
We would like to thank @Entropy for facilitating this proposal. We genuinely believe it is a step in the right direction concerning Treasury Management. The issues of Service Provider Shortfalls and the treasury’s inactive assets are matters that need to be addressed promptly:
- Regarding Service Provider Shortfalls: This will avoid going through Tally to cover differences arising from ARB volatility, providing SPs with additional assurance that Arbitrum DAO can meet the agreed compensation. We believe this shouldn’t be taken lightly, as it represents an added level of “legal certainty” for SPs engaging with the DAO (and as with everything, if the risk is lower, pricing improves).
- Concerning the treasury’s ETH: The opportunity cost of doing nothing with it is immense. We are eager to see the committee’s recommendations on how to invest the money, emphasizing that the primary guideline should be “Safety First”. This would prioritize efficient alternatives with the best possible risk/reward ratio, i.e., those offering higher yields with minimal smart contract risks.
Despite these two solutions, there is still much to be done in establishing an integral plan that encompasses all implemented proposals in this vertical (STEP, AVI, GCP, etc.). We agree that the OpCo could serve as a structure to align these initiatives, ensuring a unified Treasury Management strategy.
Regarding the proposed Council structure
- Agree with the separation into two distinct councils because the nature of the tasks differs. (choosing Treasury Managers vs choosing protocols invest ETH)
- We are not fans of the pre-selected committees. While we understand that, given the specific qualifications required of the members, it may seem optimal, we believe the DAO might be missing out on conducting its own RFP (which could open opportunities and optimize costs, despite being slower). This also raises concerns about how the OpCo should establish its negotiation processes in the future. For instance, if a service is required, ideally, the cost should have been consulted/negotiated with three or more SPs or potential committee members. We would like to know if a similar process was conducted at least privately during this pre-selection.
- Before voting on this proposal in Tally, we would like to inquire whether any of the pre-selected members have any potential conflicts of interest that we should be aware of. This is crucial to ensuring adherence to the Code of Conduct, even though it is not a position subject to elections.
December 2024
[Non-constitutional] User Research: Why build on Arbitrum?
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “AGAINST” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
Rationale
We would like to start by mentioning that the proposed research is highly interesting, and we believe it makes sense to establish comparison points with other ecosystems such as Solana and Optimism. If we were to vote in favor, it would be for the option that includes both, with the caveat that within Optimism, Base should also be covered at the very least.
That said, while reviewing this proposal, we asked ourselves, “Why shouldn’t the ARDC handle this?”
We came across this explanation from the proposer:
This explanation contains a claim (already mentioned by @JamesKBH in his rationale) justifying funding this initiative because “most of the candidates for the research position don’t have significant User Research expertise.” When we inquired about this in the ARDC’s channel within the Delegate Group, we found that several of the applicants provided a different perspective (e.g., @PYOR, Ryan from DL (joint application with @CastleCapital), and @Alice1123 from The Block).
Being 100% honest, if the applicants for the position believe they have the necessary expertise to carry out this initiative, we would prefer it to be one of many that will go on-demand under the new structure approved for ARDCv2. This preference can be justified for several reasons:
- We have already funded ARDCv2 to have a structure (both Service Providers and Human Resources) that facilitates both the research and the operational/management aspects involved. This way, the ARDC would be perfectly capable of conducting the research, avoiding double spending on tasks related to project management and coordination (again, ARDC will already have a structure for this). The point is to avoid creating repetitive structures that lead to unnecessary expenses.
- If it is an on-demand research requested by the DAO, subcontractors could be incorporated as needed. Since payments in this case are milestone-based, we see no issue as long as the DAO approves it in Snapshot.
- We prefer not to set a precedent of funding proposals that the ARDC could handle. Instead, the approach should be reversed: funding such proposals externally only when the ARDC explicitly declines to handle them due to a lack of expertise or resources.
- As a “minor” consideration, handling it through the ARDC implies one less multisig for the MSS to manage. While this should not dictate our decisions, it is important to manage resources efficiently and avoid overburdening them with unnecessary operational requirements.
That said, other factors do not convince us either:
- The proposal seems rushed. As other delegates have mentioned, while there is no strict minimum discussion period, seven days of discussion is on the edge of what is “socially accepted.” In this case, we see no need for such a short discussion period, despite the justification provided by the proposer.
- We struggle to understand why a Council is being incorporated. It has been assigned a series of tasks, but as we understand, no compensation has been planned for its members. Additionally, it is unclear who the members will be, as only a “preliminary” composition has been provided without specific names.
In summary, we would be happy to help push this research within the ARDC’s scope, following the process already established for on-demand work:
Designing and operating the reporting and information function
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “AGAINST” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
Rationale
We want to start by thanking @AlexLumley for this new version of the proposal. It is clear that Arbitrum DAO currently needs a workstream focused on reporting, granting autonomy for meetings, and especially people dedicated to tracking already-funded proposals. Although each proposal has its own “reporting system,” the optimal approach would be to standardize this as much as possible. And who is better positioned to make these suggestions to proposers than a DAO employee fully dedicated to reporting?
Yes, the proposal aims to solve a real problem, but we have several concerns that prevent us from supporting the initiative at this time:
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Rush to voting: Once again, the proposal appears rushed. In this particular case, significant changes were made on the same day the proposal was posted for voting. From budget details to the creation of an advisory committee, none of this could be thoroughly discussed among community members.
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Compensation concerns: We agree with other delegates that the requested compensation is based on an erroneous assumption: “The fee is calculated using FTE comp calibrated to match a Sr. OpCo employee (192k) plus a 30% Contractor premium for Benefits, etc.” Not only does the OpCo not yet exist, but the budget provided by @Entropy was merely an example, which does not imply that the final hiring cost will be 192k. We are also unsure that reporting necessarily warrants senior-level compensation, although this point is debatable.
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Base Comp and Bonus: Even leaving aside the above points, the base compensation seems high for the role. Also echoing comments from @cp0x, the proposed bonus does not provide a tangible return for the DAO beyond “alignment” and is again based on the assumption that the OpCo eventually pays a 30% bonus.
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Regarding retroactive payments: At SEEDGov, we generally support retroactive payments for valuable work, but in this case, we align with other delegates: the retroactive compensation appears too high. Based on the proposal, we estimate that during these months the work did not exceed 50% FTE (especially in August), with tasks focused on:
- Preparation, execution, and management of existing GRC calls (25% FTE).
- Maintenance of the GRC and Initiative Tracker, including First Mile Intake, Data Quality, and Ongoing Oversight for Completion (25% FTE).
Please correct us if this assessment is incorrect. (By the way, we quite liked the Table 1. Work Components By Phase By Resource Allocation).
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Advisory Committee: We agree with other delegates that this appears to add unnecessary bureaucracy.
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Discretionary Work Fund: It is challenging to evaluate this without an estimated breakdown of the allocation for each item:
- Regarding “R&D grants related to reporting and information distribution”, wouldn’t it be better to interact with the ARDC for research-related matters?
- Also, Is part of this fund intended for hiring Powerhouse? If so, what is the budgeted cost?
Arbitrum D.A.O. Domain Allocator Offerings) Grant Program - Season 3
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “Renew with 5 domains (adding Orbit Domain)” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
Rationale
Having participated in Seasons 1 and 2, our opinion may be biased, but we agree with other delegates that this is one of the DAO’s most successful programs.
That said, there are a few suggestions we would like to make:
- We agree with what some delegates have expressed: a compensation model incorporating a bonus based on work performed should be explored. From our perspective, some Domains receive a higher volume of applications than others, making them more labor-intensive. Therefore, we see no issue with implementing an equitable base compensation for all Domains, complemented by a bonus tied to the marginal workload that a specific Domain entails compared to others.
- Not only do we support the inclusion of the Orbit Domain, but we also believe there should be flexibility to expand the budget in the future. We understand that this wouldn’t pose a problem due to the modularity proposed by @JoJo.
Regarding @Krst’s query: at least in the “Education, Community Growth and Events” Domain, the review and follow-up of all work associated with the Domain takes approximately 5 hours per day. Over 5 days (Monday to Friday), this equates to a total of 25 hours per week.
However, there have been instances where we’ve had to add a couple of hours on weekends for revisions due to a heavy proposal load. For example, proposals requesting more than $25K require a sharper review and, at times, calls with proposers who could only schedule meetings on weekends.
Considering the above, we estimate the total average time commitment to be around 30 hours per week or approximately 120 hours per month. This translates to a rate of $66.67 per hour.
In our case, we have published monthly reports for the Domain in our Reports Thread, detailing each approved project, its geographic distribution, and the remaining funding.
Regarding due diligence, we would like to mention that we have identified and rejected at least 9 scam applicants, all cases involving individuals attempting to impersonate someone else. No applicant advances past the initial review stage without verifying their identity. To ensure this, we not only check their social media profiles but also hold meetings with cameras turned on. We agree that these practices should be replicated in all domains and from our perspective Jojo is very well positioned to ensure this.
[NON-CONSTITUTIONAL] Arbitrum Onboarding V2: A Governance Bootcamp
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “ABSTAIN” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
Rationale
Due to our clear Conflict of Interest with respect to this proposal we have decided to abstain.
ARDC (V2) Supervisory Council Election
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “50% for Frisson (Comm Role) and 50% for Jameskbh (Comm Role)” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
Rationale
This decision was not easy, as there were excellent candidates for the Comms position. On this occasion, we decided to allocate 50% of our votes to Frisson and 50% to Jameskbh, not only due to their long history of contributions to the DAO but also because, having had the chance to work with them in the Staking WG, we found two highly skilled, honest individuals with a genuine interest in adding value to the ecosystem.
On the other hand, knowing the outcome of the election, we would like to congratulate Juanrah and Alexlumley for being elected and wish them the best in this V2.0 of the ARDC.
Finally, we would like to mention that we did not allocate any votes for the Ops position as there was only one candidate running. We preferred to direct all our VP to our two preferred candidates for the Comms position. In this regard, we agree with the recent discussions: the voting methodology was not ideal. We believe it is better to create an additional vote on Snapshot than to create situations like this:
In the image, it is clear that there is a 300,000 ARB difference between the second and third candidates, while the Ops candidacy received 21.7m votes that could have been redirected to the other candidates. This indicates that (potentially) the outcome could have been different with another voting methodology.
We hope this precedent serves as a learning experience for the DAO, helping us to avoid such situations in the future.
ARDC (V2) Research Election
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “50% for Blockworks Advisory and 50% for Llama Research & Castle Capital” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
Rationale
Just like in the Supervisory Council election, this decision involved various renowned candidates (in this case, orgs), including Blockworks, which, from our perspective, has done an outstanding job during the first term. This alone was sufficient reason to allocate 50% of our Voting Power to them.
Regarding the other candidates, the joint application by Llama Research & Castle Capital especially stood out to us. Their reputation, background, and alignment with Arbitrum were undoubtedly appealing factors. Additionally, the hourly rate they specified is highly competitive (while not typically a determining factor in our decisions, we felt it was worth noting).
ARDC (V2) Risk Election
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “100% for Vending Machine” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
Rationale
We have witnessed the Vending Machine team working in both the ARB Staking WG and Everclear DAO under similar contexts. Having had the opportunity to analyze their research and simulations, we are confident that they are the right team for the role.
Even though they were not elected by the DAO, we encourage the team to continue engaging with the Arbitrum community. We are confident that, in the future, they will find new opportunities to contribute with their knowledge and expertise.
ARDC (V2) Security Election
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “100% for Open Zeppelin” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
Rationale
Not only do they have a proven track record in security, but we have also had the opportunity to witness their work during the first iteration of the ARDC and their current involvement in the Stylus Sprint program as evaluation committee members. In our opinion, they are the best-positioned and most aligned candidates with the DAO to continue leading this process.
Arbitrum Hackathon Builder Continuation Program
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “Abstain” on this proposal at the Tally Vote.
Rationale
As mentioned in our rationale for the temp-check, we decided to abstain due to our Conflict of Interest.
Treasury Management V1.2
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Tally Vote.
Rationale
Having received confirmation from Entropy on the possible COIs, we see no reason to change our vote regarding Snapshot. Here our previous rationale.
We hope that this is the first of many steps by the DAO towards a comprehensive plan, bringing together all Treasury related initiatives and that through OpCo the DAO will finally have its Annual Budget.
Unifying Arbitrum’s Mission, Vision, Purpose (MVP)
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
Rationale
Quoting our previous statement:
Establishing an MVP is a crucial step for the DAO’s decision-making process moving forward. The MVP will also serve as the foundational cornerstone for the OpCo if approved.
As JoJo rightly pointed out, both the MVP and the SOS will support the DAO in its resource allocation role by identifying which proposals are best aligned and positioned to achieve ecosystem-level objectives.
Also we appreciate the emphasis placed on the user throughout this process. Products designed to provide an optimal UX have consistently shown greater ease in facilitating onboarding, as observed in the case of Solana. Focusing on Builders and Users as our primary objectives appears to be the right approach.
Finally, it would be worthwhile for the DAO to begin discussions around the SOS proposal after the holiday season. At SEEDGov, we have previously shared our perspective:
Partner with ETH Bucharest 2025
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR, WITHOUT POAP” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
Rationale
We have known ostanescu.eth both personally and through our interactions as Domain Allocators during Questbook Season 2, where they successfully met all proposed milestones. Overall, our impression remains positive after these engagements. Additionally, we appreciate the proposer’s efforts to address every question raised in the post.
That said, there are a few points we would like to highlight:
1. POAP Cost ($15,000):
We believe the $15,000 allocated for providing POAPs is excessive, especially since this tool tends to be suboptimal for measuring attendance. From our experience organizing events and in the Domain, POAPs often serve as a floor metric for attendance since not all participants claim them. For this reason, increasing the budget by 25% solely for this purpose seems unnecessary.
2. Genesis Block Package Costs:
Some costs within the Genesis Block Package also appear high. For example, the $8,000 allocated to the Exhibition Booth aligns more closely with events of significantly larger magnitude.
3. Milestone-Based Fund Release:
As mentioned by pedrob, we believe there should be a partial release of funds tied to specific milestones (at least 2 or 3). While we understand that sponsorship packages require upfront payment to cover pre-event expenses, as noted by the proposer, other components like the Hackathon bounties budget could be milestone-based. Additionally, in our view, part of the budget or an incentive should be allocated to a final milestone for post-event reporting. We encourage the proposer to implement these changes to better safeguard Arbitrum DAO’s interests.
4. Domain Suitability:
Ideally, this project should fall under Questbook’s Domain. Even without the POAP allocation, the budget remains close to the $50,000 threshold. However, we understand that due to timing constraints, this may not be feasible. The Domain is expected to resume operations in February, which would leave only two months before the event—insufficient time considering expenses like venue rental and other upfront costs.
5. Clarification on Conflict of Interest:
Finally, we would like to clarify that we did not abstain from voting this time, despite having previously approved a grant for the same proposer. We do not believe there is a conflict of interest in this case. Unlike the Hackathon Continuation Program—which represented a continuation of the Hackathon we funded through Questbook—this proposal is for a completely separate and independent event (aside from the proposer) and is unrelated to the Hackathon funded in Romania.
OpCo – A DAO-adjacent Entity for Strategy Execution
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
Rationale
We believe our initial doubts and concerns have been adequately addressed by Entropy, and we commend the team’s willingness to incorporate feedback from most delegates—including some of our suggestions, such as increasing the compensation for members of the OAT Committee.
Overall, we feel strongly aligned with the OpCo proposal. As Service Providers for the DAO, we understand the operational advantages it can bring. Today, compliance processes and agreement drafting rely almost entirely on the AF, with only a few exceptions. While we value the Foundation’s efforts, it is crucial for the DAO to be truly autonomous—otherwise, the “A” in its name would hold little meaning.
It is also important to note that most current programs lack well-documented frameworks, making transitions to new Service Providers particularly challenging.
There are only two areas that remain a source of “concern” for us:
1. OAT and Decision-Making:
Initially, we were concerned that the OpCo might “capture” delegates with the highest VP, leading to centralized decision-making within the DAO. However, considering that the OAT Committee can only include individuals with no economic ties to the DAO (or those willing to forgo such ties), it is now difficult to envision who might fill these roles. The requirement for alignment with the ecosystem, relevant context, and the expertise needed for such a demanding task further complicates this.
2.Proposed Salary Ranges:
While we understand that the proposed salary ranges are merely illustrative and not final figures—and that the proposer’s intention is to empower the OpCo to negotiate and attract top talent—we want to stress that the salaries for the Chief of Chaos and Chief of Coins could be lower. For reference, the median salary for a COO in the United States is approximately $500,000 (base compensation).
In this regard, we trust that the future OAT Committee will prioritize austerity wherever possible, as this sets a critical precedent when negotiating compensation with the broader team and various Service Providers.