Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
This is a deadline extension rather than a fresh ask, pushing the mandate end date from July 2026 to July 2027 with no additional funding and the unspent ~63.7M ARB still sitting with the Foundation under Season Selection Committee approval. We are comfortable granting that runway given Season 1’s track record, which delivered the strongest cost-effectiveness ratio of any major Arbitrum incentive program to date alongside a substantial increase in yield-bearing stablecoin supply on the network. We would rather the committee take the time to align Season 2 with the strategic developments it referenced than force 15-20M ARB into a weaker campaign on the original timeline. Our main ask is simply that the committee follow through with a concrete Season 2 design and timeline now that the program has another year to operate.
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
We are in support of sunsetting Timeboost in favor of a priority gas auction. Timeboost’s ahead-of-time express lane saw participation thin out over time and posed a barrier for newer primitives that depend on cheap, frequent, priority inclusion, while a per-transaction priority fee model is already familiar to the searchers and arbitrageurs operating across other EVM chains. Importantly, the sequencer retains its private mempool, so the change does not introduce sandwiching or frontrunning, and the anti-starvation mechanism gives low and zero priority fee transactions a path to timely inclusion so the new revenue is not extracted at the expense of ordinary users. With 97% of priority fees routed to the DAO treasury and the operator’s parameter discretion bounded and revocable by governance, we view this as a net positive for both Arbitrum’s revenue and its competitiveness for latency-sensitive activity. As this is the temperature check, we anticipate confirming in line on the subsequent on-chain vote.
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
We support the structured wind-down and the return of roughly 143.7M ARB of AGV’s original 225M allocation to the DAO treasury. From a capital allocation standpoint, venture capacity parked against a consumer and gaming thesis the ecosystem has moved past is better recycled into the treasury where it can serve current priorities, and the structured approach preserves the value of the capital already deployed rather than forcing an untidy exit. Narrowing the remaining mandate to managing the existing portfolio plus selective follow-ons, executed by OpCo under OAT oversight, keeps the residual book inside existing accountability structures instead of standing up new machinery for a shrinking program. We would like to see transparent reporting on the reserves retained for portfolio management and outstanding obligations through the end of 2026, with any further surplus returned to the treasury as it frees up.
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
This hard-codes the 97/3 Timeboost proceeds split the DAO already ratified, routing bid proceeds on Arbitrum One and Nova through an on-chain fee splitter instead of requiring a fresh 30-plus day governance vote each time the Developer Guild’s share needs to be transferred. Automating an already-approved distribution is straightforward operational hygiene, removing recurring governance overhead and the risk of a manual transfer being delayed or missed, while keeping the ADG portion at a Foundation-controlled address so the existing oversight is unchanged. We see no new risk surface being introduced here, and enforcing the split on-chain keeps Arbitrum’s ordering-related revenue handling consistent as those products evolve. As this is the temperature check, we anticipate confirming in line on the subsequent on-chain vote.
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
The Fast Feed turns early visibility into the sequencer’s ordered transaction stream into a subscription product, with proceeds split 97/3 between the DAO treasury and the Developer Guild through the same on-chain RewardDistributor framework the DAO just ratified for Timeboost proceeds. We like that the value of low-latency data gets captured by the DAO instead of accruing quietly to whoever runs the fastest infrastructure, and that access stays open since anyone willing to pay the subscription receives the same feed. Because the stream only publishes transactions after their order is fixed, it adds no new frontrunning or sandwiching surface and leaves ordering, inclusion guarantees, and user fees untouched. Pricing parameters sit with Offchain for two years while the DAO alone retains control over the revenue split, which we consider an acceptable balance for a new product finding its market, and the paid-only model is a sensible DoS mitigation. In line with our vote on the PGA transition, this rounds out a coherent set of ordering-related revenue products for the DAO.
Vote: 33.33% each to Jojo, Rika Goldberg, A.J. Warner
Type: Election
We split our weight evenly across three candidates for the Oversight and Transparency Committee, backing the applicants whose governance track record and independence we were most confident in for the oversight mandate. An effective OAT depends on members willing to interrogate execution, spending, and reporting rather than defer to it, and we would rather concentrate our support on a shorter slate we have real conviction in than spread it thin across the field. Weighting the three equally gives each of them the best chance of clearing the threshold for a seat.