We supported none as we thought both other options were premature without a full operational cycle’s performance data. The Council was still in its startup phase, and the DAO had limited visibility into the true workload, effectiveness, and impact of the new compensation framework. Choosing None signals a preference for data-driven calibration after proven execution, ensuring accountability and avoiding setting a precedent of mid-term pay adjustments without sufficient benchmarking or community feedback.
We are in favor of this option because it makes quorum requirements more realistic and representative of active governance participation. The current model ties quorum to the total token supply, much of which is undelegated or inactive, creating unnecessary friction for legitimate proposals. Moving to a DVP based quorum ensures decisions reflect the voices of those actually engaged in the DAO’s governance process. This change promotes smoother proposal execution without compromising legitimacy.
Vote: ⅓ to each Gauntlet, Cyfrin, Immunefi Type: Security Council on Tally
Similar to our nominations, we divided our voting power into thirds among the above three candidates. Our team has in some capacity or another, across a handful of different protocols, worked with each of the providers. All three of the teams have a strong reputation in the space, and we are confident that they’ll make for great additions to the next cycle of voting in this security council election. Note that there are other candidates like ZackXBT that we strongly believe should be on the council, however, given they are almost certainly going to be voted in without our votes, we reserved our limited voting power for others.
From the information that we were able to aggregate from a couple of sources, this proposal’s ask to increase the council compensation seems fair for the corresponding workload. We do want to see strong deliverables here, as so far, there has been lackluster output since program inauguration. The “GV Startup Phase: Scoped vs Actual Council Workload” table in the proposal also demonstrated more clearly the increased workload that is required. However, we don’t feel entirely comfortable allocating further compensation yet until more clear and transparent deliverables are published. We would like to first see a year in review with tangible projects/allocations from the AGV–we are okay with retroactive funding in the event of sufficient outputs.
A stab at a new form of DIP is appreciated since this is well-thought. But the new framework risks amplifying bureaucracy and subjectivity, especially within the PRS component, where delegates are expected to assess each other’s work with little standardization. Peer review without a codified rubric will inevitably devolve into popularity-based voting or self-reinforcing cliques, producing results no more objective than the current system. Note, we do agree that the current subjective analysis by a single entity is not perfect. However, replacing SEED with an open-sourced review mechanism is not a significant improvement. Plus, adding layers of evaluation every month will further dilute attention and quality. We honestly cannot afford more of that.
There are elements of this proposal that are similar to the Triple DIP. Namely, our concern starts with the complexity and increased gatekeeping with the peer-to-peer assessment model. The requirement that delegates and contributors must join a newly created peer assembly via a vouching system before becoming eligible for rewards introduces a gatekeeping layer that risks excluding capable actors and discouraging broader participation. It also adds undue complexity. Also, the consolidation of delegates and contributors into the same umbrella may blur roles and create misaligned incentives. By making the same assembly responsible for both roles and linking rewards across multiple tracks like voting, recognition, nudges, it becomes unclear whether the program will incentivize quality deliberation and oversight or simply volume and self-promotion.
In line with our snapshot vote, we are voting in favor of this proposal. We hope to continue supporting initiatives that turn idle capital into active investments, abiding by the newly delivered IPS from the Entropy team.
Give enough support on the last benchmarking vote for the AGV to pass, we see the argument for a start-up phase bonus due to the non-trivial and meaningful upfront work needed to get this started.
Our reason for splitting voting power 50/50 among JoJo and Paper was because we sought a balance of opinion in the AGV council. JoJo has been actively involved with the existing team and is therefore acclimated with the operations and personnel. Paper, on the other hand, brings a strong sense of accountability and honesty which the DAO needs for oversight purposes.
Relative to the previous proposal around delegate incentives, this one ultimately goes back to the basics, primarily around operations and inclusion criteria. Omission of more complex components like the social reference system previously proposed compelled us to vote in favor here. As disclosure, the UADP is likely a beneficiary of this initiative.