This is a great idea that was already accepted in Snapshot 4 months ago.
There have been no significant changes in that time, so I voted YES.
I like this proposal for several reasons:
It will prevent projects from using the grant inappropriately
It will reduce operational costs for monitoring projects
It will involve more users in projects with grants. Even if they do not find any violations, they will at least understand the project and its prospects in detail
I like the proposal primarily for its thoughtful approach compared to previous grant programs.
This time, it is the Arbiter that will decide what and how much to give incentives to projects, which in turn will have to meet the requirements for the season
The amount in dollars is significantly less than previous grants - on the one hand, this is good, because large grants greatly deplete the treasury without any certain success for the Arbiter. On the other hand, weak incentives may not affect the attraction of users if this program is not actively promoted.
I like that the DAO will also take part in the development of goals for each season. This will give impetus to the development of the community, which will better understand what exactly the Arbiter requires and how to improve the incentive system in order to avoid unnecessary expenses in the future
I voted FOR this proposal
Firstly, we actually have no choice because of the very big changes in the main chain - Ethereum
Secondly, it is financially beneficial for Arbitrum - we will pay less to the main chain, since blobs have become cheaper to transfer
Thirdly, they fixed not only compatibility with Ethereum, but also a bug with Stylus, one of the advantages of Arbitrum
For Constitutional AIP, it is proposed to reduce the quorum from 5% to 4.5%.
The situation has developed that the number of tokens is growing more than the voting percentage
The last Constitutional vote took place only after an additional voting period (+2 days), but 243.89M out of a quorum of 210.74M voted, so the voting reserve was more than 33 million ARB
However, this decision is one of the worst that exists, since by the time this proposal is accepted, the quorum will increase even more and it will be necessary to vote for another reduction in the quorum percentage.
There are several other options, one like in Uniswap - to delegate the required number of tokens to top delegates (also a controversial decision, but at least it does not need any changes), and it can be done better than in Uniswap, namely, to delegate the required number of tokens only if the quorum has not been met.
The second solution is staking, which has not been launched for six months and which would solve the problem of apathy of ARB token owners
While the second solution takes time, the first one is easy to implement right now.
This is undoubtedly the right decision.
I am grateful to the team that promptly saw the completion of the project and quickly offered the only right decision - to invest these funds in a new stage of STEP
After a long period of absence of large grants, Arbitrum is back.
Despite the fact that some of my proposals did not make it into the final version (for example, mandatory use of vesting), this is basically a well-thought-out plan for the next year.
The main thing is that grants and incentives will be given only to those who help Arbitrum achieve its goals through the promotion of its product - win-win.
The amount of grants is small, but a lot depends on the cost of the ARB token, its price can greatly affect the success of the program
As I have said before, I am not happy with such changes that reduce control over OpCo, which can consume a lot of funds
The main disadvantage of these proposals is the ability to spend funds without a request from the DAO, given the large planned salary of employees who will not have sufficient knowledge and therefore need to be given a mandate for spending. I consider this very irrational and uncontrollable
The functions offered by Paulo are very useful.
As I said earlier - two of them are relevant for me, and I do not need notifications due to my active participation in the Arbitration every day.
However, the initial proposed amount turned out to be very large. Despite the detailed answers of the author and the correction of the amount by 3 times, I believe that these functions should be offered as a product for the Foundation or for Labs, so that they implement this in the basic set of the site. In the current situation, the owner of these functions may stop performing them due to circumstances beyond his control. In this case, I would like to have centralized control over convenient functions here
I still believe this rushed proposal won’t solve anything. The root approach needs to change. Adjusting quorum thresholds is unnecessary — doing so could lead to a slippery slope of constant reductions and potential governance attacks
Since SKY is one of the leading stablecoin projects in crypto, this is a great opportunity to increase USDS inflows into Arbitrum — especially considering the current hype around stablecoins
I voted for Gustavo Grieco, although it was a difficult choice.
Gustavo’s big advantage is that he has a lot of experience working with the Arbitrum chain.
On the one hand, I think that the six months that the team has been working is clearly not enough to evaluate their contribution, to really do some big work, especially considering that this initiative is relatively new and complex.
On the other hand, I understand that the team is planning to raise their salaries (although at the moment the proposal has not yet been launched) and knowing this prospect, I am no longer so sure about extending the current team composition
We have consistently voted against the creation of this committee.
As many have pointed out, the way this committee’s budget is structured creates a perverse incentive: they can technically avoid spending anything if not needed — but in order to justify their existence, they are pressured to find ways to spend.
This results in a backwards paradigm — instead of allocating funds for necessary work, we’re creating work to justify pre-allocated funds.
That’s precisely why I believe this committee is unnecessary. If such work becomes essential, it can be proposed and voted on via Snapshot like any other initiative — using the already designated funds without the need for a permanent structure
In two weeks, Arbitrum — the author of this proposal — has still not answered key questions regarding the audit.
The DAO is being asked to vote on updating contracts whose audits were incomplete and conducted over 2.5 years ago.
This should not be approved — or at the very least, delegates should be informed where to find the up-to-date audits, instead of relying on the outdated ones attached to the proposal
As I wrote earlier (back in May), I don’t see any issue with either the existence or absence of such a bridge.
Many tokens don’t have an official bridge, and it doesn’t hinder them in any way.
But if the authors want to create one, I see no reason to oppose it