Cp0x Delegate Communication Thread

Voting Rationale & Governance Calls Delegate Statements
,
242

Extending DRIP’s Mandate

DRIP is an incentive program for attracting liquidity directly from users.

Out of 80 million ARB, only 63.7 million ARB remain; they’ve only actually completed one of the four planned seasons. They were supposedly revising the program to accommodate a new strategy. The downside is that they’ve been significantly delayed, and the ARB value is currently at a minimum.

It could be extended, since there are no salaries, and the ARB is still there; no one is asking for new ones.
(I voted FOR this DRIP last year.)

Vote: FOR
Platform: Snapshot

243

OAT Elections

The OAT’s job is to hold the OpCo accountable, so we put most of our weight behind independent candidates with the fewest conflicts of interest.

Manoj Desai got the largest share — he’s the cleanest on conflicts, and his work is focused on delegate participation and accountability, which is exactly what this committee deals with. Alex Netto came next: a strong governance-security record (Blockful, the ENS Security Council) and consistent work against over-centralization. We spread the rest across Varit Ruangsiri and Zeptimus (steady, transparency-focused work), Pedro Breuer (the least-conflicted sitting member, for continuity), and a smaller share to Jojo, who knows the DAO well.

We didn’t support Patrick McCorry or A.J. Warner — one is tied to the Foundation, the other is CSO of Offchain Labs. An accountability committee shouldn’t include the parties it’s meant to oversee.

Vote: Weighted
Manoj Desai 25% / Alex Netto 20% / Varit Ruangsiri 15% / Zeptimus 15% / Pedro Breuer 15% / Jojo 10%
Platform: Snapshot

244

Fast Feed

Fast Feed is a paid, authenticated data stream that gives subscribers an earlier view of the sequencer’s already-ordered transactions. 97% of the revenue goes to the DAO Treasury and 3% to the Arbitrum Developer Guild.

We voted FOR. It’s a new revenue stream for the DAO at no cost to the treasury — Offchain Labs covers the development and the Trail of Bits audit. The revenue split and the RewardDistributor contract are the same ones already approved and running under Timeboost, so this isn’t new ground.

The key point for us: the feed only publishes data after ordering has been set by the sequencer. Subscribers get an earlier look, but they can’t frontrun, sandwich, or change ordering — it’s an information product, not an ordering privilege. Pricing is permissionless and EIP-4844-style, so buying up all the tickets becomes exponentially expensive and monopolization isn’t rational.

One concern worth noting: Offchain Labs holds the MARKET_PARAMS_SETTER role for two years, which is some operational centralization. But the DAO keeps DEFAULT_ADMIN and BENEFICIARY_SETTER and can override or revoke at any time. We’ll review the Trail of Bits audit and confirm the deployed contract matches the spec before the on-chain vote.

Vote: FOR
Platform: Snapshot

245

[Constitutional] Ratification of Security Council Election Process Improvements

Temp check on four fixes to the SC election process: 2-year cohorts instead of 1, candidate threshold down to 0.1% from 0.2%, and key rotation for both candidates and members.
Longer cohorts and a lower threshold cut down on election fatigue; the threshold drop is just a correction as supply grows. Key rotation has sensible safeguards (Foundation veto + 3-day buffer for candidates, SC veto + 18-day timelock for members). Trail of Bits audit with fix review is done.

Vote: FOR
Platform: Snapshot

246

Constitutional AIP: ArbOS 61 Elara Upgrade

Fixed version of ArbOS 60 (two gas-refund bugs touched the STF, so it needed a new version; same scope, One/Nova were never on 60). For One and Nova it does two things: raises the Stylus contract size limit from 24 KB to 96 KB (Stylus only, no Solidity/EVM impact, clear win for Rust teams), and adds a BaseFeeManager letting Offchain Labs move the min L2 base fee within 0.01–0.10 gwei without a full vote each time.

The base-fee delegation is the part worth watching, but the guardrails are fine: tight range, expires in 2 years, every change announced on the forum, DAO can revoke anytime, audited by Trail of Bits. Good that Dynamic Pricing is not activated and the special OCL pricing rights were dropped. AltDA API, compliance filtering and priority fees ship disabled on One/Nova. No cost to the DAO.

Vote: FOR
Platform: Onchain (snapshot.box)

247

[Constitutional] AIP: Security Council Election Process Improvements

On-chain vote now, after the temp check (#245). Same four fixes: 2-year cohorts instead of 1, candidate threshold down to 0.1% from 0.2%, and key rotation for candidates and members.

Longer cohorts and a lower threshold cut down on election fatigue; the threshold drop is just a correction as supply grows. Key rotation has sensible safeguards (Foundation veto + 3-day buffer for candidates, SC veto + 18-day timelock for members). Trail of Bits audit with fix review is done. The on-chain payload moves no funds, it’s a single ArbSys execution on the standard constitutional path.

Vote: FOR
Platform: Onchain (snapshot.box)

248

[Constitutional] PGA + Fast Feed

The case for replacing Timeboost is pretty clear. Three entities took around 97% of auction wins, while most atomic arbitrage and nearly all liquidations bypassed it. Moving to PGA makes sense.

We read the implementation, not just the summary. Giving the Toggler chain-owner status is a broad permission, but the contract itself is narrow: the manager can only switch tip collection on or off, and after two years anyone can remove the Toggler as chain owner. One detail is worth clarifying: the expiry is not self-enforcing, so setCollectTips() still works after year two until someone calls the permissionless revoke().

Our remaining questions are around Fast Feed.

The 18 August update limits Offchain’s control over Fast Feed payment parameters to two years, but that limit does not appear in the on-chain text: the two-year references there apply to the Toggler and K. We would rather see the Fast Feed limit enforced by the payment contract itself.

There is also a concrete gap around deployment. On 22 July, Offchain confirmed that the existing Timeboost RewardDistributor cannot be reused for Fast Feed, since each RewardDistributor handles a single asset and Fast Feed payments are in an ERC-20 stablecoin. The proposal acknowledges this and says the dedicated deployment will replace that address in the final on-chain proposal materials. These are the final materials, and the old address is still there; the payment asset and role assignments aren’t specified either.

The execution section says the final payload and proposal description must enumerate the calls, targets, addresses, role assignments and parameter values, and must separate what the payload executes from authority granted for later. For Fast Feed, neither side is fully specified.

The July update also promised periodic accounting, public dashboards and a separate distribution vote every six months. We expect those commitments to carry through once PGA is live.

None of this changes our vote. The PGA side is well specified and the Toggler is narrow and audited. The unresolved pieces sit mostly in Fast Feed infrastructure that has not been deployed yet. We’ll check the final contracts, addresses, roles and revenue routing when it goes live.

Vote: FOR
Platform: Onchain (Snapshot.box)

249

Arbitrum Security Program

We support continued audit coverage for builders and recognize AAP’s first-year results; our vote is about the budget structure, not the program’s purpose. The bug bounty and Security Council have been carried by the Foundation to date and are also covered within the aggregated technical lines of the Foundation’s 2027 funding approved in June. ASP creates a second permitted funding source for these same functions without explaining how the two budgets will be reconciled, whether the corresponding Foundation spending will be reduced, or whether ASP funding is meant to supplement it.

At the same time, audits and AI screening are the only pillar without a defined amount in the proposal’s budget; the 18 August deck marks it “from remaining balance.” With the Council’s $720k/year fixed and bounty payouts mandatory when triggered, the program’s original builder-audit purpose becomes the residual category. A minimum floor for the audit pillar and a spending priority between pillars were requested by several delegates and not provided, as were a definition of “low-risk” for idle funds and bounds on the 14-day optimistic process. Our questions remained unanswered through the close; we will assess the first quarterly reports against these points and revisit at renewal.

Vote: AGAINST
Platform: Offchain (Snapshot)