After all the, feedbacks here, feedbacks in the call and private feedbacks, voting “For” on DIP 1.5.
Is gonna be a mess, seed is gonna have the hardest time of their life, and I am pretty sure a lot of folks will initially complain about having that 0.75 points more in this or that category.
But often times than not the hardest path is also the path that leads to the biggest growth, and I think evaluating not only the votes, but a big part of the arbitrum governance life, is what we need. We literally need to put all delegates in the position of interacting, and interact in a meaningful way.
A few things here
- we are going to have to obviously trust the seed gang here. I won’t quote Uncle Ben here. But you know where i am going with this
- that said, if I had to trust one delegate on a massive program like this, it would be seed. Having had the pleasure to work with some of them, and meet a few of them, I see them as a force of good that is pushing more than others for adoption of crypto not to speculate but to solve specific problems. I quote this because is easy for some, as we saw in the call, to think that there could be too much power concentration. While is true, is also necessary since a public mechanism for evaluation would be not only extremely unfeasible, but won’t be consistent over time. TLDR: I trust seed latam, a lot, to run this in the fairiest way possible
- As suggested, I think the spread of costs between 1.5 and 1.1 of around 40k is too small. We could find ourself to have a (positive) explosion of delegates presence between this program, the staking program and all the initiatives we have. The amount of work is almost linear with the amount of delegates we have, and since this program is a 1y long one my strong suggestion is to add a clause, on the tally vote, for which that if we will be above X amount of delegates, they might ask for some further funds to cover opex, which is mostly manual labour
- in the previous iteration, seed if i recall was not able to enroll in the program to avoid conflicts. I think this be removed for 1.5. To make the participation fair and agnostic, the evaluation of seed governance could be only about the amount of votes, onchain and offchain, plus call particpation. for the rest of the evaluation, subject to interpretation, it could just be the median of the score of all delegates involved in the program, or maybe the median of the second lower half.
Yes, in all of this I am saying that seed should be able to ask more and enroll in the program, thus incresing overall cost. While aware of this, I also understand the enormous amount of workload this program will bring to their shoulders, being a cow that reads all the posts and comments in the forum: if i imagine myself not only reading all, but also evaluating all, and knowing how much this program will probably be relevant for the arbi staking proposal, I really want for seed to have all the ability to do the best job possible here. And here it means being able to onboard all the people they think are needed to have a consistent evaluation over the next 12 months.