Tané Delegate Communication Thread

[Tane]

Consolidate Idle USDC to the ATMC’s Stablecoin Balance (Snapshot)

Consolidate Idle USDC to the ATMC’s Stablecoin Balance

We have voted in favor of this proposal. Previously, we expressed ideas regarding certain aspects of Entropy’s initial proposal, specifically highlighting the need for a more structured framework to ensure that idle funds could generate yield without necessitating a reduction in available resources for ongoing activities. We are pleased to see that our feedback has been incorporated more directly and comprehensively than anticipated, by maintaining the Events Budget while optimizing its capital…

[Tane]

[CONSTITUTIONAL] Register $BORING in the Arbitrum generic-custom gateway (Onchain)

We vote in favour of this proposal on Tally.

We found no additional issues occurred before this onchain vote, and thus support this proposal for the same reason as its Snapshot voting.

Tané Delegate Communication Thread

[CONSTITUTIONAL] Register $BORING in the Arbitrum generic-custom gateway (Snapshot)

[Tane]

[Non-Constitutional] - Updates to the DIP, The Complete 1.7 Version (Snapshot)

Proposal - Updates to the DIP, The Complete 1.7 Version

We vote in favor of this proposal. Given the ongoing structural transformations within Arbitrum DAO and considering the historically high costs associated with the DIP, the proposed reduction in expenses is reasonable and timely. Additionally, while voting participation alone does not fully capture delegate performance, introducing Tier X to encourage higher voting participation aligns effectively with the DAO’s governance objectives. However, we share concerns highlighted by @paulofonseca reg…

[Tane]

[CONSTITUTIONAL] Remove Cost Cap, Update Executors, Disable Legacy USDT Bridge (Onchain)

We voted in favor of this proposal.
This is a combined vote of 3 proposals that were previously approved via Snapshot votes, for which we voted in favor.

• Remove Cost Cap on Arbitrum Nova
• Update the Upgrade Executors
• Disable Legacy Tether Bridge

Our view remains unchanged after the Snapshot votes, and we haven’t found any additional issues to be concerned about.
Thus, we decided to support this.

[Tane]

[CONSTITUTIONAL] AIP: ArbOS Version 50 Dia (Snapshot)

[CONSTITUTIONAL] AIP: ArbOS Version 50 Dia

We are voting for this proposal. As an Ethereum L2, we believe it is essential that Arbitrum keeps its protocol closely aligned with Ethereum’s roadmap and upgrades. ArbOS 50 Dia addresses the majority of the necessary changes required for the upcoming Fusaka hard fork, and we see this as a critical step to maintain strong compatibility with Ethereum at the protocol level. The detailed evaluation of technical risks will take place after the upgrade is developed and audited. For now, we do not …

[Tane]

[CONSTITUTIONAL] AIP: Security Council Election Process Improvements (Snapshot)

[Constitutional] AIP: Security Council Election Process Improvements

We voted for the proposals within this snapshot, except for “Allow members to bypass Nominee”. In our view, extending cohort duration and lowering thresholds will both strengthen governance continuity and allow more diverse candidates to participate. The introduction of key rotation mechanisms is another critical step forward, as it reduces operational risks and ensures Council members remain responsive. However, we remain unconvinced by the bypass of the Nominee phase for current members. It …

[Tane]

Revert the Delegate Incentive Program (DIP) to Version 1.5 (Snapshot)

Proposal: Revert the Delegate Incentive Program (DIP) to Version 1.5

We appreciate the effort that went into drafting this proposal and the intent to improve the Delegate Incentive Program. However, we ultimately voted against it. We do not believe that reverting to v1.5 would result in a better framework than the current one. Both the mobilization of voting power and qualitative contributions such as forum engagement and operational input are essential to the health of DAO governance, and we do not support a design that disregards voting power entirely. Moreov…

[Tane]

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies (Snapshot)

We support this proposal because it channels idle ETH into structural gains that will compound over time.

Even if the net APY is modest compared to staking, the multiplier effects in TVL growth, reduced slippage, and broader adoption far outweigh the difference. The treasury’s mandate is not only to maximize short-term yield, but also to reinforce the foundations of Arbitrum DeFi.

[Tane]

[Constitutional] AIP: DVP Quorum (Snapshot)

We vote for this proposal.
This proposal introduces an adaptive quorum mechanism based on Delegated Voting Power (DVP), replacing the current model tied to total votable supply. We supported it because aligning quorum with DVP is a logical and necessary upgrade to prevent governance gridlock and ensure the system scales with actual active participation. While we agree with implementing the algorithm itself, we emphasize that parameters such as the baseline quorum must not be set too optimistically; we expect these to be debated and calibrated carefully before finalization to maintain sufficient security and stability.

[Tane]

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies (Onchain)

We vote in favor of this proposal, maintaining the same stance we held during the Snapshot phase.

Tané Delegate Communication Thread

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies (Snapshot) We support this proposal because it channels idle ETH into structural gains that will compound over time. Even if the net APY is modest compared to staking, the multiplier effects in TVL growth, reduced slippage, and broader adoption far outweigh the difference. The treasury’s mandate is not only to maximize short-term yield, but also to reinforce the foundations of Arbitrum DeFi.

[Tane]

September 2025 Security Council Election: Member Election (Onchain)

We vote in favor of the candidates below (votes distributed equally)

• Daniel Goldman
• Consensys Diligence
• Pablo Sabbatella
• Immunefi
• Gauntlet
• zachxbt

Our aim was to construct a council that is technically self-reliant, operationally resilient, and socially accountable, rather than to endorse any single profile.
We prioritized members who collectively satisfy these complementary dimensions:

1. Independent Technical Competence
   The council must include individuals capable of understanding and verifying what they sign. We therefore selected candidates with direct experience in protocol design, auditing, or incident triage to ensure the DAO retains autonomous technical judgment.

2. Security Depth and Readiness
   Because emergencies require swift, coordinated response, we valued organizations and individuals maintaining proven 24/7 operational capacity, battle-tested playbooks, and incident-response experience.

3. Operational & Human-Layer Security
   Beyond code review, secure key management and signer discipline are essential.
   We prioritized members demonstrating mature OpSec culture, hardware-wallet practices, and established procedures for multi-sig governance.

[Tane]

AGV Council Compensation Calibration: Benchmark for Future Council Terms (Snapshot)

We voted in favor of this proposal.
This proposal ensures that AGV can attract and retain high-caliber talent by offering compensation aligned with market standards. Once the DAO has decided to operate AGV, it must provide fair and competitive pay for the level of responsibility required.

There was a legitimate concern about the procedural design that allows modifications to existing programs without a quorum requirement. We appreciate the improvements that @ArbitrumGaming applied.

@ArbitrumGaming

• Defined Quorum: Each reposted proposal will require that the combined FOR and ABSTAIN votes meet at least 3% of the total votable ARB supply to be considered valid, consistent with Arbitrum DAO’s non-constitutional quorum.

Also, we believe this rule itself merits further review in future procedural updates.

[Tane]

The DAO Incentive Program (DIP 2.0) (Snapshot)

Vote: AGAINST

Rationale:

We vote against the proposal because we believe we haven’t been convinced of the specification provided by the current form including the comp level and consideration to small/medium delegates that have contributed to the DAO so far. We also agree that it lacks the ultimate goal for the program to achieve as other prominent delegates pointed out. We look forward to the revised plan on the incentives for delegates and contributors.