Treasure Delegate Communication Thread


Hey there, we’re Treasure! Treasure is a decentralized game publisher pioneering a new era of gaming in web3. We’re building an interconnected network of games that brings players and games together through the magic of play.

Founded in 2021, Treasure has quickly grown to become a top gaming ecosystem that is home to over 15+ indie games built by seasoned game teams, including The Beacon, Mighty Action Heroes, Zeeverse, Kaiju Cards, Knights of the Ether, and many more. We also have our own in-house game studio working on developing its first flagship title based on the original Treasure IP. All projects on Treasure are linked–narratively and economically–through our network. Our community supports the entire game ecosystem to grow new projects and continue supporting more mature ones.

Treasure is one of the earliest projects to come to Arbitrum, and we’ve grown up together with it. We’re delighted and honored to be one of the largest delegates of Arbitrum DAO and look forward to representing the interests of our ecosystem and community, while advocating for the interests of gaming and entertainment, as well as other areas in order to help make Arbitrum one of the best places to be for builders and users (players!) alike.

Delegate Communication Thread

To promote transparency and communication as a delegates, we will strive to regularly maintain this thread with updates and actions in the governance of Arbitrum. TreasureDAO is currently in the process of standing up a Treasure Arbitrum Representative Council (ARC) which will be community-led and comprise active, long-standing members to represent the interests of Treasure and take leadership within Arbitrum DAO governance. This note will be updated once the council members have been appointed.


Name: TreasureDAO
Delegate Address: 0x0eB5B03c0303f2F47cD81d7BE4275AF8Ed347576
Forum Representatives: @karelvuong @jona @CJ.Bzdewka @Pepperoni_Jo3 @thechaingamer.eth @SmolPhil @pta @jpatten
Tally Profile: Tally
Governance Forum:
Websites: |
X / Twitter: @Treasure_DAO | @PlayOnTreasure | @treasuregov
Languages: English


Arbitrum Short-Term Incentive Program (STIP) Round 1 Note

In relation to Arbitrum’s Short-Term Incentive Program (Arbitrum Improvement Proposal).

We were pleased as DAO contributors to see the amount of activity on this proposal and the increased awareness that came to the ecosystem as a result. To evaluate these requests as fairly as possible and due service to the amount of time it took to submit a proposal, we constructed a framework for on-chain metrics to guide our evaluations.

For the complete list of votes, see our profile on Snapshot.

Key Considerations

  • Arbitrum native or, if non-native, included Arbitrum as a major part of its strategy in addition to mainnet
  • Total volume, both historical and recent: we considered both factors and evaluated each project as pragmatically as we could given the impact that the bear market has had on projects further in their token life-cycle while younger projects benefit from increased token speculation even during such conditions. We tried to account for the total value that projects have brought to the ecosystem and their likelihood to thrive and provide continued value in the years ahead.
  • Accounted for differences in trade volume for perp protocols which generally have higher trade volumes due to leverage (notional values).
  • TVL: we looked at the TVL of protocols as a metric but tried to also evaluate the purpose that this TVL serves in each instance.
    • Where possible, we look to Dune dashboards to get a more normalised picture of project usage over time (self reported metrics over arbitrary or selective time periods can paint a different picture).
  • Evaluated gaming and social projects by a different framework: Gaming has lower financial metrics. We evaluated DAUs, retention metrics, and activity over time instead. For example, some gaming projects that submitted a proposal have DAUs multiples higher than DeFi protocols that dwarf these games in TVL. However, in regards to on-chain activity and value to Arbitrum, we regarded them as equal.
  • We also evaluated projects based on how likely they were to help bring value to all Arbitrum projects, for instance bridge, quest, and community loyalty projects that lowered friction for user acquisition and proposals could help with user retention for all Arbitrum projects as a whole.

“Against” vs. “Abstain” vs. Not Voting.

We deliberated the implications of voting “against” versus “abstain” versus not participating at all with the understanding that the votes functioned differently at different stages of the voting period. This latter point was somewhat confusing which has led to some misunderstandings.

The vote effectively went through 3 stages:

  1. Stage 1: Did the proposal pass the 71.5mil quorum?
  2. Stage 2: Did the proposal pass 50% approval? (for / (for + against))
  3. Stage 3: If over 50 mil is allocated, prioritise proposals with highest count of “for” votes (tiebreak with FCFS)

Stage 1

In the first stage of the vote, Treasure only voted “for” on proposals which we had high conviction in. Initially we had focused only on the projects we strongly felt would improve the Arbitrum ecosystem and meaningfully attract and retain new users according to the criteria outlined above.

Stage 2 + 3

As the dollar value of proposals that reached quorum began to exceed the $50mil cap, it became clear that we could better express our opinion and support our existing “for” votes by enacting “against” votes.

This isn’t to say that those projects aren’t doing interesting or valuable experimental work. Rather, these were projects that (in our opinion) appeared too early in development, a poor fit for user acquisition incentives at this stage of the market, or niche and complex products that would likely only enrich existing users of the project.

Other “against” votes were presented for projects and proposals which we felt were either overbearingly large relative to their stage and potential, or potentially risky to the Arbitrum ecosystem from both a user and builder’s perspective (second order implications where we may inadvertently discourage new projects choosing Arbitrum as a homebase).

On Abstaining vs. Not Participating

Since “abstain” votes matter only in the first stage in helping a proposal reach quorum, they were effectively votes that merely expressed our opinion without necessarily influencing outcomes.

Abstain votes were a way for us to express that we felt a proposal wasn’t quite ready for incentives or a right fit for increasing user acquisition and retention on Arbitrum (for a multitude reasons listed above), but also that we didn’t feel so strongly as to vote down a project and influence the outcome of the vote.

Treasure runs a games publishing ecosystem that depends on collaborating with other projects. We receive daily requests to look at various Arbitrum proposals, some of which we may not necessarily agree with, nor think helps the Arbitrum ecosystem and gaming in general. Ignoring requests to look at proposals can lead to tension and it isn’t the responsible answer either. Our primary responsibility is to prioritise TreasureDAO and remain diplomatic and express opinions tactfully in a way that doesn’t undermine future collaborations with projects in the Arbitrum ecosystem. An “abstain” vote helped us express this viewpoint more thoroughly.


Security Council Elections: Round 2 Update

Tally - Security Council Elections: Round 2

Important note: As flagged by a handful of other delegates, when attempting to vote, we encountered an issue that resulted in the entirety of our votes going to the first nominee. This was the result of a misunderstanding paired with the user experience of the Tally platform auto-filling and selecting the max vote allocation by default versus starting at zero to split our voting power towards multiple nominees. Unfortunately, this was an unintentional and irreversible action. With that said, our recommendations and desired allocations are listed below.


Ordered by planned vote allocation:

  1. Patrick McCorry (Arbitrum Foundation) - 20% | 5,514,766.18
  2. Harry Kalodner (Offchain Labs) - 20% | 5.51M
  3. 0xJiro (Sushi) - 15.0% | 4.14M
  4. Omer (Chaos Labs) - 5.0% | 1.38M
  5. Matt Fiebach (Blockworks) - 17.5% | 4.83M
  6. Emiliano Bonassi (Conduit) - 22.5% | 6.20M

Actual vote allocation:

  1. Patrick McCorry (Arbitrum Foundation) - 100% | 27.57M

Perspective and Assessment Framework

As a whole, we felt it was important to ensure the Security Council comprised with a mix of both deeply technical members as well as non-technical members. Members should also be geographically spread to ensure wide coverage across the globe in the event of any possible emergency that may require quick and decisive action. On the criteria for technical members, nominees were assessed on the basis of deep technical prowess and understanding, security experience, proficiency with the programming languages listed in the self assessment matrix, and overall contribution to the Arbitrum DAO and broader ecosystem. For non-technical members, we prioritized their contribution to Arbitrum DAO, communication ability, alignment with Arbitrum values, and overall reputation.


Backfund Successful STIP Grants

Treasure DAO’s Arbitrum Representative Council (ARC) voted FOR this proposal on Snapshot.

As the DAO approved the initial round of STIPs, we believe that it is important to fund the smaller / newer projects that were at a disadvantage in the original selection process. This proposal will help boost the integrity of the original STIP. Moreover, the Arbitrum ecosystem would benefit from supporting these projects who have significant room to grow. Funding these teams will also help counteract governance and capital monopolies on Arbitrum by spreading $ARB among a more diverse group of users.

At the same time, we recognize some of the pitfalls of the initial iteration of the STIP and the uncertainty for any protocol or project who wished to apply for Round 2. As a council, we would like to see and further engage in the development of a Round 2 (3, 4, and so on) framework and move to forming a Long-Term Incentive Program (LTIP) as the DAO continues to progress, learn, and evolve to serve the interests of all builders and community members (current and future).