Uniswap-Arbitrum Delegate Program (UADP) Communication Thread

Election of Procurement Committee Members (ADPC)

Vote: Bernard & Joseph
Type: Snapshot

We have decided to split our vote evenly between Bernard and Joseph because we believe that their professional backgrounds outside of the crypto industry have enabled them to bring a degree of financial, strategic, and legal acumen to DAO space. Both have historical involvements in other protocols, collectively including Trader Joe, dydx, Olympus, Uniswap, and Safe. We have personally collaborated with Bernard in the past, so we can attest to his ability to manage and run programs/working groups. We also appreciate the efforts Joseph has recently made to make the Arbitrum DAO more structured and organized.

[Non-Constitutional]: Arbitrum Stable Treasury Endowment Program

Vote: For
Type: Snapshot

We believe that one predominant way by which DAOs mature and become sustainable organizations is by establishing a strong runway in the form of a diversified portfolio of assets. Selling off $ARB tokens for ensuring Arbitrum’s future success is an important financing lever. So far, most initiatives that we’ve seen in the past year have revolved around grants. These initiatives are important, but they should be balanced by making sure the protocol remains sustainable with a multi-year horizon.

The forum post raises good points around having a clear and informed roadmap for how the treasury will be deployed. The DAO is, in the short term, not strapped for cash. There’s no immediate need to cover particular expenses, so one could argue that it’s worth waiting before the DAO sells off ARB for RWAs. The best time to reduce native token exposure is when the markets are most frothy. This way, during the bull market, ARB can be sold at a higher price, and those reserves can be rotated into RWAs since stable assets are best held onto during drawdowns. This particular proposal acts simply as a pilot program, so it’s important to highlight that the diversification effort won’t happen immediately–it’s using an insignificant amount of capital relative to the entire DAO treasury. The sourcing component of this proposal is therefore most compelling to us. We’d rather have the DAO be in a position to buy and sell assets effectively, even if the bulk of that diversification effort will occur later on.

2 Likes

Proposal [Non-Constitutional]: Establish the ArbitrumDAO Procurement Committee

Vote: For
Type: Onchain

We are excited to see these elected members lead the first iteration of the Procurement committee and our reasoning is in line with our prior Snapshot vote.

[Constitutional] Changes to the Constitution and the Security Council Election Process

Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
Type: Onchain
(February 20, 2024 Update)

We are in favor as many of these changes operationally enhance the process. The introduction of a dedicated 7-day “Contender Submission” stage ensures more opportunities for all candidates to get their submissions in, giving potential candidates more chances to be noticed and considered. Secondly, the requirement for candidates to provide a signed message from their wallets is great with respect to the security and integrity of the election process. The proposed updates to the constitution’s wording about the election process and quorum handling, including ‘abstain’ votes, are vital for clarity and transparency. In summary, these changes should create a more equitable and transparent election structure.

Update: Voted For Onchain as well

Long Term Incentives Pilot Program

Vote: For
Type: Onchain

Our reasoning stays the same as prior. We are excited that the program will be represented by such talented reviewers.

AIP: ArbOS Version 20 “Atlas”

Vote: For
Type: Snapshot

We’re excited for these network upgrades and thank the core devs for their hard work. The ability to leverage EIP 4844 to post batches of L2 transactions as blobs on L1 at cheaper rates will be super useful and we’re also looking forward to updates from Dencun.

Update: We have also voted in support of this On Chain, in line with our reason to support on the snapshot vote.

​​AIP: Batch Poster Manager and Sequencer Inbox Finality Fix

Vote: For
Type: Snapshot

Similar to the other snapshot vote on ArbOS Version 20, we are in favor of this sequencer finality fix and again thank the core devs for their hard work.

2 Likes

Empowering Early Contributors: The community Arbiter Proposal 2.0

Vote: For
Type: Snapshot

We voted FOR this proposal since v2 brings clear improvement to the initial proposal from a couple of months ago. Retroactive rewards, we believe, are important for showing appreciation to initial contributors.

Generally speaking, community management is not an easy task, and the allotted compensation to these contributors seems reasonable–the reduction of the ARB distribution should make this easier to pass at the onchain stage. The transparency in who contributed to the community efforts is also appreciated. Previously, we stated that “as far as where this proposal is in its current state, it doesn’t seem to sufficiently outline the details behind who will be distributed the stated $ARB rewards. Since there seems to be a cap of 25 recipients, it would be best to first outline those names explicitly for transparency purposes BEFORE going forward with a vote.” V2 addresses these concerns to a degree. We understand that collecting data for this topic is not the easiest task and that screenshots of contributions are a non-customary form of collecting data–but we cannot think of a more effective mechanism, so we’ll resort to deeming this acceptable. Another point of feedback is that the proposal format here was a bit messy. We’d recommend that proposers in the future make their data more formatted and a bit easier to follow.

Proposal: [Non-Constitutional] Funding for Into the Dungeons: Machinata - a PvP Digital Miniature Game V2

Vote: Against
Type: Snapshot

We voted against this proposal because it doesn’t seem befitting to request funding directly through the DAO on a one-off basis.

The game looks pretty cool. Seems like an interesting initiative that likely would’ve been funded by Questbook. From reading over the forums, it seems that “Ali was the first founder to apply AFTER the Gaming Domain was fully allocated and as a result was not able to funded in the first round of Questbook grants.” So, this proposal seems to be an attempt at attaining funding from the DAO since the grant program ran out of allocations. Although the DAO could give case-by-case funding exemptions, we believe that this practice is very much a slippery slope. To preserve a standard for the DAO, regardless of the degree of promise presented by a project, the developing team should seek alternative forms of funding apart from the DAO. It seems thechaingamer.eth is now looking to create a developer grant framework for games, which to us, is a much more promising endeavor. This would reduce the DAO’s overall overhead, prevent bias toward individual project selection, and create a standardized structure for project evaluation.

Changes to the Constitution and the Security Council Election Process

Vote: For
Type: Onchain

As per our Snapshot vote, we voted in favor of this proposal since the stated “changes should create a more equitable and transparent election structure.”

[Non-constitutional] Proposal to fund Plurality Labs Milestone 1B(ridge)

Vote: For
Type: Snapshot

We voted FOR this proposal. The UADP is excited to see the maturation of Plurality Labs from its acquisition by ThriveCoin. The Plurality team should now have more bandwidth to address some of the issues that they previously ran into, such as communications.

“We funded 250+ projects, and spurred movement all over the DAO. But we didn’t document our work and value well”

“Our bias was for action. We cared about creating value and learning - and put blinders on for everything else. We should have hired a Marketing or Comms person.”

“There seems to be wide agreement that we created value but need to scale, document, and showcase.”

One of the most important aspects of any grant program, working group, or sub-DAO is relaying information to the stakeholder who initially entrusted you with a particular task and set of capital. In this instance, we are appreciative of Plurality’s work and effort that has gone into providing resources for numerous projects.

Another aspect that we’re fans of is the funding of grant programs upon reaching particular milestones. This will allow for funds to be disseminated in a more calculated manner–it’s important to double down on the success stories and move on from defunct projects. As mentioned by a couple of other folks, we would like to see some general KPIs implemented for tracking the continual progression of a project–these can be a mix of both qualitative and quantitative metrics. They can also be done on an ad hoc basis since each grant may be unique.

ARDC Research Member Election

Vote: Blockworks/Delphi Digital
Type: Snapshot

Blockworks Research and Delphi Digital are exemplary candidates for the ARDC Research member role. Both entities demonstrate their mastery in dissecting the complex Arbitrum and Ethereum ecosystems through comprehensive reports and technical evaluations. For instance, Blockworks Research’s analytical deep dives into Arbitrum’s staking proposal and Delphi Digital’s early insights into Ethereum’s scaling solutions underscore their capability to navigate and elucidate sophisticated blockchain mechanisms.

Out of the two groups, we’re more intimately familiar with the Blockworks folks due to their historical involvement with Arbitrum. We look forward to seeing research groups like Delphi follow suit.

ARDC DAO Advocate Election

Vote: L2BEAT/Ant Federation
Type: Snapshot

Krzysztof and DK have been active community members, continually providing input into various discussions and acting in the best interest of the Arbitrum DAO. Therefore, we believe that L2Beat and Ant Federation are a strong group to act as the oversight committee/liaison between the ARDC and the DAO.

ARDC Security Member Election

Vote: OpenZeppelin & Trail of Bits
Type: Snapshot

Both Jun and I have been involved in the Compound DAO for the past few years, and OpenZeppelin is the DAO’s go-to security provider. Due to our familiarity with them and direct interactions with their work, we have given them 50% of our votes. The other 50% goes to Trail of Bits, another group that we’ve seen continually deliver via direct work with various protocols as well as their tools like Slither for contract vulnerability detection.

ARDC Risk Member Election

Vote: Elect Chaos Labs
Type: Snapshot

Chaos Labs has a strong background in assisting DAOs like Aave and GMX with risk assessment. We believe that extending this role to Arbitrum would serve to be beneficial. They’ve published various data-driven analyses in the past, and their CEO is already a part of the Security Council, making their organization an apt candidate.

[Non-Emergency Action] Fix Fee Oversight ArbOS v20 “Atlas”

Vote: Choice 1 as “Set L1 surplus fee and L2 min”
Type: Snapshot

We voted with the above decision since by aligning Arbitrum’s fee structure with these enhancements, the network can support increased transaction throughput while reducing costs for users, which is critical for maintaining Arbitrum’s appeal in a competitive Layer 2 landscape. Sure, we’ll see a revenue decrease, but that’s a needed sacrifice to make sure Arbitrum is able to price compete. The hope is that higher volume compensates for lower marginal revenues, thereby returning total revenue to its previous level–and ideally beyond that.

[Non-constitutional] Proposal to fund Plurality Labs Milestone 1B(ridge)

Vote: For
Type: Onchain

In line with our position during the Snapshot, we will be voting FOR this proposal. We are looking forward to seeing Plurality expand its operations after their recent acquisitions–we hope that the influx of manpower and capital will enable them to deliver on their promise to better “scale, document, and showcase.”

Request for Continuation of the Arbitrum DDA Program Request

Vote: For
Type: Snapshot

The UADP is supporting this proposal since we believe that continuation of this grants program will have an overall net benefit to the Arbitrum ecosystem. Since the program is in its second inning, we believe that the experience garnered by the four domain allocators will serve to be valuable for funding future projects. The budget increase also seems reasonable since there is clear demand for these grants, as highlighted the other week by @thechaingamer.eth–Machinata had to turn directly to the DAO to request funds for their game since the Questbook budget ran its course. Reporting from this program has also been better than other grant programs that we’ve reviewed across other DAOs. We’ve appreciated the disclosure of txns, PPTS, and reports produced by @JoJo, @cattin, @Juandi and @Flook.

This question is more for Questbook–is there a plan to do a retroactive analysis of the impact produced by these grant programs? We have disclosure reports, but going through and assessing which projects have succeeded would be helpful. A VC fund for instance would typically look at ROI, and of the funded projects, only a minority really succeed. Grant success is likely the same. Perhaps later on an analysis can be done regarding volume driven, sticky TVL, increase in user base, etc around the projects. Each domain will have its unique KPIs. This would be something to consider at the termination of this grant program and would allow us to make a more informed decision on whether to continue such grants in the future.

[Non-Constitutional AIP] Front-end interface to force transaction inclusion during sequencer downtime

Vote: For
Type: Snapshot

The UADP strongly endorses this initiative proposed by WakeUp Labs for creating a front-end interface that enables direct L1 transaction submissions during Arbitrum Sequencer downtimes. This solution enhances the network’s resilience, allowing users to continue their transactions uninterrupted, and will be a big help to non devs during downtimes.

Overall, the expertise and track record of WakeUp Labs in delivering these blockchain solutions are extensive and we believe ensure the reliability and effectiveness of the project. This proposal not only bolsters the network’s operational ease but also will ensure no temporary “mass drama” when systems inevitably go down for a time.

2 Likes

FYI, noticing now that this vote never went through on snapshot. Messaged @axlvaz_SEEDLATAM.eth and tagging here for the recognized delegate program. We submitted the vote and safe app showed that we had submitted but it seems like the vote never got submitted on the back end. We believe this is an issue that others have experienced in the past and normally we could just resubmit/retry, but unfortunately, took too long for us to notice.

1 Like

Catalyze Arbitrum Gaming: HADOUKEN!

Vote: Against
Type: Snapshot

Although we are generally in support of initiatives to further strengthen Arbitrum’s gaming ecosystem, we simply believe that the ask of nearly $400M here is exorbitant. One thing we’ve been thinking about is L2s having more of a concrete identity. Naturally, Arbitrum’s identity has become DeFi-biased. And although there are strong gaming initiatives that have sprouted out of Arb, like Treasure, we feel that doubling down on what we’re good at is what we should focus more attention on. That being said, we’re not in favor of eliminating gaming in its entirety. There should still be programs to support game devs and attract publishers–but to a smaller account. Game development is very much an all or nothing task. Either we go all in or keep it light.

Everyone saying these sorts of funding programs will seed the next AAA game are simply incorrect. The entire $400M budget would easily be spent curating a AAA game and would take numerous years. The goal of this proposal is to play catch up, it seems. Hence, the focus should be on a handful of strong indie games. This budget could address that market, but we still feel that a smaller budget can be more prudently allocated to serve that purpose. We would encourage this proposal to go forward with a much smaller ask and collaborate with the grant groups, like the gaming domain allocator, to come up with a way to grow gaming. That way, some data points are present to help guide the funding initiative.

A good idea may be to switch the framing of this program to an incubator/accelerator that is paid out in tranches. A big issue with this proposal is that longevity is not addressed. We need follow-on investments to support the groups who are the most promising, and the best way to do so is track and monitor continual performance relative to given KPIs. As soon as KPIs are met, those teams attain more funding. This would elongate the timeline here from 2 years to many more. It would also reduce the ask of $400M to something smaller due to the tranched setup. This way, we are thinking more long-term and in an organized manner. Currently, it seems things are being rushed, which sounds like a recipe for disaster.

The other aspect that we feel is unclear is how tangibly the reward will circle back to the DAO. There are two aspects this proposal can optimize for: increasing Arbitrum’s gaming presence and returning value to the DAO. Of course, both can theoretically be achieved, but there’s a very real likelihood that only one or none will be accomplished. If we are competing with groups like Immutable, who’ve spent the past several years throwing money at game studios, gaming partnerships, and tooling like their SDKs and custom APIs, it’s hard to justify spending this much capital to potentially see little return when a direct competitor is miles ahead and thinks about nothing else but gaming. What we could focus on instead is a chain agnostic approach, where the DAO truly runs a VC gaming arm for the sake of profit, and of course, has a bias towards developing on Arbitrum. That way, at least we can more reasonably forecast ROI.

Arbitrum Stable Treasury Endowment Program

Vote: For
Type: On Chain

In line with our past rationale, we are still fully in support of this program and look forward to this pilot program of sorts spinning up. Eventually, we look forward to expanding and allocating more and more funds to treasuries for passive yields.

Expand Tally Support for the Arbitrum DAO

Vote: For
Type: Snapshot

Tally has been of great help to the DAO and the customizations they have done for Arbitrum have been very helpful and useful. We are in full support of them expanding support for the DAO and the funding request they have targeted in both in line with our expectations and also very reasonable for this task.

Double-Down on STIP Successes (STIP-Bridge)

Vote: Abstain
Type: Snapshot

Our team is generally in favor of supporting incentive programs. We voted FOR the previous STIP initiatives, as well as the LTIPP. This proposal, however, caused us to pause. There’s a degree of ambiguity present that leaves too many questions unanswered, and we are unsure if further incentivizing these protocols is the best use of treasury funds. There needs to be a more comprehensive analysis of the impact of the STIPs–hard numbers and data.

It seems many are beginning to justify large incentive spending as a way to compete with other L2s. Vampire attacks become especially rampant during bull markets, with new protocols offering exorbitant APRs. We’re of the opinion that enough incentives should be paid out to worthy protocols–and those incentives must be coupled with products that have market fit. If STIP incentives for a protocol don’t work, the cop out cannot simply be “there are higher yields elsewhere”. We have to consider if the products we are incentivizing actually have merit. Sure, capital chases yields, but consumers chase good products. Before providing STIP projects with more incentives, the DAO should conduct a more comprehensive analysis of the failures and successes of the already deployed incentives.

Furthermore, capital inflows shouldn’t be the only metric for judging the success of the incentives. Stickiness of capital and users is perhaps a better measure for sustainability. It’s great that these incentive programs have increased Arbitrum TVL. And we get that there’s a desire to grip onto that capital, making sure it stays in the ecosystem. But we should also consider the lasting impact of these incentives. A good way of putting it perhaps–the current TVL is like pouring water into a glass…but that glass has a hole in the bottom. Instead of continually filling up the glass with incentives, maybe we should figure out how to patch the hole.

The UADP will abstain from voting for this proposal. We hope that the authors take the DAO’s constructive feedback and provide delegates with more substantive reasoning behind why this proposal is worthwhile. If the provided reasoning is sufficient, we may alter our vote to FOR later on either during a new snapshot or the onchain vote.

Security Council Nominee Selection

Vote: Certora, Mudit Gupta, Raf (1/3 each)
Type: On Chain

We split our vote equally on these three nominees due to their experiences and personal experience working with them which makes us think they would be a great fit going forward for the council. Certora has proven itself valuable with its formal verification services. Mudit has done a great job at Polygon and we have personally worked with Raf on Uniswap and has been really helpful with issues we’ve had in the past with Tally.

1 Like

Expand Tally Support for the Arbitrum DAO

Vote: For
Type: On Chain

We are voting in line with our prior snapshot vote. We look forward to the support Tally will provide and increased updates they will continue to push our for the governance support and UI.

Empowering Early Contributors: The community Arbiter Proposal 2.0

Vote: For
Type: On Chain

These members should be compensated for their work that they diligently worked on during this time period and these amounts are just. We are in continued support as we were earlier from the snapshot.

Request for Continuation of the Arbitrum DDA Program Request

Vote: For
Type: On Chain

We are voting in line with our prior snapshot vote. We have voiced that the past program has done a great job and the in depth updates on the performance and related metrics is very helpful in our decision.

LTIPP Council Votes

Vote: 76 votes
Type: Snapshot

We are voting in line with the LTIPP council’s decisions. For any proposal that was 3/5 votes or higher, we have voted yes. For any proposal that was 2/4 (50% yes), we abstained. Any vote that was less, albeit didn’t make it to the snapshot vote, we would have voted no. Thanks to the LTIPP reviewers for their hard work these last few weeks.

Security Council Member Election

Vote: Certora, Raf (1/2 each)
Type: On Chain

We are voting in line with our prior member selection votes. We split our vote equally on these two nominees due to their experiences and personal experience working with them which makes us think they would be a great fit going forward for the council.

Delegate to Voter Enfranchisement Pool — Event Horizon

Vote: For
Type: Snapshot

Our team has had communications in the past around increasing EH’s involvement in both Uniswap and Arbitrum. The general idea around providing “the little guy” with more say in voting decisions is well-founded–but we do have concerns regarding how legitimate this assumption is. Voter apathy often festers when a large group of people have a singular vote. One person begins to believe that their measly single vote will not materially change the direction of a proposal. As a result, that voter ceases voting. A domino effect of apathy leads to lackluster participation, and then we’re back to square one–this is one reason why single-vote NFT models may not be the strongest systems. Equalizing everyone’s voice reduces the marginal incentive to put effort into making informed decisions. This is a phenomenon we could see with EH. The remedy this proposal displays, however, is:

“When participation is low… each voter receives a larger slice of the public access pie. This means the fewer people there are voting, the more incentive there is for someone new to come and participate.”

We are very curious to see where the equilibrium point lies. At this point, each voter will likely perceive the cost of voting (which is just effort) to be less than the amount of voting power that they are mobilizing. The more people that vote, the less marginal voting power there is–and vice versa. Since we are also Uniswap stakeholders, seeing the results here will also help inform our decision making on the Uniswap front.

Another concern that we initially had was sybil. The EH team has addressed this well via incorporating the Gitcoin Pass. Generally speaking, the Gitcoin Passport setup isn’t perfect, but we feel that it provides a sufficient enough cost for a sybil attack to be thwarted. We also don’t see the appeal for a large sybil attack on 7M ARB worth of voting power–it’s not large enough in our eyes. The cost to sybil this system simply seems too high to be worth swaying a particular vote.

Subsidy Fund for Security Services

Vote: 100% for 1 cohort of 8 weeks, $2.5M fund
Type: Snapshot

Directionally, we are in favor of this proposal. There is clearly a need to help front some of the costs associated with audits. However, the proposal does seem a bit rushed. There are a couple of aspects that could have been addressed prior to taking this proposal to snapshot, which would’ve assured a higher success rate as opposed to the current divisiveness we’re seeing in the polls.

“we are in the process of sourcing a neutral security expert as an advisor to aid us in judging both, applications from service providers during the RFP process and applications from projects looking to receive subsidies from the Subsidy Fund”

“the ADPC is currently in the process of setting up the procurement framework to whitelist security service providers for the DAO. Given the large amount of legal work required to structure an RFP, it is still in the drafting phase and has not yet been published to procure any security service providers.”

The above illustrate some pending work that should be completed before snapshot.

Perhaps a better order of operations is to attain a soft commitment from the DAO regarding how much an initial pilot cohort will require. Say, the snapshot vote leads to the $2.5M fund being selected. Then, the ADPC can run an RFP process, collect the projects that require subsidy, present the findings to the DAO, then follow up with an onchain vote finalizing the payment transfer from the DAO to the ADPC for distribution. This way, there’s a soft commitment present from the DAO, and the contingency at hand is that the initiative attains the earmarked funds only if it’s run in a reasonable manner. What if the DAO disapproves the onchain vote? I doubt that this will happen as long as the ADPC delivers on its promises properly. To those ends, we would like to signal our support for $2.5M for a single cohort, treating this as a pilot. If this proposal fails the snapshot, the ADPC should return to the DAO with a more comprehensive proposal once the aspects from the above quotes have been addressed.

Also, regarding the stated areas of interest–RWA, gaming, and collab tech are noted as the main sectors for audits since there are many developments occurring here. I may be wrong in my assumption, but isn’t the best use of audits for protocols that perhaps have the most value at risk? This would largely include DeFi protocols, especially high TVL ones like money markets. RWA seems like another sector that falls under this umbrella. I’d assume the cost for audits regarding tooling/collab tech and even gaming is properly lower. All this to say I’d think critically about what teams really need an audit to begin/sustain operations–versus those who can delay a full-fledged audit until they either raise more or earn more revenue.

Safeguarding Software Developers’ Rights & the Right to Privacy

Vote: 100% for Fund with 1,500,000 ARB each
Type: Snapshot

The legal terrain is a tough one to navigate, and it’s seldom top of mind for builders in the space until the community faces some sort of calamity. It’s therefore vital to fund groups that have the connections and competency to effectively court the ears of politicians and regulatory bodies. Both organizations have a strong history in shaping the landscape of digital asset regulation and defending the rights and freedoms within the blockchain community. Since we are by no means legal experts, we have resorted to the comments of folks more acclimated with this subject matter to decide our vote. Lobbying and litigation initiatives are quite expensive, so it doesn’t seem prudent to simply give the entities $500k each. It seems wiser to deploy $1M - $3M per organization so they can more effectively implement their plans. If we’re going to fund this, might as well make it worthwhile. An aspect that we hope will better be addressed in the future, however, is clearly reporting back to the DAO the successes and failures of the programs taken by Coin Center and DEF. Other DAOs have previously funded such groups, but they never returned to the DAO with KPIs and success metrics. We are curious if Immutablelawyer/Axis will be actively involved as a liaison between CC/DEF and the DAO from a communications perspective.

1 Like