Vote: Against
Type: Snapshot
Generally, this vote was a bit too much to ask for for us to say yes to this. The idea of a hub and the new ideas presented is great, but the half a million dollar budget is way too much. Additionally, other stuff is a bit too high budget wise, however we would be supportive in a potential reworking of this proposal.
Vote: For all three
Type: Snapshot
We voted For all three of the BOLD proposals because they mark a crucial evolution for Arbitrum, significantly boosting the networkâs security and decentralization.
AIP: BoLD - permissionless validation for Arbitrum:
Introducing permissionless validation allows any honest participant to help defend the network, thereby reducing our reliance on a small group of validators. This is pivotal in mitigating delay attack risks and ensuring faster, more secure dispute resolutions, aligning with best practices in optimistic rollup protocols.
However, the high bond requirements could create a barrier for smaller participantsâbut the Economics paper outlines that âbond sizes be high enough to discourage challenges from ever being opened at all, as evil parties will always stand to lose when playing the gameâ which in our opinion is a good incentive-based justification. The complexity of the dispute resolution process and the need for extensive off-chain computation could introduce operational challenges. Balancing bond costs and preventing spam while ensuring sufficient participation and security is a complex economic issue that requires careful adjustment.
AIP: Funds to bootstrap the first BoLD validator - Bond sentiment & AIP: Funds to bootstrap the first BoLD validator - Operational cost sentiment.
We voted For these two proposals as well. There needs to be an aligned actor to ensure that this system works with integrity, and having the serving as the first one makes a lot of sense. We also appreciate the checks and balances approach being taken by the Foundation: âThe ArbitrumDAO will have the authority to single-handedly return the funds to the ArbitrumDAO treasury by revoking the Arbitrum Foundationâs proposer at any time and returning the bonds back to the treasury.â The operational cost, 500 ETH for service fees and 400 ETH for L1 gas costs, seem fairly earmarked but perhaps a bit high. Since the AF will not be entitled to any service fees, that helps with potentially receiving more back after the 3 year period. Itâs better to have a larger buffer in place anyways.
Vote: Abstain
Type: Snapshot
Our team is generally in favor of the recent expansions that the DAO has made into more traditional styles of investment and ecosystem development. While most DAOâs are still relegated to grant programs, profit-driven initiatives like this are a good exploitative path for the DAO to take. We do, however, voice a degree of caution to the DAO with approving too many programs too quickly without enough inspection of the efficacy of these initiatives. Yes, it takes time for multi-month programs to materialize, but itâs important to deliberately approach utilization of the treasury. The recent investment into gaming is the most salient case of this.
The Areta team has already been pushing forward with their research on the M&A front as well, which as many have mentioned, could involve some overlap in responsibilities. Since this proposal seems to be passing the Snapshot, weâd like to highlight that Areta has also done a great job of aggregating community feedback over the past couple of months, all done prior to their official proposal asking for funding from the DAO. This care for the opinions and perspectives of the DAO is vital for pushing forward a novel initiative such as this oneâwe would like the AVI to adopt a similar communication standard.
The reason why we are abstaining on this proposal is largely because our team wants to see what the M&A groupâs research yields over the next couple of weeks/months. Since there is a degree of overlap in terms of scope, a finalized deliverable from the M&A teamâs research will help us understand how the AVI should function. This seems like a more complementary approach between the various initiatives.
Vote: â Steakhouse, Avantgarde, Particilia
Type: Snapshot
Note: one of our members has a COI with Steakhouse and has therefore not been involved in this vote.
Vote: Against
Type: Snapshot
We voted against this proposal since more thought needs to be put behind the collateralization of native tokens directly from the DAOâs treasury. This is especially the case when the native token is incredibly volatile and subject to severe downside beta. Recent approvals of initiatives that have the potential of largely suppressing ARB price furthers this concern. The dormant, unissued ARB tokens in the treasury are effectively acting as a way to bail out the given loans in the event of a downward spiral. Of course this depends on how much ARB is placed in the savior module. Iâd assume itâs relatively high since the DAO doesnât want to face a liquidation and would rather bear the brunt of fronting more and more capital in the short term. An infinite line of credit, ie the treasury, tends to blind us from the risksâuntil the LOI begins to run dry. This is a dangerous setup. Hence, from a risk-adjusted perspective, we donât believe that moving forward with this proposal is prudent.
That isnât to say that this proposal is not interestingâit certainly is something weâd like to see researched. We look forward to seeing a more fleshed out proposal from the team and the ARDC considering a handful of these risks and other points of feedback from the DAO. The teams need to solidify what sorts of risks the DAO is subject to if we were to proceed. We would suggest first outlining the perspective that the DAO comes from in relation to the native token. Do we want to collateralize ARB in the first place? And how willing are we to top up a loan to prevent liquidation?
Vote: Abstain
Type: Snapshot
We abstained from this proposal. We are in support of this type of idea. A supplement to grant programs is important especially if the DAO wishes to begin focusing more on ROI. Thatâs what the AVI proposal also aims to facilitate. However, the overhead cost of this proposal is too large for our liking. This aspect makes up a disproportionately large percentage of the total ask. For the sake of using capital more efficiently, we believe that the group should aim to be as lean as possible, or simply start out with a smaller scope. A pilot program would help show that DAO that progress is being made, and it would further clarify the specific costs needed to run this program at a larger scale. As we have mentioned in the AVI proposal, a step-by-step approach tends to fare better with delegates. Continually showing the DAO progress with empirical data is helpful in justifying the expenditure of millions of ARB.
If this proposal can be broken down into more distinct steps and milestonesâand perhaps even reduce the number of entities involved as that should decrease the opexâthen weâd be willing to revisit it. Again, the idea is good, but the roadmap needs further clarity. A piecemeal approach with continual display of deliverables will give us further confidence in this groupâs ability to execute.
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
Although we stated that âWeâd rather have Kwenta show that they can compete in the highly competitive perps market on Arbitrum firstâthen apply for this type of grant once thereâs an RFP process, like the STIP or LTIPP, thatâs created to deliver what Kwenta is requesting.â, we do understand the case for why this incentive grant can be beneficial for Arbiturm. If we had to pick between funding vs not funding this, we would vote to fund.
Vote: PGov, StableLab, Alex Lumley
Type: Snapshot
We have voted for these three members that we thought were fit for the role and have been very involved in discussions following up and during the voting process. Three votes was such that each vote made a decent impact on the results.
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
We have no complaints regarding these recommendations and feel the team should have more leeway in the future when deciding these. Not sure if a snapshot vote is needed to approve this, however the updates to the DAO are much welcomed.
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
In similar reasoning to our snapshot vote, we are in favor for this subsidy fund proposal
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
In similar reasoning to our snapshot vote, in addition to more clarity on reporting and a relatively smaller budget, we are in favor of the pilot phase for this proposal.
Vote: Improving Predictability, Abstain, Against, Predictability, Approval Process
Type: Snapshot
We are a fan of the calendar idea, but do not think the delegate approval idea of 4 large delegates to give their stamp of approval before moving to snapshot is the most effective way in going about future operations.
Vote: Abstain
Type: Snapshot
We understand the desire for there to be a more effective process behind incentivizing groups to create proposals. Itâs unfortunate when an idea is put forth, that took numerous weeks or even months to iterate, and ends up being rejected, leading to no monetary compensation for such efforts. But compensating people to work on proposals without a clear way to measure success is a tricky task. Typically, the success metric is if the proposal passes or fails a vote. This also presents an additional adverse incentive for people to work on projects without having an explicit goal of seeing it through all the way to a successful onchain vote.
Itâs often the case that the rejection of a proposal is emblematic of other issues. For instance, a proposal may be proposed at the wrong timeâthe DAO may not be mature enough to handle a given task. A proposal may simply not be unrealistic or overly ambitious. For example, the M&A initiative couldâve failed a vote even though it took months of effort to curate. Therefore, @Bernard & co. proposed to conduct a research initiative as a precursor to deploying funds. They overcame the funding issue by narrowing the scope from implementation to research. They also worked with the community, conducting numerous calls and reports. Same goes for the ventures initiative. In other words, if a proposal fails, itâs usually because the prosper presented something that is not right for the DAO, or the proposer simply didnât work intimately enough with the community. If these aspects arenât completed, then there shouldnât be compensation.
All this being said, we do think some sort of bounty system could be present for accomplishing certain tasks. Therefore, we are voting abstain for this proposal. There is likely a better way of addressing the given problem statement. The DAO consistently has aspects that need to be developed, and much of the talent faces the cold start problem of even starting the research. Optimism is perhaps a decent DAO to look at regarding smaller scope missions.
Vote: Coinflipcanada, Devan, Greg, Sam
Type: Snapshot
We divided out voting power evenly among the following four candidates, aiming to allocate evenly across those who have proven to be strong representatives for Arb DAO and individuals who have gaming industry experience. coinflipcanada has demonstrated his valuable contributions in both the LTIPP and GCP processes. thedevanshmehta has been instrumental in leading the STEP initiative for diversifying the DAOâs treasury into RWAs. Greg (JamesLawton) has an impressive background in the gaming world, having worked for Sony, Xbox, and Activisionâand is now in blockchain gaming. sam has a strong background in the marketing and growth sector of the gaming world, having recently worked on global marketing campaigns for games like Overwatch.
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
We are voting For this proposal due to the need for DAOs, especially those behind an entire ecosystem of applications, to invest more time and capital in operations. Entropyâs leading team has a strong track record in working with DAOs and conducting intimate due diligence on various protocols. At the end of the day, if Entropy can help minimize net costs, including the costs paid out to Entropy, then this partnership is a net positive. Full-time contributions to a DAO are not very common, and there will likely be a need for more immersed individuals contributing to DAOsâespecially if the DAO would like to over time become less reliant on a singular Foundation. Weâre curious to see if this proposal prompts similar teams to apply for such partnerships. Exclusivity to a particular DAO is also uncommon. Many paid contributors arenât able to run their businesses if they donât have diversity across numerous ecosystemsâwhich could create incentive misalignment.
There are aspects of the proposal that we have reservations regarding, however. The list of previous proposals that the team has proposed assumedly took three people maximum to conduct. A team of 10 people does sound a bit overkill. Employees are expensive to manage. Perhaps itâs better to hire 2-3 new people, perhaps focused more on the technical and data analytics side. That would round out the team pretty well, while prioritizing quality over quantity. Specialized expertise can be consulted on an ad-hoc basis, and the Entropy team can always leverage the Arb community for attaining opinions and perspectives on certain proposals. This lean setup would potentially cut some of the overhead. The whole legal, tax, etc side of this proposal is currently one of the justifications for the large budget. Itâs questionable if the DAO should be covering these entity formation and overhead costs.
Vote: FOR - Ban Furucombo from the Arb
Type: Snapshot
We voted to ban Furucombo. If a project receives tens of thousands of dollars from the DAO, there is no reason for unsatisfactory comms and reporting. The STIP bridge itself was rejected due to Furucomboâs lack of reporting. The sheer amount of time it took for the team to respond to this request demonstrates a lack of decorum. Even if the team isnât officially banned, theyâll struggle to attain funding from the DAO in the future due to reputation issues. Instituting an official ban should disincentivize other teams from committing similar infringements. We agree with other delegates that there should be a more clear means by which the AF/ DAO hold entities responsible.
Vote: FOR - Any blockchain network
Type: Snapshot
We are in support of expanding the deployment of Orbit chains to alternative networks. This is an opportunity for Arbitrum to increase its presence on numerous other ecosystems, while simultaneously attaining more sources of revenue. The success of a couple of these new Orbit chains could amount to decent inflowsâalthough this is currently a premature assumption.
Yes, Arbitrum is Eth-aligned, but broadening the use of Orbit does not necessarily cannibalize the success of the EVM. Itâs not like restricting Orbit development to Eth is materially increasing the competitive moat for Ethereum. The signaling here is simply that using Arbitrumâs technology is a ubiquitous resource, regardless where you decide to buildâand for using this framework, you pay Arbitrum a cut. Such openness is the case with various other competitors. If the magnitude of pull that Orbit technology had towards drawing builders to Ethereum, then this would be a different conversation. As it currently stands, the impact Orbit has in terms of bringing value to Ethereum is not significant enough to justify forgoing development on alternative networks. We stand by this perspective as long as the Arb Foundation doesnât largely divert their attention and resources to helping devs spin up Orbit chains on other networks. If the overhead related to expansion is too large, which the AF should be transparent about, then the DAO should revisit this topic.
Vote: FOR
Type: Snapshot
The UADP is in favor of this. There has been a massive influx of ARB into the circulating supply due to all of the recent governance proposals creating unprecedented sell pressure. This should help put a temporary pause and reanalysis to some of this.
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
In similar reasoning to our snapshot vote, this will be good for decreasing future DAO spending
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
In similar reasoning to our snapshot vote, we are in favor of these network upgrade proposals
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
In similar reasoning to our snapshot vote, Entropy has proven itself and will be very valuable for the DAO.
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
In similar reasoning to our snapshot vote, this is necessary to bootstrap the first BoLD validator. Although a little steep, this is something we think needs to happen and should be a priority.
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
In similar reasoning to our snapshot vote, we look forward to staking being finally activated!
Vote: Abstain
Type: On Chain
We are in favor of the proposal as a whole still, just given the incorrect submission window, we will be voting our support in the future vote when it is submitted correctly.
Vote: Against, Abstain, Panda, Unicorn
Type: Snapshot
The only thing that came from this that we think was ultimately appealing was the audit sections and clause. However, given that the nature of this is an ethereum protocol Attackathon sponsorship, we think if we wanted to fund and pay for an audit, there should be an appropriate RFC and subsequent discussions around that. In its current form, this isnât the most appealing to us and we think will have marginal benefits to the DAO, not enough to justify the costs.
Vote: FOR
Type: Snapshot
We voted For this proposal in both the snapshot and onchain phases.
Our team has been monitoring the continual iterations of this proposal by intaking delegatesâ feedback, and it has been great to see the progress towards a more conclusive structure.
After the introduction of the unistaker concept, itâs exciting to see the possibilities that can be implemented for introducing some degree of value behind âmere governance tokensâ. The initial idea to distribute surplus sequencer fees to stakers is of course difficult since the operating revenue for the DAO is currently limited, and it is an important revenue management decision to consider where and how this capital should be used. We are interested in seeing the new working groupsâ research regarding how capital should be directed to stakers. It seems unlikely that the DAO will be able to sustain decent enough yield to stakers from sequencer fees alone. The recent proposal by Karpatkey and Aera regarding âdiversifyingâ the treasury into stables and yield bearing assets would be an interesting way to potentially divert some of this non-operating revenue to stakers. Again, this is a revenue management decision. It could be the case that incorporating this staking setup is good enough for nowâand we can in the future turn on this, so to speak, fee switch and begin issuing dividends.
It could also be the case that the yield is turned on for a period of time, like issuing a dividend during a period where we have excess revenue. However, this is difficult since whenever a company issues dividends, investors expect an indefinite dividend. Turning on fees to stakers could also be something thatâs implemented during times where we need the price of ARB to perhaps increase to a particular threshold in order to preserve the severity of the treasury. As mentioned, the likelihood and incentive towards conducting a governance attack only increases as the treasury balance sheet is full of more and more non-native tokens.
Deciding who will be eligible for the yield is also a very difficult problem due to the subjectivity surrounding assessment results from groups like Karma. We look forward to seeing the research surrounding this as well.
Overall, this staked governance token setup is very promising in increasing the attractiveness of holding these tokens. Iâm sure many large DAOs have seen this and are now contemplating similar practices.
Vote: Against
Type: Snapshot
We decided to vote against this proposal since we feel that other data providers will be willing to provide this data without the DAO having to expend funds. To prevent the DAO from spending on initiatives that have a high degree of overlap, this does not yet make much sense. As the Orbit ecosystem expands and as the chain begins to differentiate, it may be worthwhile to begin exploring newer dashboards with more specific or chain-dependent metrics. Generalized metrics are well-addressed by teams like L2Beat and DefiLlama. It may also be worth exploring this initiative through a grant program since the cost isnât very cumbersome.
Vote: FOR
Type: Snapshot
Our team voted For this proposal. Data points related to governance activity is very much a hit or miss topic. Weâve personally seen a slew of products released over the past three years regarding this subject matter. Most of them have since been deprecated because nobody wants to pay for these services. The frequency with which delegates review these statistics also varies. They only review such information when conducting a report or review, which means such data only needs to be queried on a periodic basis. That being said, all of this also hinges on one important point: the type of DAO these metrics are being provided for. Dapps usually have smaller delegate bases and therefore donât need complex datapoints. Most info can be inferred, and the stats are often statistically insignificant. However, with regards to an ecosystem like Arbitrum, we arenât just dealing with a dapp. There are numerous delegates, lots of votes, various perspectives, and decent dispersion in voting power. The entry for Arb DAO is also lower relative to many other DAOs, so these dashboards are helpful for new folks. To those ends, we are voting For this proposal.
Vote: Against
Type: Snapshot
We voted against this proposal since we see benefit in being able to see what others are deciding to vote for. Shielding votes during the voting period also means some discourse in the public forums may be suppressed. Itâs important to view othersâ opinions on proposals. It helps decision makers review their presumptions and question why votes are teetering towards one direction or another. Sure, there can be a bandwagon effect, but the value of signaling in our opinion shouldnât be understated. For proposals that may see a high degree of contention, we could on an ad hoc basis run shielded electionsâbut the reason for doing so should be outlined on the forums before moving to a snapshot vote. We do see how shielding elections, however, can be beneficial. But for us to be comfortable with shielded elections, we need assurance that there are more robust systems and agreements around self-voting and COI.
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
We voted For this proposal since extending this program by two months would be nice to maintain the momentum thatâs been built with the increased level of incentivized delegate involvement. For this program, and for other programs, itâs important to consider buffer periods. An initial proposal thatâs meant to last 6-months could actually span for 7 months for the sake of a smooth transition to the next iteration of that program. During that 7th month, v2 of a program can be voted on.
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
We are in favor of exploring an off-site for delegates to discuss topics more intricately. This can be a nice supplement to the GovHacks that occurred during Eth conferences. It would be nice to collaborate with Hack Humanity to lay out a schedule to see which topics should be coveredâalong with discussions around if there should be communities or councils that separately pop up in different geographic locations, discuss topics, and then converge online.
Vote: For
Type: Against
A go-to source of truth is a great idea. We are in favor of setting up a platform like this. At Uniswap, weâve had experience with managing a couple of ENS subdomains under Uniswap.eth. This was initially set in place in order to give additional use grants to certain deployers who would request the DAO for the ability to deploy Uniswap v3 contracts onto a new EVM. This was only required while there was a BSL in place. Since April of last year, we continued similar record management to have a source of truth regarding the ârealâ Uniswap v3 contracts on each of the 23 chains that weâre deployed on. This has helped from a security and standardization standpoint. Therefore, exploring record management such as this for Arbitrum is beneficial as well.
Unfortunately, due to issues surrounding the procedure, we voted against this proposal. We will vote For a revised proposal though.
Vote: Abstain
Type: Snapshot
ââA proposal such as this should have taken place prior to others that pulled significant funds from the treasury, like the gaming catalyst initiative. It doesnât make much sense to issue such a large quantity of ARB to such a risky program. This proposal, however, is for the sake of âdiversifyingâ the treasury into more stable assets, which is important when it comes to funding various DAO-related initiatives. In order to cover the DAOâs runway, we should be pulling at least some of the funds from a reserve of stable assets, instead of fully issuing ARB tokens. And that leads to another important pointâwe are issuing ARB tokens here, not really pulling from a massive balance sheet. We might as well discount or write down most of the treasury. With a âdiversificationâ proposal, we actually begin bolstering the balance sheet. Itâs already clear that the revenue that the dao makes today has been earmarked for initiatives like bootstrapping BOLD, which means operating revenue isnât simply enough to cover expenses. We have to therefore rely on issuing native tokens.
The real issue here has been a lack of proper procedure laid out months ago by the DAO for approving large investment programs. One of the unsatisfactory precedents has been the first-come-first-serve model. For many programs, an entity proposing a large program has self-selected themselves into managing that program. This is the primary reason why we are abstaining from this proposal. There should be an RFP process for all of these large treasury management and investment proposals. Itâs a reckless argument to suggest thatâeveryoneâs been self-electing themselves, so weâll do the same.
Since the directionality of this proposal is well-founded, we arenât voting against this proposal. The main contention that we hold is the process by which the counterparties in the proposal are self-elected. We hold a great deal of respect for Karpatkey and Gauntlet, and they may very well be the managers selected for this type of proposal. But an RFP matters.
Vote: FOR: Responsible Voting Policy
Type: Snapshot
Instituting policies surrounding COI and self-voting is very important. We therefore voted for incorporating the Responsible Voting Policy so that delegates cannot outright vote themselves into particular positions in an unfavorable manner. Every DAO with committees and programs where managers are elected should have a socially-unified system where individuals are held liable for their decisions, even if there isnât a precise legally enforceable mechanism present.
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
We are in favor of the proposal as a whole, and with the new changes, we are in full support.
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
This update allows for appropriate timing in case of an upgrade that is unfavorable for people to bridge off chain using the 7 day native bridge. We are in favor.
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
This vote seems somewhat useless, we are wholly in favor and not totally sure why we are voting again for something governance already approved.
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
These changes to the multisig are advantageous to the DAO as a whole and we are a fan of the inclusion of the MSS, reducing overall costs.
Vote: Against
Type: Snapshot
Allowing Aave to come in after all other incentives are allocated on first look doesnât seem great. Given all of the challenges the team faced technically, this was a harder decision, but seeing the response and appetite of votes, we think this is appropriate.
Vote: Collect Bids in ETH
Type: Snapshot
This is a great fundamental step forward for the DAO. We think bids should be collected in ETH to allow for a future consistent non-ARB revenue stream for the DAO.
Vote: IRL/conference/scholarships, IRL/conference/no scholarships, Online event, IRL/separate/scholarships, IRL/separate/no scholarships, Drop idea and do nothing, Abstain
Type: Snapshot
We are a fan of having a IRL event that is next to a large conference, providing sponsorships when necessary. This should be relatively cost effective. We think the next best is an online event and afterwards, if needed, a separate standalone event could be planned.
Vote: Additional funds for one year, 6 months from available funds, Liquidation of RWAs and STEP, New election at $86,581 per year, Abstain
Type: Snapshot
We voted for Additional funds for one year, 6 months from available funds, Liquidation of RWAs and STEP, New election at $86,581 per year, Abstainâin that order. Liabilities must be paid in correspondence with the dollar amount elected upon passing of proposals. There is no need to return to ground zero, so the continuation with Steakhouse is prudent.
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
We voted For both the snapshot and the onchain vote here. Generally, weâre more in favor of a long-term, structured approach, as opposed to one where events are planned and paid for ad hoc. However, due to the impending deadline for setting up the event for Devcon, we thought passing this proposal, as was done with Eth CC, was the right move. We are curious to hear further communications from Klaus and team regarding the decision to cancel this proposal.
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
With a degree of reluctance, we voted For this proposal. Itâs often difficult to say No to such a large stakeholder since the work that they conduct is often critical. The AF plays an instrumental role in facilitating the effective continuation and development of the DAO and protocol. They have numerous existing relationships that cannot be easily outsourced and programs that require sustained funding. In that vein, we do think that the AF should have taken into account the large portion of ARB that is vested. Such budgeting would mean that a liquidity crunch for grants and partnerships would have led to better management and allocation of funds. However, due to NDAs and other variables that lead to a lack of full transparency, itâs hard to tell exactly why such budgeting decisions were made. A future plan should be implemented by the AF to reimburse the DAO at some point using the tokens that eventually vest, as opposed to continuing to grow their expenditure on grants. In other words, we are not seeing this as a growth programâbut a temporary solution to liquidity issues.
Vote: FOR - DIP V1.5
Type: Snapshot
Due to the increased participation in voting and engagement on forums as a result of the delegate incentive program, we are directionally in favor of this proposal. V1.5 makes more sense to incorporate over v1.1 since 1.5 attempts to encourage more proactive and natural conversation than 1.1. The old model, to an extent, can feel forced. Our team has sometimes felt this way as well. It is also more valuable for proposers to attain feedback early on before going to a vote. Delegates also change their behavior on forums with the 1.5 setup since they are now actively perusing through open discussions as opposed to solely justifying votes.
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
We are in favor of this budget, albeit massive, needed for the continuous function of the teams strategies.
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
We are voting in line with our snapshot support; looking forward to this online offsite.
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
The RARI token being upgraded makes sense and continuing our support.
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
We are voting in line with our snapshot vote, v1.5 should be a much more holistic approach to this topic.
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
We are in favor of the new team members added to this proposal and are excited to see the success of the Sprint.
Vote: Whitelist Infura Validator
Type: Snapshot
We voted For this proposalâno reason not to support this since Infura has been supporting Arbitrum for a long time, is a well-known infra provider, and has great reliability as per their uptime stat.
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
Although some folks had privacy concerns, the data is at the end of the day are public and could yield interesting findings. It would be a different story if there was a more explicit profit motive associated with thisâbut there doesnât seem to be. We also appreciate the AF for not making a decision regarding this without consultation of DAO members, since some may consider the data public but personal.
Vote: For â Use ENS txt records
Type: Snapshot
We just wanted to provide transparency regarding why we voted For this proposal. The reasoning essentially stands the same from our previous comment on this post but is updated based on proper procedure :
âA go-to source of truth is a great idea. We are in favor of setting up a platform like this. At Uniswap, weâve had experience with managing a couple of ENS subdomains under Uniswap.eth. This was initially set in place in order to give additional use grants to certain deployers who would request the DAO for the ability to deploy Uniswap v3 contracts onto a new EVM. This was only required while there was a BSL in place. Since April of last year, we continued similar record management to have a source of truth regarding the ârealâ Uniswap v3 contracts on each of the 23 chains that weâre deployed on. This has helped from a security and standardization standpoint. Therefore, exploring record management such as this for Arbitrum is beneficial as well.
Unfortunately, due to issues surrounding the procedure, we voted against this proposal. We will vote For a revised proposal though.â
Vote: Do not fund
Type: Snapshot
We decided not to fund this initiative since we do not believe that we have the understanding nor view of the contributions the parties on the poll had on the LTIPP. These decisions are more prudently made by members who were in closer proximity to the stated parties. However, we are not against the concept of retroactive funding as a wholeâit is too common that many contributors in the space donât attain their fair share of compensation for their work.
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
Given the bit of disorder that came from multiple event-based proposals in the past couple of months, we welcome this proposal. Hack Humanityâs Bangkok proposal, for instance, came last minute and had to go through a formal governance process before having the capital in their pocket to the venue, etc. Last-minute event planning should ideally have been addressed after the one-off EthCC proposal. This preset budget for 2025 will ideally help with organization and foresight.
Vote: Funded with 1.73M USDC + Council
Type: Snapshot
Our team voted for the $1.73M funding option + council. We are appreciative of the work that the ARDC conducted during v1 and are therefore willing to continue allocating resources to their efforts. Ascertaining the amount of budget to allocate for the program is not the simplest task without delving deeper into details, so we chose the least expensive option. This was also in part motivated by the new retainer model. Ideally, a retainer leads to more prudent capital allocation, which could justify minimizing the overall required budget.
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
We voted For this proposal since 1) itâs a pilot program that will help iron out some of the specific operational aspects through trial 2) the practice of token swaps, done well, can be a means for effectively aligning protocols within an ecosystem, while simultaneously acting as a means of capital investment for the purpose of a direct monetary return.
Although the premise of alignment based on holding the native token of another protocol can be questioned, we believe that it has solid grounding. The lockup term here matters, of course. Thatâs why we wouldâve liked to see a longer period where both parties are subject to a lockup, and once that cliff is reached, a gradual vesting process.
Each counterparty should also be treated differently. A token swap with GMX vs one with Thales would be very different, not only due to the relative size of each party but also based on their relative contributions to the Arbitrum ecosystem. In effect, the council is in place for the sake of underwriting, and even if this process could be relegated to the DAO, we believe that such processes are best conducted under the purview of a council. The future management of this capital is up for discussion, and in our opinion, is a point to discuss as soon as possible but need not be a blocker for this trial. It is a conversation that can occur while the due diligence for swaps occursâmore than likely we wonât be selling off our swapped treasury assets immediately due to contractual lockups.
There have also been concerns about swapping tokens with projects that lack potential upward trajectory. While this may be the case, token swaps are very much a combination of effective portfolio allocation and strategic alignment. Traditional companies, for instance, often take controlling interest in firms that they want to collaborate with, often to attain higher degrees of ownership across the value chain. In similar fashion, Arbitrum would be able to vote on the proposals of these protocols to ensure their alignment. The degree of governance that Arb DAO can partake in with these small DAOs is a fair concern.
To the portfolio allocation point, the amount of the swap would of course be lower for more risky partners. A protocol like GMX would likely warrant a larger swap due to their tried and tested natureâplus, the recent buyback+distribution program that theyâve been running only brings more value to GMX token holders. Alignment should also not be the primary impetus for token swaps, although not entirely disregarded, of course. This would mean analyzing projects that arenât exactly Arbitrum native, which could also be a prudent practice from a pure investment return perspective. More blue chip assets from multi-chain protocols would benefit Arbâs treasury by ideally reducing its overall volatility, especially since smaller cap Arbitrum native tokens would only increase the Arb treasuryâs beta to the $ARB token itself. Swaps with larger protocols can also help Arb attain a stake in the governance of notable DAOs.
Vote: Reconfirm Tim Chang & John Kennedy to GCPC
Type: Snapshot
Although we donât directly know Tim and John, we voted to reconfirm both of them based on the second-hand information that we have reviewed. Regardless of this decision, we still hold skepticism regarding the GCP as a whole and would like to see updates regarding clear progress. Since so much capital has been allocated to this, it wouldnât be wise to not place competent individuals at the helm of the program.
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
As per our vote For this proposal in the Snapshot phase, we voted in support of this proposal onchain as well. We appreciated the retainer aspect and therefore voted for the 1.76M ARB allocation since it may reduce the overall cost of the programs. This is the option that passed the Snapshot vote, in line with our perspective.
Vote: For
Type: On Chain
A more systematic approach to events is something that the DAO has needed for some time now. The disorganization and competition between multiple groups looking to run events is not favorable. And so, as per our offchain vote in favor of this proposal, we are also voting For it onchain.
Vote: For
Type: Snapshot
We voted in favor of this proposalâour team believes that a clear set of explicit guidelines is prudent for ensuring cordial participation in the DAO. Beyond general decorum, this code of conduct can allow participants like the Seed team to point towards explicit violations in the agreed code to potentially blacklist certain delegates and revoke their ability to profit from Arbitrum. Such a setup is much better than pointing towards some arbitrary social handbook that hasnât been agreed on by a majority of the DAO. The election standards are also very much welcome as weâve seen some discord in the past regarding self-voting.
Vote: Abstain
Type: Snapshot
We are in favor of the overall proposal, however, a good chunk of the specifics around committee members selection and operations accountability we are hesitant at. Some of the communication from the committee members themselves has been both hazy and negative, so we are apprehensive to be in support with this exact structure.
Vote: Against
Type: Snapshot
Although we understand the potential irritation caused by delayed payments, consideration such as reimbursing the given team should be given at the start of the program. Itâs well-known that ARB and alike native tokens are volatile, and constantly rebalancing to compensate for price drawdowns is a slippery slope. This setup may work well for other DAOs where there are less moving parts, however, for Arbitrum this is not the case. There are simply too many projects simultaneously taking place, and making an exception to rebalance accounts for this instance is unfavorable. We would encourage proposal creators to specify if the compensation for a certain initiative is denominated in dollars or the native token.
Vote: In favor, no onchain mechanism
Type: Snapshot
We were unable to vote on this due to issues around travel but partook in this discussion from earlier in the month.
The need to follow-on with hackathon winners is key for taking something from a side project and making it into a viable business. This should honestly be a part of the initial proposals to construct grant programs generally. Even in the investing world, doubling down on promising entrepreneurs is a commonplace practice. Not doing so is often leaving money on the table. We do not see a need to initially institute the onchain mechanism.