A. Name (organisation or individual): karpatkey (Organisation)
B. Wallet Address or ENS: 0x583E3EDc26E1B8620341bce90547197bfE2c1ddD
C. Tally Profile URL: Tally | governance.karpatkey.eth
D. What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:
- DeFi development on Arbitrum
- Improving Governance participation
E. Stance on “Overall Goals for the Arbitrum DAO”:
We are happy to see the current programs, such as the Short Term Incentives Program (STIP) and Uniswap-Arbitrum Grants Program (UAGP), and we believe the engagement from both individual community members and organisations during events, such as the DAO Day calls, has been high. The Arbitrum DAO is well-positioned to lead by taking community-driven governance initiatives and turning them into highly impactful programs that strengthen the protocol’s future.
Our stance on overall goals for the Arbitrum DAO includes the following ideas that we believe should be a priority:
- Developing and implementing a robust treasury management framework that aligns the DAO’s strategic goals with the actions and decisions of those responsible for managing the treasury.
- Creating a responsible Treasury Diversification plan, such as developing best practices to make the DAO sustainable and able to support public goods initiatives.
- Developing a dynamic and prosperous DeFi ecosystem that nurtures the network’s expansion, ultimately translating into increased revenue for the DAO.
- Further fostering programs that maintain healthy voter participation levels and representation that enhance the DAO governance.
F. Sample Voting Issue 1:**
Issue Overview 1.3k
Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralisation of power and favor of one service provider.
How would you vote?
We would vote Against it due to concerns about the centralisation of power around the oversight of the bounties program.
What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
There are two issues here. This creates a skewed power distribution, and critical delegates overlook this issue for their benefit. To help solve this, the following could be amended:
- The allocation committee could be restructured to remove some representations by Flipside.
- The proposal should mandate that those who would benefit from a seat on the allocation committee must abstain from voting.
How would you approach the tradeoff between centralisation of authority and the ability to get things done?
We recognise that these mistakes can be unintentional and that some of the most valuable DAO members are active across many initiatives. With this in mind, our approach would be to ensure that a culture and formal rules remain in place that promote active DAO members to uphold many roles but disclose conflicts of interest. Members with conflicts of interest should recuse themselves from voting or decision-making.
G. Sample Voting Issue 2:
Issue Overview:
Overview Link 1 3.6k
Overview Link 2 497
FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022, Rari was hacked for 80M, and a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then, in May 2022, another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward. This time, it was not passed.
Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
Split Reimbursement
Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.
A refund is appropriate where errors have been made that are not the fault of the depositors, but only if the longevity and sustainability of the protocol are maintained.
- A refund that can not be sustainably issued due to the size should be restructured, delivered over time, or reconsidered to ensure it does not undermine the protocol’s long-term health.
H. Languages we Speak and Write:
Our team has native speakers of English, Portuguese and Spanish.
karpatkey’s Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest Answer:
We are active contributors to the governance of other protocols, such as AAVE, Uniswap, and Safe. We also manage treasuries or serve on treasury committees for protocols such as Balancer, GnosisDAO, and ENS, and we hold multiple crypto assets in our treasury. Please check our treasury reports for more information.