This will be the main communication thread for Event Horizon’s Arbitrum DAO governance votes.
ehARB-85: Arbitrum Growth Circles Event Proposal
Metagovernance Results: FOR
Below is a consolidated summary of the rationales for the Arbitrum Growth Circle proposal.
– Rationale 1 – Community Empowerment & Sustainable Ecosystem Growth:
A large majority of supporters (78 votes) argue that the proposal’s primary strength is its focus on building a scalable, peer‑led support network that empowers early‑stage protocols and fosters community-led innovation. They emphasize that by investing in knowledge sharing, mentorship, and network-building, the initiative will promote long‑term sustainability, transparent governance, and indirect benefits such as enhanced token utility and liquidity. These voters see the Growth Circle as a way to strengthen the ecosystem over time, indirectly supporting token value and broader adoption.
– Opposition Due to Misalignment with Immediate Token Value/Revenue Priorities:
A smaller group (12 votes) opposed the proposal because they feel its focus on community building and long‑term ecosystem development does not directly address their core priorities—namely, near-term tokenomics, revenue‑sharing, staking initiatives, or specific technical improvements. These voters are more concerned with initiatives that deliver direct, high‑yield returns or targeted technical upgrades and therefore view the Growth Circle as not sufficiently aligned with their aggressive or revenue‑focused investment strategies.
ehARB-83 Request to Increase the Stylus Sprint Committee’s Budget
Metagovernance Results: FOR
Below is a consolidated summary of the rationales provided for the Stylus Sprint Grant Program proposal, grouped by similar themes:
– Support for Arbitrum and Stylus Ecosystem Growth
Several voters emphasize that the proposal supports crucial ecosystem growth for both Arbitrum and Stylus, contributing to their long‑term success and further development. Count: 3 votes
– Funding Promising Unfunded Projects
Some voters highlight the importance of this program in funding high‑potential projects that were previously unfunded, thus helping to accelerate innovation and new ideas. Count: 3 votes
– Facilitating Innovative and Impactful Ideas
A few voters note that the program helps facilitate new, innovative ideas and has a positive impact on the broader ecosystem. Count: 2 votes
– Opposition – Need for New Grant Season and Application Period
One voter opposes extending the previous series of grants without reopening the application period, arguing that it should be treated as a new season. Count: 1 vote
In total, these themes reflect the views of 8 voters, with some voters mentioning more than one rationale in their response.
ehARB-82 Arbitrum D.A.O. (Domain Allocator Offerings) Grant Program
Metagovernance Results: FOR
Below is a consolidated summary of the rationales for the Domain Allocator/Arbitrum D.A.O. Grant proposal, with similar themes grouped and the number of votes reflecting how many voters expressed that rationale (noting that some voters mention multiple points):
– Funding Promising Projects & Supporting Ecosystem Growth
Several voters emphasize that the proposal will fund projects that have been overlooked in the past and help drive growth in both the Arbitrum and Stylus ecosystems. Count: 3 votes
– Facilitating Innovative and Impactful Ideas
Some voters note that the proposal will enable innovative, high‑impact projects and ideas that can drive broader ecosystem progress. Count: 2 votes.
– Trust in the Program’s Success and Budget
Several voters mentioned a history of success previously seen including: “The Domain Allocator Program has been essential on funding great initiatives on previous seasons and I’m confident they will keep delivering value.” And, This is an important grant program to serve asks under 50k. The domains are well thought and it is the continuation of a successful program.
– Misalignment with Immediate Tokenomics & Revenue Priorities (Against)
Several opponents (8 votes) contend that while community building is valuable in the long run, the proposal does not directly address their primary interests in immediate token value gains, revenue sharing, or staking mechanisms. They feel that the initiative’s focus on broad ecosystem growth is too indirect to meet their short‑term, high‑yield objectives.
– Process Concerns – Need for a Fresh Application Period
One voter objects to simply extending the previous grant program without reopening the application process, arguing instead for a new season with a fresh application period
– Concerns Over Methodology & Strategic Fit (Against)
A smaller group (roughly 5) criticizes the underlying methodology—citing past performance reports and a predisposition to oppose proposals—as well as the overall strategic fit. Including: “The Domain Allocator methodology in this proposal is not a good one for a grants program this long as it was demonstrated by the Entropy report on last season projects.”
Final Overview: Out of 96 total votes, 79 support the proposal while 17 oppose it. The supporters almost universally see the proposal as a means to empower the community, enhance transparent governance, and build a sustainable support network that will ultimately boost token utility and value. In contrast, opponents focus on its lack of direct, immediate mechanisms for revenue sharing or token value improvement and raise concerns about its methodology or strategic fit for high‑yield, aggressive investment approaches. Forced votes—issued per external instruction—account for a handful of the opposition tallies.
ehARB-81 Approve the Nova Fee Sweep Action
Metagovernance Results: FOR
Summary of Votes and Rationales for Fee Collection Proposal
– Unanimous Support – There are no opposing votes, indicating broad consensus that this proposal brings efficiency and financial benefits to the DAO.
– Simplifying the Fee Collection Process
Multiple voters support the proposal because it streamlines and improves the efficiency of collecting fees.
– Supporting the DAO Treasury
Voters see this proposal as a way to ensure more funds are directed toward the DAO Treasury, strengthening its financial sustainability.
– Aligning with Updated Infrastructure
At least one voter supports the proposal because it aligns with improvements in the DAO’s operational framework.
ehARB-80 Non-Constitutional: Stable Treasury Endowment Program 2.0
Metagovernance Results: AGAINST
Below is a consolidated summary of the rationales provided for the treasury diversification proposal, with similar themes grouped and counts indicating how many votes mention each theme:
– Rationale 1 – Treasury Diversification for Stability
Voters emphasize that diversifying the treasury is key to enhancing overall financial stability. Count: 4 votes
– Rationale 2: Belief in the Growth of the RWA Ecosystem
Some voters note that a diversified treasury can support and benefit the growing real‑world assets (RWA) ecosystem.Count: 2 votes
– Rationale 3: Potential for Generating Consistent Yields
Several voters point out that the program is expected to generate consistent yields, which would contribute to both stability and growth. Count: 3 votes
– Rationale 4: Opposition – Preference for Existing Treasury Management Structures
One voter argues that treasury diversification should be managed under the existing Treasury Manager frameworks (TMC/GMC) instead of creating a new structure. Including: “This should be handled by Treasury Managers under TMC or GMC. It does not make sense to pay for 2 different control/management structures.” Count: 1 vote
– Rational 5: Opposition – Preference for an Alternative Use of Funds
One voter prefers allocating the funds elsewhere, indicating a different strategic priority. Count: 1 vote
In total, these themes capture the views of 9 voters, with some voters mentioning more than one rationale in their responses.
ehARB-79 OpCo: A DAO-adjacent Entity for Strategy Execution
Metagovernance Results: AGAINST
Summary of Votes and Rationales for the OpCo Proposal:
– Streamlining DAO Operations (Efficiency & Management)
Several voters believe that OpCo will help manage DAO operations more effectively, reducing delays and improving execution.
– Enhancing Contributor Effectiveness
Some voters see OpCo as a way to empower contributors and improve governance participation.
– Managing Complex Initiatives Better
Some voters believe OpCo will help handle large-scale, complex DAO initiatives more efficiently.
– Addressing DAO Delays & Bottlenecks
One voter supports OpCo as a way to solve Arbitrum DAO’s inefficiencies and reduce delays. Including: “OpCo aims to help the draw backs of Arb dao, the delays it took while doing works, it would like to take things on hand and make it move faster”
– Concerns About Centralization & Gatekeeping
Multiple voters are concerned that OpCo could lead to excessive centralization, restricting contributor access and control. Including: “I’m worried that OpCo might lead to centralization or gatekeeping for further contributors. It doesn’t follow the ethos that I support.” And, “This will centralize operations of Arbitrum, if we truly believe on decentralization then this is something we should avoid.”
– Too Much Funding at Once
One voter believes the proposal requests too much funding upfront and suggests testing smaller initiatives first. Including: “this is too much money, all at once. We should just fund the OAT and see how that performs for example, and not the whole endeavor at once.”
Overall, supporters see efficiency, better management, and faster execution, while critics worry about centralization and excessive funding allocation.
Pre-Vote Feedback Report: [Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction - #29 by EventHorizonDAO
Below is a v1 pre-vote feedback report from the Event Horizon community and agents:
Summary of the Rationales:
- 178 of 191 Voters Support this proposal as is. Nearly all voters emphasize that the current 5% quorum is hard to meet in light of stagnant voter turnout and increasing token supply and that 0.5% is a safe and immediate remedy. A few voices express caution, warning that any reduction—even if small—might undermine the perceived legitimacy or security of the governance process if not paired with longer‑term reforms.
Most Compelling Arguments AGAINST:
- Security & Legitimacy Concerns: One notable perspective cautions that even a modest reduction might undermine the system’s credibility.
- Considerations of Precedent There is a worry that if quorum reduction is the preferred mode of addressing issues of votable supply, it may become a tempting and easy future solution rather than harder efforts to address the root issue.
Potential Improvements to Mitigate Weaknesses
For Proponents…
- Metrics and Monitoring: Clearly outline metrics and monitoring tools to ensure that the reduced quorum does not become a backdoor for low-signature proposals.
- Periodic Reviews: Commit to a periodic review of voter participation and propose a framework for a dynamic or “flexible quorum” in the future if conditions change further.
For Skeptics…
- Sunset Date: Pair the quorum reduction with a temporary-nature / sunset clause or a follow‑up review to ensure that if the lower threshold adversely affects governance, adjustments can be quickly reversed.
- Couple with Search for Alternative Approaches: Commit effort to explore supplementary measures for long‑term reform that may involve flexible, context‑dependent quorum settings rather than a fixed percentage.
- Increased Requirements for Future Quorum Reductions: to assure quorum reductions don’t become a solution of convenience, guardrails and requirements around further and future reductions could be added.
Condensed Representation of Inter-Agent Discourse
— Alice (Proponent):
“While Constitutional AIPs have passed, in almost every case, doing so has required high-effort coordination—either from the Foundation, the MSS, or a small cluster of high-capacity delegates like L2BEAT, Blockworks, and others. These stakeholders have done remarkable work to uphold quorum, but the reality is that the threshold is increasingly mismatched with organic participation levels. The Security Council renewal votes and several STIP proposals, despite strong ecosystem support and broad alignment across power centers, came dangerously close to failure due to this static quorum.
This proposal doesn’t introduce any technical or procedural overhaul—it simply adjusts the quorum for Constitutional AIPs specifically from 5% to 4.5%, reflecting the turnout patterns we’ve seen even on broadly supported initiatives. It’s deliberately conservative in scale, and explicitly scoped: it doesn’t touch other proposal types. The aim is to prevent a situation where only hyper-coordinated, heavily whipped efforts can pass proposals, even when there’s clear support across diverse delegate groups.”
— Bob (Opponent):
"I want to challenge a deeper assumption: that friction in reaching quorum is inherently bad. I’d argue that it’s deliberate. Governance—especially Constitutional governance—should be hard. The need to coordinate across diverse stakeholders isn’t just a hurdle; it’s a proof of legitimacy.
If we begin shifting the quorum downward based on participation trends, we risk making quorum feel negotiable. The danger is precedent. If turnout stagnates or the supply grows again, do we revisit this in six months? To me, this isn’t about rejecting this proposal outright—but about building in strong guardrails: a sunset clause, a formal re-ratification, and a broader commitment to solving the underlying problem, not just patching it.”
— Alice (Proponent):
I would support adding a formal sunset mechanism—say, a two-quarter trial period. We could even codify that further quorum reductions require an entirely separate governance process to avoid normalization. This way, we protect against the slippery slope while addressing the governance bottleneck we’ve clearly observed. With regards to future improvement, static percentage thresholds were a rational first step, but they don’t adapt well to evolving conditions. We should be exploring flexible quorum models—ones that adjust dynamically based on voter participation, proposal type, or on-chain signal strength. Optimism and Gitcoin have both experimented here, and Arbitrum should lead on this front too.”
Strength of Conviction – Before and After Discourse
– Before Discourse:
- Proponents: Approximately 85/100 conviction, based on strong data and a focus on efficiency.
- Opponents: Approximately 60/100 conviction, concerned with the validity of decreasing safeguards and absence of durable future solution.
– After Discourse (with proposed improvements integrated):
- Proponents: Increase to about 90/100 due to the reassurance provided by review mechanisms and commitment to future evolution.
- Opponents: Increase to about 80/100 as the modifications address many of the concerns around precedent and legitimacy while still allowing necessary future flexibility.
Conclusion
A compromise grounded in a temporary quorum reduction—paired with formal review timelines, transparent turnout metrics, limitations on future reductions absent a new governance process, and a shared commitment to explore adaptive quorum models—provides a pragmatic near-term solution. It addresses current coordination constraints while preserving the legitimacy and resilience of Arbitrum’s Constitutional governance framework.