We recognize the extensive effort that the authors have put into this proposal and appreciate the reframing of its focus since passing on Snapshot into a program that attempts to meet the governance needs of certain protocols and service providers. However, there are a few aspects of this program, and supply-based onboarding programs in general, that have led us to vote AGAINST on Tally.
Through previous attempts at onboarding, both through GovHack and version 1 of the onboarding program, we have seen that providing individuals with basic governance knowledge is insufficient and generally falls short when it comes to positioning those individuals in a manner that provides value to the DAO. As was brought up on Tuesdayâs proposal discussion call, if the DAO does not have clear responsibilities and a need for these analysts post-program, then we are simply paying individuals to learn about Arbitrum for the sake of learning about Arbitrum. While the authors have made revisions to the program in an attempt to address this concern by matching high-performing individuals with the listed service providers/protocols, we still have concerns that there is a lack of clarity surrounding the actual responsibilities and roles of these analysts.
Furthermore, the current structure has no mechanisms to ensure that these analysts stay fully aligned with Arbitrum, and there is a risk that the best talent is pulled into other DAOs in the industry. It appears to our team that the DAO would essentially be paying the onboarding costs and, as such, take on the initial risk for other organizations to eventually hire an analyst into their own ecosystem.
Lastly, and speaking generally, a problem that plagues both DAOs and organizations is that as the number of initiatives increases, eventually, an overwhelming amount of context and time is necessary to navigate the bureaucracy. It has now been evident for some time that Arbitrum DAO has fallen victim to this phenomenon, as reflected in the fact that many key stakeholders do not actively participate in governance due to the enormous barriers to entry and time-consuming administrative work. While this proposal seeks to remedy the symptoms of this issue, and this is in no way the fault of the authors, it fails to address the underlying core issue facing the Arbitrum DAO. In our opinion, the goal should be to reduce the burden of a delegate to the point where key stakeholders find it appealing to engage as opposed to continuing down this path of increasingly complex activities to the point that the DAO has to pay for specialized analysts on behalf of these parties.