OpCo – Oversight and Transparency Committee (OAT) Elections

DAO Programs & Initiatives Operation Company (OpCo)
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The Snapshot stage to elect the three initial members for OpCo’s oversight and transparency committee will be initiated today, Thursday, March 27th. A call was held earlier today for applicants to introduce themselves and advocate for their selection. The recording, transcript, and chat log can be found below. Please also review the “Candidates Eligible for the Snapshot Voting Stage” section at the end of this post for a list of candidates included in the Snapshot vote, as well as the Applications & Nominations thread for more information on the candidates.

As a reminder, delegates also participating in the election are required to adhere to the established responsible voting policies. For a candidate who plans to self-vote, the two most important things to keep in mind are: your self-vote is not larger than the voting power directed towards any other candidate, and your self-vote is not larger than 33% of your voting power. Outlined below is a further explanation of how the rules apply to voters (candidates and non-candidates) in this OAT election.

Application of the Responsible Voting Policies in OAT Elections

First, any delegate not participating in the OAT election is free to vote however they wish. If a potential conflict of interest exists, it should be disclosed on the forums before voting as outlined in the Delegate Code of Conduct. Delegates and participating candidates who seek to abstain from the vote can do so by voting in a neutral manner, i.e, splitting the voting power equally across all candidates to effectively abstain.

The OAT election has 3 available seats to fill; therefore, a candidate is permitted to put up to 33% of their vote on themself. This is based on the section below from the Responsible Voting Policy:

As a participating candidate planning to self-vote, the most straightforward way to adhere to the policy is by voting for yourself and two other candidates, each with 33%.

If for some reason, a participating candidate wishes to have more flexibility by voting for less (1 or 2) or more (4+) than the seats available (3), we encourage them to consult the policy in full, but to summarize, the candidate should make sure a) their self-vote is not larger than the voting power directed toward any other candidate and b) is less than or equal to 33%. To give a straightforward example related to a), a candidate isn’t allowed to use 60% of their voting power on person A, 10% on person B, and 30% on themselves.

Discovered violations or attempts at collusion by a delegate will lead to an immediate disqualification from the application process, and the delegate’s votes will be removed retroactively from the results.

As always, the Entropy team is happy to answer or consult participating candidates who may have questions about the Responsible Voting Policy. Please refer to the recently posted Arbitrum DAO Code of Conduct & Arbitrum DAO Procedure posts in the Guides & Documentation subcategory for the most up-to-date versions of the documents.

Candidates Eligible for the Snapshot Voting Stage

Following the Candidate Eligibility Evaluation period led by the Arbitrum Foundation, the following applicants will be included in the Snapshot vote for OAT elections:

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LobbyFi’s rationale on the price and making the voting power available for sale for this proposal

Since the candidates have been pre-approved by the Foundation (see post Update on OAT Elections’ Candidate Eligibility Evaluation phase), we regard this proposal as secure enough to go live on LobbyFi. We will therefore make the voting power available for 1 (one) candidate only, without voting power splitting. To encourage the community to amplify their choice in this important election, we will make the auction available, where, following the winner-takes-all principle, the pool that will gather the highest amount of ETH will get 100% of the VP. Also, we must stress that the bids that are made for an option that will not turn out to be the highest can be withdrawn.

The potential upside for a candidate is the term’s compensation ($7.5k * 12 months ~ 47.1 ETH) and the bonus at current prices (100k ARB ~ 18.7 ETH) → ~ 66 ETH per candidate. LobbyFi will charge a flat 5 ETH for an instant buy, meaning that the auction may be won with 0.5 ETH and upwards, by the largest pool; otherwise, a vote equal to abstain will be cast.

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meaning, LobbyFi’s full voting power would be equally distributed between all candidates?

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Exactly, following this recommendation.

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voting 100% for Pedro Breuer (@pedrob) on the current offchain vote because once we look a little bit deeper, Pedro is, in my eyes, the only candidate in this election that doesn’t have any hint of a Conflict of Interest.

no conflict of interest in any “network competitor” (he said he would stop being a delegate at Scroll if he was elected), no conflict of interest by having a contributor role or financial relationship in Arbitrum DAO (other than the DIP which I also expect him to withdraw from, if elected), no conflict of interest by being in any other committee/council/initiative in Arbitrum DAO or any DAO-adjacent entities that could eventually contract with OpCo or the Arbitrum DAO.

I deeply believe that we need people for this Oversight and Transparency Committee that are truly credibly neutral and unbiased. This role will require from its members the upmost ethical behavior, neutrality and most importantly transparency, of any other role in this DAO. Also, Pedro is one of the very few in this election with the actual technical competencies to do this oversight and transparency focused role well, since he is one of the only 2 lawyers applying to this position (the other being @Pablo).

Also, if you closely check Pedro’s forum activity (just click here) you will see that he his one of the most detailed oriented delegates in this DAO. His feedback on proposals is always rich, deeply researched and clear, and also always pushing in the direction of more transparency by asking the right questions at the right time. And he has been doing that for a long while here at Arbitrum DAO, which means he has more context about the DAO than most.

I believe so much that Pedro is the best candidate for this role that, if I had the money to spare, I would publicly buy the 5 ETH LobbyFi instant 20M ARB vote for him.

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I think this is way under priced and could be used to actually attack the DAO. It should Not cost $1k to get $10k out of the DAO. If should cost $11k to get $10k from the DAO instantly, so the DAO is not leaking value ideally, and then the auction feature should price the votes more effectively IMO. Given the risk here I’ll be instant buying this to take it off the table.

edit: someone else already has. Thank you

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Justification for every candidate:
(I treat all candidates with respect, but I have my own opinion on how the candidate will perform this work):

  • A.J. Warner (ajwarner90) - a worthy specialist. I would like the person to be independent from the Foundation. Formally, this is true, but there is also an advantage in the fact that Warner works at Offchain Labs - he will have more connections for operational work

  • Belmin Kalkan (0xRecruiter) - I believe that the DAO representative should be related to the DAO itself. But the only activity we see from this representative is an application for this position

  • Chris Cameron (PaperImperium) - this is my personal opinion, but since I was against this program due to the significant cost of organizational expenses. The candidate’s justification that OpCo will solve some problems that may appear in the future (and also replace the Foundation) did not suit me.

  • Edgar Prediger (EzR3aL) - it is also bad for me that the candidate voted for OpCo. His justification that a legal entity is needed to hire talented employees is strange, because for any position within the scope of responsibility of the DAO we have such people without this, take at least the Security Council

  • Federico Daffina - Analyst at Reverie, experience in finding, evaluating and supporting crypto companies and their founders at early stages. This is something that can help in assessing the work of OpCo and their understanding. Also, for me, a plus is the leadership against the creation of OpCo, which means that the candidate will be more attentive to the work of this organization, which is what DAO needs

  • Frisson (Frisson) is one of the most respected delegates and has done a lot for DAO. However, his opinion about the creation of OpCo has a negative effect on me. Of course, decentralization is a difficult structure to manage, but this is what we strive for, and OpCo is a step in the opposite direction

  • Jana Bertram (Janabe) - a representative of RARI, who is connected through the Obrit chain with Arbitrum. However, there has been almost no activity from her in DAO over the past few months, which means in my opinion she cannot fully represent DAO

  • Joseph Schiarizzi (cupojoseph) is a worthy candidate with extensive experience in crypto. I am confused by the fact that the candidate did not react to the creation of OpCo. I did not find any comments on this in the history

  • Marc Zeller (MarcZeller) - in my opinion, he spends very little time on DAO and has only a few posts in the last year. I would like to see the candidate have more involvement with DAO

  • Patrick McCorry (stonecoldpat) - no questions about professional skills, but I would like the DAO representative to be in no way connected with the Foundation, because in many ways the DAO strives for decentralization, and the Foundation does the opposite

  • Paul Imseih (Pablo) - almost never participates in forum discussions, only a few posts per year

  • Pedro Breuer (pedrob) - as I wrote earlier, I have a negative attitude towards the candidates who voted for this initiative. He doesn’t like the rationale that some additional organization will manage all initiatives and that it will be good. At the moment I don’t see a sufficient rationale for the need for such a company, but simply a waste of DAO funds

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Can you elaborate on the hints of COI that you see in all the other candidates? It’s a strong claim and I’d like to understand it better.

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Let’s just say I have very strict definition of conflict of interest myself. For example, I think I’m still the only delegate that voluntarily discloses all his earnings from Arbitrum DAO. Also very strict, to the point of even recommending that @pedrob withdraws from the DIP if elected to the OAT because being paid by the DIP creates an inherent positive bias towards @SEEDGov, and since SeedGov is a service provider to the DAO, and eventually to the OpCo in the future, I think that bias shouldn’t be there for an OAT member.

But of course, as usual @krst, if you want the specific “hints of COI”, hit me up in the DMs. =)

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gm cp0x,

Thank you for sharing your breakdown of the candidates I really appreciate your thoughtful perspective and the opportunity to address your concerns about my lack of visible activity on the governance proposals and DAO forums.

Up until August 2024, I was part of the Offchain Labs (OCL) team, directly contributing to Arbitrum’s development. During my tenure, I was the recruiter who found engineers that built key components of Arbitrum’s governance contracts, DAO formation, and ecosystem development. After OCL, I hesitated to jump into DAO activities because I was concerned it might be perceived as a conflict of interest, given my prior role. For the last six months, I’ve been reflecting deeply and seeking input from others in the ecosystem to understand whether my involvement would be seen as a conflict or interpreted as behind the scenes influence due to my OCL experience.

I completely understand your concern about my lack of visible activity on the forums, and I’m grateful you raised it and it’s something I’ve been grappling with mentally. I felt that after the dust settled and my focus realigned, the OpCo and OAT roles presented the perfect timing and opportunity to step into a more active role in the ecosystem. From my perspective, the DAO needs someone who has seen its inner workings, can call out problems as they arise, and tackle them head on. I’ve witnessed firsthand the complexities of collaboration between OCL, the Foundation, the DAO, and its broader ecosystem, as well as the challenges in how proposals are handled. I believe my experience uniquely positions me to bring clearer processes, better reporting, and greater transparency to the DAO ensuring we understand where allocated funds are flowing, the ROI on projects, and how the ecosystem is being built.

To address your point about my engagement, I want to assure you that moving forward, I’m committed to being an active voice in the DAO. I plan to engage regularly on forums, contribute to governance discussions, and participate in proposal development to ensure I’m representing the community’s needs and fostering collaboration across the ecosystem. My lack of public involvement up until now was more of a mental hurdle for me, given my history with OCL and Arbitrum, but I’m ready to fully step into this role and be a visible, active contributor.

Hopefully, this clears up any questions or thoughts you might have had. I’ll be live streaming on X tomorrow at 12:30 PM EST, and I’d love for you to join so we can discuss further I’m eager to hear more of your thoughts!

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Beside security council, I don’t think we have ever had an election as important as this one. It’s the first time we elect council members that will be in charge to start the operationalization of our DAO. One could argue we did it for GCP, but to me is different: while at the time the amount of capital involved was indeed higher, I think here we have more at stake: defining if we are able to not only self govern ourself, but also manage operations.

In electing OAT members, we have to rely not only in the public figure reputation, skillset, specific knowledge, past but in the trust we can put in whoever is going to be elected. The people in there will be entrusted in choose the right persons to start this company, on behalf of the DAO and in the best interest of the DAO.

Implicitely, this suggest to me that

  1. is going to be hard to vote for people that have never had prominent roles or presence in our DAO: trust can’t be build in a single day
  2. is going to be hard to vote for people who have, involuntarily or voluntarily, harmed the DAO or the DAO reputation outside our (rather small) circle: I personally can’t trust the OAT candidates who have, in past, created situations harmful for the DAO/AF/OCL operations without first doing as much as they could to reach out interested parties. This is not about having/not having the same opinions, is about a course of action in what you do that is responsible toward not only people and operations, but also the perception about Arbitrum, especially perception from outside, that we collectively need to defend
  3. is going to be hard to vote for people that have a very good professional track record, but no strong reference and presence inside our world: Arbitrum is an ecosystem, a very complex one, and there is a fallacy in thinking that the same approach straight out of the box that has ensured success in a somehow smaller environment can also solve the problems we have here. I am talking about not only strategy, but also communication, approach, even philosophy, and all the characteristics that define a person in his attitude toward a working mission.



I have placed my fiches, equally, on these 4 candidates:

Reasons are the following:

  1. Pedro: I have worked with him during LTIPP and STIP.b, and a few time through SeedLatam before he left the org. I have the uttermost estime for him: the way he approaches the problems we have in the DAO is the type of approach we need, keen toward details, and able to not stop at the first superficial takes.
    (one good thing about DIP program is that, for people that have enough time and energy to read all feedback from all delegates, you can now know who just stops at very simplicistic views vs someone able to go more in deep).
    I also understand what @paulofonseca means when he says he is the one not having any COI. To me is slightly different: it would be ok, for me, if he was for example still collaborating with Seed, or working on his own company or protocol. What to me is worth noticing is instead the following: he has been in the DAO, now for months, providing value, with just, in the last few months, some compensation through the DIP supporting his efforts. He did show us two things: how much he cares about the ecosystem, and how he is able to tackle complex problem.
  2. Frisson: he has had and still has multiple roles in our DAO. We all know him in his capacity here and in Tally. Lately he showed, again, how he is capable of taking leadership and ownership of problems in the MSS: in a fairly chaotic situation, due to among others how the initiative was conceived, he took the lead in comms, transaction reporting, and communication, doing “what is needed and not what he is paid for”. Can’t say there is a professional perk better than being able to take ownership of problems and solve them when they arise. Beside, it honestly make sense for him to potentially leave all of his roles, consolidate his effort into a very important mission that will for sure benefit from his experience, and at the same time make some space for new contributors, extremely valid, that could fill his roles. A secondary effect that makes me even more confident in voting for him.
  3. AJ: he is, probably, the most stranger to most because in his role at OCL he didn’t had direct contact with most delegates and contributors in here nor he had a presence in the forum or delegate chat. But, if you have “been” in Arbitrum in any capacity beside doing governance in our DAO, you likely know AJ and indeed interacted with him. He has always been very present in the Arbitrum events, always interacting with top delegates, and above all he has insight in the past and future of our Lab and the vision for Arbitrum. This point is key: if he knows what Arbitrum should be from the PoV of OCL, he can definitely help the DAO getting a direction that he thinks is valuable. The other main point is how much he interacted with builders and protocols. My biggest fear for our DAO is alienating builders, detatching our governance from protocols, and AJ in the OAT would mitigate this risk
  4. Pat: I will be totally honest, I was initially conflicted about the Foundation having an active candidate along his observing role. I spent a fairly amount of time asking myself if this was a good move or not, with the OpCo being on paper and among other a potential “alternative foundation, DAO owned”.
    Is there a COI (being COI the second most preferred word in our DAO beside framework)?
    Would it be a problem having the Arbitrum Foundation in the OAT helping hiring people or shaping/scoping/rescoping the OpCo?
    At this point, I don’t think it will create any problem. We could discuss a lot about having a total separation between this new entity and the Foundation and the perks it would give us; but, the focus has to be instead be in having all stakeholders teaming up for the best outcome possible for our DAO. From a practical standpoint, having DAO members, OCL members, AF members, in the OpCo, can just help the flow of information and coordination: Patrick will know what initiative the Foundation is undertaking, even the ones that can be explicitely communicated, and help the DAO leverage this info through the OpCo.



As a final note, I voted 4 candidates for 3 spots. Per the voted proposal, the 3 elected OAT members should then nominate and hire 2 further people. Assuming this happens (and is not given for granted, there could be other proposals to rescope the OAT for example), my hope is that whoever of the 4 above gets elected, will onboard the others. I really think we have, right here and now, the best 4 names we could get, and I will be extremely happy to see all of them working in the council.

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I think this is a really good post about all the candidates including me.

Maybe just a little correction. Yes I voted for OpCo because in my opinion the Arbitrum DAO is stuck because there is too much noise and not enough transparency and a clear path on how to move forward. Basically too many initiatives. And my opinion is that Opco could get the DAO back on track. And this may be only needed for 1-3 years and afterwards it’s working super flawlessly without the need of Opco and OAT. So no, I don’t think we need a legal entity to hire talented people, not at all, it’s about having an entitity leading the DAO, being a strong competitor in the L2 landscape and attract talented people in general.
And yes the security Council is working like a charme each year. But you cannot say this for example about GCP, many grants programs that are running, LTIP and STIP are somehow also considered by some people not extremely successful.
That’s where Opco and OAT have to chime in, improve and lead and especially be transparent and communicative all the time with no delay.

Thank you

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Please consider voting for me. I promise to be relentless about the Op Co being accountable to the DAO. Here’s some of the things I want the Op Co to push:

  1. Create an accelerator for breakout apps on Arbitrum which the DAO owns a piece of
  2. build and coordinate an angel investor network to encourage more founders to focus on arbitrum ecosystem (using Echo & Legion)
  3. Help the apps on arbitrum coordinate integrations that improve the total experience. The sum of the parts is greater than the whole.
  4. Build an LP network for directing TVL to new apps with kickbacks for the DAO

Read my full statement here: Cupojoseph for Op Co - HackMD

Thank you!

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We have selected Marc Zeller, Paul Imseih, and Frisson for the OpCo Oversight and Transparency Committee (OAT) based on their expertise, governance experience, and alignment with the Arbitrum DAO’s objectives. Their combined skills address the strategic, financial, and operational needs required for effective oversight of OpCo.

  • Marc Zeller offers extensive experience in business development and strategy, demonstrated through his work at ACI, a key service provider to the Aave DAO. As an active delegate in multiple DAOs, he brings a broad DeFi network and a practical understanding of translating DAO decisions into actionable outcomes, making him well-suited for the OAT’s oversight responsibilities.
  • Paul Imseih contributes expertise in corporate finance, risk management, and legal matters from his role at Daimon Legal. His prior involvement in the Arbitrum DAO’s Procurement Committee highlights his ability to enhance governance efficiency while ensuring accountability, which aligns with OpCo’s requirements.
  • Frisson provides operational knowledge and a strong grasp of the Arbitrum DAO’s workings. His experience scaling Tally and leading efforts like the ARDC reflects his commitment to transparency and progress, positioning him as a valuable contributor to OpCo’s success.

Collectively, Marc, Paul, and Frisson bring a balanced mix of strategy, finance, and operations expertise to the OAT. We are confident in their ability to collaborate effectively and uphold transparency and efficiency in OpCo’s operations.

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I appreciate the feedback! While I may not have been as visibly active in recent DAO discussions, my engagement with Arbitrum has been continuous—from collaborating with the Foundation and Offchain Labs on RARI Chain’s launch to driving governance proposals that rank among the DAO’s highest in participation.

My experience running a foundation, navigating DAO governance, and working closely with key ecosystem stakeholders positions me to bring real oversight and transparency to OpCo. I’m committed to serving the DAO and ensuring its long-term success.

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Voting for Patrick, AJ and Jana.

Why?
One reason (in my opinion) why the OpCo will be powerful is that it will be able to have a bird’ s-eye view across DAO, Foundation, and OCL, making sure functions are not duplicated and streamlining efforts towards a common vision.
Thus @stonecoldpat and @ajwarner90 are a no-brainer.

At the same time we will need someone who

  • has stood up a similar effort in the past
  • has experience, the grits and the time! to execute/nudge others to get things going

Hence @Janabe

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Thanks for the trust @tamara!

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All candidates bring valuable perspectives, and I appreciate their willingness to contribute. After reviewing, I’ll be voting for Patrick, Christopher, and Jana, as they stand out in my view.

  • 33% Patrick McCorry - Been in the DAO since day 1, knows all the broken processes from the inside.
  • 33% Christopher Cameron (PaperImperium) - MakerDAO veteran who’s seen governance entities go off the rails before, and will make sure OPCO stays focused and doesn’t overstep its mandate
  • 33% Jana Bertram - Strong operational background scaling teams and managing cross-functional relationships - knows how to be the glue between foundation/DAO/Offchain Labs

I believe they are the best choices to also select the final two members.

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I’m casting my full vote for Frisson as I’m most familiar with their work and impressed by their outstanding track record on Tally. I recognize them as a natural leader and consistent contributor to the delegate program, always providing valuable insights that strengthen our DAO.

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The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.

After reviewing all applications and attending the call on the 27th of March, we’ve decided to split our voting power equally among the following candidates:

A.J. Warner

  • AJ is the Chief Strategy Officer for Offchain Labs, arguably the most aligned and best-positioned entity to make strategic decisions for Arbitrum. Voting for Offchain Labs to have a seat at the OAT’s table is a very sensible thing to do.

Patrick McCorry

  • Patrick is an essential strategic voice in the Arbitrum Foundation, which, along with Offchain Labs, is well-positioned to make strategic decisions for Arbitrum. Furthermore, the Foundation proved crucial in forming GCP and will also be an essential actor in forming the OpCo itself. Having them in OAT formalizes their involvement and makes it open and transparent.

Frisson

  • Lastly, Frisson is a well-known and respected member of Arbitrum’s DAO, active across many DAO-led initiatives. He has proven to be reliable and someone who can coordinate several DAO stakeholders to work towards a common goal. He is also well connected within the DAO, which will make it easier for him to serve as an interface between the DAO and the OAT.

Adding a bit of additional commentary to these choices, we believe that to be successful, the OpCo needs to find the right balance and act as a coordination layer between OCL, Arbitrum Foundation and DAO. To achieve this, it will need to gain the trust of the existing organizations and establish an efficient communication channel between them. Both OCL and AF will play a major role in the success of the OpCo, so it makes sense to have them directly represented in the OAT. In the future, OpCo may seek more autonomy and there should be less need for direct representation of both OCL and AF in its’ oversight body, but in our opinion for now it’s better to have it. As for the last seat, we found it important to have someone who is well connected within the DAO community and shows the ability to mitigate any arising tensions and doubts, we find Frisson best suited for that role, especially in the early days of the the OpCo.

Although we decided to vote for the trio mentioned above, we believe all applicants were strong and appreciate them applying. Regardless of our preference, we’re prepared to collaborate with and support whoever is elected for the OAT to ensure OpCo’s, and therefore Arbitrum DAO’s, success.

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