Proposal - Updates to the DIP, The Complete 1.7 Version

[TodayInDeFi]

In our opinion, the vote buying platform exclusion makes total sense - these platforms already have incentives to participate, and do not need additional ones.

[karpatkey]

Thank you for the detailed update — we appreciate the thoughtful revisions and the effort to adapt the program to current participation trends.

We have one clarification we’d like to ask:

• With the proposed increase of the minimum voting power threshold to 500K ARB for DIP eligibility, is it correct to assume that all DIP-eligible delegates will effectively have the option to choose between participating in Tier X (voting-only) or the standard DIP structure (voting + qualitative contributions), depending on their preferred engagement style?

[404DAO]

Thank you for the thoughtful updates and continued effort to improve the Delegates Incentive Program (DIP). While we agree with the goal of refining the program and building a more robust delegate ecosystem, we have several concerns and suggestions based on the proposed changes.

Compensation Reduction: Questioning the 40% Cut

The proposal suggests an ~40% reduction in rewards across all tiers. We believe this reduction is premature and potentially detrimental for several reasons:

• Insufficient justification: There is no clear rationale for why the number is set at 40%. Was this based on cost modeling, delegate output metrics, or private discussions with stakeholders?

• Misaligned with stated objectives: The proposal itself notes, “It is a fact that a significant number of stakeholders require these incentives to justify the time they dedicate…” This makes a 40% cut contradictory to the program’s goals of improving delegate quality and consistency.

• Risk of talent flight: Lowering compensation makes delegate participation less competitive relative to other DAOs. This risks reducing Arbitrum’s ability to retain or attract experienced contributors—something even highlighted in Entropy’s recent funding proposal.

We encourage the proposers to delay any reduction in compensation until a more rigorous evaluation of delegate workload and contribution quality can be completed under the new structure.

Tier X Participation Requirements

We acknowledge that Tier X participants likely do not have governance as their primary focus, but we urge caution in relaxing their participation requirements too much. We want to ensure voting remains high-context and avoid incentivizing low-context voting to meet quorum:

• Tier X participants bring valuable context to proposals and governance discussions. Providing a “handicap” in the name of flexibility may unintentionally reduce the diversity of high-context feedback the DAO needs.

• A better model may be to pair Tier X members with DAO-provided support (e.g. part-time governance interns) rather than reduce expectations outright.

Delegate Workload Assumptions Are Premature

The proposal notes that workload will decrease due to increased involvement from the Arbitrum Foundation and Offchain Labs. However:

• As L2Beat pointed out during the most recent SOS call, this involvement is not yet materialized, and claiming workload is set to decrease is presumptive.

• In reality, delegates are currently spending significant time engaging with the proposed organizational changes, in telegram, and participating in community calls. Reducing rewards before a measurable drop in workload is unjustified.

Delegate ROI Framing Is Too Narrow

We caution against evaluating delegates purely through a “return on incentivized VP” lens. Participation from smaller or newer delegates brings:

• Unique perspectives and skillsets

• Diverse backgrounds

• Accountability to larger delegates

Cutting off their funding purely based on raw VP efficiency undermines basic talent retention principles, community building, and decentralization.

Dispute Process Changes Need More Guardrails

While we support reducing Program Manager discretion and increasing stakeholder consultation:

• Removing disputes is not the answer. Stakeholders consulted in contribution reviews may themselves have biases or conflicts of interest.

• We recommend maintaining a lightweight, transparent dispute mechanism that allows for:

  • Public airing of concerns

  • Delegate feedback on questionable contribution assessments

  • Better checks and balances on centralized authority

This strikes a better balance between streamlining and accountability.

Business Development Reporting

We encourage SeedGov to provide regular reporting on their business development efforts, including visibility into the protocols they are engaging with and updates on the progress of those conversations.

Closing Thoughts

We remain supportive of efforts to improve the DIP and appreciate the iterative nature of this proposal. However, several notable changes feel either under-justified or misaligned with the current reality of delegate involvement. We look forward to continued discussion and improvement of this critical program.

[Arbitrum]

In alignment with the Arbitrum Foundation’s previous stance on vote buying (here), we support SeedGov’s decision to omit vote buying platforms from the DIP.

We believe that the DIP should incentivize good delegate participation, rather than participation for participation’s sake. The program shouldn’t, for example, incentivize behaviour which while participatory, potentially undermines DAO’s economic security via vote buying. Furthermore, we believe it’s important that vote buying platforms become mature enough for the community to better understand their actual impact before being included in such programs.

If vote buying platforms were to be included, we believe that it would only make sense to reward them for voting ‘abstain’ (which, in the case of the largest vote buying platform, is the default when no one buys its vote), as the platform generates revenue if users purchase for/against votes already.

On another note, we see significant room for improvement in how the DIP is structured and what kind of tangible outcomes it brings to the DAO, e.g., a clear delineation between contributor and delegate is needed. Consequently, we believe that the work on a 2.0 version of the DIP should be accelerated.

[SEEDGov]

First and foremost, we want to thank all delegates and stakeholders for their valuable feedback — both in this thread and during the two recent governance calls.

Summary of Changes - July 30th

To provide greater clarity and reassurance to all delegates and stakeholders, we confirm that the following changes have been made:

• Adjustment to Delegates’ Feedback Evaluation Criteria

  In the original proposal, point 4.3 stated:

  “3. The Program Manager may also propose outstanding contributions, provided these are submitted for validation by the OP or other relevant stakeholders.”

  This has now been amended to:

  “3. The Program Manager may also include outstanding contributions.”

  This change ensures that the inclusion of outstanding contributions is not perceived as an additional validation hurdle for participants. The updated process intends to strengthen the assessment by incorporating feedback from proposers and major stakeholders — thereby reducing overreliance on the PM’s subjectivity — not to make the program less inclusive.

• Change in TL;DR Wording

  Accordingly, we’ve updated the TL;DR phrasing for clarity:

  The Delegates’ Feedback parameter will be evaluated more objectively and robustly. (instead of “stringently”).

  This aims to avoid confusion regarding the evaluation process. As we’ve stated before, our goal is to make the process more robust and well-grounded — not more restrictive.

• Clarification on Vote-Buying Platforms. Previously, the clause stated:

  7. Exclusion of vote-buying platforms

  Vote-buying platforms will be excluded from the Delegate Incentive Program, given that these platforms operate with their own economic incentives for how the Voting Power they acquire is used.

  We’ve now introduced discretionary language to allow for future alignment if the DAO reaches consensus:

  7. Exclusion of vote-buying platforms Vote-buying platforms will be excluded from the Delegate Incentive Program, given that these platforms operate with their own economic incentives for how the Voting Power they acquire is used. The Program Manager reserves the right to revisit this decision if, in the future, the DAO gains greater clarity on the matter and finds it feasible to use the DIP as a mechanism for alignment with vote-buying platforms. This means that, if consensus is reached, pathways may be proposed to allow these platforms to participate in the program for the benefit of the DAO.

  This leaves the door open for future changes that may enable the DAO and the DIP to better align with such platforms.

• DIP’s Terms and Conditions and Requirements to Participate in the DIP

  In the original proposal, one of the Requirements to participate in the DIP stated:

  Adhere to the DIP’s Terms and Conditions and any other Social Agreement: Each DIP Participant must adhere to the DIP’s Terms and Conditions and all social agreements reached through Snapshot, including those outlined in proposals such as ‘Improving Predictability in Arbitrum DAO’s Operations,’ ‘Should the DAO Create COI & Self Voting Policies?,’ ‘Incentives Detox Proposal,’ [Non-Constitutional] Arbitrum DAO Delegate Code of Conduct + Formalizing the DAO’s Operations and any other proposals or codes of conduct that may be approved in the future. If there are contradictions between a Social Agreement (such as the DAO’s Code of Conduct) and the DIP’s Terms and Conditions, then the DIP’s policies shall take precedence.

  Now, we included a sentence that states that current DIP Participants are considered to automatically adhere to the DIP’s Terms and Conditions.

  Adhere to the DIP’s Terms and Conditions and any other Social Agreement: Each DIP Participant must adhere to the DIP’s Terms and Conditions and all social agreements reached through Snapshot, including those outlined in proposals such as ‘Improving Predictability in Arbitrum DAO’s Operations,’ ‘Should the DAO Create COI & Self Voting Policies?,’ ‘Incentives Detox Proposal,’ [Non-Constitutional] Arbitrum DAO Delegate Code of Conduct + Formalizing the DAO’s Operations and any other proposals or codes of conduct that may be approved in the future. If there are contradictions between a Social Agreement (such as the DAO’s Code of Conduct) and the DIP’s Terms and Conditions, then the DIP’s policies shall take precedence.
  Current DIP Participants are considered to automatically adhere to the DIP Terms and Conditions unless they state otherwise. In this case, they will be excluded from the program, as adherence to these Terms and Conditions is a mandatory requirement for participation.

  With this, we seek to avoid current participants having to reapply or edit their applications to indicate that they agree to the new Terms and Conditions, leaving the possibility for those who do not agree with these TyCs to withdraw their applications from the program.

• Disputes

  In the original proposal, the dispute modifications stated:

  Rubrics on DF and Bonus Points may receive feedback, but will not be altered.

  We have now included a sentence clarifying that the Program Manager reserves the right to make changes to the scoring of DIP Participants once the monthly results have been published:

  Rubrics on DF and Bonus Points may receive feedback, but will not be altered. The Program Manager reserves the right to make amendments to the scoring of a DIP Participant after presenting the results.

  The aim of this is to prevent the PM from being unable to make amendments if we overlook an important contribution.

• Tier’s Caps were recalculated

  New table:

  Tier	TP%	Min (USD)	Max (USD)	ARB Cap
  1	90–100%	$3,600	$4,200	12,350
  2	75–90%	$2,500	$3,000	8,800
  3	65–75%	$1,800	$2,000	5,900
  X	50–65%	$1,000	$1,500	4,400

  The ARB Caps have been recalculated using 80% of the VWAP from the last 30 days at the time the Snapshot vote is published.

  Note: The ARB 30-day VWAP on July 31st is $0.425, therefore the 80% of the VWAP is $0.34 which is the price used to recalculate the ARB Caps.

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We’ll address the remaining comments below:

@Hawheik

I don’t think this holds up, logically speaking. The existing criteria applied by SEEDGov still remains, but now it is behind an additional sieve in that it has to fulfill additional criteria to even be considered. This is as opposed to the current situation, where all feedback should be considered.

If less feedback is considered, but is judged using the same criteria that is already applied currently, it only seems possible for overall net scores to go down, not up.

This is unless the judgement criteria becomes more permissive, but I didn’t see any mention of that and it seems contrary to the stated objective for DF to be evaluated “more … stringently”.

@0xDonPepe

DF Thresholds in Practice

@Hawheik already did the math in a previous comment, but it really hit me. If you’ve got around 50k voting power, a perfect voting record, and show up to every call (getting that 5% bonus), you’d still need to score at least 14.6 points in Delegate Feedback to qualify for Tier 3.

Now, on paper that might seem doable. But in reality? Only about 12% of delegates managed to pull that off in the last round. That’s 8 out of 66 people. And now the proposal suggests grading DF even more stringently, narrowing the pool of comments that count, and only giving credit to stuff that has some kind of external validation or clear “impact.”

I get where that’s coming from (we want quality over quantity) but if we’re already at just 12% of people passing that DF bar, making it even stricter is just going to filter out more small but active delegates. That’s not the direction we should be heading in.

We believe the clarifications above should fully address these concerns.

As for your specific points, @0xDonPepe:

1. We reiterate that we are introducing new perspectives to the evaluation process — not additional barriers. We’ve updated the wording to avoid confusion.

2. We’ve previously explained why your second suggestion was not feasible from our perspective.

3. Moving the Voting Power Multiplier (VPM) to the payment calculation would undermine its purpose, which is to adjust the scoring only for voting activity. Applying it to payments would distort results under Delegates’ Feedback and Bonus Points, potentially penalizing high-impact contributors with lower VP (e.g., Tekr0x, who was in Tier 1 in June despite limited VP).

4. In this iteration, we reserve the right to increase the BP percentage for governance calls and to include other DAO-relevant calls.

We genuinely appreciate your deep feedback and hope these responses are helpful.

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Hi @TodayInDeFi !

@TodayInDeFi

We dont have a huge pushback on this, (although it would be good to keep having a mechanism for smaller delegate participation, either through DIP or an alternate mechanism)

But we wonder if retroactive activation is necessary?

if there is a vote for DIP 1.7 and that vote retroactively determines if August is 1.6 or 1.7, that changes the participation criteria for August drastically, based on a vote which is concluding in august.

It’s an extremely strange situation that is hard for Delegates to adapt to and is not how laws work or are passed normally.

Why not simply make the DIP vote apply on the next month? this is how normal laws apply: after the vote concludes not retroactively, making it difficult or impossible for the people affected to adapt.

We believe this response should address your concern:

@SEEDGov

There will be no retroactive changes for July. However, we want to be clear that if the proposal is approved during the first half of August, the changes will apply to that month, as delegates will have already been informed of the potential updates in advance.

This RFC has been public for two weeks. Given that most of the DAO is already aware of the proposed changes — and that they were also discussed in yesterday’s Open Discussion of Proposals Governance Call — we see no reason to delay implementation further.

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Hi @lobbyfi,

Thank you for your respectful feedback and continued commitment to Arbitrum DAO.

Our intention here is not to punish, but rather to act responsibly as Program Managers by ensuring that the incentives distributed serve a meaningful purpose.

With the inclusion of Tier X, if LobbyFi votes in every proposal during a given month, it will automatically qualify. So far, this hasn’t had financial implications, but it will in the future if we don’t include this clause.

Also, while we recognize LobbyFi has contributed meaningfully to Arbitrum DAO in the past, we acknowledge that there’s no clear consensus on how the DIP will ensure long-term alignment — nor how to extend that alignment framework to other vote-buying platforms.

Ideally, we would like to use this program — or another mechanism — to align LobbyFi’s incentives with those of the DAO. But under current conditions, providing incentives without such alignment guardrails would reduce the program’s incentive to a technicality, rather than a tool for impact.

Having said that, we want to leave the door open to the possibility of revisiting this decision once the DAO has more clarity on how to best align with these platforms, which is why we changed the clause.

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Hi @karpatkey !

@karpatkey

Thank you for the detailed update — we appreciate the thoughtful revisions and the effort to adapt the program to current participation trends.

We have one clarification we’d like to ask:

• With the proposed increase of the minimum voting power threshold to 500K ARB for DIP eligibility, is it correct to assume that all DIP-eligible delegates will effectively have the option to choose between participating in Tier X (voting-only) or the standard DIP structure (voting + qualitative contributions), depending on their preferred engagement style?

Yes — in practice, that’s exactly right. Eligible delegates can opt for voting-only participation and fall into Tier X, or engage more deeply and qualify for higher tiers. No declaration is needed — the scoring process will determine the outcome.

Hi @404DAO

@404DAO

Compensation Reduction: Questioning the 40% Cut

The proposal suggests an ~40% reduction in rewards across all tiers. We believe this reduction is premature and potentially detrimental for several reasons:

• Insufficient justification: There is no clear rationale for why the number is set at 40%. Was this based on cost modeling, delegate output metrics, or private discussions with stakeholders?
• Misaligned with stated objectives: The proposal itself notes, “It is a fact that a significant number of stakeholders require these incentives to justify the time they dedicate…” This makes a 40% cut contradictory to the program’s goals of improving delegate quality and consistency.
• Risk of talent flight: Lowering compensation makes delegate participation less competitive relative to other DAOs. This risks reducing Arbitrum’s ability to retain or attract experienced contributors—something even highlighted in Entropy’s recent funding proposal.

We encourage the proposers to delay any reduction in compensation until a more rigorous evaluation of delegate workload and contribution quality can be completed under the new structure.

We understand your concern, but we don’t believe the rationale is lacking in justifications.

Objectively, voting volume has declined significantly since 2024, which is well-supported in our midterm report. Additionally, several structural changes are already in place, and those changes will lower the workload for delegates going forward — not just DRIP, but also the ATMC, increased Foundation involvement, and the OpCo’s new setup (which eliminates the need for Snapshot votes to approve Service Provider contracts in many cases).

As for talent retention, we believe the revised compensation structure remains highly competitive, especially in the top tiers.

@404DAO

Tier X Participation Requirements

We acknowledge that Tier X participants likely do not have governance as their primary focus, but we urge caution in relaxing their participation requirements too much. We want to ensure voting remains high-context and avoid incentivizing low-context voting to meet quorum:

• Tier X participants bring valuable context to proposals and governance discussions. Providing a “handicap” in the name of flexibility may unintentionally reduce the diversity of high-context feedback the DAO needs.
• A better model may be to pair Tier X members with DAO-provided support (e.g. part-time governance interns) rather than reduce expectations outright.

There may be some confusion here. Tier X is designed to acknowledge delegates with significant VP who consistently vote but currently lack the bandwidth to contribute beyond that. It’s also a mechanism to re-activate voting from delegates who’ve been passive despite holding large amounts of VP.

@404DAO

Delegate ROI Framing Is Too Narrow

We caution against evaluating delegates purely through a “return on incentivized VP” lens. Participation from smaller or newer delegates brings:

• Unique perspectives and skillsets
• Diverse backgrounds
• Accountability to larger delegates

Cutting off their funding purely based on raw VP efficiency undermines basic talent retention principles, community building, and decentralization.

We agree — ROI should not be reduced to just ARB per USD spent.

That’s why our KPIs include a specific section recognizing high-impact contributors, regardless of VP:

@SEEDGov

Identify at least 5 contributors who can add value in specific verticals: So far, the DIP has demonstrated some success in attracting, identifying, and guiding contributors — especially those with lower VP — to deliver value within specific verticals. Examples include:

• Tekr0x for organizing side events at ETH Bucharest and ETHcc, as well as contributions to the AGV.
• Paulo Fonseca for facilitating and organizing the ETH Bucharest event and for creating the New Delegates’ Telegram Group.
• Tempetechie for contributions to the SOS process.
• Tamara and JoJo for providing valuable perspectives and feedback across various discussions.
• Pedrob, who was an active participant in the program and was later onboarded to the OAT.
• Organizations like Castle Capital and 404DAO have not only actively contributed through feedback and valuable input but have also participated in or continue to participate in key initiatives. (For example, Castle Capital was recently onboarded to the AGV in a communications role.)
• Organizations like L2BEAT have helped the DAO in various ways, including conducting the SOS process, engaging with builders to encourage their participation, and identifying structural problems. They have also collaborated horizontally with Arbitrum to contribute to its success.
• Blockworks Research for making a podcast with AJ Warner that actually had outreach (+15k views), giving Arbitrum an important communication channel.

We are likely forgetting to mention others (apologies if that’s the case). The key point is that, after speaking with most of them, it’s clear they’ve all been able to affirm that the DIP allowed them to dedicate meaningful time and effort to Arbitrum DAO — and that, without programs like this, they likely wouldn’t have found a sustainable path to long-term collaboration.

@404DAO

Business Development Reporting

We encourage SeedGov to provide regular reporting on their business development efforts, including visibility into the protocols they are engaging with and updates on the progress of those conversations.

Great point — we’ll include updates on our BD efforts in future monthly reports.

Thanks again for all your feedback. While we may not agree on every point, we deeply value the time and care you’ve put into these discussions — and we hope this latest round of clarifications and improvements reflects that.

[paulofonseca]

voting Against on the current offchain vote because this new version will, every month, distribute $55k in rewards to delegates on average, and cost $27.5k to run. this is roughly a 50% overhead on admin which clearly shows that the proposed design of this program is not fit for purpose. we should design a way better program that runs with way less overhead and subjectivity.

[Euphoria]

The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.

We recognize that evolving the DIP is essential as Arbitrum DAO grows, governance processes become more mature, and the role of delegates continues to shift. The move to introduce Tier X for high-voting power delegates, to recalibrate compensation reflecting a lower overall governance workload, and to make feedback assessment more transparent and objective are all clear signals that the DIP aims to adapt to a changing ecosystem.

However, as delegates with less VP, we are especially sensitive to how program changes can influence the inclusiveness and diversity of everyone. Our experience matches the sentiment that insightful questions, research, and onboarding energy frequently emerge from smaller delegates who may not hold large amounts of voting power but have a significant investment in the DAO’s quality and long-term success. We have seen, time and again, that Arbitrum benefits when the tent remains open to these perspectives.

It is for this reason that we particularly echo the concerns raised by other delegates, like @0xDonPepe mentioned, regarding the stringency of the DF scoring and its compounded effect when combined with the voting power multiplier. With only around 12% of delegates presently clearing the DF bar under the current, less strict system, increasing the difficulty and combining it with a high voting power threshold risks closing the door to smaller and independent delegates. At a time when the DIP is one of the last open doors for such participation and recognition, we worry about inadvertently entrenching governance around the largest holders and institutional actors, to the detriment of dynamism and decentralization.

While we recognize the logic for introducing Tier X (appreciate the thinking of the team to focus on increasing voting in DAO) and for focusing incentives and program energy where the most voting power can be activated, we urge caution so that these changes do not inadvertently diminish the existing pipeline for new and diverse delegates. The 40% reduction in compensation is significant and, while the justification is grounded in lower overall proposal workload and increased institutional involvement, we recommend ongoing review to avoid discouraging the participation of contributors whose involvement is critical, especially as new delegates start contributing in Arbitrum DAO. Rewarding voting activity alone for large delegates, while increasing the requirements for smaller ones, should be regularly reassessed to ensure it does not yield a disengaged or lopsided ecosystem.

On the subject of vote-buying platforms, we agree that exclusion from DIP incentives is a sound decision until there is consensus and a robust framework to ensure meaningful alignment. The language that leaves the possibility for future inclusion if proper controls are in place demonstrates an appropriately measured approach.

In summary, we vote FOR DIP v1.7, acknowledging the thoroughness of the process, the clarity of documentation, and the clear need for DIP to remain responsive and sustainable as Arbitrum grows. Our support comes with genuine encouragement to keep inclusiveness and diversity of delegate voices as a core priority, to normalize DF scoring wherever possible to the actual best performer each month rather than an impossible ideal, and to ensure that the program’s gates do not shut out newer and smaller contributors who are essential for a thriving DAO. Our decision today is a vote of confidence in the process, paired with a commitment to ensuring Arbitrum’s governance remains open, legitimate, and robust.

[cp0x]

The core issue lies elsewhere - the DIP claims to promote broader participation in voting, and LobbyFi is arguably one of the most effective contributors to that goal.

Yet, instead of being rewarded for their positive impact, they are being penalized.
Their financial model is irrelevant here - what matters is the value they bring, and they absolutely deserve to be rewarded for it.

[Curia]

Thanks to @SEEDGov for the work that went into this proposal and for continuing to engage with the community. We appreciate the decision to delay the vote and remove retroactive changes for July. We also support the broader goal of improving the Delegate Incentive Program to reflect the current needs and maturity of the DAO.

That said, we will be voting Against DIP v1.7 in its current form. While the proposal introduces a number of meaningful improvements, there are still several concerns that we believe need to be addressed before it can move forward.

One of our main concerns is the introduction of Tier X. While this may help improve quorum by activating high-voting-power delegates, the structure heavily favors large token holders. In contrast, small and mid-sized delegates are still expected to contribute significantly in order to qualify. This creates a dynamic that feels unbalanced. It might help the DAO reach higher voting participation numerically, but we question what value this brings in the long term if it comes at the cost of devaluing meaningful engagement. The goal of the program should not just be to pass proposals more easily, but to foster thoughtful discussion and active participation across a broad set of contributors.

Smaller and mid-sized delegates are often the ones who take on the more intensive governance work. This includes reviewing proposals, participating in calls, drafting feedback, and contributing to proposal development. These responsibilities require time and effort. Under DIP v1.6, there was already a multiplier that rewarded delegates with higher voting power. With Tier X, the system appears to shift even more benefits toward large holders while making it harder for smaller delegates to stay motivated. In the long run, this could reduce the number of people contributing meaningfully, even if overall quorum looks stronger.

We are also concerned about the proposal to raise the minimum eligibility threshold to 500,000 ARB. While we understand the operational reasoning, this change would exclude many mid-sized delegates who have consistently shown up and delivered value to the DAO. It could also create a much higher barrier to entry for new contributors. Many motivated participants do not begin their journey with large voting power. Removing their opportunity to grow into the program could limit the future delegate pipeline and discourage wider participation.

On the topic of scoring, we believe that removing the ability to dispute subjective evaluations entirely may reduce transparency. While we understand that the evaluation process will now involve more stakeholders and coordination, having no formal channel to raise concerns may cause issues in edge cases. A lightweight dispute process would help maintain fairness without significantly increasing administrative burden.

We also want to acknowledge the proposed 40 percent reduction in delegate rewards. While this may be supported by recent activity data, the cut feels sudden. A more gradual adjustment could help maintain contributor motivation and give people time to adapt. Additionally, although the number of proposals may have decreased, the level of impact required to remain eligible has not changed. Delegates typically still contribute to three or more proposals each cycle. The work required to meet the threshold is still meaningful and should be reflected in the reward structure.

Lastly, we want to echo @paulofonseca about the program’s overall overhead. While delegate rewards are being reduced, the combined budget for the Program Manager and other service providers such as Karma remains unchanged. Some responsibilities, such as managing disputes, have been removed, which raises the question of whether the scope and cost of these roles should be adjusted. At present, the overhead cost is nearly half the amount allocated to delegate rewards, which feels disproportionately high compared to similar incentive programs. We believe it would be beneficial to explore ways to reduce this overhead and redirect more of the budget toward contributors who are directly involved in governance.

In summary, we support the overall intent behind DIP v1.7 and recognize the effort that has gone into improving the program. However, we believe more work is needed to ensure that it remains inclusive, transparent, and sustainable. We hope to see further iterations that address these concerns and look forward to continuing the discussion.

[Griff]

MY VOTE: For: Upgrade to v1.7

I’m voting for this proposal but I want to be transparent that I have concerns about the DIP program as it stands today. The original intention is good. We all want to support governance participation, reward delegates who contribute, and bring more structure to how value is recognized in the DAO. But over time the program has become bloated and difficult to manage. The overhead it creates is significant. It takes time and energy away from the actual work of growing the ecosystem. And the process feels increasingly misaligned with the spirit of a lean and resilient DAO.
I don’t think small fixes will be enough. If this program is going to continue, it needs a complete redesign. We need clearer goals and simpler mechanisms to evaluate impact, and I would love to see AI tools like x23.ai more integrated into the process. We need to reduce friction and make it easier to participate without creating extra bureaucracy. And we need to do a better job at capturing the kinds of contributions that actually move Arbitrum forward.
It’s also important to remember that the DIP program should be about strategy discussion and roadmap alignment, not execution. Those are two very different responsibilities. We shouldn’t confuse high-level governance decisions with individual contributions. If we want work to get done, we either need to hire people directly or create a well-designed reward system for contributions. But we need to be clear about what we’re trying to achieve and how each action fits into a broader strategic framework. Otherwise we risk blurring responsibilities and losing focus.
My vote in favor is largely about supporting the addition of Tier X. I see this as an interesting experiment that might activate some of the larger delegates and encourage them to engage more with the process. If it leads to more people reading proposals, showing up, and voting, that could create positive momentum meanwhile we are also strengthening quorum.
I still believe in the potential of a program like DIP. But to live up to that potential, we need to be honest about what is and isn’t working. A full revamp is needed. And if we do that work together, I think we can create something that serves the DAO better and lasts.

[blockful]

We will ABSTAIN from this proposal.

While the DIP update introduces improvements and recent clarifications show responsiveness to delegate feedback, we remain concerned about the threshold increase to 500K $ARB. This approach risks favoring large delegates and reducing incentives for smaller ones to stay active.

We recognize SEEDGov’s impactful work for DAOs and appreciate the effort to make the program clearer and fairer, but our concerns about concentration of voting power remain.

[Tane]

We vote in favor of this proposal.

Given the ongoing structural transformations within Arbitrum DAO and considering the historically high costs associated with the DIP, the proposed reduction in expenses is reasonable and timely. Additionally, while voting participation alone does not fully capture delegate performance, introducing Tier X to encourage higher voting participation aligns effectively with the DAO’s governance objectives.

However, we share concerns highlighted by @paulofonseca regarding the increased administrative budget despite a significant reduction in delegate incentives.

@paulofonseca

distribute $55k in rewards to delegates on average, and cost $27.5k to run. this is roughly a 50% overhead on admin which clearly shows that the proposed design of this program is not fit for purpose

We understand that the newly added Business Development effort will indeed require additional resources.

However, given limited resources and the overarching goal of fostering greater delegate engagement in forum discussions and voting, it seems counterproductive to maintain administrative expenses at these levels while substantially cutting delegate rewards. The administrative budget should be streamlined through program simplification or restructuring to achieve a more efficient allocation of resources.

Addressing this issue, however, would require substantial structural changes to the DIP. Therefore, we chose not to vote against this specific proposal based on this concern alone. Nevertheless, we believe this aspect should be addressed during the upcoming DIP revision process for the next term.

[paulofonseca]

@Tane

unchanged administrative budget

the admin budget is not unchanged. on the contrary, it’s going to increase by 25% with the activation of the Program Growth Clause in this proposal, as can be seen here:

@SEEDGov

12. Program Growth Clause

At the moment of approving the 1.5 proposal, we had a Program Growth Clause that allowed the Program Manager to reopen discussions on the budget:

Although the proposed administrative budget is sufficient in both versions, we understand that if there is a considerable increase in registrations, the workload would increase significantly. That is why we will incorporate a clause where if the program exceeds 65 registered delegates (which is the number that we believe we could cover with the budget requested) we will reopen discussions in the forum on the budget, also considering the possibility of increasing the number of delegates incentivized.

In light of the increase in Eligible Participants, the addition of new responsibilities such as the formalization of our authority to determine cases of non-compliance with the Terms and Conditions / DAO Code of Conduct, and our commitment to carry out a Business Development effort to onboard new DIP Participants into the program, we propose a 25% increase in the Program Manager’s compensation for the remaining four months.

[Tane]

Thank you for catching that, @paulofonseca.

We’ve updated our rationale to reflect the corrected figures and context, and these edits didn’t change our overall stance on the proposal.

[Saurabh]

The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.

We appreciate the work put in by Seed Latam in the Delegate incentive program. We support the changes as it will help reduce the cost and will have a tighter structure and reward delegates for the amount of work they have put in not rewarding for the sake of incentives. We are in favour of the proposal.

[ocandocrypto]

As in @web3citizenxyz representation, voting abstain for this proposal. Below the rationale:

Web3 Citizen Delegate Communication Thread

Snapshot: DIP 1.7 We’re voting abstain for this proposal The proposal revises how the program is run, adjusting scoring, enforcement and eligibility. It still could improve in a way to ease and streamline the implementation of the program. We’d feel an automated approach plus manual review by the program managers streamlines the process the most. We support adding a new tier and lowering complexity for scoring and for onboarding, admin overhead wherever possible should be reduced. We hope to s…

[krst]

The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.

We are voting FOR, although we are quite critical of this proposal.

In general, we are supportive of restructuring the DIP program and reducing DAO’s spend on it. However, the restructuring should come first, with cost reduction being a byproduct rather than a primary goal. We should first clarify what we want to incentivize delegates and contributors to do, what activities are desirable, and which activities will be rewarded.

From the current proposal structure and justification provided, it can be inferred that delegate participation is most valued in terms of voting and meeting quorum. The proposal states that the delegate workload is lower than it used to be and provides an explanation for this:

Lower activity in the DAO … due to a more institutionalized environment, with the emergence of Evaluation Committees, the OpCo, Entropy as Governance Facilitator, and both the Arbitrum Foundation and OCL playing a more active role in the DAO

As we mentioned during the DIP call, this statement so far is rather questionable. Almost all initiatives that are ongoing right now in the DAO originated from DAO contributors and delegates’ initiatives:

• There would be no Arbitrum Treasury Management if not for STEP, which came from the Treasury Sustainability Working Group that came from Plurality Labs’ Firestarters program

• There would be no DRIP if not for STIP and later variations, DETOX discussions, ARDC incentives analysis, and various proposals (like the IOSG wake-up call proposal) coming from the DAO to improve on the incentives.

• The D.A.O Grants program comes from the Questbook Delegated Domain Allocator program

• Arbitrum Audit Program originated as the ADPC Audit Subsidy program

• AGV is a DAO-originated and DAO-led initiative

• Hackathon Continuation is a DAO-originated initiative

• OpCo originated from delegate discussions at ETHDenver

• DAO Events Budget originated from DAO-led GovHack events

• SOS discussions are being driven by the community, while AAEs, other than Entropy, are not. participating in them

Many initiatives within the DAO, such as the Arbitrum Ventures Initiative, DAO events, and marketing working groups, were put on hold under the assumption that the AAEs would take them over and drive them forward. However, nothing has materialized on that front yet.

We would argue that the current lower activity in the DAO is not due to an increase in the activity of AAEs, but rather because of a lack of activity from them. We were, and still are, supportive of the Vision for the future of Arbitrum proposed by the Arbitrum Foundation. However, we must acknowledge that, four months after its publication, we have seen very little initiative from AF or other entities to make it work.

In our opinion, that does not justify lowering the incentives for delegates, unless the goal is just to limit the community activity in the DAO and reduce the delegates’ role to just ratifying future proposals put forward by the AAEs. This current proposal does not address these issues, therefore, we would like to amplify @Arbitrum Foundation’s request:

On another note, we see significant room for improvement in how the DIP is structured and what kind of tangible outcomes it brings to the DAO, e.g., a clear delineation between contributor and delegate is needed. Consequently, we believe that the work on a 2.0 version of the DIP should be accelerated.

We hope the Arbitrum Foundation will take a more active role in the public discussion around the program, aligning it with their vision for the future of Arbitrum and clarifying expectations for contributors and delegates.

Due to our concerns, we were initially considering voting against this proposal, but after discussing it with @SEEDGov, we understand that this new format allows us to reduce SEED overhead on delegate assessment, which will allow them to put more resources into working on the new version that will address proper clarification of contributor paths and delegate roles. So we decided to support it.

[travcole567]

FOR — The “legacy” Tether bridge predates the canonical USDT contract, fragments liquidity, and leaves an extra surface for exploits or spoofed deposits. Disabling it now—after months of notice and with exchange integrations already migrated—consolidates all USDT flow into the single, audited canonical contract. Users holding the legacy token can still redeem 1:1, so no funds are stranded. This clean-up lowers long-term support overhead, eliminates a security foot-gun, and makes the network simpler for wallets, dApps, and new institutional treasuries that are considering an Arbitrum deployment.

[gi0rgos]

Although I’m a relatively new delegate, which means I would naturally benefit from the program staying exactly as it is, I support the reduction in compensation. This change will decrease the DAO’s expenses, something I view positively.

I also agree with the increase in the token threshold to 500,000, as it helps prevent individuals from joining the DAO solely to farm the treasury. That said, I do appreciate that current delegates remain eligible. If that weren’t the case, it would feel somewhat unfair — given that eligibility requires a time commitment of at least three months before any potential compensation is even received. Reaching the 50,000 token threshold isn’t simple either, so I feel there is a fair degree of respect shown toward the work some of us have already put in.

Ultimately, from my first to my last vote, I will always support proposals that reasonably reduce expenses and those that increase revenue for the DAO.

Finally, I view more than positive the exclusion of vote-buying platforms. Everyone has their own mindset and makes their own choices, but this kind of platform is strongly against my work ethic

The former led in my voting FOR in this proposal.

[cp0x]

Just a general comment based on the feedback from delegates

I hope someone can explain to me why delegates vote For, yet raise a large number of concerns about the proposal in their justifications.

Delegates - if you disagree with something, you can simply vote Against. The current program is already in place, and these changes would only apply for a couple of months until the new 2.0 program is introduced - so why agree to something that doesn’t suit you?

If you’re offered 5 good and 5 bad changes, the right approach is to first remove the 5 bad ones and only then approve the proposal.
There’s nothing wrong with rejecting a proposal - it’s just a reason to reflect and improve it. I don’t understand why one would accept a compromise that they’re clearly unhappy with in such a controversial situation