The DAO Incentive Program (DIP 2.0)

[Obitrum]

@paulofonseca

oing to be the Program Manager?
why doesn’t it specify on the proposal who is going to be Program Manager?
how much is the Program Manager going to be paid?

This is a really good question that was not answered, to add on, I would like to voice my concerns for another things that has been mentioned by @PossumLabs , the criteria to qualify should not be determined by a peer reviewed aseembly and should instead be an open incentive that is made available to all voters of a proposal. It can be done on an opt-out or opt-in basis, but I think the overaching goal should be to not gatekeep the rewards and possibly create a walled garden of privillaged people where they would not admit more people into the group to protect their interests.

[cp0x]

The answer to this on the call was that it was SeedGov, and regarding the salary, Raam clarified that they had not yet agreed on it (and it is unlikely that they will tell us this figure, since the salary will probably be from the Foundation, and not from DAO directly).

[cp0x]

@Arbitrum

Added clarification that once the first 50 members have been onboarded to the Peer Assembly, vouches will be restricted to one per member per month

I don’t really understand why three vouchers after reaching 50 delegates is a problem in this system.

After all, these vouchers go to the delegates trusted by the other delegate who is responsible for them.
There are also no issues with payouts, since five delegates can receive payments.

[Arbitrum]

@cp0x

1. Contributor definition
The term “positively supports” could benefit from clarification. Constructive criticism can also be positive, especially if it helps identify issues or improve the DAO.
Could you clarify how “positive” will be assessed, and who determines it?

You make a good point that constructive criticism can also be positive. Ultimately, whether something is positive is subjective and is up to the Peer Assembly members who vouch for one another.

@cp0x

2. Incentives vs. salary
I agree that the program should not replace a full-time salary. At the same time, delegates spend a meaningful amount of time (20–30 hours per month), and incentives should reasonably reflect this effort.
Could we aim for rewards that are competitive with market standards?

Delegates should primarily participate for reasons beyond compensation. Perhaps it is their full-time role within an organization, they are part of a project that depends on Arbitrum’s success, or they personally need Arbitrum to thrive. The reward is simply an incentive grant, so it is unlikely to be substantial enough to serve as the sole motivation for participation.

@cp0x

3. Assembly System
The proposed assembly mechanism could unintentionally create barriers for new participants. It might be helpful to clarify why a delegate should need to be part of a “club” in order to access rewards. And there are many questions in this part:

1. What criteria will members use, especially given many members have only interacted online?
2. How will penalties for a sponsored delegate be applied, and what form will they take?
3. Why should OpCo be the final arbiter in disputes, rather than the members themselves?
4. When does sponsorship end? (criteria)
5. How can new participants join if they are not yet known? Could this discourage newcomers?
6. What happens if a member leaves the program and no sponsor can be found?

1. As mentioned above, it is up to each Peer Assembly member’s value system to determine whether they would vouch for someone’s character.
2. The PM, with the OpCo’s approval, will determine the appropriate penalty based on the severity of the case. Penalties may include reduced rewards, temporary suspension, or, in the worst case, permanent removal from the Assembly.
3. The OpCo is responsible for overseeing the entire program and ensuring it operates as intended. It is their duty to resolve any issues with the program, including disputes.
4. Vouches do not expire; however, they can be intentionally revoked by a Peer Assembly member or removed if the member who provided the vouch leaves the Peer Assembly.
5. It is possible to submit recommendations for contributors who are not yet part of the Peer Assembly, recognizing meaningful contributions they have made to the Arbitrum ecosystem (assuming they have an open application thread on the Forum). If their contribution is deemed worthy, the PM or OpCo may assist the contributor in obtaining vouches to join the Peer Assembly and claim the reward. In fact, one of the program’s design goals is to identify and engage individuals who might not normally participate in the DAO or join such an assembly.
6. If a member cannot secure a replacement vouch within two months, they will be removed from the Peer Assembly.

@cp0x

4. Long-term Goals

1. Increased active voting power:
   Could we set a specific target (percentage or absolute numbers) to measure success, rather than a broad goal?
2. Reduced voter apathy:
   Could you clarify how delegate incentives would realistically reduce voter apathy? Many tokens are in the hands of investors or yield protocols, so incentives alone might not shift delegation behavior. What would be considered a successful outcome here?

1. We agree that setting quantifiable targets will help the DAO evaluate the program’s effectiveness over time. If and when this program is implemented, the PM, under the OpCo’s oversight, can define specific metrics to measure success.
2. Voter apathy refers to tokens that have been delegated but are not actively participating in governance. It does not include token holders who have not delegated their tokens. In other words, within the set of all delegated tokens, the goal is to increase the percentage that actively participates in governance.

@cp0x

5. Dollar Spent per Vote Cast
It may not be accurate to include all delegates in this metric, since many already vote consistently regardless of incentives. Would it make sense to count only delegates who are active participants in the program (e.g., those who applied)?
Do you want this parameter to be the defining factor for the delegation system? If so, the question is: is the best outcome - not spending a single dollar on voting - what will the program strive for?

The metric only includes delegated voting power that is registered in this program and receiving rewards.

Paying zero is not an ideal outcome, as it defeats the purpose of an incentive program. At the same time, overpaying should be avoided, as it does not represent good value for money. The optimal outcome is to find a balance—rewarding delegates fairly for their participation while keeping the program cost-effective and sustainable over the long term.

@cp0x

6. Non-voting Contributions
The proposal focuses mainly on voting. However, many valuable contributions happen before votes – including technical discussions and analysis.
Could these also be recognized, so that the DAO doesn’t unintentionally devalue important types of work?

The primary goal of the Peer Recognition Program is to identify and reward contributions that go beyond what is visible on the forum. As you mentioned, much of the meaningful work happens before votes take place and within private discussions. The program aims to recognize and reward those efforts that help drive progress.

@cp0x

7. Recurring Tasks
The draft suggests that recurring tasks should rarely be rewarded.
Could you clarify the reasoning? For example, if someone organizes useful community calls each month, that seems like an ongoing valuable contribution.
Why should it be treated as diminishing over time?

Recurring tasks or initiatives that need to be kick-started should be funded through a different program. This could include a potential Firestarter Program or a budget allocated by the OpCo for essential operational tasks.

@cp0x

8. Budget and Payments

1. The program manager may adjust the budget with OpCo’s approval. Since the overall budget is set by the DAO, could you clarify why this extra step is needed?
2. Payments should ideally follow clear, consistent timelines. Could we define a fixed date for monthly payouts to avoid uncertainty?
3. The proposal mentions an initial budget of $50k per year. Could you clarify whether this is for the program manager only, or for the entire delegation program?

1. The DAO approves the program’s annual budget; however, the PM, with OpCo’s approval, determines the more detailed, season-based budgets.
2. As with the previous Delegate Incentive Program, variations may occur early on as new processes are introduced, trialed, and refined. Over time, we expect greater consistency to develop, particularly around payment schedules.
3. The $50k budget is designated for miscellaneous and operational expenses. The PM’s service fee is separate.

@cp0x

10. Transparency of Recommendations
Under this design, only the program manager would see recommendations, which raises concerns about subjectivity. Previously, assessments were visible to all, ensuring accountability. Could we keep evaluations transparent, so that rewards are based on usefulness rather than loyalty? This would also help safeguard Arbitrum’s reputation: constructive criticism may look negative in the short term but is valuable for long-term improvements.

The proposal already contains principles on how recommendations can be ranked. The PM is responsible for ranking them, and the OpCo must approve the final rankings.

@Curia

Looking ahead, we see the Peer Assembly as the most exciting part of this proposal - not just for what it is, but for what it can become. As the Assembly matures, it creates the perfect foundation for these more decentralized mechanisms. We believe a system like our Peer Recognition Score could add significant value here. We understand that a culture of active peer recognition is a prerequisite, and the Assembly is the ideal incubator for that culture. Once established, we envision a pilot program where a peer-based evaluation model could complement the Program Manager’s work. This hybrid approach would reduce subjectivity and decentralize the rewards process, making it more resilient and reflective of the community’s collective wisdom.

This is something the DAO could consider in the future. For now, we want to avoid adding extra responsibility onto the Peer Assembly.

@cp0x

The answer to this on the call was that it was SeedGov, and regarding the salary, Raam clarified that they had not yet agreed on it (and it is unlikely that they will tell us this figure, since the salary will probably be from the Foundation, and not from DAO directly).

To clarify, once the PM’s agreement terms have been finalized, the scope and compensation will be shared with the DAO.

@cp0x

I don’t really understand why three vouchers after reaching 50 delegates is a problem in this system.

It is mostly to make sure that there is a good spread among members who are vouching for others. If the program allows for unlimited vouches, then the same 3 people can vouch for everyone.

[krst]

@cp0x

7. Recurring Tasks
The draft suggests that recurring tasks should rarely be rewarded.
Could you clarify the reasoning? For example, if someone organizes useful community calls each month, that seems like an ongoing valuable contribution.
Why should it be treated as diminishing over time?

TBH, I was also curious about this particular exclusion clause. especially since there are not that many contributors in the DAO who used to do lots of recurring calls in the past not tied to reporting of their own DAO-funded initiative. So, it feels rather precisely targeted. One thing that struggles me is that if those recurring calls were perceived as of such little or diminishing value (which can be deduced from the design of this mechanism), then why did no one say so earlier? Said contributors could just have stopped organising them.

[Arbitrum]

The recording of the The DAO Incentive Program (DIP 2.0): Open Discussion #2 can be accessed here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/11_CYAfGuaQXe7Ra3cDUz2tMoq1IaATpG/view

[Arbitrum]

Thank you for the continued feedback on this proposal.

We have made some further, minor updates, as follows:

• Added clarification that AAE’s can vouch for new Peer Assembly members.
• Added clarification that the PM cannot earn delegate or contributor regards.
• Added clarification that excess funds will be returned to the DAO if the program does not continue beyond 1 year.

[krst]

The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on our combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.

We are voting AGAINST this proposal in its current form.

We reviewed this proposal in parallel with the Triple Dip proposal, and unfortunately, in our opinion, neither is worth supporting at this point.

Our main concern here is the same as with Triple Dip - this proposal doesn’t even attempt to answer the core question: What valuable contributions are we looking for in the DAO? What is the role of delegates and contributors, and what is actually expected of them?

Are delegates meant to act merely as notaries of decisions made by AAEs? Are contributors simply “fans” who promote tweets, attend events, and contribute to the vibes - but don’t necessarily help drive initiatives within the DAO? If that’s indeed the expectation, that’s fine, but it should be stated clearly. But this would mark a shift from what the DAO used to represent - and from where, in our view, most of its past successes originated.

Without a clear understanding of our end goals, it’s difficult to support an incentive program that’s meant to help achieve them. This proposal doesn’t outline such goals; instead, it references the OpCo as the entity that defines and understands them. At this point, it seems delegates are expected to simply trust that process without sufficient clarity on how those goals are established.

Beyond that high-level concern, we also have issues with some of the mechanisms proposed:

• The Peer Assembly structure feels overly complicated. Complexity might be justified if we were facing an overflow of contributors and needed to filter based on social reputation - but that’s not our current reality. DAO activity seems to be at an all-time low. In the past six months, we can hardly recall any initiative that gained meaningful traction among delegates. The AAEs operate in isolated silos, with little feedback or input from the broader community. Given this, we see no reason for such a complex gatekeeping mechanism for potential contributors.
• The proposal puts too much power and responsibility in the hands of OpCo and Program Manager. And we’re more concerned about the responsibility part, not the power part. In our view, the fact that PM was responsible for assessing impact and assigning rewards was detrimental to the program in the past. It consumes nearly all of the PM’s capacity and leads to endless debates with little added value. Simplifying, we’ve seen ten times more energy spent on assessing impact than on producing it. We should reverse that ratio, not institutionalize it.
• We also question the reliance on peer reporting for identifying meaningful contributions. This approach disadvantages contributors who add value quietly without campaigning for peer recognition. It assumes peers have broad visibility into the DAO’s activities, which rarely happens in practice. In our opinion, this setup risks evolving into a closed circle of like-minded contributors isolated from the rest of the community - a feedback loop of people patting each other on the back.

There are additional technical details we find problematic, but going through them one by one doesn’t seem productive here.

However, one example worth mentioning is the recurring contributions exclusion clause, which seems to specifically target our past contributions - even citing monthly calls as an example of activities not eligible for rewards. To be clear, we don’t mind; we’ve never done this work for rewards but to bring value to the ecosystem, we’ve started those calls way before the DIP program. Still, we disagree with the spirit of this clause. Furthermore, if those contributions were not considered valuable, it would have been more natural (and civil) to communicate that directly before designing an incentive mechanism to exclude them.

Finally, we would like to repeat the statement we made in the Triple Drip proposal, as we find it important overall in context of those two proposals being voted on almost in parallel:

@krst

Ultimately, we’d like to point out that we have two separate proposals addressing the same issue, competing with each other and not working together. We find this to be a complete failure of the DAO governance process and us, as people behind it. I totally understand that there are differences between people in any community, especially one as decentralized as this one. Yet the fact that we cannot put our differences aside and seek value in the ideas shared here means that we’re doing something really wrong. This represents a missed opportunity to align efforts and create impact and it’s a waste of time, effort, and potential.

This DAO once thrived because we could debate - passionately, even heatedly - while still adding value to the ecosystem. Sadly, that spirit of collaboration and constructive dialogue feels lost. And that’s a loss for all of us.

[Saurabh]

The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.

This version of the DIP focuses on a few delegates, making it more centralized. We would like to see more delegates involved, rather than focusing on just a selected few handful of delegates.

With governance activity significantly going down, capping the budget is also not a great idea, as it will likely lead to reduced participation both across the board and on the forum, which is not ideal.

We would like to recommend keeping the incentives similar to the last DIP such as tier-based incentives for delegates while working on improving the review mechanism.

[stonecoldpat]

@krst: TBH, I was also curious about this particular exclusion clause. especially since there are not that many contributors in the DAO who used to do lots of recurring calls in the past not tied to reporting of their own DAO-funded initiative. So, it feels rather precisely targeted. One thing that struggles me is that if those recurring calls were perceived as of such little or diminishing value (which can be deduced from the design of this mechanism), then why did no one say so earlier? Said contributors could just have stopped organising them.

The peer recognition program is focused on identifying contributions that help move the needle for Arbitrum. It isn’t restricted to the forum, calls, or the even the people recognised as regulars in the DAO. It is trying to target anyone who is going up and beyond to fight for Arbitrum. For example, I was asked, “If someone is is arguing for Arbitrum on another DAO forum that leads to a positive outcome, i.e., integrating Arbitrum , does that count in the program?” and my answer was “Yes, that is exactly what the program is trying to target.”

Community calls, especially if it is around an initiative that is trying to drive something forward, can be recognised as a contribution.

But, if it is a long-standing and recurring community call, then we should find a proper way to compensate the people organising it and to review it periodically to make sure the recurring task is still needed. The intention being that they are properly supported and they do not need to rely on an ad-hoc contribution program to recognise that their work is indeed useful. With that in mind, it should not be seen as an exclusion clause.

Also, we took your earlier feedback, and allow people to self-submit contributions. So if someone is doing good work, and others have not yet seen it, they can still submit it themselves and have it evaluated alongside all other contributions. The goal here is for the program to capture as many meaningful contributions as possible and try to reward some of them every month.

@Saurabh: This version of the DIP focuses on a few delegates, making it more centralized. We would like to see more delegates involved, rather than focusing on just a selected few handful of delegates.

With governance activity significantly going down, capping the budget is also not a great idea, as it will likely lead to reduced participation both across the board and on the forum, which is not ideal.

Only one program, the ‘delegate reward’ is focused on delegates. It is fairly straight forward too.

As long as the delegate is:

• Registered in the peer assembly,
• Casting votes,
• Posting relevant rationale.

Then, the delegate will be entitled to rewards.

If the program passes, we are hoping to see even more delegates sign up compared to the previous DIP, as the eligibility requirements are not complicated.

In regards to the pay cap per proposal, it is just to make sure a single delegate with significant VP does not absorb most of the allocated budget and there is still funds left over for other delegates with less VP.

The peer recognition program and nudge seasons is focused on people who may or may not have any voting power. So 2/3 of the programs are focused on contributors (not delegates). Hopefully enabling us to bring on more people who would not traditionally be involved because they do not have any voting power.

[krst]

@stonecoldpat

Community calls, especially if it is around an initiative that is trying to drive something forward, can be recognised as a contribution.

In my opinion (which you can obviously disagree with), community calls are most certainly a contribution and a valuable one. For example, the monthly governance calls that I started hosting at the inception of the DAO were in my opinion valuable and helped drive many initiatives forward. The fact that they’ve been taken over by OpCo kind of proves my point. Also other recurring calls that we used to host such as Incentive DETOX calls or SOS calls were in my opinion (that you can obviously disagree with) quite valuable even if they couldn’t unleash the full potential due to lack of support. Community calls can drive debate, allow for low-barrier engagement from broader community and can break silos if properly facilitated. They’re powerful tools and in my opinion (again, as above) should be encouraged, not discouraged.

@stonecoldpat

But, if it is a long-standing and recurring community call, then we should find a proper way to compensate the people organising it and to review it periodically to make sure the recurring task is still needed. The intention being that they are properly supported and they do not need to rely on an ad-hoc contribution program to recognise that their work is indeed useful. With that in mind, it should not be seen as an exclusion clause.

If that was the intention, it should have been stated like that. Currently, the proposal only states that recurring contributions such as monthly calls, should not be rewarded.

[cp0x]

I voted against

Here are the main points in short:

1. In practice, all decisions in the program are determined by the Program Manager (PM). There is no clarity on who this PM will be – the DAO isn’t even given that choice.
2. The program has become more closed:

• The proposals on which the PM makes decisions are hidden from the community.
• A delegate club has appeared: if a delegate isn’t part of it, they don’t get rewards, and entry is only possible by recommendation. At the same time, the PM can both punish a delegate and exclude them from this club.

3. There are no clear budget criteria – neither for delegate payouts nor for operational expenses.
4. There are no clear KPIs – what exactly is the program aiming for?

We believe that this program is not moving in the direction of openness for delegates, whom it claims to attract, but instead toward centralization of power and backroom decision-making. We hope that the Arbitrum will listen to the voices of active delegates—the very people this system is designed to attract.

[0xDonPepe]

I support incentivizing governance, but not in this shape. DIP 2.0 reintroduces subjectivity, adds gatekeeping, and centralizes discretion in OpCo/PM, while leaving compensation, evaluation, and appeals insufficiently transparent or decentralized. I’m voting AGAINST and would favor a simpler, more transparent framework, one that keeps incentives open to all active delegates, relies on public and verifiable scoring, defines its KPIs up front, and anchors accountability directly to the DAO.

[JoJo]

I am voting abstain.

There are a few things that don’t convince me about this proposal.

The main thing is the structure of a single proposal for both delegates and contributors.
Even though DIP 2.0 distinguishes between the two, they should live under the same umbrella. These are very different dynamics: former is highly programmatic, and the latter is more subjective. We should have two separate programs with distinct oversight and metrics.

The second painpoint is the denomination risk (ARB vs stables).
Budgets and payouts are set in ARB, and the pool comes from ARB. That introduces high volatility but, above all, poor predictability for participants, especially if we’re closer to a top than a bottom in the market, and one could argue that this could be the case for the current one. In a severe bear market, payouts could become trivial, in the order of 30-50 dollar for constitutional proposals, relative to the intended incentive level. Yes, PM/OpCo can adjust quarterly, but that’s still reactive and limited by an ARB budget.

The third point is about payout sizing and predictability.
I’m personally neutral on the mechanics (proportional vs quadratic, and VP/total VP etc). There are many ways to do it. The real issue is predictability when payouts are ARB denominated. Over a 1 year program, ARB drawdowns could reduce the effective payout to levels that won’t move the needle, particularly for delegates with meaningful VP. While quarterly reviews helps, having USD denominated targets would better stabilize incentives.
As a secondary note, this lack of predictability might just kill the effort of the last few months made by SeedGov and the community itself to gather high VP but previously dormant delegates that might find themself not wanting to partake in voting.

On the Peer Assembly gating I’m neutral. But a gate for delegate rewards can exclude high-VP delegates from payouts and may create unintended secondary effects. I understand the intent, and I can think about lobbigy for example which we have historically wanted to be excluded by DIP rewards (not judging on the merit here just stating facts), but I’m not sure if there are other tradeoffs.

I would suggest the following adjustments

• Price payouts in USD to preserve incentive efficacy across different market regimes.
• Budget composition: have the budget in stables, or at least a 50/50 stables-ARB mix. PM/OpCo could decide month by month which portion to use. If sell pressure is a concern, stable-sourced payouts could be converted to ARB via buybacks just before distribution. A bit clunky and complex operationally, but doable.
• Separate the programs: run a delegate program, and a contributor program, with different structures, KPIs, framework and budget. Voting is mechanical, and payout up to some degree could/should be deterministic. Contribution can be quite subjective instead.

I am abstaining to still show support, some elements are imho worth saving such as nudge seasons, and there is a clear intent to try and fix previous things of DIP perceived by the broad community as either unfair or worth changing; that said, we are not hitting the proper target here, which is incentivising voting power on important proposals.

[Griff]

I’m voting against this proposal.

Don’t get me wrong, I really like the experiment with the social graph concept and most of the details proposed, and I don’t think its a problem if it’s ARB denominated. But I would love it if the Foundation worked with Paulo to find the best proposal out of the two approaches. This vote failing is an opportunity to gather more feedback on the proposal and collaborate rather than compete.

I think the AAEs should look to foster community led efforts whenever possible. I appreciate a lot of things about Paulo’s proposal, if we could integrate some of the best aspects of his proposal (e.g. the coordinape-esque feedback) we could better live up to our DAO nature.

Of course, the AF has a better perspective for designing this proposal. But if the community is already building toward something similar, I believe it would be better for the AF to support and collab with the community than to compete… At least in this circumstance.

ALSO! Let’s add delegation of voting power to DIP

As a side note, I would LOVE to see a way for DIP participation to result in ARB Delegation increases.. This is a nearly cost free way for rewarding Delegates, while also helping us fight the quorum issues that we have been fighting.

[Euphoria]

The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

We are voting AGAINST this proposal in the Snapshot voting.

We want to begin by acknowledging the effort and thought behind this proposal. The team included lessons from the Delegate Incentive Program and attempted to create a clearer distinction between delegates and contributors through a more structured framework. The intent to improve accountability, encourage transparency, and expand recognition to contributors is nice and directionally positive for the DAO.

However, after reviewing the proposal and reflecting on our experience across all previous DIPs, we believe that this version of DIP, while well-intentioned, would benefit from deeper alignment with the DAO’s long-term direction before being implemented. Our vote against is not a rejection of the idea itself, but a call to refine and unify approaches for the benefit of the entire ecosystem.

The separation between delegates and contributors is a natural and much-needed evolution, as it acknowledges that meaningful governance participation takes different forms. However, the current structure may benefit from a better balance between operational efficiency and community autonomy. For incentive programs to scale sustainably, decision-making authority should ideally be distributed across transparent, peer-validated processes rather than concentrated in administrative functions.

The introduction of the Peer Assembly and vouching system raises further questions about accessibility and fairness. By design, it creates a permissioned layer around participation, one that relies on social consensus rather than open criteria. Over time, such systems tend to consolidate influence around a smaller inner circle, reducing the openness that has defined Arbitrum’s governance to date. While accountability is essential, we must ensure that inclusion and decentralization remain foundational to any incentive framework adopted by the DAO.

It’s also important to recognize the broader context of where the DAO stands today. Arbitrum has reached a stage where governance experimentation has multiplied, from various incentive programs to multiple DIP revisions. This experimentation is healthy, but at this point, the DAO would benefit from more convergence rather than fragmentation. Currently, there are two active proposals: DIP 2.0 and the Triple Dip, both addressing the same fundamental challenge of delegate incentives.

This parallel effort represents more than just creative diversity; it reflects a coordination gap. Instead of working together toward a unified system, we now have two competing frameworks, both of which have strong ideas but separate execution paths. This is not the DAO at its best. The real strength of Arbitrum’s governance has always come from open debate followed by collective alignment, even among differing perspectives. A joint framework, one that combines the operational clarity of DIP 2.0 with the decentralized logic and automation of the Triple Dip, would deliver far more value than either in isolation.

[0x_ultra]

I’m voting against this proposal.
I really appreciate all the work that has been done to come up with this proposal, including new and fresh solutions like the Assembly or the Nudge Season. However, I don’t think that this version represents a sustainable structure.

Firstly, this arrives at a moment when DAO governance has been slowing down for several months already. There are fewer proposals, and among those, very few have meaningful impact. The current DIP should acknowledge this reality rather than creating additional layers of complexity and restrictions. What’s needed now is a program designed to invite more users, energize delegate participation, and lower barriers, not one that makes things more difficult and less accessible.​

To me, the proposal’s mechanisms for vouching and peer assembly actually risk making the DAO more closed. While these instruments could improve accountability in theory, in practice they tend to exclude new contributors and reinforce decision-making among a smaller group. Several delegates have commented that this kind of structure can create echo chambers, and I agree with them. There’s a danger the Peer Assembly becomes a self-reinforcing feedback loop instead of an open, evolving space.​

Another concern is subjectivity, which remains central in the program. Earlier versions of the incentive program faced strong criticism due to subjective judgments and selective rewards. DIP 2.0 has not fundamentally resolved this. Reward distribution would still depend on discretionary decisions, leaving room for bias and disputes over fairness.​

Fundamentally, as @krst pointed out, it seems we lack alignment on what the program’s goals even are. Without clear consensus, the proposal tries to address multiple aims at once, resulting in scattered solutions. I think our priority should be agreeing on shared objectives first, before deciding on any kind of incentive structure. Only after clear goals are defined should we move on to design details.​

I will continue participating in these discussions and try to think about concrete alternatives, not just criticize. My vote against is a call for a more pragmatic, context-aware design that deals directly with the DAO’s present situation, rather than hopes or ideals. The current version risks rewarding the wrong behaviors and discouraging the right ones, and in my view, it misses the opportunity to truly revitalize governance engagement

[CastleCapital]

We appreciate the intent behind DIP 2.0 to evolve delegate incentives and clarify the distinction between them and contributors. However, we’re voting Against in its current form.

Our concerns are objectively, structurally, and economically oriented:

• Payout predictability: Rewards should be USD-denominated for budgeting stability. ARB-denominated incentives create volatility and undermine predictability.
• Compensation levels: Current payouts, both for delegates and contributors, are too low to meaningfully sustain delegate or contributor operations, particularly for smaller delegates.
• Program structure: We align with JoJo that delegate and contributor programs should be separated, with distinct goals and appropriate budgets.
• Peer Assembly complexity: The vouching system introduces friction and subjectivity, potentially discouraging new contributors and centralising participation at a time when DAO participation is already low.
• Delegated Voting Power: The proposal does not take into account or attempt to increase delegated voting power across the DAO.
• Lack of Goals and Objectives: The proposal does not clearly state the desired behaviour of delegates and contributors, even with a loose North Star. We understand this will be determined and updated by the PM and OpCo through the program; however, an initial steering definition would be greatly beneficial.

[mihal]

Voting against DIP 2.0.

I support incentives for DAO work, nobody should grind for free. But this proposal bundles delegates and contributors into one program under the Peer Assembly, which muddles things. I’d support a clean separation between lower time commit responsibilities like voting, and deeper contributor responsibilites.

Vouching is an interesting experiment, but tying everything together risks complexity and gameability. Central eval by PM/OpCo makes sense for efficiency, but without clearer budgets and metrics, it’s harder to back.

[gi0rgos]

Thank you for the proposal!

Unfortunately, we keep getting caught up in this topic, as I’ve mentioned several times before. It’s also clear that incentives would naturally increase participation, which in turn supports the maintenance of a truly decentralized DAO.

@Griff made a solid point, which was also discussed in today’s (10 / 29) call, along with potential additions.

However, when evaluating this proposal, there are clear weaknesses, several of which were correctly highlighted by @krst, with the most important being the lack of clarity on what the DAO actually expects from its delegates. Only then will delegates be able to know what to do, how to meet the DAO’s goals, and how to drive increased productivity and capital efficiency for the DAO.

To sum up, I’m voting Against, and I genuinely hope we can find a way to move past this issue once and for all.