Blockworks Research – Delegate Communication Thread

[BlockworksResearch]

Delegate Address: 0xA5dF0cf3F95C6cd97d998b9D990a86864095d9b0

Delegate ENS Address: blockworksres.eth

Voting Activity: Tally & Snapshot

Twitter: blockworksres

The information provided herein represents the opinion of Blockworks Research in its capacity as a delegate and does not reflect the entity’s work as a Research Member of the ARDC. Blockworks Research’s ARDC-related output can be found here.

[BlockworksResearch]

Voting Rationale for the STIP-Bridge Challenges

• MUX: Approve Funding – Although the project didn’t increase its market share in perpetual trading volume and the ARB allocation is quite large, it remains a notable contributor to ecosystem activity. The Degen implementation seems interesting, with incentives possibly helping to bootstrap additional capital. It’s appreciated that they are not asking for the maximum allocation.
• Stargate: Approve Funding – The project’s initial STIP wasn’t initiated due to KYC complications. In our opinion, it’s fair to give the allocation now, especially since they are not asking for the maximum available allocation. Their focus on facilitating the migration from USDC.e to native USDC is likely to be beneficial for the entire ecosystem.
• Solv: Approve Funding – From forum updates, it’s somewhat unclear how the protocol has developed and what future implementations are planned. Nevertheless, considering high-level figures, performance has been robust, and the requested ARB amount is relatively small.
• Sanko GameCorp: Approve Funding – The project seems to have generated strong organic demand and operates within an underappreciated vertical through a unique business model.
• Tide: Reject Funding – It is unclear how sustainable the activity created through the Tide Tsunami campaign has been, and similar campaigns would be launched for the Bridge. Additionally, the project is asking for a larger allocation of ARB than in the initial STIP.
• KyberSwap: Approve Funding – The project has used funds responsibly during the initial STIP and is not asking for the maximum allocation for the Bridge. The Aggregator product has seen notable market share growth in 2024.
• Gains Network: Approve Funding – Although the project didn’t grow its market share in volume and the ARB allocation is quite large, it remains a notable contributor to ecosystem activity. While we aren’t the biggest fans of the liquidity incentives allocation, new protocol upgrades combined with fine-tuned trading incentives could lead to interesting results.
• Boost (Prev. RabbitHole): Reject Funding – A large share of the incentive allocation seems to overlap with other projects’ incentive programs. Previous performance raises concerns regarding sustainability, and the take rate channeled to the Boost Guild is excessively high.
• Thales Protocol: Approve Funding – Despite the late distribution of approximately 20% of the initial STIP allocation bending the rules, performance has been strong, and the new incentive structure seems interesting (although exact details are not given).
• Savvy DAO: Reject Funding – The project changed its incentive distribution mechanism quite heavily during the STIP, effectively selling ARB for native tokens and ETH. There is no readily available data on the areas incentivized during the STIP, but based on Dune dashboards, growth in activity has been quite minimal.
• Stake DAO: Reject Funding – Based on initial STIP performance, customer acquisition costs are extremely high. The protocol is still actively distributing incentives, and we don’t think the project requires additional funds.
• Furucombo: Reject Funding – In addition to requesting a much larger ARB allocation than in the initial STIP, there are doubts regarding the project’s ability to allocate incentives effectively based on historical performance.
• Socket Bridge: Reject Funding – The addendum doesn’t address how the new incentive mechanism would better create sustained usage, and based on historical performance, we have doubts regarding the project’s ability to operate an incentive program effectively.
• Angle DAO: Reject Funding – The project plans to leverage similar incentive mechanisms used in the initial STIP, although for USDA instead of EURA. The results from the first program were somewhat lackluster, and we think there is a high likelihood that the proposed incentive mechanisms for the Bridge will yield similar results.
• OpenOcean: Reject Funding – A large share of incentives would be allocated to trading campaigns. During the STIP, growth seems to have been mainly driven by a similar campaign, but activity derived from this incentive mechanism appears to have been unsustainable.
• Thetanuts Finance: Approve Funding – Performance has been robust and the POL-related concerns have been addressed.
• Dolomite & Umami Finance: Approve Funding – Both showcase strong performance and there seems to be consensus that the oARB mechanism is a reasonable tool.

[BlockworksResearch]

Voting – May 2024

Snapshot

Grant Request - Curve Finance

• Vote: For
• Reasoning: Here

Proposal for Approval of DeDaub as the ADPC Security Advisor

• Vote: For
• Reasoning: Here

Pilot Phase: M&A for Arbitrum DAO

• Vote: For
• Reasoning: Here

STIP Bridge Challenges

• Votes & Reasoning: see previous post within this thread

Arbitrum Multi-sig Support Service (MSS)

• Vote: #1 FOR: Implement MSS and Reporting; #2 FOR: Implement MSS; #3 Abstain; #4 Against
• Reasoning: Here

Streamlining the LTIPP Bounties

• Vote: For
• Reasoning: Here

Kwenta x Perennial: Arbitrum Onboarding Incentives

• Vote: For
• Reasoning: Here

Tally

Double-Down on STIP Successes (STIP-Bridge)

• Vote: Against
• Reasoning: Here

GovHack at ETH CC (Brussels)

• Vote: For
• Reasoning: Here (unchanged from Snapshot)

Grant Request - Curve Finance

• Vote: For
• Reasoning: Here

Front-end interface to force transaction inclusion during sequencer downtime

• Vote: For
• Reasoning: Here

Pilot Phase: M&A for Arbitrum DAO

• Vote: For
• Reasoning: Here

Constitutional AIP - Security Council Improvement Proposal

• Vote: For
• Reasoning: Here

[BlockworksResearch]

Voting – June 2024

Snapshot

Proposal to set up a Sub-Committee for the Security Services Subsidy Fund

• Vote: For
• Reasoning: Here

Proposal: Nova Fee Router (ArbOS 30)

• Vote: For
• Reasoning: Here

Proposal to Activate Stylus and Enable Next-Gen WebAssembly Smart Contracts (ArbOS 30)

• Vote: For
• Reasoning: Here

Proposal to Support RIP-7212 for Account Abstraction Wallets (ArbOS 30)

• Vote: For
• Reasoning: Here

Proposal [Non-Constitutional] Pilot Phase: Arbitrum Venture Initiative

• Vote: FOR [NO IRL EVENT]
• Reasoning: Here

Tally

Proposal [Non-Constitutional]: Defending Open Source: A United Stand for Developer Rights and Software Freedom

• Vote: Abstain
• Reasoning: Here

Proposal: Catalyze Gaming Ecosystem Growth on Arbitrum

• Vote: Against
• Reasoning: Here

STEP Program Manager Applications

• Vote: 50% Steakhouse 50% Avantgarde
• Reasoning: Here

AIP: BOLD - permissionless validation for Arbitrum

• Vote: For
• Reasoning: Here

[Non-Constitutional] Pilot Stage: Treasury Backed Vaults research and development

• Vote: Against
• Reasoning: Here

Betting on Builders: Infinite Launchpad Proposal

• Vote: Against
• Reasoning: Here

[Non-Constitutional] ArbitrumHub Evolution: The Next Step in Streamlining Information Access and Raising Awareness for Arbitrum DAO

• Vote: Against
• Reasoning: Here

[RFC] Arbitrum Multi-sig Support Service (MSS)

• Vote: Abstain
• Reasoning: Here

[BlockworksResearch]

Voting – July 2024

Snapshot

Approval of STEP committee recommendations

• Vote: For

• Reason: Here

Improving Predictability in Arbitrum DAO’s Operations

• Vote: For Improving Predictability, Against Delegate Approval

• Reason: Here

Pilot for a Questbook Jumpstart fund for problem definition and DAO improvement

• Vote: Did not vote.

• Reason: Here

Gaming Catalyst Program (GCP) Council Voting

• Vote: Split equally across the following: Greg Canessa, ImmutableLawyer, CoinflipCanada, Karthik Raju, and David Bolger.

• Reason: Here

Furucombo’s Misuse of Funds

• Vote: For - Banning Furucombo from Arbitrum

• Reason: Here

Arbitrum Expansion Program Changes

• Vote: For

• Reason: Here

Tally

Subsidy Fund for Security Services

• Vote: For

• Reason: Here

AVI Pilot Phase

• Vote: For

• Reason: Here

[BlockworksResearch]

Voting – August 2024

Snapshot

Entropy Advisors: Exclusively Working with Arbitrum DAO

• Vote: Abstain

• Reason: Here

[Non-constitutional] Incentives Detox Proposal

• Vote: For

• Reason: Here

ARB Staking: Unlock ARB Utility and Align Governance

• Vote: For

• Reason: Here

Transparency and Standardized Metrics for Orbit Chains

• Vote: Abstain

• Reason: Here

ArbitrumDAO Governance Analytics Dashboard

• Vote: For

• Reason: Here

Should the DAO Default to using Shielded Voting for Snapshot Votes?

• Vote: For (Elections Only)

• Reason: Here

Proposal to Temporary Extend Delegate Incentive System

• Vote: For

• Reason: Here

ArbitrumDAO Off-site

• Vote: For

• Reason: Here

An (EIP-4824 powered) daoURI for the Arbitrum DAO

• Vote: Against

• Reason: Here

Strategic Treasury Management on Arbitrum

• Vote: For

• Reason: Here

Should the DAO create COI & Self Voting Policies?

• Vote: For (Disclosure Policy, Responsible Voting policy, and Strict Self-Voting Policy)

• Reason: Here

Ethereum Protocol Attackathon Sponsorship

• Vote: For (Unicorn Partners, Panda Partners, Abstain)

• Reason: Here

Tally

Entropy Advisors: Exclusively Working With Arbitrum DAO

• Vote: Abstain

• Reason: Here

Funds to bootstrap the first BoLD validator

• Vote: For

• Reason: Here

ARB Staking: Unlock ARB Utility and Align Governance

• Vote: For

• Reason: Here

Delegate to Voter Enfranchisement Pool – Event Horizon

• Vote: For

• Reason: Here