SEED Latam Delegate Communication Thread

Communication and processes for the selection of the Security Council for SEEDLatam

As committed representatives in Arbitrum’s governance, the @seedlatam team wishes to share our decision regarding the members of the Security Council. In addition, we aim to be transparent about the criteria we consider for our choice and the internal voting process we follow.

Internal Voting

As we have mentioned on various occasions, our votes are always community-based. @Seedlatam and this delegation strive to represent the voice of the Latin American community. From our beginnings and in other governance, we have maintained this approach. However, we recognize the risk of a Sybil attack due to the increasing number of participants in our governance calls. Although we are in the process of moving our votes to Snapshot, we are aware of the complexity of establishing effective filters when making decisions.

Based on this premise, we have chosen to limit the vote for the selection of the Security Council members only to this delegation’s team. The reason is clear: the selection of the Security Council members is of great importance and is a delicate matter when discussing the leading rollup of the ecosystem. Our priority is not only the security of Arbitrum but also that of the hundreds of protocols that operate within the chain.


For this vote, we have divided the vote into 2 parts and have established the following criteria:

Selection of 3 Technical Members

We assigned 2/3 of our voting power to three members with a technical profile, giving approximately ~622k ARB to each. The criteria we have taken into account for this selection include:

  • Deep Technical Understanding: It is essential that the members of the Security Council have robust technical knowledge. They must fully understand how the Arbitrum protocol works and also know and be confident about what they are endorsing or signing.
  • Reputation: We believe it is important that the members of the Security Council have an impeccable reputation. It is vital that DAO members can evaluate and trust this reputation.
  • Commitment to Arbitrum: It is crucial that the selected members resonate with the values and principles of Arbitrum. We especially value those who have contributed to the protocol or are part of a protocol already implemented in Arbitrum.

Selection of 3 Non-Technical Member Profiles

We have assigned 1/3 of our voting power to three members with a non-technical profile, giving approximately ~310k ARB to each one. The criteria we have considered for this selection include:

  • Regional Diversity: It is vital that council members are distributed in different geographical locations and time zones. This ensures 24-hour availability and strengthens the council’s resilience against specific regulations and jurisdictions.
  • Reputation: As with the previous technical member selection, it’s essential that council members have a solid reputation and are trustworthy.
  • Diversity of Skills: Although we highly value technical profiles, we believe having members who bring other competencies is essential. These profiles can enrich the council’s perspective and help identify and address various challenges, such as legal issues.

Member Selection

Members with a technical profile:

  • Harry Kalodner: Probably the candidate that best understands Arbitrum and its tech stack. He is closely aligned with Arbitrum in various aspects. His reputation precedes his actions, and I consider it crucial to have members from Offchain Labs on the council, at least in these early stages of ArbitrumDAO.
  • OMER: He has an excellent technical profile and extensive knowledge of protocols. As CEO of Chaos Labs, both he and his company have an impeccable reputation and are aligned with Arbitrum.
  • YQ: He is highly technically and deeply understands Rollups in general. As the founder of Altlayer, he has an excellent reputation, as does his company. Also, his relationship with Arbitrum is strengthened by Altlayer’s business model.

Members with a non-technical profile:

  • DisruptionJoe.eth (U.S.): Joe has shown great commitment to Arbitrum. He has made numerous contributions to ArbitrumDAO and also has extensive experience in human coordination.
  • Pablito.eth (Argentina): Pablo is a member of our community with a background in Cybersec, well known for supporting crypto education in the region.
  • Patrick McCorry (United Kingdom): He’s been actively involved in the DAO since its inception and is clearly aligned with Arbitrum’s interests. As mentioned earlier, we believe having members from Offchain Labs at this stage would be reasonable.


We believe that the Security Council members’ first election is vital. For this reason, we carried out the vote following the previously established criteria. We also believe that in these first steps towards decentralization, it’s essential to have members from Offchain Labs on the security council.


Arbitrum Short-term Incentive Program

On October 11th, we held our 13th governance call at SEED Latam in collaboration with L2 in Spanish, where we discussed how to allocate votes from the Short-term incentive program with our community.

Participants: 55 attendees

Duration: 1h 20m


Given the nature of the vote and the large volume of proposals, as I have already mentioned, we formed a working group to conduct a preliminary evaluation of the proposals. The process was as follows:

  1. We examined the initial 106 proposals, asking specific questions related to each protocol.
  2. From those, we selected 32 proposals totaling 54,398,000 ARB.
  3. The community had the opportunity to vote for the protocols on our Snapshot, aiming to reach the 50M ARB figure. If you wish to understand our process in depth, you can refer to here and here.
  4. Based on the community voting results, we cast our vote on the Arbitrum snapshot in favor of the protocols that received the most support. Below, you will find a detailed list of these proposals.

Voting and rational


  1. Archi Finance
  2. AngleProtocol
  3. Balancer
  4. Beefy
  5. Camelot
  6. Curve
  7. Dolomite
  8. Dopex
  9. Gamma
  10. GMX
  11. JonesDAO
  12. OmniBTC
  13. PancakeSwap
  14. Perennial Finance
  15. Pendle
  16. Radiant
  17. Ramses
  18. StakeDAO
  19. Sanko GameCorp
  20. Shell protocol
  21. Silo
  22. Socket
  23. Stargate
  24. Tally
  25. Thales
  26. Timeswap
  27. Trader Joe
  28. Umami Finance


  1. GMD Ecosystem
  2. MUX
  3. Lodestar Finance
  4. WINR Protocol
  5. Shell Protocol


  • All protocols that were left out of this list


The volume of proposals was substantial, and the time for evaluation was limited. Surely, as governance, we need to continue refining the process, but despite these challenges, achieving this fund allocation coordinated by ArbitrumDAO has been a success.

On our part, as SEED Latam, we acknowledge that our process was somewhat cumbersome and confusing but by no means arbitrary. We always include and educate the community when making decisions. We have learned from this experience and will continue to enhance our internal processes for the benefit of Arbitrum and our community.


Proposal: Empowering Early Contributors: The Community Arbiter Proposal

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote in Favor of this proposal at the Temperature Check.


We believe it is important to retroactively reward Arbitrers who collaborated in the growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem in its early days. These early collaborations are important and beneficial to the ecosystem and should be recognised and compensated.


We would like to clarify that this decision is subject to change for voting in Tally, as we would like the proposal to include the following details in the next phase:

  • List of the 25 members, with their discord user, Twitter (or other social media if possible) and the address where they will receive the funds
  • Criteria considered for the election of the members
  • Description of their contributions and tasks they performed. Link and metrics, we know this is difficult, but we believe there is surely data to collect.
  • Multisig address where funds and signatories will be received


We should keep in mind as DAO that this kind of proposal opens the door for other contributors to ask for retroactive payments for past contributions. Perhaps in the future, we should establish a general framework to be able to filter this type of proposal.


Proposal: Build Optimal Onboarding for STIP Teams (BOOST)

The @SEEDLatam delegation, led by myself, has decided to vote AGAINST this proposal at the Temperature Check.


We recognize the value of these projects in attracting new users to the ecosystem. However, we have decided to vote against for the following reasons:

  • We consider the requested amount of 1M to be excessive, especially when compared to RabbitHole’s proposal, which requests half that amount. Although we understand that they take a different approach.
  • The proposal is adjusted with the STIP execution date, taking into account that on-chain voting takes 2 weeks the schedule seems to be quite tight.
  • We would like more details on expenses to understand the amount of tokens requested.
  • We would also like more details of the missions to be executed and an estimate of the metrics you believe you can achieve.


We hope that the proposal will include more details and that the costs will be justified and detailed. As we mentioned at the beginning, we know that this type of project attracts new users and could be beneficial to the arbitrum ecosystem.


Proposal: Activate ARB Staking

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote AGAINST this proposal at the Temperature Check.


After reading the entire proposal and all the debate it has generated, we have decided to vote against it for the following reasons:

  • We believe that 12 months for an experimental proposal is too long. Perhaps it should be reduced to 6 or 3 months and iterated upon as some results are measured.
  • 1% of the Circulating Supply is a high amount to offer as a stake incentive.
  • We agree with @Michigan_Blockchain that a minimum APR of 7.8% for users to accumulate the tokens passively will likely attract nearly all token holders. This will result in a loss of liquidity for $ARB across all exchanges and diminish its use as collateral in monetary markets. It is counterproductive to the goal of driving network and ecosystem growth as voted in the STIP incentives.
  • As @pedrob mentions, there should be some pre-established metrics that this proposal aims to achieve. We would also like to see metrics from other staking programs with different governance tokens, listing the pros and cons.
  • We also don’t think that adding staking to increase token inflation would add ‘utility’ to Arbitrum’s token.
  • There are several legal risks and complexities associated with a staking program, which may inadvertently transform ARB staking into an investment contract. It is important to distinguish between staking for the purpose of validating or securing a network and staking solely to receive a financial return.


We’re always down to explore new ways to add utility to Arbitrum’s token, but we simply don’t think that this proposal would achieve that goal. Plus, it needs more detail and a clearer definition of the objectives it seeks to achieve. Lastly, for an experimental proposal, the time and amount involved are quite significant. We also believe we can innovate with more than just staking the ARB token.


[PROPOSAL] - Consolidate Security Proposals into a RFP Process

The @SEEDLatam delegation decided to vote:

Note: We want to clarify that while we were analyzing the proposal and preparing this message, the @Cyfrin team decided to withdraw it. However, we believe it is positive to leave our feedback.


As with our past vote, we consider it essential to establish a general framework for contracting service providers, where everyone can compete on an equal footing. This will enable ArbitrumDAO to evaluate and choose the best option in terms of cost, capability, and quality. Therefore, we support the initiative proposed by @dk3, which reflects the approach that the DAO should adopt to prevent centralization and the monopoly of services, as @pedrob expresses in their post. Furthermore, this method ensures that any provider has the chance to compete, thereby improving both the variety and quality of available alternatives. It also makes ArbitrumDAO an appealing environment for the most competent teams in the ecosystem.


We consider the Consolidate Security Proposals into a RFP Proces approach to be beneficial to ArbitrumDAO. We believe it is necessary for the vendor selection process to include the participation of recognized experts in the field of security auditing, as this is a critical area that requires knowledge and experience in the field.

We look forward to a more detailed description of the selection process that is fair, democratic, and competitive for all applicants prior to the Tally vote.


Proposal: The Arbitrum Coalition

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote AGAINST this proposal at the Temperature Check.


We believe the proposal accurately identifies the needs of an emerging DAO that requires driving third-party proposals and providing assistance to delegates to make informed decisions.

The post begins by stating that the Arbitrum forum includes many worthwhile suggestions, but often lacks the research, coordination, design, and risk assessment necessary to move forward in an optimal manner.

Now, the question is, should it be the DAO’s responsibility to fund the research, coordination, or design of third-party proposals seeking Arbitrum funding? Shouldn’t it be its own responsibility to submit optimal proposals for approval? Who has an interest in having these proposals approved?

One could argue that the DAO does have an interest in financially supporting teams to deploy on its network, as this will create incentives for users to join the network, generating positive network effects that ultimately benefit the DAO and the value of the ARB token.

So what is the best way to achieve this?

First step: Establish a clear process or framework for projects to present their proposals. Even though there currently exists a template, we think it’s still to simple and might benefit from having some more details. Therefore, the first step should be to agree on a template or framework for those projects submitting proposals. This should include, at least:

  • Project Identification.
  • Team Overview (including previous successful works).
  • Milestones & Deliverables.
  • Supplementary Research.
  • Required Funding.
  • Commitment to transparency and accountability.
  • Disclosure of any conflict of interests.
  • Support Needed: Highlight any specific areas where the project requires pre-approval support or resources from The DAO.

Why? We agree that there may be cases where projects or just good ideas, as the Arbitrum Coalition proposal states, may not have the capacity to conduct the research, coordination, design, and risk assessment to move forward optimally on their own. And we are fine with projects asking for it.

How to financially support projects? This can be achieved in various ways:

  • Hire a governance facilitator to help them understand the processes and assist projects in preparing proposals.
  • Have the DAO contract a service provider to thoroughly study the proposals, recommend what is deemed advisable, and help the delegates decide.
  • Provide resources to the delegates so they can form their own teams and have the operational capacity to analyze the proposals. In this case, financially supporting only a certain percentage of the delegates will incentivize them to do their research and make more well-founded decisions. In this scenario, the ARB holders ultimately decide which delegates perform this task most efficiently, and, in theory, those will be the ones to receive a larger percentage of delegated ARB.

Hiring a Facilitator

We talked about this role some time ago but the DAO did not have the maturity and activity that it has today. This role encompasses what has been proposed here for The Advocate and makes it much more comprehensive, being key in assisting any participant in the governance of Arbitrum.

Hiring a Service Provider

The Arbitrum Coalition would act as a service provider. How can we ensure that this provider is neutral, does not favor particular projects, and does not conflict with the interests of the DAO?

One option is to bar this position to delegates or large ARB holders.

But this unfairly disadvantages the proponents, who have the reputation and track record to provide high-quality and efficient services to the DAO. Therefore, in line with what @dk3 said, we need to build trustless systems that don’t allow collusion or censorship. (we share the concerns described by him in his post)

What can be done? Utilize existing systems: Use the temperature check as a filter to decide which projects will receive the resources for the research, design, and risk assessment service provider to move forward optimally.

As it happens now, proposals that are approved via temperature checks are not necessarily complete or defined. Sometimes the approval comes from delegates supporting an idea or project, but with the condition that the proposal is strengthened.

This same system can be used for the DAO to express the intention that the project should receive assistance from the service provider. By this, before the on-chain vote delegates will have the necessary tools (research, risk assessment, etc.) to decide whether to approve that proposal or not.

Whom to hire as a service provider? As @pedrob argues in the Security Enhancement Fund proposal, the DAO could opt for approving a budget dedicated to subsidizing research and risk assessment, subsequently allowing each protocol to apply for the subsidy they deem necessary for deployment on Arbitrum. Complementing this, a list of recommended—or potentially mandatory—service providers could be voted on. This ensures that, when evaluating each application, the research and risk assessment are guaranteed to be conducted by a reputable and proficient service provider (such as Blockworks, Gauntlet, & Trail of Bits).

Providing resources to the delegates

Lastly, as we mentioned before, offering financial compensation will incentivize delegates to conduct their research and make decisions with a stronger foundation.

DAOs like MakerDAO incentivize their delegates with substantial resources, and their responsibilities extend beyond merely voting and communicating their vote—they also carry out sensitive tasks such as auditing spells and other activities related to governance security.

The expected tasks for the delegates could be specified, and a work regulation outlined that the facilitator will verify before executing payments.

Which do we believe is the best approach?

In our view, a resilient and decentralized system should feature a combination of the three strategies. A facilitator is contracted to support in the initial stage, the possibility of requesting funds prior to the final approval of the proposal, and providing delegates with greater resources so they can study the proposals in depth and with quality time.


We would like to thank Blockworks Research, Gauntlet, and Trail of Bits for the detailed proposal and, most importantly, for bringing this discussion to the table. We agree that the DAO should allocate resources to ensure that the proposals are well-supported and assist delegates in making informed decisions. In this case, we don’t agree with the proposed mechanism.

In this regard, we will support future proposals that include a detailed framework for how various service providers can present themselves to offer their services, rather than a specific allocation proposal for a single provider. There should also be specific milestones outlining the objectives to be pursued and KPIs that allow for the measurement of the results achieved.

Also, we agree with L2BEAT that the current delegate situation is not long-term sustainable.

We believe that a proposal of this nature, which aims to alleviate the workload of delegates and support them in their decision-making processes, should aim for a multi-faceted system. Resources should be allocated to a mixed solution where not just one concentrated point is incentivized, thereby mitigating all the risks and concerns detailed in this forum thread. To this end, we think it prudent to revisit the discussion about hiring a facilitator, the incentives for delegates, and ultimately, the framework for the contracting of service providers.


Proposal to Backfund Successful STIP Proposals (Savvy DAO) [DRAFT]

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote FOR this proposal at the Temperature Check.


According to the STIP proposal, only 50 million ARB was originally allocated to support various projects within the Arbitrum ecosystem. However, this fund was quickly exhausted due to the large number of proposals received in the forum (a total of 106). Unfortunately, only the initial 20 projects that gained community approval were able to secure the incentives, leaving several other projects, that were also approved by the community, without any financial funding.

Given this situation and motivated by the insights provided in tnorm’s proposal, which highlights the DAO’s capability to unlock additional funds to backfund successful proposals, we believe the action suggested by this proposal is reasonable.


We support this proposal because we acknowledge that this whole process was a bit experimental and it only seems fair to support those projects that had already been approved by the DAO but couldn’t fit within the budget. Going forward though we do want to emphasize that this type of extension shouldn’t be used for future STIPs and we should formulate a solution to prevent this from happening again.


Proposal [Non-Constitutional]: Procurement Framework [Security Service Providers]

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote FOR this proposal at the Temperature Check.


The proposal seeks to establish an RFP for selecting auditors or security service providers in the Arbitrum ecosystem. We believe this is an essential first step to ensure high-quality services for the DAO in a fair and competitive way.

This will not only contribute to improving the current and future security of the projects and the ecosystem in general but will also encourage the participation of the parties that are truly interested and create healthy competition between security service providers.


The objective of this Snapshot vote was to keep following the right path of the previous proposal where the Arbitrum DAO voted in favor of Consolidate the Arbitrum Security into an RFP Process

AIP: ArbOS Version 11

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote FOR this proposal at the Temperature Check.


We believe that updating all Arbitrum chains with the EVM Shanghai update, along with the PUSH0 opcode, is a wise decision to bring Arbitrum closer to the technological infrastructure of Ethereum. This ensures that new developers using Ethereum will feel comfortable working in Arbitrum.

The Shanghai update later or soon will have an indirect impact not only on Arbitrum but all L2 solutions that use Ethereum as L1. So, we believe that it is crucial to consider all technical changes that Ethereum undergoes to guarantee that Arbitrum will remain at the forefront of technological advancements.


We support the idea of keeping Arbitrum updated with all the changes that Ethereum will undergo to improve its performance. This action will indirectly enhance the L2 chains that Arbitrum DAO handles.

[TALLY]Empowering Early Contributors: The community Arbiter Proposal

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote AGAINST this proposal at the Temperature Check.


Upon reviewing the information provided after the snapshot vote, we concluded that it’s simply too difficult to determine if the contributors are being compensated justly for their contributions to the DAO. We’re not trying to minimize their effort or make it sound like they don’t deserve any compensation, but we think it would be reasonable to make this compensation proportional to their contributions or at least have a clearer idea of what these contributions were, which would be expected for the amount being requested.

Most of the information provided is challenging to validate completely. We believe that it can be presented more clearly to assist all delegates in supporting this proposal.


The support of all users to help grow the Arbitrum ecosystem is crucial for attracting new potential users. However, we believe that this kind of contribution requires a deeper explanation of the budget to maintain transparency.


Proposal [Non-Constitutional]: Establish the ArbitrumDAO Procurement Committee

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote FOR this proposal at the Temperature Check.


The proposal aims to establish the ArbitrumDAO Procurement Committee (ADPC) with the objective of ensuring transparency, efficiency and a responsible approach to procurement. This initiative is aimed at benefiting the Arbitrum ecosystem by ensuring high quality service providers.

We strongly believe that the ADPC will create an optimal organizational framework for the procurement of services. At the same time, it will establish a marketplace for service providers that have undergone preventive quality assurance, contributing to the overall improvement of the Arbitrum ecosystem.


The creation of the ArbitrumDAO Procurement Committee is a crucial step to promote transparency, efficiency and accountability in procurement processes. By creating a structured framework and marketplace for pre-approved service providers, we anticipate significant improvements in the quality and reliability of services into the Arbitrum ecosystem.

Proposal [Non-Constitutional]: Establish the ‘Arbitrum Research & Development Collective

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote FOR this proposal at the Temperature Check.


The Arbitrum Research and Development Collective (ARDC) is designed to help Arbitrum users refine and improve their ideas, transforming them into solid DAO proposals. We believe that this support will ensure the creation of high quality proposals, promoting a positive impact into the Arbitrum DAO. This initiative is especially beneficial for new users with innovative ideas but little experience in participating in a forum.


The creation of the Arbitrum Research and Development Collective represents an interesting idea to help users refine their ideas and turn them into high-impact proposals. To us this is crucial to the continued growth and success of the Arbitrum DAO.

Long Term Incentives Pilot Program

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote AGAINST this proposal at the Temperature Check.


I want to say that I appreciate all the effort that went into drafting this proposal. I understand that the whole STIP was a bit chaotic, so I really like seeing a proposal that aims to make its successor more efficient, but I’m not sure if this is the best way.

First of all, I feel like relying so heavily on a council could end up centralizing Arbitrum’s governance a bit too much, especially if it’s related to protocol incentives since they are essential for the development of the ecosystem. Because, even though I understand that it was a burden for most delegates, I think that we could just give them more time to review proposals (with longer review windows and feedback periods). This, coupled with compensations for delegates, could alleviate the burden.

Replacing delegates with a council might be more efficient in a way, but it also takes away value from governance - if I’m not wrong, many protocols started engaging with the DAOs governance thanks to STIP.

Second, I think some expenses are a bit too high and might not be necessary. I understand that the DAO has a massive treasury but it doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be a bit more careful with it ~ excluding the incentives, there’s an additional 815,000 ARB requested for various purposes, this amounts to roughly $1.7M. For example, I think that the program shouldn’t include the role of the advisor since, ideally, with a longer timeframe, feedback should come from the delegates + it would encourage protocols to learn the DAO governance process. As a side note, I noticed that @SEEDGov applied to this role, but I just wanted to state that our delegation decides independently from the organization.


Eventhough I like the direction towards this proposal is going, I think we have to develop a program that seeks more involvement from the delegates and relies less on centralized committees.


LTIPP Council + Advisor elections

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote for the following candidates to form the council for the Long-Term Incentives Pilot Program.

Pilot Program Advisor Elections

  • @JoJo: Has been acting as an allocator in the domain of ‘Ideas for new protocols’ for the Questbook platform. We believe their experience assisting various projects in applying for grants adds significant value to the council.
  • @Boardroom: They have considerable demonstrable experience in governance, their alignment with Arbitrum’s values is clear. They have shown credible neutrality in other governance and very good communication skills, which we consider important for this position.
  • Abstention: We did not vote for a third position because @SEEDGov was a candidate and it was a conflict of interest for this delegation.

Pilot Program Council Elections

  • @GFXlabs: We are familiar with the work of GFX Labs in other governances (Optimism, MakerDAO), we believe their experience is necessary for this first instance of the Council.
  • @karpatkey: We are also very familiar with karpatkey’s treasury management work in other DAOs, we believe they are the right profile for the council. They have demonstrated their knowledge in this excellent report on Arbitrum’s Treasury.
  • @Bob-Rossi: Has a general knowledge of the Ethereum and Arbitrum ecosystem. In addition, he is an active delegate and has demonstrated alignment with the values of Arbitrum. We believe this general vision can be an added value for the council.
  • @therollupco: They have great knowledge about the Defi ecosystem in Arbitrum and have also been active in giving visibility to the protocols that were selected in STIPv1.
  • @karelvuong: Their experience within and alignment with Arbitrum is very clear. We believe they are the only person who has knowledge and experience in web3 gaming. We believe it is important for them to be part of the council given their profile and the clear need within arbitrum to support this ecosystem.

We want to make it clear that although the @SEEDLatam delegation voted against the Long Term Incentives Pilot Program, for the reasons expressed here. We believe that as a delegation we must respect the will of the DAO, which approved the program, hence we have dedicated time to evaluate each applicant. While we may not always agree with some proposals, our main objective and responsibility is to contribute to the success of Arbitrum as we announced from the beginning in this governance.


Security Council Improvement Proposal

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote “Increase the threshold to 9/12” in this proposal at the Temperature Check


As mentioned by other delegates at the RFC, increasing the minimum number of signatories from 7 to 9 is the least intrusive and easiest to reverse as it does not require on-chain changes.

On the other hand, considering that the Security Council is a crucial component of Arbitrum, we insist on creating some kind of Emergency Response Drills, which should be audited by a third party, to evaluate the efficiency of the council’s response times.

Broadly speaking, the idea is to define certain response parameters that the DAO expects to be satisfactorily met by the Security Council, including response time, and number of signatories, among other aspects.


After carefully reviewing the proposal and considering the comments from @dzack23, we believe that option 1 is the most appropriate.

1 Like

Election of Procurement Committee Members (ADPC)

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote for the following candidates to form the Procurement Committee

  • Joseph (@Immutablelawyer): First of all, we think he had done a great job in drawing up the proposal for the committee in question. In addition, it is necessary to consider that Joseph has an adequate background for the work to be done by the committee. His professional experience in crypto and his focus on service agreements make him a great candidate. Finally, he is also an active member of governance, having contributed value to other initiatives.
  • Bernard Schmid (@Bernard): His knowledge of governance processes and strategies, his experience in Arbitrum DAO and related initiatives, and his focus on transparency, accountability, and finance make him a strong candidate and provide some diversity to the committee.
  • Jeff G (@Jeff_G): Jeff has a strong procurement background having spent a long career in government. He has also focused on building relationships with security vendors in the crypto industry which reinforces his suitability for the role.
1 Like

Changes to the Constitution and the Security Council Election Process

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote FOR this proposal at the Temperature Check and Tally vote.


We fully agree with the need to improve the Security Council election process and believe that this proposal goes in the right direction by putting all applicants on an equal footing and allowing for a more orderly process where there are first contenders’ submissions and then evaluation, rather than both processes being concomitant.

In addition, we suggest (as this is such an important vote) again to think about incorporating shielded voting and we are open to further evaluation of options to achieve this. We believe that this modality of voting avoids certain vices typical of public voting, such as being swayed by what others vote, benefiting those who gain support early in the vote, or speculating by delaying the vote until the end to decide the vote in the last minutes.


The proposal in question is a step forward in terms of voting structure, making it fairer and easier to carry out. It also introduces a necessary check on the wallets used by council members.

1 Like

Experimental Delegates Incentive System

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to ABSTAIN in this proposal at the Tally vote.


Considering that we have proposed ourselves as the experimental system’s Administrators and although we think that delegates are the core base of the DAO and should be properly incentivized to maintain active participation, both in voting and feedback on proposals and in the ideation of governance processes, we believe that the right thing to do is to abstain from voting to avoid any possible conflict of interest.

[Non-Constitutional]: Arbitrum Stable Treasury Endowment Program

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote FOR this proposal at the Temperature Check


In principle, we believe it is valuable to introduce Arbitrum to the diversification of its treasury through investment in Real World Assets (RWA) while leveraging this goal to also incentivize the deployment of protocols on the network.

However, there are some points that we believe should be improved before moving forward with the proposal:

  • More clarity towards the goals of approving this budget. Is it to diversify the treasury? That seems too limited. Is it to experiment with RWA? Is it to incorporate as many providers as possible into Arbitrum?
  • More clarity towards the expected timeline. How much time should we expect until the screening committee publishes the RPF? How much time will they review applications? Once investments are done, how much time do you consider must be waited until STEP it’s considered successful? Or what milestone must be achieved to consider it concluded?
  • More clarity towards RFP and how to evaluate the committee’s work. If it’s not possible to have the definitive version of the RFP before the tally vote, it would be great to have some guidance points on how it will look like and what we can expect of their work.
  • A detailed breakdown of the budget. I expect to have a full breakdown on how the 200K ARB are going to be used for the implementation of the proposal.

Also, as @pedrob stated, it is necessary for us as a DAO to define short-medium-long term objectives, to have a consensus on what to spend on, and to make a framework for investments that aligns with the sentiment of the DAO itself.

We hope that through STEP 1 we can learn about how we want to manage treasury more broadly, so that we can implement a strategy for both spending and investing, considering the impact, cost/benefit, and sustainability of each decision.


We believe that, although the proposal is headed in the right direction, it still lacks clarity on some issues that we consider essential for approval.

We will again support the proposal on tally if these issues are clarified and included in the proposal.

ArbOS 20 “Atlas” - Arbitrum Support for Dencun + Batch Poster Improvements

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote FOR both proposals at the Temperature Check and Tally vote


We are clearly in favor of the proposed changes and are excited to see the benefits this update can bring to the entire Arbitrum community.


We are confident in Offchain Labs’ ability to continue to improve the Arbitrum ecosystem and appreciate their commitment to publish the relevant audits before submitting the on-chain vote.

Empowering Early Contributors: The community Arbiter Proposal 2.0

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote FOR this proposal at the Temperature Check


As said in the conclusion of our previous rationale regarding the first version of this proposal, the support of all users to help grow the Arbitrum ecosystem is crucial for attracting new potential users.

However, the first proposal lacked sufficient elements to evaluate the contributions made by the Arbiters, the ARB amount requested was somewhat high and there were no details on the payments made in the past by the foundation.

On this occasion, the proposal has been clearer, although somewhat chaotic, it has allowed the delegates to have a closer look at the work done and thus have more certainty about the impact generated.

At the same time, we have obtained reliable information on the payments made by the Foundation in the past and the amounts requested have dropped considerably.


In summary and as mentioned by @maxlomu, we believe that the total compensation achieved between the USDCs paid by the Foundation and the ARBs required from the DAO seems fair based on the contributions and time the Arbiters have made to this ecosystem.

Finally, we would like to state that we agree with @krst statement and we also suggest that the DAO should not consider such votes in the future unless there is a very strong reason to do so.

Funding for Into the Dungeons: Machinata - a PvP Digital Miniature Game V2

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote AGAINST this proposal at the Temperature Check


Although we believe that both the gaming industry in general and this project have a lot of potential, some aspects do not allow us to support this proposal.

First of all, we understand that this is not the most desirable way to award/apply for grants. It is inefficient and complex both for the devs (who in case they have to apply individually in different proposals are forced to understand the flow of a proposal and the ins and outs of the DAO functioning) and for the delegates, who should consider and give feedback on each proposal separately. We therefore consider that we should avoid establishing such a precedent.

Secondly, and concerning the above, we would like to see this type of proposal within a developer grant framework where various actors in the industry can apply.


Although we find the proposal reasonable and promising, we consider that it is necessary to focus on having a comprehensive framework that allows us to better establish the processes to be followed as well as the objectives we pursue when investing in Gaming as a DAO.

Proposal to fund Plurality Labs Milestone 1B(ridge)

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote FOR this proposal at the Temperature Check


We believe it’s important that the DAO keep pushing for grant programs that aim to efficiently distribute funds for grants at scale, which is why we appreciate the effort put into drafting this proposal and giving it another shot.

However, I do want to state that we do want to see quantifiable objectives for this proposal before it goes to Tally, these are not quantifiable objectives

I understand it’s a very difficult task to do so, especially since this program is, as its name states, “pluralistic.” Having specific KPIs might be complicated, but I think that since the idea is going to be to double down on winners, we could have KPIs based on the winners from milestone 1a so that we can effectively determine what programs are working and which aren’t.

That being said, I’m excited to see the progress that the team made since the start of the program and the effort put into improving this first milestone.

ARDC Members Election

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote for the following candidates to form the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective:

ARDC Risk Member: Chaos Labs

Although they are the only candidates in this section, they are highly suitable for the position due to their excellent risk background.

Their contributions, not only to the Arbitrum community and its DAO but also to important players in the ecosystem such as Aave and GMX, demonstrate the commitment and professionalism with which Chaos Labs is managed.

ARDC Security Member: Trail of Bits

We believe that their experience, their proximity working with Offchain Labs on security reviews, and the countless security contributions (for example: Retryable Tickets Bug Report) they have been making within the ecosystem positions them as ideal candidates for the position.

ARDC DAO Advocate: L2BEAT/Ant Federation

For those who are moderately active in Arbitrum’s governance, it is impossible to deny that L2Beat has played an extremely important role in the day-to-day running of the DAO. They have organized several Governance calls and provide their perspective/feedback on most of the initiatives that arise. Ant Federation’s joining the nomination reinforces this argument as they have also contributed significantly to the functioning of the DAO.

ARDC Research Member: Blockworks/Delphi Digital

Their contributions to the DAO and Blockworks/Delphi’s background in Research leave no doubt as to their suitability for this position. Both their reputation and previous work allow us to believe that they will do a great job together.

[Non-Emergency Action] Fix Fee Oversight ArbOS v20 “Atlas”

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote “Set L1 surplus fee and L2 min” in this proposal at the Temperature Check


Based on the proposal, we see no reason not to implement both changes. Although the DAO’s revenue is affected, we believe that in a market where various L2 solutions are emerging, it is important to establish competitive advantages and maintain an economically sustainable network for users.

Front-end interface to force transaction inclusion during sequencer downtime

SEED Latam is voting FOR this proposal at the Temperature Check.


Back in December 1, we asked for devs interested in pushing this initiative forward since it’s something we always say users can do on arbitrum, but in reality, it’s not the case since we don’t have a user-friendly frontend to force transaction inclusion during sequencer downtime. WakeUp Labs answered this call and we’re very excited to see it finally taking shape. As a delegate, I think the DAO should support devs more and encourage them to build on arbitrum.

One thing I think will be crucial in executing this proposal is ensuring good communication between the DAO and WakeUp Labs. Apart from this, we agree with @krst’s statement that this should be OS from the start. We’re down to help with anything that might be needed and are excited to see further developments.

Request for Continuation of the Arbitrum DDA Program Request

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote ABSTAIN in this proposal at the Temperature Check.


While we are broadly in favor of the continuation of this program, because we believe it has not only been successful but also has the potential to continue to generate benefits to the Arbitrum ecosystem, we have decided to abstain from voting in line with other similar situations (such as the experimental delegate incentive program, which we administer).

This decision responds to our conviction to avoid conflicts of interest as much as possible, considering that we are Domain Allocators in this Questbook program.

Catalyze Arbitrum Gaming: HADOUKEN!

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote FOR this proposal at the Temperature Check


Gaming is currently a very important vertical at DeFi, and we have already seen that several competitors in the L2s universe have started to take action to attract web3 game developers.

Since the development of quality video games is costly and time consuming, and when it comes to blockchain requires an environment to accompany it, we believe that a program like this is necessary, in which the DAO acts by providing not only funding but also a team of experts to collaborate in the analysis of each request that comes through a publisher or builder.

We are aware that given the large size of the grant this represents a vote of confidence and we look forward to seeing the final status of the proposal in tally.

[TALLY] Proposal to fund Plurality Labs Milestone 1B(ridge)

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote AGAINST this proposal at the Tally Vote


While we had supported the proposal at the Temperature Check we also mentioned on several occasions the importance of having quantifiable objectives and greater precision in terms of the execution of the program itself.

Despite considering that the Plurality Labs program has had some achievements to its credit, we should not forget that several of the milestone 1.a objectives were not met and that in this bridge 1.b it is extremely important to be able to accurately monitor its progress.

That is why, despite the inclusion of an Advisory Board, we stick to our decision made on snapshot where we stated that without more quantifiable objectives we won’t be able to support this proposal.

Expand Tally Support for the Arbitrum DAO

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote FOR this proposal at the Temperature Check


First of all, we are delighted to see the interest of the Tally team in continuing to improve the governance process at Arbitrum, we believe they are making very significant contributions and that leads us to have great confidence in them.

That said, the proposed changes are a resounding YES, from the small details (such as showing the changes to a proposal when passing from Snapshot to Tally or showing more information about when a quorum is reached) to the more important ones, such as being able to cancel a proposal in case of errors or integrating the Karma dashboard providing greater visibility to the work of the delegates.

We also welcome the initiative to investigate how to perform partial delegations and shielded voting, which as we have mentioned previously, could be something worth exploring for the Security Council elections.

Double-Down on STIP Successes (STIP-Bridge)

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote AGAINST this proposal at the Temperature Check


We’re concerned about how rushed this proposal was and the fact that it feels like taking one step back instead of building on what we could get from the LTIP. Personally, I think that by rushing an incentives program, we risk giving incentives to protocols that might not be used efficiently - this could end up harming innovation throughout the ecosystem, similar to what happens in nations that subsidize certain sectors heavily.

Also in relation to the strong competition with other L2s solutions, the market is clearly heated and other chains will start launching their tokens; so I don’t think that simply injecting more tokens will change this, nor will it really give us much of a competitive advantage vs other ecosystems, since many will be doing the same. What I think we should do is double down on protocols that, through their innovation, will help us compete, and not based on whether they qualified for other incentive rounds.

We believe that a complete analysis should be prioritized at the end of LTIP to allow us to design a long-term joint framework that does not distinguish protocols by whether they received funding from one program or another.

Arbitrum Stable Treasury Endowment Program

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote ABSTAIN this proposal at the Tally Vote


As we mentioned at the outset, this delegation believes that diversifying the treasury and introducing RWA is the right way forward, and we therefore initially supported the proposal at the Snapshot stage.

However, although several of our original concerns were answered, we have noticed that when the proposal was put to a vote at Tally, changes were introduced that we didn’t like (at least in the way they were implemented) such as the 150% increase in payments to the Council over the budget approved by Snapshot and the fact that the role of Program Manager is designated by the ADPC instead of the DAO.

For this reason, we believe that the most coherent thing to do is to abstain in this case, as we agree with the initiative in substance but dissuade in some details of the final proposal.

LTIPP Council Recommended Proposals

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote FOR the LTIPP Council Recommended Proposals


While this delegation has expressed disagreement with the existence of Councils and Advisors, due to the possibility of centralization of Arbitrum’s governance, we also understand that during STIP the burden on delegates has been considerable and we have noted that in particular, the role of the Advisor has allowed the applicant teams to present stronger proposals and to clear up doubts about them.

At the same time, we are grateful for the work done by the Council, we appreciate that they have provided feedback in a public way, this helps to the objective of having a transparent program. As part of our feedback, we would like to see CoI reports made public in the future. Concerning this topic, we agree with what @thedevanshmehta said, we don’t think it is right that Council members with declared conflicts of interest give the decisive vote in tied votes, we believe that clear criteria should be defined for situations like this.

In conclusion, as a delegation, we have decided to trust the Council’s judgment as they have provided us with sufficient tools to evaluate why they have accepted each proposal.

Thanks for the reasoning provided and the participation !

I do think it remiss to mention the pay increase from snapshot to tally but not also mention the increased workload on council members in the same breath

In snapshot the STEP council would only screen for eligible applicants (in part to address the concern you raised on LTIPP over centralisation). But we got overwhelming feedback at eth denver that in the final tally version they wanted the council to also pick the winners, whichh is a huge increase in workload

Would appreciate if you can edit the post to also reflect this fact of increased workload, otherwise it makes it look like an arbitrary increase

Subsidy Fund for Security Services

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote ABSTAIN in this proposal at the Temperature Check


We fully agree on the goal behind this proposal - subsidizing security services could help a lot in reducing friction for onboarding new projects looking to build on arbitrum, but we think there are still some points that have to be defined as mentioned by @pedrob.

Despite the explanations we have been given, we do not understand the rush to bring this proposal to a vote without having developed the RFP for whitelist service providers, just as we do not agree that the ADPC should be in charge of virtually the entire process (as program manager, committee, and decision maker).

On this part, though, we could have someone who served as a past Security Council cohort member. Since they would already be somewhat vetted and “Arbitrum aligned”.

The conclusion is that we agree with the essence of the proposal but not with the proposed implementation.

Delegate to Voter Enfranchisement Pool — Event Horizon

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote FOR this proposal at the Temperature Check


Even though we’re still not sure how evident this proposal’s impact could be in improving Arbitrum’s governance, we’re interested in seeing how it plays out. However, given its experimental nature, We think we should reduce the total ask to 4-5M ARB and run it for 6 months instead of 1 year.

Safeguarding Software Developers’ Rights & the Right to Privacy

The @SEEDLatam delegation has decided to vote “Fund with 1,000,000 ARB each” this proposal at the Temperature Check


We believe that the mission of both entities (CoinCenter and Defi Education Fund) justifies that the various DAOs of the crypto ecosystem do their bit to fight regulations in the legal field and especially to defend the rights of those who build this ecosystem every day. It is essential that they can work and innovate with the peace of mind that such organizations will look after their interests if necessary.

That is why we decided to support this proposal without a second’s hesitation. At the same time, we opted for the “1M ARB each” option, considering the possible volatility that this asset could suffer in the future.

We are delighted that Arbitrum DAO has decided to support this proposal strongly.

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