Oversight and Transparency Committee (OAT) - June 2026 Elections Application Thread

Below you’ll find the application form for the Oversight and Transparency (OAT) committee elections that will take place in June 2026. For more information or questions about the process, please refer to the forum post outlining the elections process. Please only post applications in the thread below.


Application Form

  • Full Name:

Applicant / Nominee Information

  • Contact Information:

  • Current Occupation:

  • Country of Residence / Time Zone:

Nominator Information (Only complete this section if you are nominating someone else for the role)

  • Nominator Full Name:

  • Your Relationship to the Nominee:

  • Why Are You Nominating This Person:

Applicant / Nominee Qualifications and Experience

  • Identify one of the domains described within the Desired Qualifications section in the OpCo - Oversight and Transparency Committee (OAT) Application Process Overview forum post in which you have the most experience and describe that experience:

  • Describe your network and reputation within the blockchain/technology industry. Have you previously represented a crypto brand and/or navigated DAO governance:

  • Detail your experience in advisory, governance, and/or oversight roles:

  • Have you previously contributed to the Arbitrum DAO? Describe any relevant experiences through which you’ve gained an understanding of the DAO’s current structure, contributors, and programs:

  • Given the scope of OpCo is relatively broad in its current form, describe how you view OpCo’s role within the DAO and what it should accomplish to deem the entity a success over the next 3-5 years:

Additional Information (Only complete if relevant)

  • Please share any other relevant information that supports the applicant/nominee:

References (Only complete if relevant)

  • Please provide the name, position, and contact information of individuals who can attest to the applicant’s/nominee’s qualifications and character:

Disclosures

  • Please disclose all of the applicant’s/nominee’s actual and potential conflicts of interest, including but not limited to financial, personal, DAO governance, and professional:

  • Please disclose all active contributor roles and payment streams related to the Arbitrum DAO that the applicant/nominee, and entities that they have a professional or financial relationship with, have and is receiving:

Declarations

  • The applicant/nominee understands that any offer to join and hold a position in the OAT is contingent on:

    • Successfully completing as well as maintaining updated all relevant non-disclosure agreements, KYC requirements, and other necessary documents

    • Not being a direct representative or full-time employee at network competitors (e.g., Solana, Polygon, Optimism, etc)

    • An individual will be entitled to run as a candidate for the election. No single organisation should be overly represented in the OAT. There should be no more than 1 candidate associated with a single entity.

    • If a candidate is elected on behalf of an organisation, then the OAT membership is tied to them and cannot be rotated to someone else in the organisation. It will be up to the current OAT to enforce the above policy, and if a candidate is excluded from the election, then the rationale must be publicly disclosed to the ArbitrumDAO

    • Being aligned with the community values listed in The Amended Constitution of the Arbitrum DAO, following the Code of Conduct for delegates, being committed to prioritizing the Arbitrum DAO’s needs, and acting in absolute good faith and utmost honesty to fulfill their duties to the best of their abilities.

  • If nominating someone else, the nominator confirms that the nominee is aware of their nomination and the essential details related to it

  • The applicant/nominator confirms that they have read and understood all the content within this form and that the information submitted is accurate and complete: Yes/No

:warning: Please only post applications in the thread below. For any additional information, please refer to the forum post outlining the election process.


If you have any questions or concerns, please contact Sinkas on Telegram.

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Full Name:
Manoj Kumar Desai


Applicant / Nominee Information

Contact Information:

Current Occupation:
Independent DAO Governance Researcher & Writer (Multi‑chain governance · Protocol risk · Tokenomics)

Country of Residence / Time Zone:
India – IST (UTC+5:30)


Nominator Information (Only complete this section if you are nominating someone else for the role)

(Not applicable – self‑application.)


Applicant / Nominee Qualifications and Experience

Identify one of the domains described within the Desired Qualifications section in the OpCo Oversight and Transparency Committee (OAT) Application Process Overview forum post in which you have the most experience and describe that experience:

I have the most experience in DAO governance, oversight and accountability.
I work as an independent governance researcher focused on how DAOs make decisions, how power concentrates among a few delegates or entities, and how treasury and program decisions are monitored over time. My research covers major protocols such as Arbitrum, Aave, Optimism, Lido, ENS and others, with a specific focus on delegation patterns, proposal quality, and the gap between what is promised in governance proposals and what is actually delivered. I regularly publish governance analysis pieces and threads that translate complex on‑chain and organizational decisions into clear narratives for non‑technical stakeholders, including risk assessments and incentive analysis.

Describe your network and reputation within the blockchain/technology industry. Have you previously represented a crypto brand and/or navigated DAO governance:

I am known as one of the early, independent governance voices from India, active across multiple DAO forums and social platforms under the identity “MconnectDAO”. My work is visible on governance forums (Aave, Optimism, Arbitrum and others), on LinkedIn where I write about DAO governance evolution and systemic risks, and on Paragraph where I publish long‑form research essays. I have not represented a single protocol or brand as an employee; instead, I position myself as a neutral, research‑driven observer and commentator. I have actively navigated DAO governance processes by engaging in discussions, analyzing proposals, and highlighting issues such as conflicts of interest, treasury risk and missing accountability mechanisms.

Detail your experience in advisory, governance, and/or oversight roles:

My primary contribution has been in governance oversight through public analysis and scrutiny. I review governance proposals, budget requests and program designs with an emphasis on:

  • Clarity of mandate and KPIs.

  • Alignment with the DAO’s long‑term interests.

  • Transparency of incentives and potential conflicts.

  • Realistic assessment of execution and risk.

Through forum comments, articles and social posts, I have provided independent “second‑layer review” on governance processes – asking critical questions around treasury deployment, reporting standards, and how communities can protect themselves from information asymmetry and governance fatigue. While I have not held a formal, paid oversight seat inside a DAO, my work effectively operates as soft oversight: reading, questioning, and publicly documenting governance risks and learning patterns across ecosystems.

Have you previously contributed to the Arbitrum DAO? Describe any relevant experiences through which you’ve gained an understanding of the DAO’s current structure, contributors, and programs:

Yes. I actively follow and comment on Arbitrum governance. My contributions focus on:

  • Analyzing Arbitrum’s evolution from early governance experiments to a more structured framework with defined procedures, elections, and clearer expectations for delegates and programs.

  • Writing about Arbitrum’s role as a “digital sovereign fund”, where the DAO must manage and deploy a large treasury across DeFi, infrastructure, gaming and other verticals in a responsible way.

  • Tracking key proposals around treasury management, ecosystem programs, and security‑related governance, and using them as case studies to highlight best practices and risks in DAO governance.

Through this, I have developed a practical understanding of:

  • How the Arbitrum DAO is organized (delegates, programs, service providers, working groups).

  • Where process is strong (clearer voting process, constitutional guidance, public documentation).

  • Where oversight challenges remain (fragmented reporting, uneven transparency across programs, difficulty for average tokenholders to evaluate performance and conflicts).

Given the scope of OpCo is relatively broad in its current form, describe how you view OpCo’s role within the DAO and what it should accomplish to deem the entity a success over the next 3–5 years:

I see OpCo as a high‑trust execution and coordination layer for the DAO – but not as a political center of power. Over the next 3–5 years, OpCo should:

  1. Help standardize how funded entities report performance, risks and use of funds, so that OAT and the wider community can easily compare outcomes across programs.

  2. Enable faster, safer execution of DAO decisions by handling operational complexity while keeping decision‑making authority anchored in tokenholder governance.

  3. Maintain strict transparency about its own activities, relationships and trade‑offs, so that it never becomes a “black box” for the DAO.

Success, in my view, is when:

  • Tokenholders and delegates can clearly see who is funded, what they have delivered, and what happens when they underperform.

  • Oversight mechanisms (like OAT) are supported with timely, accurate information.

  • OpCo is trusted because its processes are transparent and predictable, not because of personalities or informal influence.


Additional Information

I bring a perspective from an emerging market (India), representing communities that are often under‑represented in formal DAO governance roles but are highly active in usage and discussion. My background is non‑technical and finance/governance‑oriented, which aligns well with reading long documents, following incentives, and asking structured questions about accountability and risk. I also regularly communicate in simple language for non‑experts, which can help OAT’s oversight outputs reach a wider audience of tokenholders.


References

Available on request from governance contributors and researchers who have interacted with my work across forums and social platforms.


Disclosures

I do not have any current paid roles, grants, or employment relationships with ArbitrumDAO programs, OpCo, or direct network competitors.
I am an independent, self‑directed governance researcher and content creator under the identity “MconnectDAO”.
If I enter into any future relationships that could influence my independence or judgement, I will disclose them publicly to the DAO and, if selected, to the OAT.


Declarations

  • I understand that any offer to join and hold a position in the OAT is contingent on completing and maintaining all required NDAs, KYC requirements and other necessary documents.

  • I am not a direct representative or full‑time employee of a network competitor.

  • I understand that OAT membership is tied to me as an individual and cannot be rotated to someone else in an organization.

  • I confirm that I am aligned with the community values in the Amended Constitution of the Arbitrum DAO, will follow the Code of Conduct for delegates, and will act in good faith and with honesty if selected.

  • I confirm that I have read and understood all the content within this form and that the information submitted is accurate and complete: Yes


  • Full Name: Max Lomu

Applicant / Nominee Information

  • Contact Information:

  • Arbitrum Forum: @maxlomu

  • X (Twitter): @maxlomu

  • Current Occupation: Orbit grant manager for the DAO program (ending in September 2026), advisor / BD contributor across onchain credit, RWA, and ecosystem growth initiatives.

  • Country of Residence / Time Zone: Italy

Applicant / Nominee Qualifications and Experience

  • Domains in which you have the most experience:

Business Development, Venture Building, and Strategy & Operations, with a strong overlap in capital allocation and ecosystem strategy.

Over the past few years, I have worked across several crypto organizations helping turn ideas into concrete initiatives, partnerships, and operational plans. My work has included ecosystem growth - scaling protocols up to $1B in TVL, grants, business development, liquidity sourcing, project onboarding, and strategic positioning.

Most recently, I have been building RevOnchain, focused on bringing real-world cashflows and private credit opportunities onchain. That work involves sourcing opportunities, assessing risk, structuring partnerships, speaking with LPs and protocols, and helping teams understand how to make their product credible to institutional and crypto-native capital.

Inside Arbitrum, I’ve spent the last 1.5 years managing the Orbit domain of the DAO Grant Program. I’ve spoken with well over 100 teams and builders to understand what they actually need and how to help them succeed.

I also worked on proposals and strategic initiatives around ecosystem growth, RWA adoption, liquidity, and builder support, including the BLAZE / bootstrapping loan concept. Not everything I’ve pushed moved forward, but I learned a lot on how to align capital, risk appetite, contributors, delegates, and eco priorities.

I am comfortable operating in ambiguous environments where there is no perfect playbook, which I think is especially relevant for OpCo.
I also have a strong entrepreneurial mindset, which hopefully can support OpCo in its effort to create new revenue streams for the DAO.

  • Describe your network and reputation within the blockchain/technology industry. Have you previously represented a crypto brand and/or navigated DAO governance:

I have a strong network across the Arbitrum ecosystem, DAOs, RWA / private credit protocols, DeFi teams, founders, service providers, and capital allocators.

I have previously represented crypto brands in different capacities. I am frequently a speaker at Ethereum conferences (most recently: ETHCC 2026 and ETHMilan 2026) and have been vocal on social media about strategies, smart initiatives and vision for what I hope the crypto industry can become.

In the Arbitrum DAO, I have participated as a delegate, contributor, and Grant Manager. That has given me direct experience with the realities of DAO governance: writing and reviewing proposals, talking through ideas with delegates, understanding incentives, handling disagreement, and trying to push things forward with so many stakeholders.

I try to be direct, practical, and focused on the ecosystem without compromising my values or integrity. I care about growth, but I care even more that initiatives are actually executable and create real long-term value instead of just short-term optics.

  • Detail your experience in advisory, governance, and/or oversight roles:

I have experience advising teams on strategy, positioning, business development, capital formation, go-to-market, and ecosystem alignment.

As an Arbitrum DAO delegate and Grant Manager, I have reviewed initiatives not only on whether they sound interesting, but whether they are aligned with the DAO’s goals, realistic, and worth the resources. That requires balancing optimism with accountability. I constantly advise new projects to challenge assumptions, and identify missing risks

In oversight roles I’ve learned that good oversight isn’t about micromanaging. It’s about setting clear expectations, defining what success looks like, asking the uncomfortable questions early, and making sure reporting is transparent enough that people can actually trust the process.

  • Have you previously contributed to the Arbitrum DAO? Describe any relevant experiences through which you’ve gained an understanding of the DAO’s current structure, contributors, and programs:

Yes. I have contributed to the Arbitrum DAO as a delegate, Grant Manager, proposer, and active participant in governance discussions.

My work has included reviewing and discussing proposals, participating in delegate conversations, managing grant processes, and developing strategic ideas for how Arbitrum can attract more builders, liquidity, and real economic activity.

One of my main contributions was developing the BLAZE / Bootstrapping Loans concept, which explored how the DAO could use capital more strategically to support promising projects building on Arbitrum and Orbit chains. Even though the initiative did not ultimately move forward, it gave me a deeper understanding of the DAO’s internal dynamics, the role of delegates, the Foundation, Offchain Labs, service providers, and the importance of risk appetite and institutional alignment.

I have also worked on broader ecosystem narratives around Arbitrum as a home for builders, innovation, chain abstraction, and real-world assets.
I shared my vision for the DAO and Arbitrum ecosystem in the SOS submission which received positive feedback at the time, although some of my views have evolved since then.

Through this, I have interacted with contributors, teams, delegates, and stakeholders across the DAO and have developed a strong understanding of both its strengths and its coordination challenges.

  • Given the scope of OpCo is relatively broad in its current form, describe how you view OpCo’s role within the DAO and what it should accomplish to deem the entity a success over the next 3-5 years:

I see OpCo as the DAO’s operational execution layer, but also as one of the key entities that can help restore momentum in the DAO.

Right now, Arbitrum governance is less active than it should be. Proposal flow has slowed down, community energy feels lower than in previous phases, and many contributors are either waiting for direction or unsure how to plug in meaningfully. This is not unique to Arbitrum, but it is something Arbitrum needs to solve if the DAO wants to remain one of the most important ecosystems in crypto.

The first phase of OpCo has understandably focused on internal processes: taking over functions previously managed by other AAEs, supporting programs like RAD, and professionalizing operational workflows. That was necessary. As the key hires are close to completion, I believe we are ready for the next phase: OpCo should become more proactive and help the DAO move from maintenance mode back into growth and execution mode.

For me, success over the next 3–5 years would mean:

  • Reactivating real DAO execution and reducing fragmentation:
    Creating a clearer pipeline of strategic priorities, contributors, and initiatives instead of the DAO passively waiting for good proposals
  • Lowering coordination friction between the DAO, Foundation, Offchain Labs, Entropy, AGV, service providers, and future entities
  • Establishing clear operational accountability so everyone knows who owns what, what’s delayed, and what’s progressing. Great progress has been made in the recent months but I believe there is al ot of room to improve.
  • Shifting reporting from activity metrics to real impact and value creation
  • Exploring new revenue streams and ways to make the DAO more self-sustaining,

That said, OAT’s role is is oversight, not execution. As a committee member my role would be to make sure OpCo is delivering against the agreed priorities, flag scope creep early, and ask the hard questions when needed.

Good oversight should actually be a bit boring when it’s working well: clear expectations, transparent reporting, and catching small issues before they become big problems.

I believe I can contribute effectively here because I’ve worked directly with builders, delegates, protocols, capital allocators, and DAO contributors. I’ve seen the coordination gaps up close. Arbitrum still has one of the strongest technical and ecosystem foundations in crypto, it just needs more initiative, sharper priorities, and tighter execution loops to fully realize that potential.

Disclosures

  • Please disclose all of the applicant’s/nominee’s actual and potential conflicts of interest, including but not limited to financial, personal, DAO governance, and professional:

Own small amount of crypto assets across a variety of ecosystems.

  • Please disclose all active contributor roles and payment streams related to the Arbitrum DAO that the applicant/nominee, and entities that they have a professional or financial relationship with, have and is receiving:

Part of the D.A.O. program - ending on september this year

Declarations

  • The applicant/nominee understands that any offer to join and hold a position in the OAT is contingent on:
    • Successfully completing as well as maintaining updated all relevant non-disclosure agreements, KYC requirements, and other necessary documents
    • Not being a direct representative or full-time employee at network competitors (e.g., Solana, Polygon, Optimism, etc)
    • An individual will be entitled to run as a candidate for the election. No single organisation should be overly represented in the OAT. There should be no more than 1 candidate associated with a single entity.
    • If a candidate is elected on behalf of an organisation, then the OAT membership is tied to them and cannot be rotated to someone else in the organisation. It will be up to the current OAT to enforce the above policy, and if a candidate is excluded from the election, then the rationale must be publicly disclosed to the ArbitrumDAO
    • Being aligned with the community values listed in The Amended Constitution of the Arbitrum DAO, following the Code of Conduct for delegates, being committed to prioritizing the Arbitrum DAO’s needs, and acting in absolute good faith and utmost honesty to fulfill their duties to the best of their abilities.
  • If nominating someone else, the nominator confirms that the nominee is aware of their nomination and the essential details related to it
  • The applicant/nominator confirms that they have read and understood all the content within this form and that the information submitted is accurate and complete: Yes
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Application Form

  • Full Name: Federico Holzwarth (Fehz)

Applicant / Nominee Information

  • Contact Information: TG: @fehz93 / X: @federiconh

  • Current Occupation: Head of Governance & Business Development at SEED Gov - Independent Consultant

  • Country of Residence / Time Zone: Argentina (GMT-3)

Applicant / Nominee Qualifications and Experience

  • Identify one of the domains described within the Desired Qualifications section in the OpCo - Oversight and Transparency Committee (OAT) Application Process Overview forum post in which you have the most experience and describe that experience:

Business Development, Venture Building, and Strategy & Operations:

Blockchain Related Experience:

My BD and strategy experience covers organizational scaling, cross-protocol partnerships, and ecosystem development in web3. At SEED Gov, I led the expansion of the organization’s client portfolio from 4 to 12 protocols, establishing consulting and DAO operations agreements with DAOs, Labs, and Foundations. This required identifying market opportunities, scoping service offerings, negotiating terms, and building operational frameworks to deliver across concurrent engagements.

Beyond organizational BD, I have been involved in facilitating connections between treasury management service providers and DAOs, helping match needs with capacity at a moment when treasury diversification was becoming a governance priority across the ecosystem.

The initiative that most directly illustrates my most recent BD and strategy capabilities is Arbitrum Bridge LATAM, a pilot designed with the SEED Gov team to validate institutional demand for Arbitrum in Latin America’s financial infrastructure. Rather than a broad outreach campaign, it was structured around a specific hypothesis: that Arbitrum could credibly enter conversations with senior decision-makers in banking, payments, fintech, and regulation, and that our team could secure and lead those conversations effectively.

The pilot consisted of a C-level executive dinner and a curated institutional session within ArbiVerse at Devconnect Buenos Aires (November 2025). Attendees included CEOs, founders, and directors from banks, payment processors, large-scale fintech companies, and regulatory institutions, alongside representatives from Arbitrum Foundation, Offchain Labs, Entropy, and OpCo.

Non-Blockchain Experience:

I believe it is worth to mention that beyond web3, my background comprehends complex operations management across public, private, and institutional environments. At Nielsen, I led cross-functional teams across Latin America and Canada managing a large-scale portfolio for the Marketing Mix Modeling program.

Prior to that, I spent nearly seven years in the Buenos Aires City Government in progressive leadership roles, overseeing interministerial projects, digital transformation initiatives, large-scale public events, and cross-sector coordination across public, private, and NGO stakeholders. My most operationally demanding role was as City Operations & Government Relations Coordinator for the Buenos Aires 2018 Youth Olympic Games serving as the primary interface between the Organizing Committee and 40+ operational areas, regulatory authorities, and foreign embassies, managing interjurisdictional frameworks under a fixed, non-negotiable deadline.

  • Describe your network and reputation within the blockchain/technology industry. Have you previously represented a crypto brand and/or navigated DAO governance:

My network includes governance contributors, protocol teams, foundations, and institutional actors across the web3 ecosystem, built through years of operating at the intersection of governance design, BD, and ecosystem development rather than through passive participation.

At Decentraland, I served as Governance Manager, leading the DAO Governance & Facilitation Squad. In that role I represented the DAO publicly, managed its governance operations and community, and acted as the primary bridge between community contributors, the DAO Committee, Core Units, and the Decentraland Foundation. This was one of the earliest and most visible DAO governance management roles in the ecosystem at the time, and it gave me both a formal reputation as a governance practitioner and a broad network across the teams and contributors building in that space.

At SEED Gov, as Head of Governance, I have operated as a recognized service provider and governance consultant across more than 12 protocols, navigating governance processes, designing incentive frameworks, and representing the organization in front of DAOs, Labs, Foundations, and increasingly, traditional institutions.

Within Arbitrum specifically, I am known across delegates, Foundation staff, Offchain Labs, and OpCo contributors through direct collaboration on programs, working groups, and ecosystem activations.

  • Detail your experience in advisory, governance, and/or oversight roles:

    • Decentraland - Council Member

      • Served as part of the oversight layer governing Decentraland’s Executive Arm -Regenesis Labs-, the operational entity responsible for executing the DAO’s strategy and managing resources.

      • Approved the Executive Arm’s annual strategy, budget, and treasury diversification plans before implementation.

      • Responsible for hiring, guiding, and performance-reviewing the Director of the Executive Arm.

      • Exercised veto power over critical operational and financial decisions to ensure alignment with the DAO’s mission and community interests.

      • Acted as the accountability bridge between decentralized token-holder governance and the DAO’s day-to-day operational execution.

    • SEED Gov:

      • Drove governance design, operations, and BD strategy across 12+ blockchain protocols, tailoring incentive frameworks to create sustainable value for ecosystem actors and stakeholders, including grants management, incentive programs, governance revamps, facilitation, IRL events, workshops, and working groups.

      • Acted as a bridge between crypto-native governance and traditional institutions including banks, fintechs, payment processors, regulators, and government bodies facilitating their integration with Web3 and decentralized frameworks.

  • Have you previously contributed to the Arbitrum DAO? Describe any relevant experiences through which you’ve gained an understanding of the DAO’s current structure, contributors, and programs:

Since February 2024, I have led SEED Gov’s dedicated Arbitrum team, with contributions ranging from direct governance participation to leading and overseeing programs within the DAO’s structure:

-With SEED Gov team as D.A.O. Domain Allocator, I co-designed RFPs based on the ecosystem’s strategic needs, oversaw funds allocation, and coordinated contributors across the DAO’s operational layers.

-Through the design and continuous iterations of the Delegates Incentive Program -now RAD-, I oversaw the delegate participation layer and developed a detailed understanding of how incentives shape governance quality and alignment.

-I also maintained a soft-oversight role over Watchdogs and the Stylus Sprint Evaluation Committee, tracking accountability mechanisms and evaluation processes across funded programs.

In parallel, I attended several Arbitrum conferences and organized activations through SEED Gov where Arbitrum Foundation, Offchain Labs, and DAO contributors participated directly , including the Arbitrum Bridge LATAM pilot at Devconnect Buenos Aires.

This work built open, direct channels with contributors across the DAO and all Aligned Entities, which over time has become as valuable as any formal role in understanding how the DAO actually operates.The result is a wide knowledge and understanding of Arbitrum’s programs, contributors and structural dynamics.

  • Given the scope of OpCo is relatively broad in its current form, describe how you view OpCo’s role within the DAO and what it should accomplish to deem the entity a success over the next 3-5 years:

I view OpCo not only as a coordination and execution layer, but as the entity that allows the DAO to act like a principal in the world, not just a governance forum. Success over the next 3-5 years means OpCo evolving across four interconnected fronts:

-Treasury activation: The ATMC has taken significant steps in activating idle treasury funds by moving Arbitrum meaningfully beyond passive holding. OpCo’s role in this shouldn’t be to duplicate that work, but to ensure treasury deployment is connected to strategic outcomes: that capital flows toward global and regional BD initiatives that build institutional positioning, that a ventures arm can complement grant-making with co-investment in high-conviction ecosystem bets, and that the DAO’s financial strategy and its growth strategy are actually in conversation with each other.

-Institutional positioning and regional BD: Arbitrum has the technology and the liquidity depth to become the premier and default institutional layer. But that positioning has to be earned through deliberate BD work, and that means building relationships with banks, payment processors, fintechs, and regulators before they’re ready to integrate, not after. OpCo should own and coordinate this institutional outreach function, including through regional strategies in high-potential markets where early engagement compounds into durable infrastructure partnerships.

-Regulatory and public affairs as a strategic function: OpCo should build or coordinate genuine public affairs capacity by monitoring regulatory developments, engaging policymakers, and positioning Arbitrum as a constructive actor in digital asset policy conversations globally.

-Continued Web3 integration and ecosystem growth: OpCo should take a more active role in driving protocol-level integrations and growth initiatives, not by replacing the current Offchain and Foundation’s efforts, but by identifying strategic integration opportunities that benefit the ecosystem and coordinating execution across the relevant actors. A venture’s arm that complements grant-making with strategic co-investment would accelerate this significantly.

Underlying all of this is a principle: OpCo succeeds when it makes Arbitrum more competitive in the world, not just more organized internally. The OAT’s role in that vision is to hold OpCo accountable to that ambition.

Additional Information (Only complete if relevant)

  • Please share any other relevant information that supports the applicant/nominee:

References

  • Please provide the name, position, and contact information of individuals who can attest to the applicant’s/nominee’s qualifications and character:

Disclosures

  • Please disclose all of the applicant’s/nominee’s actual and potential conflicts of interest, including but not limited to financial, personal, DAO governance, and professional:

    • As an individual, I provide blockchain adoption consulting services at an institutional level, which may occasionally involve advising organizations exploring or operating across multiple blockchain ecosystems, including potential Arbitrum competitors. I will ensure that any such engagements are disclosed and that my OAT responsibilities are never compromised by outside consulting work.

    • As part of the Decentraland DAO Council, I hold a governance role in a separate blockchain ecosystem. While Decentraland does not operate as a direct competitor to Arbitrum, I acknowledge this as a potential conflict and will manage both roles with full transparency.

    • As part of SEED Gov, I have been actively involved in governance and operations across multiple blockchain protocols, some of which may be Arbitrum competitors or operate on other L2s. If elected to the OAT, I will recuse myself from all SEED Gov activities related to other L2 protocols and potential competitors. Should any additional conflict of interest arise, it will be promptly disclosed and resolved in favor of Arbitrum’s best interests.

    • I have applied to Arbitrum’s RAD, so if elected to the OAT, I will resign from the delegate compensation program upon taking office.

    • As an evaluator within the D.A.O. Program, and should the program still be active at the time I take office, I will step down from that role upon assuming OAT responsibilities.

  • Please disclose all active contributor roles and payment streams related to the Arbitrum DAO that the applicant/nominee, and entities that they have a professional or financial relationship with, have and is receiving:

    • As SEED Gov has stepped down from several service provider and committee roles, the remaining ones are:

      • D.A.O. Arbitrum Education, Community Growth and Events 3.0 Domain Allocator

      • Applied to the RAD

Declarations

I acknowledge that any offer to join and hold a position in the OAT is contingent on:

  • Successfully completing as well as maintaining updated all relevant non-disclosure agreements, KYC requirements, and other necessary documents

  • Not being a direct representative or full-time employee at network competitors (e.g., Solana, Polygon, Optimism, etc)

  • An individual will be entitled to run as a candidate for the election. No single organisation should be overly represented in the OAT. There should be no more than 1 candidate associated with a single entity.

  • If a candidate is elected on behalf of an organisation, then the OAT membership is tied to them and cannot be rotated to someone else in the organisation. It will be up to the current OAT to enforce the above policy, and if a candidate is excluded from the election, then the rationale must be publicly disclosed to the ArbitrumDAO

  • Being aligned with the community values listed in The Amended Constitution of the Arbitrum DAO, following the Code of Conduct for delegates, being committed to prioritizing the Arbitrum DAO’s needs, and acting in absolute good faith and utmost honesty to fulfill their duties to the best of their abilities.

  • If nominating someone else, the nominator confirms that the nominee is aware of their nomination and the essential details related to it

  • The applicant/nominator confirms that they have read and understood all the content within this form and that the information submitted is accurate and complete: Yes/No

Application Form

  • Full Name: Pedro Breuer

Applicant / Nominee Information

  • Contact Information: pedro_breuer (Telegram)

  • Current Occupation: Legal Counsel & OAT Committee Member

  • Country of Residence / Time Zone: Buenos Aires, Argentina (UTC-3)

Applicant / Nominee Qualifications and Experience

  • Identify one of the domains described within the Desired Qualifications section in the OpCo - Oversight and Transparency Committee (OAT) Application Process Overview forum post in which you have the most experience and describe that experience:

Strategy & Operations: - Crypto Law - Compliance. I am an attorney specializing in intellectual property at one of the leading firms in Argentina and Latin America in this field. Additionally, I have been involved in the Web3 industry for more than six years, giving me deep knowledge of the most relevant regulations affecting the space, including financial, corporate, and, of course, IP laws.

As a current OAT Member, optimizing operations and guiding strategic initiatives across cross-functional teams has been the core of the focus over the past year. Our efforts have centered on resolving operational friction, establishing robust working structures, and empowering the OpCo Team to execute effectively.

  • Describe your network and reputation within the blockchain/technology industry. Have you previously represented a crypto brand and/or navigated DAO governance:

DAO Governance: Between 2021 and 2024, I was a core member of SEED Latam (formerly DeFi Latam), where I actively participated in various DAO governances and initiated my involvement in the Arbitrum ecosystem.

Arbitrum Delegate: Since July 2024, I have been actively contributing to the Arbitrum DAO as a dedicated delegate.

Oversight & Transparency Committee: Since May 2025, I’ve served as an OAT member alongside A.J. Warner, Patrick McCorry, Tyler Bench, and Gavin Wang.

Ethereum Argentina: I was part of the core team of Ethereum Argentina, organizing the largest Ethereum conference in the region, which connects local talent with global Web3 leadership. As a consequence, I have acted as an informal liaison for LATAM projects looking to work with Arbitrum, streamlining their connection to the appropriate teams at the Arbitrum Foundation and OCL.

  • Detail your experience in advisory, governance, and/or oversight roles:

Prior to joining the OAT, I held various roles within the DAO, which you can review in my previous application. Those include active participation in several DAO programs, such as incentive programs and working groups.

Currently, in my role as an OAT member, I have been deeply involved in operationalizing the OpCo from the ground up. This includes setting up the legal structure, hiring the OpCo Team, designing and implementing our strategy alongside them, and managing budget approvals.

More broadly, over the past year, the Arbitrum DAO has undergone a structural evolution: from a governance body driven by delegates into a network of Arbitrum Aligned Entities. By virtue of its composition, members with diverse professional backgrounds and deep roots across the Arbitrum DAO’s stakeholder base, the OAT has operated as a multidisciplinary and cross-functional body. Sitting at the intersection of delegates and AAEs, the OAT has been a point of convergence, providing strategic and operational support where needed.

  • Have you previously contributed to the Arbitrum DAO? Describe any relevant experiences through which you’ve gained an understanding of the DAO’s current structure, contributors, and programs:

I’ve been serving as a delegate since the DAO’s inception in 2023, first through SEED Latam, and independently since July 2024, and as an OAT member since May, 2025. My previous experience gave me a valuable perspective as an external stakeholder deeply committed to Arbitrum’s success. Transitioning into a formal role as an OAT member complemented this dedication by providing me with firsthand context on how the organizations managing day-to-day operations function. Consequently, I believe I have a comprehensive understanding of the structure, organization, its frictions and remaining challenges ahead.

Furthermore, I’m an Arbitrum maxi. Arbitrum has strong teams, best-in-class technology, and a solid business model. With the transition to the AAEs model nearing completion, I believe the ecosystem is well positioned to leverage Arbitrum’s talent and distinctive standing in the market, and to translate that into measurable ecosystem growth.

  • Given the scope of OpCo is relatively broad in its current form, describe how you view OpCo’s role within the DAO and what it should accomplish to deem the entity a success over the next 3-5 years:

The thesis I proposed in my application a year ago remains unchanged. I’ve stated that the OpCo will be successful if it:

  • Manages to establish a team that properly understands the DAO’s vision and efficiently executes the necessary action items to implement that vision.

  • It aligns and coordinates Arbitrum stakeholders, creating synergy for leveraging the available resources to drive ecosystem growth.

  • It positions the Arbitrum DAO as the go-to place for doing business in and with Arbitrum.

  • In coordination with the Arbitrum Foundation and Offchain, position Arbitrum as the leading L2 across all metrics. Arbitrum is already the best place to build. It should also be the leading L2.

I believe the direction of both the industry and the market has validated it. Over the past year, the focus has been on resolving operational friction and coordination challenges among different stakeholders. Today, we see a DAO operating as a business, much more focused on cost-effective, revenue-generating initiatives that grow the treasury in order to reinvest in Arbitrum’s core business.

With the OpCo close to being fully operational and key hires in place, the focus can shift toward translating the vision into initiatives that drive measurable growth.

So after one year of OpCo’s existence, I’ll add:

  • It’s capable of spinning up new business lines that bring revenue to the DAO treasury.

References (Only complete if relevant)

  • Please provide the name, position, and contact information of individuals who can attest to the applicant’s/nominee’s qualifications and character:

The best candidates to attest to my work and value within the OAT are those I have worked alongside over the past year:

  • OAT Members: AJ Warner, Patrick McCorry, Tyler Bench (aka Frisson)

  • The OpCo Team: Tamara & Sinkas

  • The Arbitrum Foundation Governance Team: Mateusz Rzeszowski

Disclosures

  • Please disclose all of the applicant’s/nominee’s actual and potential conflicts of interest, including but not limited to financial, personal, DAO governance, and professional:

I have no financial interests in Arbitrum competitors or service providers that could constitute a COI. I am an ETH maxi and an ARB maxi. That said, if any potential COI arises in the future, I will disclose it.

  • Please disclose all active contributor roles and payment streams related to the Arbitrum DAO that the applicant/nominee, and entities that they have a professional or financial relationship with, have and is receiving:

I’m an active OAT member and receive compensation for that role.

Declarations

  • The applicant/nominee understands that any offer to join and hold a position in the OAT is contingent on:

    • Successfully completing as well as maintaining updated all relevant non-disclosure agreements, KYC requirements, and other necessary documents

    • Not being a direct representative or full-time employee at network competitors (e.g., Solana, Polygon, Optimism, etc)

    • An individual will be entitled to run as a candidate for the election. No single organisation should be overly represented in the OAT. There should be no more than 1 candidate associated with a single entity.

    • If a candidate is elected on behalf of an organisation, then the OAT membership is tied to them and cannot be rotated to someone else in the organisation. It will be up to the current OAT to enforce the above policy, and if a candidate is excluded from the election, then the rationale must be publicly disclosed to the ArbitrumDAO

    • Being aligned with the community values listed in The Amended Constitution of the Arbitrum DAO, following the Code of Conduct for delegates, being committed to prioritizing the Arbitrum DAO’s needs, and acting in absolute good faith and utmost honesty to fulfill their duties to the best of their abilities.

  • If nominating someone else, the nominator confirms that the nominee is aware of their nomination and the essential details related to it

  • The applicant/nominator confirms that they have read and understood all the content within this form and that the information submitted is accurate and complete: Yes.

Applicant / Nominee Information

  • Full Name: Patrick McCorry (on behalf of AF)
  • Contact Information: @stonecoldpat
  • Current Occupation: Arbitrum Foundation
  • Country of Residence / Time Zone: Hong Kong

Applicant / Nominee Qualifications and Experience

  • Identify one of the domains described within the Desired Qualifications section in the OpCo - Oversight and Transparency Committee (OAT) Application Process Overview forum post in which you have the most experience and describe that experience:

My work at the Arbitrum Foundation has focused on the domain: Business Development, Venture Building, and Strategy & Operations

I have been involved in most aspects of Arbitrum Governance ranging from communicating its strategic importance, general operations to ensure all stakeholders complete deliverables, handling disputes that arise among participants, and assisting in finalising negotiations and terms for proposals passed by the DAO.

Additionally, I am a technical academic, with a good grasp on the technical and theoritical aspects of how blockchains (and rollups) work. Trending the line between theory (protocol design) and feasibility of deployment (usable by users). This knowledge assists with venture building and business development.

  • Describe your network and reputation within the blockchain/technology industry. Have you previously represented a crypto brand and/or navigated DAO governance:

I have worked in the cryptocurrency industry since 2013 with a predominant academic and research background. I am still an active peer reviewer for conferences like Financial Cryptography, Science of Blockchain Conference (SBC), and others. In recent years, my focus has changed from writing papers and educational pursuits to working with the ArbitrumDAO. Generally, how to handle more ‘people’ than ‘technical’ problems.

  • Detail your experience in advisory, governance, and/or oversight roles:

I am generally involved, or touch in some manner, nearly all proposals that pass through the DAO. Thankfully, there is now a greater number of people involved in the oversight of DAO governance and programs, but I was the inital soul to take on that responsibility. The experience has taught me to stick to facts and to always do what is right in regards to the proposal’s intent and expectation of DAO participants.

  • Have you previously contributed to the Arbitrum DAO? Describe any relevant experiences through which you’ve gained an understanding of the DAO’s current structure, contributors, and programs:

Yes. The only active role I’ve taken in the DAO is to join the OpCo’s OAT and the Arbitrum Security Council. All other engagements were behind the scenes via the Arbitrum Foundation to enable DAO governance.

  • Given the scope of OpCo is relatively broad in its current form, describe how you view OpCo’s role within the DAO and what it should accomplish to deem the entity a success over the next 3-5 years:

The original vision for OpCo was to handle operations for the DAO, but over the year, its swifted towards an organisation that is focused on adding new business lines to the DAO and increasing the DAO’s revenue. I believe this is the right approach for the OpCo going forward.

To date, the main bottleneck for OpCo is finding a leader for the organisation. A Head of OpCo is now being onboarded which is very exciting. I’d like to see OpCo take control of its future and for the OAT’s role to focus more on oversight of the team as opposed to acting as primary decision makers.

Disclosures

  • Please disclose all of the applicant’s/nominee’s actual and potential conflicts of interest, including but not limited to financial, personal, DAO governance, and professional:

My significant holdings are ETH, BTC, and ARB. I have a position at Lemniscap as a part-time advisor/research partner for ~6 years. I only participate in the ArbitrumDAO.

  • Please disclose all active contributor roles and payment streams related to the Arbitrum DAO that the applicant/nominee, and entities that they have a professional or financial relationship with, has and is receiving:

My income as part of my employment at the Arbitrum Foundation.

Declarations

  • The applicant/nominee understands that any offer to join and hold a position in the OAT is contingent on:

    • Successfully completing as well as maintaining updated all relevant non-disclosure agreements, KYC requirements, and other necessary documents

    • Not being a direct representative or full-time employee at network competitors (e.g., Solana, Polygon, Optimism, etc)

    • An individual will be entitled to run as a candidate for the election. No single organisation should be overly represented in the OAT. There should be no more than 1 candidate associated with a single entity.

    • If a candidate is elected on behalf of an organisation, then the OAT membership is tied to them and cannot be rotated to someone else in the organisation. It will be up to the current OAT to enforce the above policy, and if a candidate is excluded from the election, then the rationale must be publicly disclosed to the ArbitrumDAO

    • Being aligned with the community values listed in The Amended Constitution of the Arbitrum DAO, following the Code of Conduct for delegates, being committed to prioritizing the Arbitrum DAO’s needs, and acting in absolute good faith and utmost honesty to fulfill their duties to the best of their abilities.

  • If nominating someone else, the nominator confirms that the nominee is aware of their nomination and the essential details related to it

  • The applicant/nominator confirms that they have read and understood all the content within this form and that the information submitted is accurate and complete:

Yes. I’ll be elected as a representative of the Arbitrum Foundation.

1 Like

We’ll be extending the application window by one (1) week.

The deadline for anyone to apply or nominate will be Friday, 12th of June, 2026, at 00:00 UTC.

1 Like

Applicant / Nominee Information

Name: Varit Ruangsiri
Email Address: varit@curialab.xyz
Telegram Handle: @v3dao
Current Occupation: Co-founder, Curia Lab
Country of Residence & Time Zone: Bangkok, Thailand (GMT+7)

Qualifications and Experience

Domain Expertise

Primary: Business Development, Venture Building, and Strategy & Operations Secondary: Corporate Finance, Capital Allocation, and Financial & Risk Management

Network and Experience

I am the Co-founder of Curia Lab, a governance analytics and research team. Before founding Curia Lab, I worked at SCB 10X, the venture-captital & venture-building arm of Siam Commercial Bank, one of the largest financial groups in Thailand and SEA. I sat on both sides of the table there: as a researcher evaluating emerging technologies, business models, and risks, and as a builder operating inside ventures during their early stages. That dual exposure to evaluation and execution is what I bring to oversight work, understanding how a venture is structured, where it is strong, and where it is fragile, helps me read whether an organisation is actually on track. Curia Lab itself was incubated inside SCB 10X in 2023 and spun out into a Singapore-incorporated company in February 2024.

Through prior oversight work on milestone-based grant programs and as part of the metrics & milestones council, I have reviewed delivery and performance across more than 200+ builder teams. That work is the closest analogue to the OAT’s accountability mandate: defining success in advance, asking uncomfortable questions early, separating real progress from optics, and writing transparent assessments the community can rely on. Combined with operating ventures from the inside at SCB 10X and running Curia Lab as a company — with the budget, hiring, and counterparty decisions that entails — it covers both sides of what OAT oversight requires: judging whether an organisation is delivering, and understanding the operational reality of the entity being judged.

Operating from Southeast Asia, I have built a strong network of crypto-native operators, founders, and builders across the region where OpCo will likely need to recruit as it scales into these emerging markets. I am an active voice in the regional Ethereum and DAO community, was an early advocate for bringing Devcon to Bangkok, and have spoken on DAO governance and tooling at industry events including SEA Blockchain Week, Governance Day, REDeFiNETOMORROW2026 hosted by SCB10x <> Bloomberg.

Arbitrum Governance Contributions

I have been an active contributor to ArbitrumDAO governance since its launch in 2023 through Curia. A summary of activity is on the @Curia profile, and headline contributions include:

  • Arbitrum Governance Analytics Dashboard and monthly analytics reports: built by Curia Lab and funded through a Questbook grant. Live since 2024, the dashboard is a widely-referenced analytics surface for Arbitrum holders, voting power, proposals, participation, and delegate behaviour.
  • Quantifying Decentralization: Analysis of Voting Power in Arbitrum DAO: a quantitative research report to measure power concentration across the Delegated Voting Power Layer and the Proposal Voting Layer, with recommendations on supporting small and mid-tier delegate participation.
  • Curia Forum Score Integration: a methodology integrated into the dashboard that quantifies delegate engagement beyond on-chain voting, combining Proposal, Engagement, and Activeness scores.
  • RAD Dashboard: a public, auditable dashboard supporting OpCo’s administration of the Rewarding Active Delegates program.
  • Curia AI: an onchain and offchain governance assistant currently in beta with Arbitrum delegates.
  • Active delegate with published voting rationale in the Curia Delegate Communication Thread.

OpCo Vision

I see OpCo as a high-trust execution layer that the DAO can verify rather than have to trust. The DAO retains strategic authority, OpCo handles operational complexity, and the OAT provides the bridge of accountability. Beyond keeping the lights on, I want to see OpCo help Arbitrum become a genuine home for builders, the place where the strongest teams choose to launch, scale, and stay.

Over the next 3 to 5 years, I believe OpCo should be responsible for:

  • Standing up and managing the operational success of DAO-approved initiatives
  • Proactively sourcing and onboarding builders into the Arbitrum ecosystem, including from underrepresented regions like Asia
  • Setting a common reporting spine so performance across funded entities is comparable
  • Ensuring deep, accurate, and timely reporting to delegates
  • Moving quickly on hiring, contracting, and counterparty negotiations on behalf of the DAO
  • Maintaining a clearly bounded mandate, never becoming a shadow Foundation

I would consider OpCo successful if:

  • Any token holder can see in near real-time who is funded, how much, against what KPIs, and what was delivered
  • OpCo itself is reviewed quarterly against predefined success metrics
  • The DAO has visibly broadened its builder and contributor base, with measurable growth in mid-tier delegate participation
  • Delegates and the wider community trust OpCo because its work is verifiable, not because of personalities or informal influence

References

  • Available on request. Contact details will be shared privately to OpCo during the eligibility evaluation period.

Disclosures

  • My only paid contributor relationship with the Arbitrum DAO was the Questbook grant for the Arbitrum Governance Analytics Dashboard. All milestones have been completed and no payments are currently being received.
  • I previously served on the Optimism Milestones & Metrics Council. That term has concluded and I no longer hold any role with Optimism or its grant programs after end of this month.
  • Curia Lab is an active delegate at several other L2/L1 & DeFi protocols. If elected, I will recuse the Curia delegate address from any votes that bear on Arbitrum-competitive matters and will publish a recusal log.
  • If elected, I will not personally benefit from any new Arbitrum DAO contracts signed during my OAT term. Any future contracts will be handled by other Curia Lab team members, and I will recuse myself from any OAT decision touching Curia Lab proposals or contracts.

Declarations

I understand that any offer to join and hold a position in the OAT is contingent on:

  • Successfully completing as well as maintaining updated all relevant non-disclosure agreements, KYC requirements, and other necessary documents
  • Not being a direct representative or full-time employee at network competitors (e.g., Solana, Polygon, Optimism)
  • An individual will be entitled to run as a candidate for the election. No single organisation should be overly represented in the OAT. There should be no more than 1 candidate associated with a single entity.
  • If a candidate is elected on behalf of an organisation, then the OAT membership is tied to them and cannot be rotated to someone else in the organisation.
  • Being aligned with the community values listed in The Amended Constitution of the Arbitrum DAO, following the Code of Conduct for delegates, being committed to prioritizing the Arbitrum DAO’s needs, and acting in absolute good faith and utmost honesty to fulfill their duties to the best of their abilities.

I confirm that I have read and understood all the content within this form and that the information submitted is accurate and complete.

Application Form

Applicant / Nominee Information

  • Full Name: Alex Netto

  • Contact Information: X

  • Current Occupation: CEO & Founder at blockful

  • Country of Residence / Time Zone: Brazil / GMT-3

Applicant / Nominee Qualifications and Experience

  • Identify one of the domains described within the Desired Qualifications section in the OpCo - Oversight and Transparency Committee (OAT) Application Process Overview forum post in which you have the most experience and describe that experience:

Domain: Business Development, Venture Building, and Strategy & Operations

I founded blockful in 2022 as a web3 software house and have since led its evolution into a specialized governance, security, and infrastructure company. Growing from the ground up, I scaled the team to 18 people before strategically consolidating to a senior team of 10 to focus on security products. I have directly sold over $5M in services and software solutions, spanning smart contract development, governance tooling, and security advisory.

A central product of this journey is Anticapture, a governance security platform we built to monitor economic behavior, delegation patterns, and delegate activity across DAOs, translating governance dynamics into measurable risk indicators and classifying each DAO into security maturity stages. The platform functions as an independent risk assessment layer for the ecosystem: making governance security visible, public, and actionable before vulnerabilities are exploited. Anticapture’s active modules include a real-time governance dashboard, a governance alerts system for proposals and power shifts, a call data review service, a governance front-end package, stage-progression consulting, full governance security audits, governor test rehearsals, and a dedicated researcher line for continuous advisory. The platform has been adopted by ENS DAO to monitor its Security Council and track governance risks, and has driven governance improvements at Uniswap DAO after a formal risk analysis.

A significant share of my BD experience sits at the intersection of blockchain and traditional finance. I co-designed a BRL-backed stablecoin architecture in collaboration with Chainlink, Stark Bank, and Genial Investimentos - a project that demanded coordination across financial institutions, technology providers, and regulatory stakeholders. I organized and hosted an event at B3 (the Brazilian Stock Exchange) with the leadership of Brazil’s CBDC program, bringing together the public and private sectors around digital asset infrastructure.

Before founding blockful, I served as CTO at Ayla, a real estate technology startup, where I owned the full technical strategy, product architecture, and delivery roadmap - driving a 70% increase in company revenue. Before that, I built backend systems at TecBan, the operator of Brazil’s Banco24Horas ATM network, one of the country’s largest financial infrastructure providers, serving over 150 million transactions per year. This career arc, from fintech infrastructure to startup technical leadership to founding and scaling a governance security company, has given me a hands-on, multi-disciplinary perspective on building organizations, identifying strategic opportunities, and executing across complex cross-functional environments.

  • Describe your network and reputation within the blockchain/technology industry. Have you previously represented a crypto brand and/or navigated DAO governance:

I have been an active participant in the Ethereum and broader blockchain ecosystem since 2022, consistently operating at the intersection of governance, security, and infrastructure. My reputation has been built through direct, high-stakes contributions, founding and running blockful, representing it in front of institutions and DAOs globally, and producing open-source work that has materially advanced governance security practices across the ecosystem.

As an ENS Delegate (netto.eth) since 2022 and elected Lead Steward for the Term 6 of ENS DAO Meta Governance Working Group. Facilitating and improving governance processes, doing oversight on the endowment’s treasury management, managing budgets, grants and coordinating with a diverse set of stakeholders.

I am also a member of the ENS Security Council, the multisig body established to protect ENS DAO’s ~$2B treasury against governance capture, a council that my team was directly responsible for designing and deploying after blockful discovered a critical governance vulnerability in 2024. This dual role across both elected governance (steward) and security infrastructure (Security Council) reflects the breadth of my engagement with ENS as an institution.

blockful’s governance security work extends well beyond ENS. In early 2025, applying the Anticapture framework across the Ethereum ecosystem, we identified a critical governance vulnerability in Shutter DAO (0x36): the combination of a low market cap, minimal active voting power, zero timelock, and no proposal guardrails meant an attacker could acquire sufficient voting power for approximately $100K and drain a treasury of over $3M in stablecoins - a risk-reward ratio exceeding 30x. After more than a year of private engagement with Shutter stakeholders and a controlled simulation that validated the full attack sequence, we coordinated an emergency mitigation with a coalition of aligned delegates. My team designed, developed, and deployed the SecurityCouncilAzorius guard contract (independently audited by Cyfrin), which was submitted as a governance proposal alongside a 2-day timelock. Critically, the guard was structured to retroactively protect the DAO even during the voting window itself - meaning once the proposal was submitted, any attack proposals submitted during that period could still be vetoed. Full technical disclosure was made only after the mitigation was live and active.

blockful has also been a grantee of the Uniswap Foundation, extending our governance security research and tooling to them.

Beyond these engagements, I have been an invited speaker at Stanford University (2025, 2026), a bootcamp instructor at ETH Denver 2023 and SmartCon 2023, and a speaker at blockchain conferences across Brazil, the United States (Denver, San Francisco, New York City), Switzerland, Turkey, and Spain I have also organized ETHFloripa contributing to community growth at the local and international level.

  • Detail your experience in advisory, governance, and/or oversight roles:

Meta-Governance Steward: Term 6 (netto.eth)

Elected Meta-Governance Steward for ENS DAO. I oversee Working Groups, approve budgets, and evaluate service providers: the accountability layer between token holders and executors, directly analogous to OAT’s role for OpCo.

I coordinate operational decisions across WGs, resolve priority conflicts between contributors, and make resource allocation calls in real time, including incomplete information and competing stakeholder pressure.

Security Council Member

I sit on the multisig that can veto or delay on-chain proposals threatening the protocol or treasury. I proposed, designed, and deployed the Security Council: its mechanism, smart contract, and operational rules.

Through Blockful’s engagement with ENS DAO governance, I identified a critical flaw in March 2024 that would have enabled ~$150M treasury seizure and full protocol capture. I drove responsible disclosure, defined the remediation scope with core contributors, and led end-to-end delivery of the Security Council.

Delegate: Calldata Review & Governance Security (since 2022)

ENS Delegate since 2022. I vote, deliberate, and build governance tooling. I created and maintain dao-proposals (open source), the framework used to decode, verify, and security-review on-chain proposal calldata. It is a trusted independent verification layer in ENS governance.

  • Have you previously contributed to the Arbitrum DAO? Describe any relevant experiences through which you’ve gained an understanding of the DAO’s current structure, contributors, and programs:

Our most consistent contribution to Arbitrum has been active participation in its governance, deliberating on and voting across proposals submitted to the DAO. Given blockful’s background in governance security, our focus has been particularly on proposals that could affect the structural integrity or security posture of the DAO. We approach each proposal with the same analytical lens we apply in our security work: assessing intent against on-chain execution, identifying potential attack vectors or unintended consequences, and evaluating whether the incentive structures embedded in a proposal are sound. This ongoing engagement has given us a grounded understanding of the DAO’s contributors, programs, and decision-making dynamics.

  • Given the scope of OpCo is relatively broad in its current form, describe how you view OpCo’s role within the DAO and what it should accomplish to deem the entity a success over the next 3-5 years:

OpCo’s primary function is to serve as the operational executor of the Arbitrum DAO, the entity that transforms governance decisions into concrete action. All meaningful operational work of the DAO should be enabled and coordinated through OpCo. But I believe OpCo’s mandate should extend well beyond execution.

Over the next 3 to 5 years, a successful OpCo will have taken a more active role in reactivating Arbitrum’s governance itself, fostering new initiatives, increasing demand for its products, and growing the broader ecosystem. Governance vitality is not a given; it requires deliberate investment.

On the governance side, this means designing and implementing meaningful incentives for participation, not necessarily grant programs funding abstract ideas, but mechanisms that attract people who are genuinely interested in building on Arbitrum and contributing to its long-term success. The goal is to bring in contributors who are invested in the ecosystem’s growth, not just recipients of funding.

This activation effort must also happen off-chain. OpCo is uniquely positioned to engage the financial sector, academic institutions, and other traditional stakeholders, identifying pathways to bring new contributors into the Arbitrum DAO from outside the crypto-native world. Institutional relationships built through this kind of outreach compound over time and can meaningfully expand the contributor base.

Beyond business development, one of the most critical areas for improvement is communication and transparency across Arbitrum’s stakeholder landscape, from active delegates to the Foundation. Today, the perception is that these entities operate in silos, with limited information flow reaching the delegates who are most engaged in governance. OpCo should own the responsibility of closing this gap: establishing clear, consistent, and proactive communication channels so that all stakeholders have the context they need to contribute effectively.

In short, OpCo succeeds over the next 3 to 5 years if it manages to make Arbitrum’s governance more active, transparent, and accessible to new contributors, while simultaneously bringing new builders and institutional actors into the ecosystem through deliberate, sustained outreach both on-chain and off.

Additional Information (Only complete if relevant)

  • Please share any other relevant information that supports the applicant/nominee:

Beyond the roles and engagements described above, I have built and maintained a suite of open-source governance tools that reflect my long-term commitment to improving how DAOs operate and defend themselves.

dao-proposals: A governance proposal review framework developed for ENS DAO, providing calldata decoding, on-chain verification, and security analysis for every proposal submitted to the DAO. This tooling protects a ~$2B treasury by ensuring that what delegates vote on is actually what gets executed.

deadman-switch-safe: A Gnosis Safe module implementing a dead man’s switch for automatic asset recovery in the event an owner becomes inactive. This project was recognized at multiple hackathons and addresses a real operational risk in multisig-governed treasuries.

ERC-7884: Operation Router: I co-authored this Ethereum Improvement Proposal, which defines a standard enabling smart contracts to redirect write operations to L2 chains, L1, or off-chain databases. The ERC is a foundational piece of infrastructure for cross-layer DAO operations.

DAOIP-6: I co-authored this DAO interoperability standard for grant program reporting, developed through Metagov and DAOstar. DAOIP-6 creates a common reporting interface across DAO grant programs, increasing accountability and comparability across the ecosystem.

Safe{Wallet} contribution: I contributed ENS name resolution to the account list UI in Safe{Wallet}, which was merged into the main codebase and is now used by millions of Safe smart account users.

References (Only complete if relevant)

  • Please provide the name, position, and contact information of individuals who can attest to the applicant’s/nominee’s qualifications and character:

  • James Waugh: Delegate on ENS

  • Vegayp: Delegate and former steward in ENS DAO

  • Alex Van de Sande: ENS co-founder

Disclosures

  • Please disclose all of the applicant’s/nominee’s actual and potential conflicts of interest, including but not limited to financial, personal, DAO governance, and professional:

There is no conflict of interest as of the date of this application. Should Blockful, the company I founded and in which I am directly involved, become a service provider, I will abstain from decisions related to it.

  • Please disclose all active contributor roles and payment streams related to the Arbitrum DAO that the applicant/nominee, and entities that they have a professional or financial relationship with, have and are receiving:

Declarations

  • The applicant/nominee understands that any offer to join and hold a position in the OAT is contingent on:

    • Successfully completing as well as maintaining updated all relevant non-disclosure agreements, KYC requirements, and other necessary documents

    • Not being a direct representative or full-time employee at network competitors (e.g., Solana, Polygon, Optimism, etc)

    • An individual will be entitled to run as a candidate for the election. No single organisation should be overly represented in the OAT. There should be at most 1 candidate associated with a single entity.

    • If a candidate is elected on behalf of an organization, then the OAT membership is tied to them and cannot be rotated to someone else in the organization. It will be up to the current OAT to enforce the above policy, and if a candidate is excluded from the election, then the rationale must be publicly disclosed to the ArbitrumDAO

    • Being aligned with the community values listed in The Amended Constitution of the Arbitrum DAO, following the Code of Conduct for delegates, being committed to prioritizing the Arbitrum DAO’s needs, and acting in absolute good faith and utmost honesty to fulfill their duties to the best of their abilities.

  • If nominating someone else, the nominator confirms that the nominee is aware of their nomination and the essential details related to it

  • The applicant/nominator confirms that they have read and understood all the content within this form and that the information submitted is accurate and complete: Yes

Application Form

Full Name: Zeptimus

Applicant / Nominee Information

Contact Information: X/TG @zeptimusq

Current Occupation: DAO Advocate at Giveth

Country of Residence / Time Zone: Spain, CET

Applicant / Nominee Qualifications and Experience

Identify one of the domains described within the Desired Qualifications section in the OpCo - Oversight and Transparency Committee (OAT) Application Process Overview forum post in which you have the most experience and describe that experience:

Corporate Finance & Risk Management. I studied economics and started my career in banking, working in operations and accountability. That’s where I learned to read a budget, understand what it commits you to, and how to keep track of it. I’m a firm believer in keeping incentives aligned with the token so everyone has skin in the game, and I don’t approve spending you can’t tie to an outcome. If a budget comes in vague, or the targets are soft, or it’s not well aligned with the bigger picture, that’s the moment a finance person is supposed to slow things down, support and coordinate the team, align the different stakeholders, and keep them accountable to the plan. That’s the role I’d like to play.

I’ve spent over 10 years in crypto. I was close to the community back in my university days, but I got really active in the last 6 years, working full time in crypto after landing at the Token Engineering Commons. There I served as Transparency Steward, helping the working groups stay accountable to the DAO. During that time I got so hooked on governance that I now enjoy it daily across multiple DAOs. My current role is DAO Advocate at Giveth, working closely with Griff Green.

I’ve also worked in product, leading Pairwise, a voting tool that turns a long list of proposals or projects into 1v1 choices. Leading it taught me the product side, but even more the business development and strategy behind it, figuring out who the tool was really for and getting it in front of the right DAOs.

Though I expect to serve mostly on the corporate finance and risk side, I don’t see myself as a single-lane committee member. I lean hard on AI agents to handle the heavy lifting, which frees me up to actually be useful to the people around me. So if another OAT member or a working group needs a hand outside my lane, I want to be the one who shows up with it, and my AI work lets me do that across different fronts. I was already doing this before AI, back at the TEC, which helps me a lot with oversight in general. I’d rather make the team win than guard my corner.

Describe your network and reputation within the blockchain/technology industry. Have you previously represented a crypto brand and/or navigated DAO governance:

I’ve been around crypto for a while now, and most of my real network grew out of DAOs and the people I’ve met at conferences along the way. It’s deepest in governance and public goods, and lately in security too. Like most people who go to conferences, you end up hanging out with all kinds of different groups. Most of my career reputation relevant to this role comes from my work at the Token Engineering Commons, General Magic and Giveth. I also work closely with Griff, who will support me in this role if needed.

I work as a DAO Advocate at Giveth and take part in multiple DAOs, so I have extensive experience navigating DAO governance.

Detail your experience in advisory, governance, and/or oversight roles:

I was working on transparency for DAOs before it was really a thing, back at the Token Engineering Commons in 2020. I was a steward there, and on top of that I was entrusted with building the systems to monitor the other stewards and keep everyone accountable to the DAO. So my actual job was making sure what people said they’d do matched what they did, and that the money and the decisions stayed out in the open where members could see them.

The OAT role is almost the same, just at a bigger scale. Keeping the AAEs accountable to each other, while also making it easier for everyone to understand one another and the broader goal.

My DAO Advocate role at Giveth has me spending time in a lot of DAOs, and the interesting part is seeing what they have in common and where they differ. The same governance problems show up everywhere, just dressed up differently, and after a while you can tell what actually works from what only looks good on a forum. It also means that when I’m thinking through a governance question, it’s easy for me to reach the right person, bounce the idea around, and get honest feedback before it turns into something. That cross-DAO view can be very valuable for an oversight seat.

Have you previously contributed to the Arbitrum DAO? Describe any relevant experiences through which you’ve gained an understanding of the DAO’s current structure, contributors, and programs:

Yes, as a very active delegate. I attend nearly every call and stay informed on the forum. All my stances on different topics can be seen here.

Given the scope of OpCo is relatively broad in its current form, describe how you view OpCo’s role within the DAO and what it should accomplish to deem the entity a success over the next 3-5 years:

OpCo succeeds if it can give the DAO direction and actually make use of the human capital around it. A DAO has far more talent floating around it than any company could ever hire, but most of it goes to waste because there’s no coordination. That’s the gap OpCo should fill.

Success to me looks like Opco facilitating so the right decentralized contributions get incentivized. The impactful work moves fast without burocracy, but Opco makes sure that impact actually sums up over time instead of drying up. Its not about doing more, its about the contributions compounding toward the mission.

The thing with DAOs is that when everyone is responsible, no one is. So OpCo should own the set of rules that make the DAO succeed in the short term: carry the intention behind the SOS, set a clear way to engage after that, bring talent in and point it at the mission. And the whole time it stays accountable to ARB holders, the people it answers to.

Additional Information (Only complete if relevant)

Please share any other relevant information that supports the applicant/nominee:

I’ll be the one holding the seat and accountable for it. But I’d bring Griff in spirit too. We spend a lot of time together, working out 4x a week or and on daily 1-1 calls where we cowork on DAO Governance and Giveth related work. The DAO gets me and Griff’s free advisory services

Griff is also willing to sign an NDA if permitted by the rules. If that is not possible, he will be unable to provide advice on matters of which he is unaware.

References (Only complete if relevant)

Griff can attest for me (@GriffGreen TG/X)

Disclosures

Please disclose all of the applicant’s/nominee’s actual and potential conflicts of interest, including but not limited to financial, personal, DAO governance, and professional:

I’m hands-on with Griff across most of his ecosystem, including Giveth and TheDAO.

Please disclose all active contributor roles and payment streams related to the Arbitrum DAO that the applicant/nominee, and entities that they have a professional or financial relationship with, have and is receiving:

Applied and actively contributing to RAD

Declarations

The applicant/nominee understands that any offer to join and hold a position in the OAT is contingent on:

Successfully completing as well as maintaining updated all relevant non-disclosure agreements, KYC requirements, and other necessary documents

Not being a direct representative or full-time employee at network competitors (e.g., Solana, Polygon, Optimism, etc)

An individual will be entitled to run as a candidate for the election. No single organisation should be overly represented in the OAT. There should be no more than 1 candidate associated with a single entity.

If a candidate is elected on behalf of an organisation, then the OAT membership is tied to them and cannot be rotated to someone else in the organisation. It will be up to the current OAT to enforce the above policy, and if a candidate is excluded from the election, then the rationale must be publicly disclosed to the ArbitrumDAO

Being aligned with the community values listed in The Amended Constitution of the Arbitrum DAO, following the Code of Conduct for delegates, being committed to prioritizing the Arbitrum DAO’s needs, and acting in absolute good faith and utmost honesty to fulfill their duties to the best of their abilities.

If nominating someone else, the nominator confirms that the nominee is aware of their nomination and the essential details related to it

The applicant/nominator confirms that they have read and understood all the content within this form and that the information submitted is accurate and complete: Yes/No

1 Like

Application Form

Full Name: João Kury

Applicant / Nominee Information

Contact Information: TG @joaokury

X (Twitter): @cripto_nita_

Current Occupation: Ecosystem builder and Growth/BD operator.

Country of Residence / Time Zone: Brazil (BRT, UTC−3)

Applicant / Nominee Qualifications and Experience

Identify one of the domains described within the Desired Qualifications section in the OpCo - Oversight and Transparency Committee (OAT) Application Process Overview forum post in which you have the most experience and describe that experience:

Business Development, Venture Building, and Strategy & Operations, most of it earned inside the Arbitrum ecosystem and across LATAM.

I have spent the last years building things and running the teams behind them. As Hub Lead at ICP HUB Brazil, I ran two rounds of a local incubation program, owning the strategy and leading a team of five to take early-stage projects from idea to launch. I then co-founded Modular Crypto and built it from zero into one of Brazil’s most active crypto communities at some point, 10k+ members and 15+ events, with a team of close to ten contributors that I led.

That operating background is what I brought into the Arbitrum Foundation as Community Growth LATAM, where my job was to turn Arbitrum’s presence in the region into real activity. The clearest example was the institutional push around Merge São Paulo, where I led the Foundation’s institutional outreach: I selected and brought together 18 senior executives across banking, payments, fintech, and crypto, from institutions like Itaú, Bradesco, Visa, BTG, and Mercado Bitcoin, and held more than 10 meetings with institutional/fintech LATAM players on behalf of the Foundation to find synergies with Arbitrum. I also represented Arbitrum on stage, with talks across three countries.

The throughline is taking something from nothing to real, whether a startup, a community, or an institutional relationship, and running the operation that gets it there. It maps directly onto oversight, because the OAT’s job is to judge whether OpCo is spending the DAO’s resources on things that build durable value or just on things that look good on social media. I have spent my career on the first kind, and I know how to tell them apart.

Describe your network and reputation within the blockchain/technology industry. Have you previously represented a crypto brand and/or navigated DAO governance:

I have spent years developing a reputation in LATAM crypto as a builder. I represented the Arbitrum Foundation as Community Growth LATAM for a year, and before that I co-founded and led Modular Crypto, which I grew into a community of 10k+ members running 15+ events across Brazil. I have also worked across other ecosystems, including ICP HUB Brasil as Hub Lead, Polkadot as an ambassador, Nodle as Brazil Lead, to mention a few.

On governance specifically, I served as an Optimism DAO badgeholder across two RetroPGF rounds, helping evaluate and fund projects by real delivered impact. I am no longer a badgeholder (see Disclosures).

My network is strongest in LATAM, including close relationships across the Arbitrum DAO community in the region, but my work reaches beyond it and I operate comfortably with global teams.

Detail your experience in advisory, governance, and/or oversight roles:

My oversight experience comes from three places that, together, cover both sides of what this committee does.

First, allocation. As an Optimism badgeholder across RetroPGF rounds 3 and 4, my entire job was evaluation: deciding what had actually delivered value and allocating retroactive funding accordingly, under full public scrutiny. That is the allocator’s discipline the OAT uses when it reviews OpCo’s spending and performance.

Second, governance study. I co-hosted and coordinated a podcast focused on studying DAOs while at Bankless Brasil DAO and a Governance Study Group with Brazilian universities, which meant pulling apart how different DAOs structure power, accountability, and incentives. I was thinking critically about governance design before anyone was paying me to.

Third, my legal background. I hold a law degree, and while I do not actively practice, I have had to step into and handle a few real cases over the past years. That training and hands-on experience taught me to read agreements carefully and assess risk, the core diligence any oversight seat requires.

What ties these together is independent judgment about whether resources and mandates are being used well, informed by having both allocated funding and been accountable to it as a builder.

Have you previously contributed to the Arbitrum DAO? Describe any relevant experiences through which you’ve gained an understanding of the DAO’s current structure, contributors, and programs:

Yes, and from an angle I think is rare for this kind of seat. I have been on both sides of it.

As an external contributor through Modular Crypto, I proposed and executed an education and events initiative funded via Arbitrum’s Domain Allocator. I know exactly what it is to apply to the DAO for resources, deliver, and report back.

Then, as Community Growth LATAM at the Arbitrum Foundation, I worked from the other side. Representing the Foundation, I acted as a two-way bridge for the region: I helped people inside the ecosystem with context on LATAM communities and teams, and at the same time I connected local builders with opportunities in the DAO. Throughout, I followed governance closely and built strong relationships with delegates, especially in LATAM.

That arc, from a builder asking the DAO for funding to someone inside the Foundation connecting the region to the ecosystem, is what I would bring to the OAT. Oversight often evaluates builders from the outside. I have been the builder being evaluated, and I have been the one inside the ecosystem opening doors for others. I understand both the operational reality of an entity being judged and the standard it should be held to.

Given the scope of OpCo is relatively broad in its current form, describe how you view OpCo’s role within the DAO and what it should accomplish to deem the entity a success over the next 3-5 years:

OpCo will be judged on a lot of things, but I think one matters more than the rest: whether the best builders and institutions choose Arbitrum and stay. Everything else, treasury, reporting, coordination, exists to make that possible. OpCo is increasingly the entity that sources, onboards, and supports those teams, and that is exactly the work I did from inside the Foundation in LATAM.

The OAT’s job is to make sure that, as OpCo gains the autonomy it needs to execute, that autonomy stays anchored to the DAO’s mandate. This is where my perspective earns its seat. I have been the builder deciding whether an ecosystem was worth committing to, and I have been inside the Foundation working to win builders over. I know what makes that decision easy and what makes it fall apart. An OAT with someone who has sat in the builder’s chair can pressure-test OpCo’s programs against the question that actually matters: would a strong team find this credible and worth their time?

I would consider OpCo a success over the next 3-5 years if it delivers on three fronts:

Builders. It measurably grows the base of teams actually building on Arbitrum, including beyond the usual crypto-native circles, and those teams stay.

Spending well. It knows how to deploy the DAO’s resources with judgment, funding what builds durable value instead of what looks good in a report, and can show the difference. Having allocated funding as a RetroPGF badgeholder and been on the receiving end as a funded builder, this is the part I would watch most closely.

Institutions. It brings serious institutions into the ecosystem, the kind of banking, payments, and fintech players I worked to put in the room for Arbitrum at Merge São Paulo, and turns that interest into something lasting.

That is the lens I would bring: keep OpCo anchored to the DAO’s mandate, and constantly check its work against the test that decides everything else, whether the builders and institutions Arbitrum needs would actually choose it.

Additional Information (Only complete if relevant)

Please share any other relevant information that supports the applicant/nominee:

What I offer this committee is a perspective it does not currently have: someone who has been an independent builder funded by the DAO, then represented the Arbitrum Foundation doing institutional BD across LATAM, and who evaluated and allocated funding as an Optimism RetroPGF badgeholder. That combination lets me read both whether an entity is delivering and what the people it serves actually need. I add a strong network to a region that matters more and more to Arbitrum’s growth. My legal training adds diligence on contracts, conflicts, and risk. I work in Portuguese, English, and Spanish.

References (Only complete if relevant)

People from the Arbitrum Foundation can attest to my work and character, as can governance contributors and delegates from other ecosystems I have collaborated with.

Disclosures

Please disclose all of the applicant’s/nominee’s actual and potential conflicts of interest, including but not limited to financial, personal, DAO governance, and professional:

I previously served as an Optimism badgeholder and participated in RetroPGF rounds 3 and 4. I am no longer a badgeholder and hold no ongoing role, payment, or representative relationship with Optimism or any other Arbitrum competitor. I previously worked at the Arbitrum Foundation as Community Growth LATAM and no longer work there. I co-founded Modular Crypto and led it until joining the Foundation; during that time we executed one initiative funded through Arbitrum’s Domain Allocator. I hold small amounts of crypto assets across several ecosystems. I have no current conflicts of interest that would prevent me from acting in the best interest of the Arbitrum DAO.

Please disclose all active contributor roles and payment streams related to the Arbitrum DAO that the applicant/nominee, and entities that they have a professional or financial relationship with, have and is receiving:

None currently active. My past Arbitrum-related involvement is concluded and generates no ongoing payment stream to me.

Declarations

The applicant/nominee understands that any offer to join and hold a position in the OAT is contingent on:

Successfully completing as well as maintaining updated all relevant non-disclosure agreements, KYC requirements, and other necessary documents

Not being a direct representative or full-time employee at network competitors (e.g., Solana, Polygon, Optimism, etc)

An individual will be entitled to run as a candidate for the election. No single organisation should be overly represented in the OAT. There should be no more than 1 candidate associated with a single entity.

If a candidate is elected on behalf of an organisation, then the OAT membership is tied to them and cannot be rotated to someone else in the organisation. It will be up to the current OAT to enforce the above policy, and if a candidate is excluded from the election, then the rationale must be publicly disclosed to the ArbitrumDAO

Being aligned with the community values listed in The Amended Constitution of the Arbitrum DAO, following the Code of Conduct for delegates, being committed to prioritizing the Arbitrum DAO’s needs, and acting in absolute good faith and utmost honesty to fulfill their duties to the best of their abilities.

If nominating someone else, the nominator confirms that the nominee is aware of their nomination and the essential details related to it

The applicant/nominator confirms that they have read and understood all the content within this form and that the information submitted is accurate and complete: Yes

Full Name

Rika Goldberg

Contact Information

Current Occupation

Founder of Axia Network

Country of Residence / Time Zone

United States / Eastern Time


Applicant / Nominee Qualifications and Experience

1. Identify one of the domains described within the Desired Qualifications section in the OpCo - Oversight and Transparency Committee Application Process Overview forum post in which you have the most experience and describe that experience.

My strongest fit is Business Development, Venture Building, and Strategy & Operations.

I am especially interested in this role because OpCo’s work is expected to focus on establishing new business lines and revenue opportunities for Arbitrum DAO. That makes OAT’s oversight role strategically important. OAT should not execute OpCo’s day-to-day work, but it should help evaluate whether OpCo is pursuing commercially credible opportunities, allocating resources responsibly, and creating sustainable value for the DAO.

My relevant experience sits at the intersection of DAO governance, institutional relationship-building, and ecosystem strategy.

Outside of Arbitrum, I have been building relationships with financial institutions, family offices, wealth-management stakeholders, and other potential institutional adoption partners in Atlanta and the broader Southeast. This network gives me a practical lens on how traditional capital allocators and financial institutions evaluate crypto opportunities: what they understand, what makes them cautious, what kinds of counterparties they trust, and what use cases feel credible enough to explore.

I believe this perspective is highly relevant to OpCo’s mandate. If OpCo will be developing new revenue streams for the DAO, it will need to identify areas where its infrastructure can support real business activity: payments, settlement, financial applications, institutional DeFi, tokenized assets, enterprise or semi-enterprise pilots, and other commercial use cases. OAT members do not need to be the sales team, but they do need to understand what good revenue strategy looks like.

My contribution would be to help OAT pressure-test these opportunities. For example:

  • Is this a real business line or just vague ecosystem activity?
  • Who is the customer, partner, or user?
  • Why is Arbitrum well-positioned to capture this opportunity?
  • What resources are required?
  • What risks, conflicts, or dependencies exist?
  • What would validate or invalidate the opportunity?
  • What KPIs would allow delegates and tokenholders to evaluate progress?
  • How does this support Arbitrum’s long-term position?

In short, I believe I can help OAT evaluate whether OpCo’s work is commercially meaningful, properly resourced, aligned with the DAO’s mandate, and connected to networks that can help Arbitrum grow.


2. Describe your network and reputation within the blockchain/technology industry. Have you previously represented a crypto brand and/or navigated DAO governance?

My network sits across DAO governance, DeFi, academic blockchain communities, and increasingly traditional finance / family office circles.

In traditional finance and institutional circles, I have been actively building relationships with financial institutions, family offices, wealth-management stakeholders, and capital allocators in Atlanta and the broader Southeast. I see this as directly relevant to Arbitrum DAO’s next stage of growth. Many of these groups are interested in crypto, but they need credible education, clear risk framing, trusted counterparties, and use cases that connect to real business needs.

This gives me a useful perspective for OAT. If OpCo is exploring new business lines for Arbitrum DAO, it will need to understand how non-crypto-native institutions evaluate opportunities. It will also need to distinguish between relationships that are interesting in theory and relationships that can realistically lead to adoption, pilots, capital, or recurring economic activity.

My academic network is also relevant. I have relationships with Georgia Tech blockchain, cryptography, and computer science professors and students. I recently mentored Georgia Tech CS students on a DAO/governance research project where they chose Arbitrum as their case study. Their work included a GitHub PR to the Arbitrum Foundation governance repository with technical annotations of Arbitrum’s governance and Security Council architecture, and I later turned their work into a public visual explainer deck on Arbitrum’s Security Council architecture. I was also interviewed for a forthcoming Harvard Business School case study on Uniswap. I believe Arbitrum can benefit from stronger bridges into academic institutions, both for technical talent and for credible research and education.

Within DAO governance, I originally contributed to Arbitrum governance through 404 DAO and later acquired its governance assets, forming Axia Network as a new entity to continue governance work. That transition is public and documented in the 404 DAO delegate communication thread.

Since then, Axia has continued participating in governance and maintaining public delegate communications.

My Arbitrum-specific work includes active governance participation, STIP application review (404 DAO was later elected to the LTIPP Council), delegate incentive and accountability discussions, service as an elected Arbitrum DAO multisig signer through 404 DAO, leading a DAO contributor onboarding working group and pilot, and completing a Firestarters grant researching a potential DAO Contributors Program. I maintain a public portfolio of this work here:

https://rikagoldberg.xyz/DAOs/arbitrum

I have navigated DAO governance both as a contributor and delegate turning research, relationships, and governance participation into durable institutional knowledge. My reputation is built around being thoughtful, direct, and focused on whether governance activity translates into real outcomes.


3. Detail your experience in advisory, governance, and/or oversight roles.

My oversight experience is strongest in governance review, treasury execution integrity, program evaluation, and strategic accountability across leading DAOs in the Ethereum and Bitcoin ecosystem.

As an elected Arbitrum DAO multisignature wallet signer through 404 DAO, I had direct responsibility related to treasury execution integrity: reviewing and signing transactions that disburse DAO funds. That role requires attention to process, accuracy, and trust rather than public visibility. It also reinforces an important lesson for DAO oversight: operational details matter, especially when delegated authority and treasury movement are involved.

I have also reviewed governance, grant, and incentive programs with attention to ROI, measurable outcomes, incentive design, and whether requested resources were likely to create durable ecosystem value. In Rootstock Collective, a leading Bitcoin DAO, I review grant applications and assess whether the proposed work is aligned with ecosystem priorities, realistically scoped, and likely to produce measurable impact. This is relevant to OAT because OpCo’s work should not be evaluated only by activity level. It should be evaluated by whether resources are being directed toward commercially credible and strategically meaningful revenue drivers for the DAO.

My background across DAO governance, institutional relationship-building, and academic networks gives me a useful vantage point for this kind of oversight.


4. Have you previously contributed to the Arbitrum DAO? Describe any relevant experiences through which you’ve gained an understanding of the DAO’s current structure, contributors, and programs.

Yes. I have contributed to Arbitrum DAO as a delegate, governance contributor, elected treasury multisig signer, contributor onboarding working group lead, and Firestarters grantee.

Relevant contributions include:

Arbitrum DAO Multisignature Wallet Signer

I served as an elected signer responsible for reviewing and signing treasury disbursement transactions through 404 DAO / Axia. This role gave me direct exposure to the operational side of DAO governance, where accuracy, process, and execution integrity are essential.

STIP Application Review

I assisted with the review of a high volume of STIP applications with attention to incentive efficiency, ROI, measurable outcomes, and whether proposed incentives were likely to create durable ecosystem value.

Delegate Incentives / Accountability Work

I have participated in delegate incentives and accountability discussions, including discussion related to the Rewarding Active Delegates program and broader questions of how the DAO should evaluate governance contributions.

404 DAO → Axia Network

I originally contributed through 404 DAO and later acquired its governance assets, forming Axia Network to continue governance participation and public delegate communications. That transition is documented here.

Arbitrum Contributor Research and Governance Education

I have also worked on contributor research and governance education within Arbitrum, including contributor onboarding research and a governance bootcamp pilot. While not my core OAT value proposition, this work gave me deep context on the DAO’s structure, execution capacity, stakeholder landscape, and operational challenges.

Public Educational and Technical Artifacts

My work samples include an Arbitrum Security Council architecture walkthrough, Arbitrum DAO contributor research, Georgia Tech student mentorship, DeFi/governance visualizations, and other public artifacts:

https://rikagoldberg.xyz/work-samples


Through this work and my continued active engagement in Arbitrum DAO, since its inception, as a delegate and contributor, I have developed a practical and high-context understanding of the AAE vision.


5. Given the scope of OpCo is relatively broad in its current form, describe how you view OpCo’s role within the DAO and what it should accomplish to deem the entity a success over the next 3-5 years.

I view OpCo as Arbitrum DAO’s operational coordination and execution layer: not a replacement for tokenholder governance, and not a political center of power, but a professionalized entity that helps the DAO pursue and execute on revenue creating opportunities.

The most important part of OpCo’s role, in my view, is helping Arbitrum establish new business lines and revenue opportunities. Arbitrum already has strong technology, liquidity, brand recognition, and ecosystem depth. The question is how the DAO turns those strengths into sustainable long-term sources of value.

That requires more than general coordination. It requires identifying commercially credible opportunities, building relationships with the right partners, testing business lines, understanding market demand, and creating reporting that helps the DAO understand what is working.

I also understand OAT’s role as distinct from OpCo’s role. OAT should not execute OpCo’s day-to-day work. Its role should be to provide oversight, consultation, and accountability: ensuring resources are allocated efficiently, OpCo remains within the DAO’s mandate, strategic objectives are met, and delegates and tokenholders receive reporting that is clear enough to evaluate progress.

Over the next 3-5 years, I would like to see OpCo succeed across several areas.

1. New Business Lines and Revenue Streams

OpCo should help Arbitrum identify and develop revenue opportunities that are commercially credible and aligned with Arbitrum’s strengths.

Potential areas could include:

  • payment and settlement use cases
  • institutional DeFi
  • fintech or bank partnerships
  • tokenized asset infrastructure
  • ecosystem business development
  • venture-building opportunities
  • strategic partnerships that bring recurring usage, fees, or commercial value to Arbitrum

Not every opportunity will work. That is why OpCo needs strong oversight and clear reporting. The DAO and tokenholders should be able to understand what is being tested, why it matters, what resources are being used, and what would count as success or failure.

2. Strategic Partnerships and Network Development

OpCo should make Arbitrum easier to partner with.

That means clearer partner intake, better routing of opportunities, faster coordination across stakeholders, and more professional follow-through with external organizations.

This is one area where OAT members can be useful without becoming executional. OAT can help open doors, provide market feedback, identify relevant networks, and pressure-test whether proposed partnerships are likely to create value.

3. Institutional Adoption

Arbitrum should continue building credible pathways for institutional adoption. This does not mean chasing every enterprise conversation or treating institutions as the only audience that matters. It means identifying specific use cases where Arbitrum’s infrastructure can solve real problems.

My own network in Atlanta and Southeast financial institutions and family offices gives me a practical lens on this. Many traditional capital allocators and financial actors are curious about crypto, but they need education, credible counterparties, clear risk framing, and use cases that feel concrete. OpCo can help Arbitrum meet that market with more structure.

4. Accountability and Transparency

OpCo should produce reporting that lets delegates and tokenholders understand what is happening, what is working, what is blocked, and what requires governance input.

This could include KPIs, quarterly reporting, budget context, deal pipeline summaries where appropriate, decision logs, mandate tracking, and clear communication around major operational decisions.

OAT should help make this reporting decision-useful. Transparency is not just posting updates. It is giving the DAO enough context to understand whether OpCo is making progress against its mandate.

5. Operational Maturity

OpCo should help Arbitrum move from informal coordination to more long-term sustainable operating capacity that creates revenue for the DAO.

That means better handoffs between governance and execution, clearer vendor and service provider processes, stronger communication channels, and more consistent coordination across AAEs.

What Success Looks Like

In 3-5 years, I would view OpCo as successful if:

  • Arbitrum has new revenue streams or commercially credible business lines.
  • OpCo has helped source, evaluate, and support meaningful strategic partnerships.
  • External partners understand how to engage with Arbitrum.
  • Institutional partners view Arbitrum as serious infrastructure for payments, settlement, DeFi, and application development.
  • Delegates and tokenholders can clearly understand what OpCo is doing and why.
  • OpCo’s reporting gives the DAO enough context to evaluate progress.
  • Resources are allocated efficiently and within the DAO’s mandate.
  • OpCo has improved coordination between the DAO, Foundation, Offchain Labs, AAEs, service providers, contributors, and external partners.
  • OpCo is trusted because its processes are transparent and accountable.

My contribution to OAT would be to bring a business development, network, and strategy lens to that oversight. I can help ask whether OpCo’s work is commercially meaningful, whether the right external stakeholders are being engaged, whether opportunities are realistic, and whether the DAO has the information it needs to evaluate progress.

OAT does not need to be the sales team. But it does need to understand what good revenue strategy looks like.


Additional Information

Additional context and work samples are available at my governance portfolio and work-samples page.

Other relevant context:

  • I am based in Atlanta and have been building relationships with financial institutions, family offices, wealth-management stakeholders, and other potential institutional-adoption partners.
  • I have relationships with Georgia Tech blockchain, cryptography, and CS professors.
  • I recently mentored Georgia Tech CS students on a DAO/governance research project where the students chose to use Arbitrum as a case study.
  • I was interviewed for a forthcoming Harvard Business School case study on Uniswap.
  • I previously worked with 404 DAO, then acquired the governance assets and formed Axia Network to continue advancing governance work.

404 DAO → Axia Network transition reference here.


References

Pruitt Martin — Entropy
Dan Peng — Arbitrum Gaming Ventures (AGV)
Sinkas —OpCo
Patrick McCorry — OAT / Arbitrum Foundation


Disclosures

Please disclose all of the applicant’s/nominee’s actual and potential conflicts of interest, including but not limited to financial, personal, DAO governance, and professional.

I am the founder of Axia Network, a governance and strategy entity that participates in DAO governance and may pursue research, advisory, ecosystem strategy, or business development work with DAOs and crypto organizations.

Potential conflicts could arise if Axia, an Axia client, or an entity with which I have a financial, advisory, referral, token, equity, or business relationship becomes involved in an OpCo or OAT matter. If elected, I would disclose and recuse from any such matter where appropriate, and comply with all confidentiality, ethical trading, self-dealing, and conflict-of-interest requirements.

I do not represent or work full-time for a direct Arbitrum competitor.

I hold crypto assets and may hold assets related to ecosystems or protocols that interact with Arbitrum. I would comply with any OAT ethical trading, confidentiality, and disclosure requirements, and would disclose specific holdings where required or where they create a material conflict.

Please disclose all active contributor roles and payment streams related to the Arbitrum DAO that the applicant/nominee, and entities that they have a professional or financial relationship with, has and is receiving:

My only active Arbitrum DAO contributor payment stream is participation in the Rewarding Active Delegates (RAD) program through Axia Network.

I will disclose any additional Arbitrum-related contributor role or payment stream if one becomes active.

Declarations

  • The applicant/nominee understands that any offer to join and hold a position in the OAT is contingent on:

    • Successfully completing as well as maintaining updated all relevant non-disclosure agreements, KYC requirements, and other necessary documents

    • Not being a direct representative or full-time employee at network competitors (e.g., Solana, Polygon, Optimism, etc)

    • An individual will be entitled to run as a candidate for the election. No single organisation should be overly represented in the OAT. There should be no more than 1 candidate associated with a single entity.

    • If a candidate is elected on behalf of an organisation, then the OAT membership is tied to them and cannot be rotated to someone else in the organisation. It will be up to the current OAT to enforce the above policy, and if a candidate is excluded from the election, then the rationale must be publicly disclosed to the ArbitrumDAO

    • Being aligned with the community values listed in The Amended Constitution of the Arbitrum DAO, following the Code of Conduct for delegates, being committed to prioritizing the Arbitrum DAO’s needs, and acting in absolute good faith and utmost honesty to fulfill their duties to the best of their abilities.

  • The applicant/nominator confirms that they have read and understood all the content within this form and that the information submitted is accurate and complete: Yes

Applicant / Nominee Information

  • Full Name: Tom Berry (@atomist)

  • Contact Information: atomist@castlelabs.io / @atomist on Telegram

  • Current Occupation: Co-Founder, Castle Labs

  • Country of Residence / Time Zone: United Kingdom / BST (UTC+1)

Nominator Information

N/A

Applicant / Nominee Qualifications and Experience

Identify one of the domains described within the Desired Qualifications section in the OpCo - Oversight and Transparency Committee (OAT) Application Process Overview forum post in which you have the most experience and describe that experience:

I am applying to the Corporate Finance, Capital Allocation, and Financial & Risk Management domain, with a profile that also has strong coverage in Business Development, Venture Building, and Strategy & Operations domain.

Most of my relevant experience in the primary domain lies at the intersection of capital allocation, programme oversight, and DAO operations, roles I have held within the Arbitrum DAO itself.

As an advisor to the Long-Term Incentive Program Pilot (LTIPP) and STIP Bridge, I worked directly with applicants to refine their funding requests, justify budgets, and design incentive mechanisms that the DAO could actually hold them to and that would deliver broader benefits to the ecosystem. Across both programmes, Castle reviewed more than 60 protocol applications. The collaborative revision process helped reduce total grant requests by more than half, from 152.4M ARB to 65.9M ARB, making DAO fund allocation more efficient.

The allocator-side work continued through Castle’s role as a Research Member of ARDC V2, which I led, where our outputs included:

We took this experience a step further by continuing our role as allocators through Castle’s Domain Allocator role in the New Protocols and Ideas domain of the D.A.O. Grants Program. We were responsible for evaluating live funding applications against criteria for budget transparency, measurable impact, execution credibility, and post-grant sustainability.

I am a co-founder of Castle Labs and have led the company from its bootstrapping and incorporation through to today, establishing it as a well-known research company. That has meant managing budgets, pricing, runway, hiring, and cost reductions through difficult market periods, while making the capital allocation decisions required to build a sustainable business from zero without outside funding. Running a self-funded company in the sector has deepened my understanding of what fiscal controls mean when the money being protected is your own.

Building and growing Castle from a community research collective into an advisory firm serving institutional clients, protocols, and Arbitrum-aligned entities has allowed me to strengthen my experience in Business Development, Venture Building, and Strategy & Operations and Human Resources & Talent Management. I have anchored on capital allocation because it is where my Arbitrum-specific track record is strongest, and because the OAT’s hardest recurring decisions, including budgets, salaries, third-party deals, and performance accountability, sit closest to that domain.

Describe your network and reputation within the blockchain/technology industry. Have you previously represented a crypto brand and/or navigated DAO governance:

I have publicly represented Castle Labs since its founding, and Castle has represented itself within Arbitrum since the DAO’s earliest days.

Castle’s work has been utilised, amplified, and referenced by Arbitrum-aligned entities, delegates, ambassadors, ecosystem contributors, and research organisations. In addition to the service work we have done for the DAO, we have run multiple media campaigns for Arbitrum, with Castle’s coverage becoming one of the ecosystem’s most consistently referenced editorial voices.

Castle’s research reaches 1,600+ organisations across some of the largest institutions, exchanges, protocols, investors, foundations, and media companies in the world. We are currently laser focused on onchain finance, across RWAs, tokenisation, compliance infrastructure, onchain credit, neobanks, agentic payments and more, with our network growing in these sectors everyday.

Separately, Castle has worked with or supported protocols and ecosystems including Mantle, Starknet, Ink, Berachain, Stacks, Almanak, Resolv, Curvance, and OpenEden. This gives me a broad view of how other ecosystems structure incentives, reporting, and contributor accountability, while my deepest governance experience remains inside Arbitrum. Furthermore, I have delivered keynotes and conducted founder interviews at major industry events, including EthCC and ETH Milan, where Castle co-hosted Arbitrum Day last year.

Detail your experience in advisory, governance, and/or oversight roles:

  • Advisor and allocator: Through my experience within LTIPP, STIP Bridge, ARDC V2, and the Domain Allocator role, I have spent more than two years evaluating other teams’ requests for DAO capital, designing or applying the scoring rubrics and application frameworks used to assess them, and holding funded teams to their stated milestones. That work requires the same basic judgement the OAT needs: separate ambition from practical execution, ask for evidence before approving spend, make trade-offs explicit, and stay useful to contributors without becoming captured by them.

  • DAO Relations partner to AGV: In March 2025, the Gaming Catalyst Program brought Castle in as its dedicated DAO Relations partner during a period of significant delegate concern and scrutiny, including the clawback debate. Castle was brought in to improve consistent updates, create a structured communication calendar, and facilitate two-way engagement between GCP and the DAO. Since then, our mandate has been to rebuild transparency and trust by supporting AGV’s Transparency Reports, running communications for the 2026 AGV Council election, coordinating delegate-facing updates, and re-establishing a predictable information flow between the entity and the DAO. During our work for AGV, I have led the engagement, sitting between an AAE and the delegates who fund it, ensuring the information flowing between them is timely, accurate, and honest. I have seen first-hand what happens to an AAE when that flow breaks, and what it takes to repair it.

  • GMX Governance Committee Member: I currently sit on the GMX Governance Committee, giving me direct, ongoing experience of protocol-level governance on Arbitrum’s largest native perpetuals exchange, as well as representing them within Arbitrum DAO governance.

Have you previously contributed to the Arbitrum DAO? Describe any relevant experiences through which you’ve gained an understanding of the DAO’s current structure, contributors, and programs:

  • Delegate since the DAO’s inception, through Castle Labs, participating in research, proposal feedback, and voting through an internal committee process.

  • LTIPP Advisor and STIP Bridge Advisor, reviewing and refining more than 60 protocol applications, supporting applicant teams through budget and mechanism design, and helping reduce aggregate funding requests from 152.4M ARB to 65.9M ARB.

  • Multisig Signer Service member, contributing to operational reliability and trust in DAO execution.

  • ARB Staking Rewards Source working group contributor, participating in one of the DAO’s core incentive and token utility discussions.

  • ARDC V2 Research Member, in partnership with DefiLlama Research, producing grant programme recommendations for Season 3, governance vulnerability research, incentive programme analysis, and ecosystem mapping.

  • Supervisor to the Domain Allocator, D.A.O. Grants Program, in the New Protocols and Ideas domain, reviewing live funding applications and supporting grant programme execution.

  • DAO Relations partner to GCP/AGV from March 2025, supporting structured DAO communications, transparency reporting, council election communications, and delegate engagement during a period of low trust between the entity and the DAO.

  • Education domain grantee, through Arbitrum Unlocked 1.0 and 2.0, delivering roughly 845k aggregate impressions of Arbitrum-focused educational content across ten months, meeting 100% of milestones, and publishing full public final reports.

Through these roles, I have worked directly or indirectly with the Arbitrum Foundation, Offchain Labs, Entropy Advisors, Nethermind, AGV, SEEDGov, Questbook, DefiLlama Research, active delegates, grantees, service providers, and protocol teams across the ecosystem. I know the DAO’s current structure not from reading forum posts, but from operating inside its programmes since they were created.

Given the scope of OpCo is relatively broad in its current form, describe how you view OpCo’s role within the DAO and what it should accomplish to deem the entity a success over the next 3-5 years:

OpCo exists to professionalise DAO operations: clearer ownership, better coordination between AAEs, comparable reporting, and faster escalation when mandates drift or delivery falls short. OAT should not run OpCo, but it should make sure OpCo and the AAEs are legible to delegates and accountable to their mandates.

My assessment is that OpCo’s initial phase has delivered less visible coordination than delegates likely expected. Some of that is obviously structural: operating without a Head of OpCo limited its ability to set cadence, coordinate across AAEs, and make its work consistently visible to the DAO. The next phase should be judged less on intent and more on whether it creates predictable reporting, clearer ownership, and decision-useful information for delegates.

Over the next 3–5 years, success would mean

  1. AAEs have clear mandates, visible priorities, and reduced duplication.

  2. OpCo’s key roles are filled by credible operators, with public KPIs and regular reporting.

  3. Major programmes report against a common minimum standard, making cost, delivery, and impact comparable.

  4. The DAO has a clearer path to financial sustainability, with budgets, revenue opportunities, and new entities assessed through disciplined accountability and clear strategic objectives.

References

  • JoJo, Blockworks (worked together in LTIPP, STIP Bridge, D.A.O.)

  • Dan or Rick, Arbitrum Gaming Ventures

  • Matt Fiebach, Entropy Advisors (worked together in ARDC V2)

  • Tamara, OpCo (worked together in ARDC V2)

Disclosures

Please disclose all of the applicant’s/nominee’s actual and potential conflicts of interest, including but not limited to financial, personal, DAO governance, and professional:

  • Castle Labs currently serves as the DAO Relations partner for Arbitrum Gaming Ventures (AGV)

  • I sit on the GMX Governance Committee, which controls 8M ARB voting power from GMX DAO.

  • Castle Labs has previously provided research, advisory, content, and distribution services to protocols deployed on Arbitrum as well as competitor ecosystems, and may do so again. Any future engagement that conflicts with Arbitrum would be disclosed to the council, and I would recuse myself from it internally.

Please disclose all active contributor roles and payment streams related to the Arbitrum DAO that the applicant/nominee, and entities that they have a professional or financial relationship with, have and is receiving:

  • Castle Labs <> AGV DAO Relations engagement, paid and ongoing as above. If elected, I would recuse myself from any involvement with AGV re: Castle operations.

  • While Castle Labs is signed up to Arbitrum’s RAD, we are below the 200k ARB voting power to receive any rewards. If elected to the OAT, I would resign from the RAD program.

  • While Castle is a Domain Allocator within the D.A.O. Program, I personally do not receive payment from this service. The program has a few months of maintenance left.

Declarations

I acknowledge that any offer to join and hold a position in the OAT is contingent on:

  • Successfully completing as well as maintaining updated all relevant non-disclosure agreements, KYC requirements, and other necessary documents

  • Not being a direct representative or full-time employee at network competitors (e.g., Solana, Polygon, Optimism, etc)

  • An individual will be entitled to run as a candidate for the election. No single organisation should be overly represented in the OAT. There should be no more than 1 candidate associated with a single entity.

  • If a candidate is elected on behalf of an organisation, then the OAT membership is tied to them and cannot be rotated to someone else in the organisation. It will be up to the current OAT to enforce the above policy, and if a candidate is excluded from the election, then the rationale must be publicly disclosed to the ArbitrumDAO

  • Being aligned with the community values listed in The Amended Constitution of the Arbitrum DAO, following the Code of Conduct for delegates, being committed to prioritizing the Arbitrum DAO’s needs, and acting in absolute good faith and utmost honesty to fulfill their duties to the best of their abilities.

  • If nominating someone else, the nominator confirms that the nominee is aware of their nomination and the essential details related to it

  • The applicant/nominator confirms that they have read and understood all the content within this form and that the information submitted is accurate and complete: Yes

1 Like

Applicant / Nominee Information

  • Full Name: Jojo
  • Contact Information: @jojothecow on Telegram / @JoJo on the Arbitrum forum
  • Current Occupation: Lead analyst and advisor at Blockworks; Program Manager of the Arbitrum D.A.O. Grant Program S3
  • Country of Residence / Time Zone: Italy / CET

Nominator Information

(Not applicable - self-application)

Applicant / Nominee Qualifications and Experience

Identify one of the domains described within the Desired Qualifications section in which you have the most experience and describe that experience:

Corporate Finance, Capital Allocation, and Financial & Risk Management.

Most of my professional work, before my time in the Arbitrum DAO, has been about deciding where capital should go and what could go wrong once it gets there. Even before joining Blockworks I always did risk analysis and modeling for several Arbitrum-native protocols. Today, as lead advisor, my day-to-day work is producing actionable reports for protocols: fee and revenue structures, loan book analysis, comparative economics, and risk assessments.

Within Arbitrum specifically, my experience has been mostly related to be an allocator on behalf of the DAO:

The combination matters for the OAT specifically since the overarching goal of the committee is, at the very end and among others, analyst work applied to oversight.

Describe your network and reputation within the blockchain/technology industry. Have you previously represented a crypto brand and/or navigated DAO governance:

I have been a delegate in the Arbitrum DAO since 2023, recognized by the Arbitrum Foundation as the second highest contributor after L2Beat. Through Blockworks I have multiple ecosystem connections and work daily with protocols, foundations, and service providers across the industry. Within Arbitrum, the roles listed above mean I have worked directly with most of the DAO’s recurring stakeholders: the Foundation, Offchain Labs, Entropy, OpCo, AGV, program operators, and grantee teams.

Detail your experience in advisory, governance, and/or oversight roles:

  • Current member of the AGV council, alongside David Bolger (OCL) John Kennedy and Tim Chang. I was also member of the interim council of the GCP, alongside krz, BobRossi, limes, and coinflip at the very start of the gaming entity
  • Advisor/evaluator across four DAO incentive and grant programs (LTIPP, STIP.b, Stylus, Questbook)
  • Program Manager of the D.A.O. Grant Program, where I am currently the operator producing the reporting and accountability the DAO expects
  • Signer in the Arbitrum Multi-sig Support Service (MSS)
  • Previously governance lead at Camelot

Have you previously contributed to the Arbitrum DAO? Describe any relevant experiences through which you’ve gained an understanding of the DAO’s current structure, contributors, and programs:

Yes, continuously since 2023. Two points worth adding. First, I have seen the DAO’s programs from both sides: as a delegate voting on and scrutinizing them, and as an operator running one and being scrutinized. That dual perspective is directly relevant to a committee whose job is to hold an operating entity accountable without micromanaging it. Second, as part of the D.A.O. Grant Program I authored the mid-term summary report analyzing the state of Arbitrum from the perspective of the teams building on it, which required a working knowledge from the perspective of DAO programs, delegates, and protocols’ operators.

Given the scope of OpCo is relatively broad in its current form, describe how you view OpCo’s role within the DAO and what it should accomplish to deem the entity a success over the next 3-5 years:

OpCo should be the DAO’s organization and execution layer, not its decision-making one. The DAO should be able to decide once properly informed on what is happening, ecosystem’s goals and other info that, with the current setup, only OpCo is able to produce through connections with the Foundation and Labs entities; OpCo makes the decision happen with professional standards. In 3-5 years I would call OpCo a success if three things are true:

  1. Execution speed in the entities measurably better. Proposals and programs that are needed and havea consensus in the DAO should be executed by the appropriate entities in a timely manner. We should not spend time in the limbo made by the assignment of ownership, the establishment of deliverables etc. We don’t have infinite time. OpCo should directly act on this.
  2. Follow-up on initiatives is materially better. Proposals, Researches, Succesfull programs that are well executed do not die after their natural end but they are put at the service and are served by other entities and programs. We should not reinvet the wheel everytime, and we should leverage what we have created so far instead of leaving it unused. OpCo should create shared repositories with the knowledge of all entities.
  3. OpCo establish shared cross-functional frameworks for all the entities. We are at the point in which Foundation, Labs, Entropy, DAO, all communicate their results and before that execute tasks in their own way. We dissipate a ton of energy through this, with unaligned uninformed people working on the same problems from different angles. OpCo should allow for better human and knowledge efficiency by putting together different arms of different entities oriented toward the same tasks.

My general view on committees, stated publicly many times as a delegate, applies to the OAT itself: if the DAO elects a committee and assigns a budget, it should trust that committee and judge it on outcomes without micromanaging it. That said, the outcomes should be material, measurable and somehow pre established, albeit with the ability to change it during the course if this is what aligns with new missions, purposes and ambitions the ecosystem might have.

Additional Information

While not required, I want to briefly explain the reasoning behind my candidacy.

I have professionally started my crypto career in Arbitrum. I have been, here, a delegate, an evaluator, and an operator.
DAOs are now different from 6 months ago, and this is reflected by how they operate.
My goal is to participate to the ecosystem by having the highest degree of impact possible; as of today, through the DAO, this is possible only through the OpCo.
At a more grounded level, know the programs OpCo coordinates with because I have evaluated, run, or overseen most of them, and I know what good reporting looks like because producing it is my job. I also have relationship with all the entities involved, and have a deep degree of context about each one.

References

  • Krz (L2Beat)
  • Raam (Arbitrum Foundation)

Disclosures

I am employed by Blockworks, currently winding down its Arbitrum delegate role. I am the Program Manager of the D.A.O. Grant Program, and I am part of the Council of AGV. I am in the RAD program. All DAO roles should come to an end either right at the start or slightly after the new OAT mandate; I plan to step down from any DAO role still active at that time.

Declarations

  • I understand that any offer to join and hold a position in the OAT is contingent on successfully completing and maintaining all relevant non-disclosure agreements, KYC requirements, and other necessary documents.
  • I am not a direct representative or full-time employee at network competitors.
  • I understand that no single organisation should be overly represented in the OAT, that no more than 1 candidate may be associated with a single entity, and that if elected, OAT membership is tied to me and cannot be rotated to someone else in my organization.
  • I am aligned with the community values listed in The Amended Constitution of the Arbitrum DAO, will follow the Code of Conduct for delegates, am committed to prioritizing the Arbitrum DAO’s needs, and will act in absolute good faith and utmost honesty to fulfill my duties to the best of my abilities.
  • I confirm that I have read and understood all the content within this form and that the information submitted is accurate and complete: Yes