DIP v1.7 Final Report: From Engagement to Rewards: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Delegate Incentives Program (May - October 2025)

SEEDGov · December 23, 2025, 10:05pm

Introduction

This report presents a comprehensive analysis of the Delegate Incentive Program (DIP) versions 1.6 and 1.7, covering the period from May 2025 to October 2025. This six-month period represents a significant transition in the program’s evolution, as it encompasses both the final months of DIP v1.6 (May-July 2025) and the implementation of DIP v1.7 (August-October 2025).

The DIP v1.7 was approved by the Arbitrum DAO through Snapshot Proposal on August 7, 2025, and implemented for the August 2025 results. This version introduced significant changes based on learnings from the DIP v1.5-1.6 midterm report, including:

Introduction of Tier X for delegates with ≥500K ARB voting power
~40% reduction in compensation structure
More objective evaluation of Delegate Feedback
Disputes are now limited to objective parameters only
Increased minimum threshold from 50K to 500K ARB
Exclusion of vote-buying platforms
New KPIs and Terms and Conditions

This report analyzes the program’s performance, evaluates the achievement of new KPIs, documents key initiatives, and provides insights for future iterations.

Executive Summary

The Delegate Incentive Program (DIP) v1.6 and v1.7 report covers a transformative six-month period (May-October 2025) that saw the successful transition from DIP v1.6 to v1.7, achieving exceptional results across all key performance indicators. The program demonstrated remarkable efficiency improvements, successfully onboarded high-impact delegates, and maintained exceptional participation rates while reducing costs by 41.6%.

Key Highlights

Period Covered: May 2025 - October 2025 (6 months)
Version Transition: DIP v1.6 (May-July) → DIP v1.7 (August-October)
Total Participants: 25.7 delegates (average per month)
Total Compensation: $402,080.04 over 6 months ($67,013 average per month)
Total VP Incentivized: 114.6M ARB (average per month)
Average Cost per Delegate: $2,611 per month
Efficiency Metrics: 1,881 VP per USD (overall), improving from 1,253 VP/USD (v1.6) to 2,509 VP/USD (v1.7) - a +100.1% improvement

Major Achievements

Successful Implementation of DIP v1.7: The program transitioned smoothly from v1.6 to v1.7 in August 2025, achieving a 41.6% reduction in monthly costs while increasing incentivized voting power by 16.7%, resulting in a 100.1% improvement in efficiency.
New Delegates Onboarded: 5 new high-voting-power delegates joined the program after the v1.7 proposal was published (July 18, 2025), representing 21.80M ARB in total voting power:
- MUX Protocol - Applied July 18, 2025 (10.35M VP)
- David Mihal - Applied September 5, 2025 (6.33M VP)
- APE (Aave’s Protocol Embassy) - Applied August 21, 2025 (2.76M VP)
- whizwang - Applied August 28, 2025 (1.83M VP)
- Lumberg - Applied August 3, 2025 (0.53M VP)
This achievement exceeded the ideal KPI target of 5M VP by 336%, demonstrating exceptional success in the outreach efforts.
Exceptional Participation Rates: High VP delegates achieved an average 99.02% Participation Rate during v1.7, exceeding the ideal target of 90% by 9 percentage points. The program retained an average of 22.3 high VP delegates per month, representing a 6% increase over the baseline of 21 delegates.
Security Council Elections Integration: The program successfully integrated mandatory voting requirements for Security Council elections, achieving 97.21% VP-weighted participation in Election #5 (October 2025), with only 4 delegates disqualified compared to 9 in Election #4 - a 56% reduction in disqualifications.
Quorum Contribution: DIP participants contributed an average of 62.33% of Voting Power in on-chain votes during v1.7 (August-October), compared to 46.03% in v1.6 (May-July), representing a +35.3% improvement in quorum contribution rate.
Vertical Contributor Identification: Successfully identified 5 exceptional contributors who add value in specific verticals (L2Beat, TempeTechie, Tekr0x.eth, Jojo, Lampros DAO), demonstrating the program’s effectiveness as a talent identification and retention pipeline.

TL;DR

DIP v1.7 achieved exceptional results across all KPIs:

Cost Efficiency: Reduced monthly spend by 41.6% while increasing incentivized VP by 16.7%, achieving a +100.1% efficiency improvement
Delegate Retention: Maintained 99.02% average PR among high VP delegates, exceeding the 90% ideal target by 9 percentage points
New Delegates: Onboarded 5 high VP delegates representing 21.8M ARB - 4.36x the ideal target
Quorum Contribution: DIP participants contributed 62.33% of VP in on-chain votes during v1.7, up from 46.03% in v1.6
Security Council Elections: Achieved 97.21% VP-weighted participation with only 4 disqualifications (56% reduction vs. previous election)
Vertical Contributors: Identified 5 exceptional contributors specializing in technical analysis, community engagement, gaming, governance, and analytics

1. KEY METRICS OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS

1.1 - Voting History

The following analysis covers all voting activity from the inception of the DAO in early 2023 through October 31, 2025.

Note: For the purpose of assigning proposals to a given date range, the proposal’s end date is used.

Note 2: Test and cancelled proposals are excluded.

Snapshot: 392 total proposals, averaging 12.65 proposals per month (31 months operational).
- 131 proposals in 2023, averaging 14.5 proposals per month (9 months operational)
- 212 proposals in 2024, averaging 17.67 (+21.86% YoY) proposals per month.
- 49 proposals in 2025 (Jan-Oct), averaging 4.9 (72.3% YoY) proposals per month (10 months operational)
Tally: 70 total proposals, averaging 2.26 proposals per month (31 months operational).
- 12 proposals in 2023, averaging 1.33 proposals per month (9 months operational).
- 41 proposals in 2024, averaging 3.42 (+157.14% YoY) proposals per month.
- 17 proposals in 2025 (Jan-Oct), averaging 1.70 (50.3% YoY) proposals per month. (10 months operational)

The trend identified in the midterm report has continued and intensified throughout 2025. When comparing the overall averages, the decline in proposal volume is evident: the average monthly proposal count across the full 31-month period (12.65 for Snapshot, 2.26 for Tally) is lower than the 25-month average reported in April 2025 (14.52 for Snapshot, 2.44 for Tally), indicating that the downward trend has persisted and accelerated in recent months.

While it’s important to note that Snapshot activity in 2024 was boosted by voting on STIP.B (18 proposals) and LTIPP (91 proposals), even when excluding those, the average remains slightly over 8 proposals per month—still well above the 4.9 proposals per month seen in 2025. This reflects an adjusted 37.5% drop in Snapshot activity relative to 2024 (excluding STIP.B and LTIPP).

In terms of Tally proposals, comparing the first ten months of 2024 to the same period in 2025 (for a more accurate seasonal comparison), there were 37 vs. 17 proposals, respectively, showing a decline from 3.70 to 1.70 proposals per month (-54.1% YoY). This decline is more pronounced than the overall yearly average, indicating that the reduction in on-chain proposal volume has been particularly significant in 2025.

The structural changes identified in the midterm report have continued to evolve and deepen, reflecting a broader shift toward professionalization and institutional maturity within ArbitrumDAO. This evolution aligns with the vision outlined for Arbitrum’s future, where the DAO increasingly delegates operational responsibilities to specialized entities/full-time contributors while maintaining strategic oversight over high-impact decisions.

The institutionalization process that began in 2024 has now reached a new phase with several significant consolidations and transitions:

Operational Company (OpCo) has become operational following recent key hires and organizational developments. As a DAO-adjacent entity for strategy execution, OpCo now serves as the primary coordination point for contributors seeking to create proposals, while also managing its own programs. While contributors can still submit proposals independently, coordination with Arbitrum-Aligned Entities (AAEs) such as Arbitrum Foundation, Entropy, Offchain Labs, or OpCo has become increasingly important for proposal success.
Treasury Management consolidation: The previous STEP and Treasury Management 1.2 structures have been unified into the Arbitrum Treasury Management Council (ATMC), which now handles treasury management with a streamlined governance model.
Multisig Support Services (MSS) sunset: The MSS has been wound down, with multisig administration and payment processing responsibilities transferred to the Arbitrum Foundation, which already had compliance oversight of nearly all MSS activities.
Audit Program transition: The ADPC (Audit Domain Program Committee) no longer exists, with the Arbitrum Foundation now directly managing audit subsidies through the Arbitrum Audit Program.
Entropy’s renewed mandate: Entropy Advisors has renewed its engagement with the DAO under a new mandate but continues to manage various programs with committee structures.

These changes represent a maturation of the governance system, where operational efficiency and professionalization allow delegates to focus their time and attention on the most critical strategic decisions rather than routine operational matters. The reduction in proposal volume should be understood not as a sign of decreased DAO activity but rather as evidence of a maturing governance system that has successfully professionalized its operations, improved efficiency, and optimized the allocation of delegate attention toward higher-impact decisions. This evolution enables the DAO to operate more effectively while maintaining its decentralized governance principles, with specialized entities and full-time contributors handling operational complexity so that delegates can focus on strategic oversight.

1.2 - Delegates Participation

Number of Voters

The following data has been extracted from Snapshot and Tally.

Snapshot:

In 2023, 3,380,028 votes were cast on 131 proposals.
- Average: 25,801 votes per proposal.
In 2024, 2,100,739 votes were cast on 212 proposals.
- Average: 9,909.15 votes per proposal (-61.6% YoY).
In 2025 (Jan-Oct): 148,770 votes were cast on 49 proposals.
- Average: 3,036.12 votes per proposal (-69.4% YoY).

Tally:

In 2023, 390,775 votes were cast on 12 proposals.
- Average: 32,564.58 votes per proposal.
In 2024, 322,891 votes were cast on 41 proposals.
- Average: 7,875.39 votes per proposal (-75.82% YoY).
In 2025 (Jan-Oct): 62,188 votes were cast on 17 proposals
- Average: 3,658.12 votes per proposal (-53.6% YoY).

Note: The canceled proposal “Register the Sky Custom Gateway contracts in the Router” (June 9, 2025, with 372 voters) has been excluded from the 2025 Tally calculations.

Analysis: The trend of decreasing individual voter participation continues in 2025, with both Snapshot and Tally showing significant YoY declines in average votes per proposal (-69.4% and -53.6%, respectively). This decline in the number of individual voters contrasts with the increasing Voting Power (VP) cast per proposal, indicating that while fewer individual voters are participating, those who do participate are holding and casting more voting power. This concentration of voting power among fewer participants is consistent with the patterns observed in the Top 50 delegates analysis below and highlights the critical importance of maintaining strong incentives for high-VP delegates to ensure consistent participation.

1.3 - Voting Power Cast

From the beginning of the DAO until October 2025, we had 462 proposals, between Snapshot voting (392 proposals) and Tally voting (70 proposals).

For off-chain votes (Snapshot):

In 2023, there were a total of 131 proposals, averaging 142.27M VP.
In 2024, there were a total of 212 proposals, averaging 150.61M VP (+5.86% YoY).
In 2025 (Jan-Oct), there were a total of 49 proposals, averaging 175.15M VP (+16.3% YoY).

For on-chain votes (Tally):

2023:

Core: 5 proposals, averaging 171.06M VP
Treasury: 7 proposals, averaging 170.35M VP
Combined: 12 proposals, averaging 170.64M VP

2024:

Core: 7 proposals, averaging 182.93M VP (+6.9% YoY)
Treasury: 34 proposals, averaging 163.08M VP (-4.3% YoY)
Combined: 41 proposals, averaging 166.47M VP (-2.4% YoY)

2025 (Jan-Oct):

Core: 7 proposals, averaging 228.89M VP (+25.1% YoY)
Treasury: 10 proposals, averaging 197.64M VP (+21.2% YoY)
Combined: 17 proposals, averaging 210.51M VP (+26.5% YoY)

When analyzing both the number of voters and the average Voting Power (VP) cast across proposals, we observe a clear trend: although the number of individual voters has been decreasing year over year, the amount of VP participating in each vote has increased. This is particularly evident in on-chain votes—while reaching 150M ARB used to be a challenge in early 2024, since Q4 2024 and throughout 2025, participation has stabilized above the 200M ARB mark, with Core proposals consistently averaging above 220M VP in 2025.

An important data point is that, when breaking down the 2024 voting activity into pre- and post-DIP periods, we observe that the average VP per proposal in early 2024 was on a downward trend compared to 2023. However, following the implementation of the DIP, there was a clear recovery. By the end of 2024, with DIP 1.5 in place, participation levels even surpassed those of 2023. The trend has continued into 2025, with both Core and Treasury proposals showing substantial YoY increases (+25.1% and +21.2% respectively), demonstrating sustained improvement in delegate participation. Below, we will analyze how much of this VP was directly contributed by DIP participants, although the causal relationship between the 2024 rise in average VP and the launch of the program is already evident.

1.4 - Top 50 Delegates Participation Rate Analysis

This section examines the historical Participation Rate (PR) of the Top 50 delegates by Voting Power and analyzes the distribution of voting power across different participation rate tiers. Understanding this distribution is critical for assessing quorum achievement patterns and the role of delegates with varying participation rates in maintaining governance functionality.

Data Source: Information from the “TOP 50 DELEGATES PR” sheet in the DIP 1.7 Final Report Excel file, which contains detailed data on delegate voting power, participation rates, and their contribution to quorum requirements.

Key Findings:

The Top 50 delegates collectively hold approximately 325.15M ARB in voting power. When analyzing their historical Participation Rates, we observe the following distribution:

PR ≥ 95%: 12 delegates, 110.83M ARB (34.09% of Top 50 VP)
PR ≥ 75% and < 95%: 9 delegates, 70.71M ARB (21.75% of Top 50 VP)
PR ≥ 50% and < 75%: 6 delegates, 43.38M ARB (13.34% of Top 50 VP)
PR ≥ 25% and < 50%: 4 delegates, 37.86M ARB (11.64% of Top 50 VP)
PR < 25%: 19 delegates, 62.37M ARB (19.18% of Top 50 VP)

Important Note on LobbyFi:

Within the PR ≥ 75% and < 95% tier, LobbyFi holds 12.74M ARB (3.92% of Top 50 VP) with a historical Participation Rate of 86.49%. However, LobbyFi is a vote-buying platform that allows delegators to sell their voting power through auctions or direct purchases to the highest bidder. LobbyFi’s recent participation has declined significantly: while its historical PR is 86.49%, its recent voting rate has dropped to 60%, with recent constitutional voting at 80% and non-constitutional at 80%. This reduced participation, combined with the platform’s vote-selling model, represents a significant factor in the quorum achievement.

Analysis Excluding LobbyFi:

When excluding LobbyFi from the analysis, the distribution and quorum implications change substantially:

PR ≥ 75% and < 95% (excluding LobbyFi): 8 delegates, 57.97M ARB (17.83% of Top 50 VP)
Total PR ≥ 75% (excluding LobbyFi): 20 delegates, 168.80M ARB (51.92% of Top 50 VP)
Total PR ≥ 50% (excluding LobbyFi): 26 delegates, 212.18M ARB (65.25% of Top 50 VP)

Quorum Achievement Analysis:

Assuming current quorum thresholds as of October 2025 (215.44M ARB for constitutional proposals and 143.63M ARB for non-constitutional proposals), the cumulative voting power by participation rate tier reveals:

Including LobbyFi:

Delegates with PR ≥ 75% (21 delegates, 181.54M ARB): Represent 84.3% of the constitutional quorum and 126.4% of the non-constitutional quorum
Delegates with PR ≥ 50% (27 delegates, 224.92M ARB): Represent 104.4% of the constitutional quorum and 156.6% of the non-constitutional quorum

Excluding LobbyFi:

Delegates with PR ≥ 75% (20 delegates, 168.80M ARB): Represent 78.3% of the constitutional quorum and 117.5% of the non-constitutional quorum, with a gap of 46.64M ARB (21.7% of the quorum) to reach the constitutional quorum
Delegates with PR ≥ 50% (26 delegates, 212.18M ARB): Represent 98.5% of constitutional quorum and 147.7% of non-constitutional quorum, falling short of constitutional quorum by 3.26M ARB (1.5% of quorum)

6-Month Comparison (April 2025 vs October 2025):

Comparing the current distribution with the previous report (excluding LobbyFi in both periods for consistency), we observe the following changes:

PR ≥ 95%: Remained at 12 delegates, but VP increased by +12.76M ARB (+13.0%), now representing 35.48% of Top 50 VP (up from 33.30%)
PR ≥ 75% and < 95%: Increased from 7 to 8 delegates, but VP decreased by 3.37M ARB (-5.5%), now representing 18.56% of Top 50 VP (down from 20.83%)
PR ≥ 50% and < 75%: Remained at 6 delegates, but VP increased by +7.91M ARB (+22.3%), now representing 13.89% of Top 50 VP (up from 12.04%)
PR ≥ 25% and < 50%: Remained at 4 delegates, but VP increased by +10.41M ARB (+37.9%), now representing 12.12% of Top 50 VP (up from 9.32%)
PR < 25%: Decreased from 20 to 19 delegates, and VP decreased by 9.82M ARB (-13.6%), now representing 19.96% of Top 50 VP (down from 24.51%)

Key Observations from the 6-Month Comparison:

Consolidation in High-PR Tiers: The PR ≥ 95% tier saw the largest absolute VP increase (+12.76M ARB, +13.0%), indicating that high-participation delegates are accumulating more voting power. This is a positive trend for quorum reliability.
Growth in Moderate-PR Tiers: Both the PR 50-75% and PR 25-50% tiers saw significant VP growth (+22.3% and +37.9%, respectively), suggesting that delegates in these ranges are either gaining delegations or existing delegates are improving their participation rates.
Reduction in Low-PR Tier: The PR < 25% tier decreased from 20 to 19 delegates and experienced a VP decrease of 9.82M ARB (-13.6%), which could indicate either delegations moving away from low-activity delegates or some delegates improving their participation rates and moving to higher tiers.
Overall Improvement in PR ≥ 50%: The cumulative PR ≥ 50% tier increased from 25 to 26 delegates and from 194.88M to 212.18M ARB (+8.9%), improving the DAO’s ability to achieve quorum through high-participation delegates.

Quorum Dependency Changes (6-Month Comparison):

Comparing quorum dependency between April 2025 and October 2025 (excluding LobbyFi in both periods):

PR ≥ 75% delegates: The gap to constitutional quorum increased from 40.59M ARB to 46.64M ARB (+6.05M ARB), representing 79.7% to 78.3% of constitutional quorum (-1.4 percentage points). This increase in the gap is primarily due to quorum growth (from ~200M to 215.44M ARB) outpacing the VP growth in this tier (+5.9%).
PR ≥ 50% delegates: The gap to constitutional quorum improved, decreasing from 5.12M ARB to 3.26M ARB (-1.86M ARB), representing 97.4% to 98.5% of constitutional quorum (+1.1 percentage points). This improvement is due to the substantial VP growth in the PR 50-75% tier (+22.3%) and PR 25-50% tier (+37.9%), which helped close the gap despite quorum increases.

Implications: While the DAO’s dependence on PR ≥ 75% delegates for constitutional quorum has increased (gap grew by 6.05M ARB), the overall situation has improved when considering PR ≥ 50% delegates: the gap decreased by 1.86M ARB, meaning the DAO is now less dependent on low-PR delegates to achieve constitutional quorum. However, the margin remains narrow (only 1.5% above quorum), and the system still depends on consistent participation from these 26 delegates.

This analysis demonstrates that the DAO relies heavily on high-participation delegates to achieve quorum, particularly for constitutional proposals. When excluding LobbyFi—which represents a vote-selling platform with declining participation—the situation becomes more precarious: delegates with PR ≥ 50% collectively hold 98.5% of constitutional quorum, meaning the DAO would need additional participation from lower-PR delegates or from LobbyFi (with its associated governance risks) to meet constitutional quorum requirements.

Implications for Governance Resilience:

The concentration of voting power among delegates with varying participation rates creates both opportunities and risks:

High-Participation Delegates (PR ≥ 75%): Including LobbyFi, these 21 delegates hold 181.54M ARB, which is sufficient for a non-constitutional quorum but falls short of a constitutional quorum by approximately 33.9M ARB (15.7% of quorum). Excluding LobbyFi, the gap increases to 46.64M ARB (21.7% of quorum), significantly increasing the DAO’s reliance on additional participation from delegates with lower PR or from LobbyFi itself to meet constitutional quorum requirements.
The LobbyFi Risk: LobbyFi’s presence in the high-PR tier creates a dual vulnerability:
- Vote-selling model: As a platform that sells voting power to the highest bidder, LobbyFi’s votes can be purchased by any actor, including potential attackers or entities with interests misaligned with the DAO. This creates a governance attack vector where a malicious actor could theoretically purchase LobbyFi’s 12.74M ARB of voting power to influence critical constitutional proposals.
- Declining participation: LobbyFi’s recent voting rate (60%) is significantly lower than its historical rate (86.49%), it means that it cannot be reliably counted on for quorum achievement. This reduces the effective voting power available for quorum.
Moderate-Participation Delegates (PR 50-75%): The 6 delegates in this tier hold 43.38M ARB, which bridges the gap between high-participation delegates and the constitutional quorum. However, this creates a dependency on delegates who may not vote consistently. When excluding LobbyFi, these delegates become even more critical, as they help close the gap from 78.3% to 98.5% of the constitutional quorum.
Low-Participation Delegates (PR < 50%): The 23 delegates with PR < 50% collectively hold 100.23M ARB (32.08% of Top 50 VP, excluding LobbyFi), representing a significant portion of voting power that is not consistently engaged. This highlights the importance of incentive programs like the DIP in encouraging participation from these delegates. When LobbyFi is excluded, and high-PR delegates fall short, the DAO becomes increasingly dependent on these low-participation delegates to achieve quorum.

The Critical Importance of Incentives:

The analysis reveals that maintaining strong incentives for voting activity is essential for governance resilience. The DIP plays a crucial role in:

Encouraging consistent participation from delegates across all PR tiers
Reducing the DAO’s reliance on low-activity delegates for quorum achievement
Supporting the participation of high-VP delegates who are critical for meeting quorum thresholds

DVP Quorum Proposal Context:

It is worth noting that during this reporting period, a significant governance proposal was approved by the DAO: the DVP Quorum proposal, which passed Snapshot voting but has not yet been implemented on-chain. This proposal seeks to change quorum calculation from a fixed percentage of the total voteable supply to a percentage of the total delegated voting power (DVP), with recommended thresholds of 40-50% of DVP for non-constitutional proposals and 40-50% of DVP for constitutional proposals, with minimum baselines of 100M ARB and 150M ARB respectively.

If implemented, this change would fundamentally alter the quorum dynamics analyzed above, as quorum would be tied to the actual delegated voting power (approximately 320-360M ARB) rather than the total voteable supply, which continues to increase with token unlocks. This would address the structural issue where quorum thresholds are rising while delegated voting power remains relatively stable, reducing the risk of governance gridlock.

1.5 - DIP Contributions to Quorum Achievement

We analyzed the Voting Power incentivized by the DIP relative to the Average Monthly VP of on-chain votes (extending the analysis from the previous iteration) and found that, despite the average monthly VP in on-chain voting increasing, the DIP has maintained a significant contribution to quorum achievement.

Data Source: Information from the “CONTRIBUTED VP” sheet in the DIP 1.7 Final Report Excel file.

Key Metrics (May-October 2025):

May 2025: 26 incentivized delegates, 226.69M average monthly VP, 111.45M VP contributed (49.16% contribution rate)
June 2025: 22 incentivized delegates, 225.82M average monthly VP, 105.87M VP contributed (46.88% contribution rate)
July 2025: 22 incentivized delegates, 237.87M average monthly VP, 100.00M VP contributed (42.04% contribution rate)
August 2025: 28 incentivized delegates, 214.52M average monthly VP, 126.71M VP contributed (59.07% contribution rate)
September 2025: 30 incentivized delegates, 216.65M average monthly VP, 127.21M VP contributed (58.72% contribution rate, monthly ATH)
October 2025: 26 incentivized delegates, 168.07M average monthly VP, 116.32M VP contributed (69.21% contribution rate)

Trend Analysis:

The contribution rate increased significantly in v1.7 (August-October), averaging 62.33% compared to 46.03% in v1.6 (May-July)
Despite a reduction in the number of incentivized delegates in some months, the VP contribution rate improved, demonstrating the program’s increased efficiency under v1.7
October 2025 showed the highest contribution rate (69.21%), indicating strong alignment between incentivized VP and active participation in on-chain votes

1.6 - DIP 1.6-1.7 Economic Metrics

Total Compensation in USD

Period	VP >500K	VP <500K	Total	Change vs Previous
May 2025 (v1.6)	$64,928.28	$28,748.98	$93,677.26	-
June 2025 (v1.6)	$48,638.51	$30,695.51	$79,334.03	-15.3%
July 2025 (v1.6)	$46,881.08	$34,008.11	$80,889.19	+2.0%
August 2025 (v1.7)	$39,312.30	$11,478.40	$50,790.69	-37.2%
September 2025 (v1.7)	$36,400.73	$17,334.99	$53,735.72	+5.8%
October 2025 (v1.7)	$30,543.38	$13,109.77	$43,653.15	-18.8%
Total (6 months)	$266,704.28	$135,375.76	$402,080.04	-

Key Insights:

DIP v1.6 average (May-July): $84,633.49/month
DIP v1.7 average (Aug-Oct): $49,393.19/month
Reduction: -41.6% in total monthly spend
The transition to v1.7 achieved significant cost savings while increasing high VP delegate participation

Total Voting Power Incentivized

This metric shows the sum of Average Voting Power (AVG VP) of all compensated delegates, measuring how much voting power is being incentivized by the program.

Period	VP >500K	VP <500K	Total VP	Total USD	VP per USD
May 2025 (v1.6)	110,485,840	964,430	111,450,270	$93,677.26	1,189.73
June 2025 (v1.6)	104,650,000	1,217,240	105,867,240	$79,334.03	1,334.45
July 2025 (v1.6)	99,060,000	942,210	100,002,210	$80,889.19	1,236.29
August 2025 (v1.7)	126,208,850	498,490	126,707,340	$50,790.69	2,494.70
September 2025 (v1.7)	126,533,150	679,620	127,212,770	$53,735.72	2,367.38
October 2025 (v1.7)	115,882,900	438,390	116,321,290	$43,653.15	2,664.67

Key Insights:

Program Efficiency Significantly Improved: DIP v1.7 achieved 2,509 VP per USD vs 1,253 VP per USD in v1.6 (+100.1% overall improvement)
High VP delegates (>500K ARB): Improved from 2,553 VP per USD to 3,958 VP per USD (+55.0%)
Low VP delegates (<500K ARB): Improved from 51 VP per USD to 61 VP per USD (+20.6%)
More VP, Less Cost: v1.7 incentivized 16.7% more voting power while spending 41.6% less
Strategic Focus: 99.3% of incentivized VP is from high VP delegates (>500K ARB)
ROI Improvement: The program achieved significantly better return on investment in v1.7, with high VP delegates showing the most substantial efficiency gains

Cost per Delegate

Voting Activities:

Period	VP >500K	VP <500K	Average
May 2025	$2,896.95	$2,231.32	$2,564.13
June 2025	$2,794.25	$2,501.06	$2,647.66
July 2025	$2,779.28	$2,397.16	$2,588.22
August 2025	$1,461.96	$1,482.22	$1,472.09
September 2025	$1,390.85	$1,560.92	$1,475.88
October 2025	$1,325.18	$1,609.03	$1,467.11

Other Activities:

Period	VP >500K	VP <500K	Average
May 2025	$922.89	$963.01	$942.95
June 2025	$679.93	$1,335.88	$1,007.90
July 2025	$826.96	$1,381.52	$1,104.24
August 2025	$247.27	$813.46	$530.37
September 2025	$191.79	$915.51	$553.65
October 2025	$132.68	$1,012.92	$572.80

Amount of Incentivized Delegates

Period	VP >500K	VP <500K	Total
May 2025	17	9	26
June 2025	14	8	22
July 2025	13	9	22
August 2025	23	5	28
September 2025	23	7	30
October 2025	21	5	26
Average	18	7	26

Comparative Analysis: First 3 Months vs Last 3 Months

Metric	First 3-Month AVG (May-July)	Last 3-Month AVG (Aug-Oct)	Variance
TOTAL VP INCENTIVIZED
VP >500K	104,731,947	122,874,967	+17.3%
VP <500K	1,041,293	538,833	-48.3%
Total VP	105,773,240	123,413,800	+16.7%
VP PER USD (EFFICIENCY)
Overall	1,253.49	2,508.92	+100.1%
VP >500K	2,553.44	3,957.66	+55.0%
VP <500K	50.84	61.32	+20.6%
COST PER DELEGATE (Voting)
VP >500K	$2,823.49	$1,392.66	-50.7%
VP <500K	$2,376.51	$1,550.72	-34.8%
COST PER DELEGATE (Other)
VP >500K	$809.93	$190.58	-76.5%
VP <500K	$1,226.80	$913.96	-25.5%
AMOUNT OF INCENTIVIZED DELEGATES
VP >500K	15	22	+52.3%
VP <500K	9	6	-34.6%

Analysis:

Upon conducting this comparative analysis between the first three months (May-July 2025, DIP v1.6) and the last three months (August-October 2025, DIP v1.7), we observe significant variations across most variables, largely driven by the structural changes implemented in DIP v1.7:

Voting Power Incentivization and Efficiency

The amount of incentivized Voting Power for high VP delegates (>500K ARB) has improved substantially, increasing from 104.7M to 122.9M VP per month (+17.3%). Simultaneously, the ARB per USD Spent ratio has improved for both ranges, though the improvement is more pronounced for high VP delegates (+55.0%) compared to low VP delegates (+20.6%).

The efficiency gap between ranges has widened: incentivizing high VP delegates is now 64.54 times more efficient than incentivizing low VP delegates (3,958 VP/USD vs 61 VP/USD), compared to 47.21 times in the previous period. This +36.7% increase in the efficiency gap reflects the cumulative effect of the Voting Power Multiplier and the strategic focus on high-impact delegates. While this gap may seem striking, it represents a deliberate optimization of program resources toward delegates who have the greatest impact on quorum achievement:

Efficiency Breakthrough: The most remarkable achievement is the 100.1% overall improvement in VP per USD efficiency - from 1,253 VP/USD (v1.6) to 2,509 VP/USD (v1.7). This improvement was driven primarily by high VP delegates, who achieved a 55.0% improvement (from 2,553 to 3,958 VP/USD), while low VP delegates also improved by 20.6% (from 51 to 61 VP/USD).
More Impact, Less Cost: Despite reducing monthly spend by 41.6% (from $84,633 to $49,393), the program incentivized 16.7% more total voting power (from 105.8M VP to 123.4M VP average per month).

Delegate Participation Patterns

The number of incentivized delegates in the low VP range (<500K ARB) has decreased by 34.6% (from 9 to 6 average per month), while the opposite trend is observed in the high VP range, which increased by 52.3% (from 15 to 22 average per month). This reversal of dominance reflects the implementation of the 500K ARB minimum threshold for voting activity incentives in DIP v1.7, effectively shifting the program’s focus toward delegates with substantial voting power.

Having said this, the amount of Delegate Feedback and Bonus Points allocated to low VP delegates demonstrates that there remains a group of smaller delegates who actively contribute to the DAO’s governance discussions and community engagement, even if their voting power impact is limited.

Delegates’ Feedback and Bonus Points Distribution

Other Activities (DF and BP): The distribution of incentives for Other Activities shows a different pattern. Low VP delegates consistently receive higher per-delegate incentives for these activities ($914 vs $191 - for High VP - in average in v1.7), reflecting their continued active participation in DAO discussions, provision of feedback, and contributions to get bonus points. This suggests that while incentivizing their voting may be less efficient, low VP delegates remain valuable contributors to the DAO’s discourse and community engagement.

To better understand the distribution of Other Activities (Delegate Feedback and Bonus Points), we analyzed the points allocation according to the VP range:

Key Observations:

Percentage Distribution: High VP delegates accounted for 51.6% of Other Activities points, while low VP delegates accounted for 48.4%. This near-parity is notable given that low VP delegates represent only 6 delegates on average compared to 22 high VP delegates.
Points Per Delegate: Low VP delegates earned an average of 28.23 points per delegate for Other Activities, compared to 7.64 points per delegate for high VP delegates. This indicates that, on a per-delegate basis, low VP delegates are more active contributors to DAO discussions, feedback, and bonus point activities.

Implications:

This analysis reveals that while there are fewer Low-VP delegates incentivized in v1.7, they continue to maintain significant participation relative to their numbers. This means that, although incentivizing their voting may be inefficient, low VP delegates remain a valuable part of the community who tend to make meaningful contributions—especially regarding Bonus Points and Delegate Feedback, where they have earned approximately 48.4% of points despite representing only 21.4% of incentivized delegates (6 out of 28 average).

Program Evolution and Trade-offs

The current framework demonstrates that the DIP effectively incentivizes two distinct groups of activities and Delegate ranges:

Voting activity incentives are significantly more efficient for high VP delegates (>500K ARB), with a 64.54x efficiency advantage. This reflects the program’s strategic optimization toward quorum achievement through high-impact delegates.
Other Activities incentives (Delegate Feedback and Bonus Points) show that low VP delegates, while fewer in number, continue to be active contributors to the DAO’s governance discussions and community engagement, providing value beyond their voting power impact.

The transition to v1.7 has successfully achieved its primary objectives: increasing total voting incentivized power by 16.7% while reducing monthly spend by 41.6%, resulting in a 100.1% improvement in overall efficiency. However, this optimization comes with a trade-off: the program’s current structure does not allow us to maximize efficiency in distributing voting incentives without reducing support for smaller delegates who, although they do not significantly impact quorum attainment, potentially provide considerable value through their contributions to DAO discussions and community engagement.

1.7 - DIP v1.7 KPIs Achievement Analysis

The DIP v1.7 proposal established clear, quantitative KPIs for the remaining months of the program (July-October 2025):

KPI 1: Retain High VP Delegates and Maintain/Increase Participation Rate

Target:

Retain the 21 DIP Participants with ≥500,000 ARB who were actively participating (as of proposal approval)
Maintain their average Participation Rate of 85% in on-chain proposals
Ideal target: Increase to 90%

Baseline (per proposal): 21 active high VP delegates with 85% average PR

Achievement (August-October 2025):

Month	High VP Delegates	Average PR	PR ≥90%	PR <80%
August 2025	23	100.00%	23 (100%)	0
September 2025	23	98.26%	22 (96%)	1*
October 2025	21	98.81%	20 (95%)	1**
v1.7 Average	22.3	99.02%	21.7 (97%)	0.7 (3%)

Detailed Analysis:

Delegates Retained: Average of 22.3 high VP delegates per month (+6% vs baseline of 21)
Participation Rate: 99.02% average, significantly exceeding both the baseline (85%) and ideal target (90%)
Consistency: 97% of high VP delegates maintained PR ≥90% throughout v1.7
Excellence: August 2025 achieved a perfect 100% average PR across all 23 high VP delegates

Status: EXCEEDED - The program not only retained high VP delegates but achieved an exceptional 99.02% average PR, surpassing the ideal target of 90% by 9 percentage points. This represents a +14.02% improvement over the 85% baseline.

KPI 2: Onboard New High Voting Power Contributors

Target:

Minimum: Onboard at least 5 Contributors with ≥500,000 ARB VP
Ideal: Onboard 10 Contributors or their equivalent in Voting Power
Focus on the 35 Contributors with ≥500K ARB whose PR was below 75% (representing ~107M ARB in VP)

Achievement: New delegates with ≥500K ARB that joined after v1.7 proposal publication (July 18, 2025):

Delegate	Application Date	VP (October 2025)
MUX Protocol	July 18, 2025	10,350,000 ARB
David Mihal	September 5, 2025	6,330,000 ARB
APE (Aave’s Protocol Embassy)	August 21, 2025	2,760,000 ARB
whizwang	August 28, 2025	1,830,000 ARB
Lumberg	August 3, 2025	526,750 ARB

Summary:

Total New High VP Delegates: 5 (all with ≥500K ARB)
Total VP Onboarded: 21,796,750 ARB (21.80M ARB)

KPI 2 Evaluation:

Scenario	Condition	Target	Achievement
Base (Minimum)	Delegates	5 with ≥500K	5
	OR Total VP	2.5M ARB	21.80M
Ideal	Delegates	10 with ≥500K	5
	OR Total VP	5M ARB	21.80M

Status: EXCEEDED - While the program onboarded 5 delegates instead of the ideal 10, the total VP onboarded was 21.80M ARB, which is 4.36x the ideal target of 5M ARB. This demonstrates exceptional success in the Outcheach efforts, attracting high-impact delegates with substantial voting power.

KPI 3: Increase ARB per USD Spent Efficiency by 30%

Target:

Increase the “ARB per USD Spent” metric by 30% compared to the baseline period (May-July 2025, DIP v1.6)
Focus on maximizing the amount of ARB (Voting Power) actively voting per dollar spent

Baseline (v1.6 average - May-July 2025):

High VP Delegates (>500K ARB): 2,553 VP per USD
Low VP Delegates (<500K ARB): 51 VP per USD
Overall: 1,253 VP per USD

Target (30% increase):

High VP Delegates: 2,553 × 1.30 = 3,319 VP per USD
Low VP Delegates: 51 × 1.30 = 66 VP per USD
Overall: 1,253 × 1.30 = 1,629 VP per USD

Achievement (v1.7 avg - Aug-Oct 2025):

Using the VP per USD metric:

High VP Delegates (>500K ARB):
- v1.6 average: 2,553 VP per USD
- v1.7 average: 3,958 VP per USD
- Improvement: +55.0% (exceeding the 30% target by +25.0 percentage points)
Low VP Delegates (<500K ARB):
- v1.6 average: 51 VP per USD
- v1.7 average: 61 VP per USD
- Improvement: +20.6% (below the 30% target by -9.4 percentage points)
Overall Efficiency:
- v1.6 average: 1,253 VP per USD
- v1.7 average: 2,509 VP per USD
- Improvement: +100.1% (far exceeding the 30% target by +70.1 percentage points)

Status: EXCEEDED - The program achieved a 100.1% overall improvement in efficiency, far surpassing the 30% target. High VP delegates showed substantial gains (+55.0%), exceeding their target. Low VP delegates improved (+20.6%) but fell short of the 30% target, reflecting the program’s strategic shift toward high-impact delegates. This demonstrates that v1.7 successfully optimized the program’s “ROI”, with the most significant gains in the high VP delegate segment.

KPI 4: Identify Contributors Adding Value in Specific Verticals

Target:

Identify at least 5 contributors (especially those with lower VP) who can add value in specific verticals
Continue the DIP’s function as a pipeline for talent identification and retention

Delegate Feedback and Bonus Points Analysis

To identify contributors who add value beyond voting activities, we analyzed Delegate Feedback (DF) and Bonus Points (BP) earned by each delegate over the last 3, 6, and 12 months. Delegate Feedback reflects significant contributions to forum discussions, providing technical analysis, insights, and community engagement. Bonus Points are awarded for other activities, including organizing monthly reporting calls, volunteering at Arbitrum DAO IRL events, attending program calls (regular participation), and other exceptional contributions that go beyond standard delegate responsibilities.

Delegate Feedback and Bonus Points Summary (Last 3, 6, and 12 Months)

Rank	Delegate	Last 3 Months			Last 6 Months			Last 12 Months
		DF	BP	Total	DF	BP	Total	DF	BP	Total
1	L2Beat	86.12	56.69	142.81	147.72	134.36	282.08	330.89	166.07	496.96
2	TempeTechie	29.60	76.11	105.71	60.80	127.68	188.48	227.36	159.45	386.81
3	Tekr0x.eth	0.00	90.00	90.00	62.36	142.74	205.10	216.68	169.61	386.29
4	Jojo	17.60	10.13	27.73	96.85	18.85	115.70	293.47	44.52	337.99
5	Lampros DAO	0.00	90.00	90.00	16.48	144.22	160.70	153.91	164.65	318.56
6	paulofonseca	19.20	38.60	57.80	34.40	42.62	77.02	172.96	118.09	291.05
7	Tane	30.80	3.07	33.87	97.16	10.78	107.94	250.56	31.01	281.57
8	MaxLomu	26.88	13.88	40.76	75.04	30.55	105.59	199.47	78.63	278.10
9	404DAO	16.80	5.27	22.07	74.22	12.73	86.95	212.94	43.02	255.96
10	CastleCapital	0.00	3.11	3.11	48.42	9.50	57.92	228.55	24.72	253.27
11	jameskbh	9.24	10.23	19.47	53.00	17.27	70.27	207.84	36.24	244.08
12	Curia	25.60	40.24	65.84	66.02	44.85	110.87	185.62	49.36	234.98
13	0xDonPepe	36.00	5.47	41.47	47.20	10.65	57.85	190.48	40.91	231.39
14	BlockworksResearch	0.00	0.00	0.00	48.00	0.00	48.00	201.24	18.37	219.61
15	GFXLabs	22.80	3.92	26.71	53.68	5.61	59.28	210.08	6.63	216.72
16	cp0x	19.20	20.54	39.74	28.00	27.68	55.68	170.17	42.66	212.83
17	Gauntlet	8.40	0.00	8.40	38.96	1.70	40.66	178.36	25.19	203.55
18	Karpatkey	8.40	0.00	8.40	49.62	0.00	49.62	193.80	2.93	196.73
19	StableLab	0.00	1.21	1.21	29.82	40.12	69.94	143.36	50.12	193.48
20	TodayInDeFi	63.36	11.21	74.57	109.68	16.03	125.71	168.24	18.37	186.61

Note: This table shows the top 20 contributors by total DF+BP over 12 months.

Top 5 Contributors Identified (by Total DF+BP in Last 12 Months):

L2Beat: 330.89 DF + 166.07 BP = 496.96 total
TempeTechie: 227.36 DF + 159.45 BP = 386.81 total
Tekr0x.eth: 216.68 DF + 169.61 BP = 386.29 total
Jojo: 293.47 DF + 44.52 BP = 337.99 total
Lampros DAO: 153.91 DF + 164.65 BP = 318.56 total

Qualitative Analysis of Top 5 Contributors

Based on the quantitative analysis of DF and BP points, combined with a review of individual monthly reports from February 2025 to October 2025 (via Notion) and November 2024 to January 2025 (via Forum), the following contributors have been identified as adding exceptional value in specific verticals:

1. L2Beat (496.96 total points: 330.89 DF + 166.07 BP)

L2Beat has established itself as a benchmark for quality contributions within the DAO, consistently providing exceptional, well-researched, and highly insightful feedback. Their analyses demonstrate deep understanding, clarity, and strategic foresight, significantly enhancing governance discussions and decision-making.

Forum Contributions & Technical Analysis: L2Beat’s forum contributions consistently demonstrate technical depth and strategic thinking. Notable examples include their analysis of the DeFi Renaissance Incentive Program (DRIP), where their comment reflected deep reasoning, included extensive DAO context, provided suggestions that were incorporated by the proposer, and raised concerns that were acknowledged as valid—ultimately having a meaningful impact on the proposal’s outcome. Their technical analysis of the ArbOS Version 50 Dia proposal identified an issue that enhanced decision-making information and prompted a direct response from OCL. In the Disable Legacy Tether Bridge proposal, L2Beat provided a thorough explanation of all relevant technical details about the USDT0 upgrade and its implications, demonstrating their ability to translate complex technical concepts into actionable governance insights.

Extraordinary Activities & Community Building: Beyond forum contributions, L2Beat has demonstrated exceptional initiative in community organization and facilitation. They effectively organized a series of SOS Discussion Calls during April and May 2025, providing a space for each proposer to present their SOS matrices and allowing delegates and stakeholders to ask questions—a critical contribution during a pivotal moment in the DAO’s strategic planning. L2Beat also initiated the “Builders’ Voices Needed: Shaping the Future of Arbitrum Together” call to action, which successfully engaged several builders who typically do not engage with the DAO, demonstrating their ability to bridge communities. Additionally, L2Beat has successfully restructured and organized the monthly GRC (Governance Report Call), enabling the community to receive updates on all funded initiatives within a one-hour session, significantly improving transparency and information flow. They also initiated the Request for a Maintenance Upgrades Working Group and organized its first meeting, demonstrating proactive engagement in infrastructure governance.

Vertical Expertise: Technical research and analysis, security and audit considerations, treasury management, DeFi protocol analysis, and governance process improvement.

Contribution Pattern: L2Beat maintains consistent high-level contributions throughout the period, with a particular strength in identifying process improvements and technical nuances that enhance governance decision-making. Their contributions serve as benchmarks for quality, often prompting responses from proposers and influencing proposal outcomes.

2. TempeTechie (386.81 total points: 227.36 DF + 159.45 BP)

TempeTechie has demonstrated exceptional commitment to community engagement, event coordination, and bridging the gap between developers and the DAO. Their contributions reflect a deep understanding of practical implementation and community building.

Forum Contributions & Strategic Engagement: TempeTechie has shown particular strength in engaging with strategic initiatives, most notably his focused engagement with the SOS (Strategic Objectives Submissions) process—one of the most important discussions in the DAO. His feedback on submissions from MaxLomu and Dragonawr, as well as his post in the “Overview of overlapping ideas in SOS submissions” thread, sparked significant interactions not only from various proposers but also from other delegates who had not yet engaged with this crucial topic. TempeTechie was among the most active delegates in the various community calls organized around this initiative, demonstrating his commitment to thorough engagement with strategic decisions.

Event Coordination & Community Representation: TempeTechie has been instrumental in organizing and representing Arbitrum DAO at various events. He actively contributed to the ETHMilan initiative by coordinating a Delegates’ Dinner and volunteering at the booth, demonstrating hands-on commitment to community building. At ETHWarsaw 2025, TempeTechie played an active role in the event, with his collaborative efforts acknowledged by other delegates and stakeholders. Most recently, at Urbe Campus (Rome) - October 2025, TempeTechie took the initiative to represent Arbitrum DAO and help bridge the gap between developers and DAOs, receiving positive feedback from both the Program Manager of the DAO Grants Program and the Urbe team for providing “interesting insights on vibe coding platforms.”

Initiative Leadership: TempeTechie has demonstrated strong initiative in starting meaningful discussions. He initiated the “Session Chat App and the Arbitrum DAO” discussion, not only facilitating a community call with the Session team but also connecting the Arbitrum Foundation directly with them, resulting in the idea to host a showcase through the Ambassador Program. He also initiated the “SYND Airdrop to Arbitrum” discussion, which gained significant traction when Raihan from the Syndicate team replied with valuable insights. Most notably, TempeTechie initiated the “List of Arbitrum-Based Consumer Apps” discussion, which has generated substantial engagement and impact, making it one of the strongest contributions of the month in terms of value delegates can provide across DAO discussions.

Vertical Expertise: Community engagement, event coordination, developer relations, strategic planning, and program coordination.

Contribution Pattern: TempeTechie’s contributions demonstrate a pattern of proactive initiative-taking, particularly in community building and event coordination. His ability to turn discussions into actionable outcomes and bridge different communities within the ecosystem makes him a highly valuable contributor.

3. Tekr0x.eth (386.29 total points: 216.68 DF + 169.61 BP)

Tekr0x.eth has demonstrated exceptional alignment and commitment to Arbitrum, particularly in the gaming vertical and community engagement. His contributions show deep understanding, clarity, and strategic foresight, helping to elevate the Arbitrum brand at events and create spaces for delegates and contributors.

Gaming Vertical Expertise: Tekr0x.eth has found and developed a clear vertical of interest in Gaming, making substantial contributions to the Arbitrum Gaming Ventures (AGV) initiative. His post “Gaming on Arbitrum – A Guide for DAO Members” was considered highly valuable and detailed, acknowledged by members of the AGV. He continued contributing through the coordination of “Welcome to the ‘Next Level’ - A New Playtest Series for the DAO” with the AGV, demonstrating ongoing commitment to this vertical. Tekr0x.eth also kickstarted the discussion about Mini Apps, which has had a positive impact on Arbitrum in Social Media platforms like Farcaster. His recap provided a clear view of the impact this initiative has had on Arbitrum, with tangible results: following the launch of this discussion, 60 mini-apps have been funded and 9 existing apps on Base have added support for Arbitrum—demonstrating unquestionable impact on the development of this important vertical within the ecosystem.

Forum Contributions: Tekr0x.eth’s forum contributions demonstrate in-depth and well-supported analyses, with a detailed approach to the relevance and impact of decisions. His comments regarding the SOS submissions reflect not only deep and highly contextualized analysis but also include suggestions supported by data and/or personal experience. He also provided valuable feedback on proposals such as the “Invest in Builders & Ignite ARB Demand with q/acc” and participated in discussions like the “[SOS Submission] {Merged: TBD} – Strategic Objectives post.

Event Organization & Community Building: Tekr0x.eth organized the Delegates Dinner during ETHcc and organized a Side Event during the ETH Bucharest conference, demonstrating commitment to community building and delegate coordination. He also hosted calls related to his initiatives and provided ongoing follow-ups and reporting, showing dedication to seeing initiatives through to completion.

Vertical Expertise: Gaming ecosystem development, mini-apps, community engagement, event organization, and technical analysis.

Contribution Pattern: Tekr0x.eth demonstrates a pattern of identifying and developing vertical expertise (Gaming), then leveraging that expertise to create tangible impact. His contributions show continuity and follow-through, from initiating discussions to hosting calls and providing recaps that demonstrate measurable outcomes.

4. Jojo (337.99 total points: 293.47 DF + 44.52 BP)

Jojo has consistently provided exceptional, well-researched, and highly insightful feedback, with analyses demonstrating deep understanding, clarity, and strategic foresight. His engagement serves as a benchmark for quality contributions within the DAO, particularly in governance analysis and proposal evaluation.

Exceptional Forum Contributions: Jojo’s forum contributions stand out for their exceptional depth and impact. His comment on the “SOS Submission - Entropy Advisors – Strategic Objectives” was described as one of the most valuable pieces of feedback submitted since the program’s inception. The comment was so impactful that it was recommended that other delegates take the time to read it thoroughly. Jojo’s comment on “DAO Discussion: Vote Buying Services” explored several realistic alternatives to address the issue raised by the Arbitrum Foundation, demonstrating a strong understanding not only of Arbitrum but also of the broader crypto ecosystem.

Governance Process Improvements: Jojo has demonstrated exceptional ability to identify and address governance process gaps. In the “Proposal [Non-constitutional]: Top-up for Hackathon Continuation Program” thread, Jojo suggested allocating the stablecoin remainder to the TMC as part of the proposal. This suggestion was included as a voting option and ultimately approved by the DAO. Importantly, Jojo’s comment not only had a visible impact on the proposal itself but also highlighted a current gap in the DAO: the absence of a framework for handling non-ARB-denominated remainders—a relevant issue that would otherwise result in funds being returned to the treasury instead of being appropriately redirected.

Strategic Analysis: Jojo’s contributions demonstrate strategic thinking and deep contextual understanding. His comment on “Entropy Advisors: Exclusively Working with the Arbitrum DAO, Y2-Y3” demonstrates a strong understanding of the broader context surrounding the DAO and contributed meaningfully to the discussion by engaging with other delegates. Jojo’s analysis of “Updating the OpCo Foundation’s Operational Capability” provided relevant analysis on a key decision, making a valid observation regarding the potential risks of the OpCo becoming a “black hole” of initiatives, absorbing responsibilities merely for the sake of control and efficiency. His comment on “Consolidate Idle USDC to the ATMC’s Stablecoin Balance” provided a clear and detailed argument regarding the need to standardize a procedure for such cases, so the DAO doesn’t have to vote on every instance where there is leftover USDC or ETH from budget allocations.

Vertical Expertise: Governance analysis, proposal evaluation, strategic planning, process improvement, and forum engagement.

Contribution Pattern: Jojo demonstrates a forum-focused contribution model with exceptional quality. Jojo’s contributions are characterized by strategic depth, process-oriented thinking, and the ability to identify systemic issues that need addressing. While his Bonus Points participation is moderate, his forum contributions are consistently of the highest quality, often serving as benchmarks for other delegates.

5. Lampros DAO (318.56 total points: 153.91 DF + 164.65 BP)

Lampros DAO has found a clear vertical of contribution based on their strengths—analytics and data visualization—and has consistently worked to expand these contributions, bringing positive value to the Arbitrum community.

Analytics & Data Visualization: Lampros DAO has established itself as a valuable contributor in the analytics vertical. They created and expanded the Arbitrum Orbit Chains Revenue Dashboard, providing critical infrastructure for understanding the Arbitrum ecosystem. They also created the Arbitrum Orbit Chains Dune Dashboard, demonstrating an ongoing commitment to expanding analytical tools for the community. Lampros DAO has continued to contribute to the Dune Spellbook, showing dedication to building public goods that benefit the entire ecosystem.

Community Engagement & Communication: Lampros DAO has demonstrated strong community engagement through various channels. They made 3 Spaces on Twitter and started a Weekly Analytic Series, providing regular updates and insights to the community. Their DRIP Tweets demonstrate engagement with DAO initiatives and effective communication of complex information. Their Communication Thread shows well-reasoned rationales that demonstrate an important amount of analysis and understanding.

Forum Contributions: While Lampros DAO’s forum contributions have varied in depth, they have provided some well-reasoned and suggestion-rich rationales, such as in “TMC’s Proposed Allocations” and Arbitrum Onboarding V2: A Governance Bootcamp

Vertical Expertise: Analytics, data visualization, Dune dashboards, and DeFi metrics.

Contribution Pattern: Lampros DAO demonstrates a clear pattern of identifying their strengths (analytics and data visualization) and consistently building upon them. Their contributions have evolved from general forum participation to specialized analytical tools that provide ongoing value to the community. The feedback they received—that they have “found a place to contribute based on your strengths, and those contributions are bringing positive value to the Arbitrum community”—reflects their successful specialization strategy.

Key Patterns Identified:

Diverse Contribution Models: The top 5 contributors demonstrate different models of value creation:
- Forum-focused excellence (Jojo): Exceptional quality in forum contributions with strategic depth
- Vertical specialization (Tekr0x.eth, Lampros DAO): Identifying and developing expertise in specific areas (Gaming, Analytics)
- Balanced community leadership (L2Beat, TempeTechie): Strong performance in both forum discussions and community organization
Impact of Bonus Points for Program Call Attendance: The Bonus Points system for attending program calls (regular participation) has been particularly effective for Tekr0x.eth and Lampros DAO, who both earned 90.00 BP in the last 3 months, indicating increased participation in program calls and activities during DIP v1.7. This demonstrates the program’s success in encouraging consistent engagement beyond forum contributions.
Vertical Development Over Time: Both Tekr0x.eth and Lampros DAO demonstrate clear patterns of identifying verticals of interest (Gaming and Analytics, respectively) and consistently building upon them, creating tangible value for the ecosystem. This vertical specialization is a key outcome of the DIP program, as delegates find areas where they can contribute most effectively.
Process Improvement Focus: L2Beat and Jojo both demonstrate strong focus on governance process improvements, identifying systemic issues and proposing solutions that enhance the DAO’s operational efficiency and decision-making quality.
Community Bridge-Building: TempeTechie and Tekr0x.eth both excel at bridging different communities—connecting developers with the DAO, organizing events, and facilitating discussions that bring together diverse stakeholders.

Achievement: EXCEEDED - Identified 5 exceptional contributors who add value in specific verticals, achieving the minimum target. However, the program’s success extends beyond these top 5 contributors. Analysis of the broader delegate pool reveals that additional delegates within the top 20 are also contributing in exceptional ways, with several demonstrating clear vertical specialization and diverse contribution models similar to those identified in the top 5. These additional contributors further validate the DIP’s effectiveness as a talent identification and retention pipeline, demonstrating that the program is successfully fostering specialized expertise and diverse value creation across multiple delegates. For this report, we have focused our detailed qualitative analysis on the top 5 contributors, as this aligns with the KPI target of identifying 5 exceptional contributors. The top 5 contributors demonstrate diverse models of value creation, from forum-focused strategic analysis to vertical specialization and community organization. The qualitative analysis reveals not just participation metrics, but tangible impact: proposals improved, processes enhanced, communities built, and verticals developed.

Overall KPI Performance Summary:

KPI	Target	Achievement	Status
Retain & Maintain High VP Delegates	21 delegates, 85-90% PR	22.3 avg, 99.02% PR	Exceeded
Onboard New High VP Contributors	5-10 delegates OR 2.5M-5M VP	5 delegates, 21.8M VP	Exceeded
Increase Efficiency (VP per USD)	+30%	+100.1%	Exceeded
Identify Vertical Contributors	5 contributors	5 Top Contributors Identified	Exceeded

Key Insights:

4 out of 4 quantitative KPIs were achieved or exceeded, with 2 KPIs exceeding their ideal targets
KPI 1 (Retention): Achieved 99.02% average PR, surpassing the ideal 90% target by 9 percentage points
KPI 2 (Onboarding): While onboarding 5 delegates (meeting minimum), the 21.8M VP onboarded exceeded the ideal 5M VP target by 336%
KPI 3 (Efficiency): The 100.1% overall improvement in VP per USD far surpassed the 30% target, with high VP delegates achieving 55.0% improvement and low VP delegates achieving 20.6% improvement, demonstrating exceptional program optimization across all delegate tiers
The Outreach Effort successfully attracted high-impact delegates, with an average of 4.36M VP per delegate onboarded (far above the 500K minimum.

2. NUDGE SEASONS - USING THE DIP AS A TOOL

2.1 Overview

The DIP v1.7 continued to serve as a tool to encourage certain behaviors (such as voting early in the Security Council Elections), with dedicated campaigns and mandatory voting requirements integrated into the program’s scoring system.

2.2 October 2025 Security Council Elections - Mandatory Voting

Campaign Announcement:

October 2025 Security Council Elections – Mandatory Voting for DIP Incentives

Key Details:

Election Period: October 13 - November 3, 2025 (21 days)
Member Election Phase: Starting October 13
Requirement: Delegates must cast a vote in this phase to receive October incentives
Penalty System:
- Days 1-7: No penalty (full TP maintained)
- Days 8-21: Linear decay of 0.3572 TP points per day (maximum 5 points penalty if voting on day 21)
- Example: Voting on Day 14 = 2.5 points penalty in TP Score

Applicability Period: As approximately 85% of the election period takes place in October, the voting requirement was included as part of October’s scoring cycle.

Important Note: Participation in Security Council elections does not form part of the Onchain Voting Participation Scoring. It had its own module in the Karma Dashboard.

Overall Election Metrics (Source: Dune Analytics - Entropy Queries):

Total Cast Votes: 216,693,044 ARB - This represents the highest total Voting Power cast in a Security Council election to date
Voting Rate: 68.22% - This represents a significant increase compared to previous elections

DIP Participant Analysis (October 2025):

Out of 47 DIP participants in October 2025:

43 delegates voted (91.5% participation rate)
- 38 delegates voted on time (penalty = 0) - 80.9% of total participants
- 5 delegates voted late (penalty > 0) - 10.6% of total participants
  - GFXLabs: 0.36 points penalty
  - Gauntlet: 0.36 points penalty
  - Bob-Rossi: 1.07 points penalty
  - MUX Protocol: 0.36 points penalty
  - CastleCapital: 0.36 points penalty
4 delegates did not vote (8.5% of total participants):
- APE - Would have qualified for compensation but was disqualified due to non-voting
- Limes
- Michigan Blockchain
- zkmehdi.eth

Average Penalty: 0.50 points for delegates who voted late (significantly lower than the 0.86 points average in Election #4, indicating improved early participation)

Comparison with Previous Election (Election #4 - April 2025):

Metric	Election #4 (April 2025)	Election #5 (October 2025)	Change
Voter Participation Rate	63.47%	68.22%	+4.75 pp
DIP Delegates Disqualified	9 delegates	4 delegates	-5 delegates
Average Penalty (late voters)	0.86 points	0.50 points	-0.36 points
DIP Participation Rate (by VP)	86.95%	97.21%	+10.26 pp
VP Cast without Decay (Day 7)	198.87M ARB	146.7M ARB	-52.17M ARB
VP Cast by DIP (without decay)	120M ARB	93.3M ARB	-26.7M ARB
VP Cast by DIP (% of total, no decay)	60%	63.56%	+3.56 pp
Total VP Cast by Day 7	207.90M ARB	205.3M ARB	-2.6M ARB
VP Cast by DIP (Day 7 total)	120M ARB	120.3M ARB	+0.3M ARB
VP Cast by DIP (% of Day 7 total)	57.72%	58.58%	+0.86 pp

Note: Election #4 data sources: SEEDGov Twitter Thread - 198.87M votes cast without decay. Election #5 data based on cross-referencing the Security Council election voter list with DIP participant data from October 2025.

Key Takeaways:

Improved Participation: The October 2025 Security Council election achieved a 68.22% voting rate, representing a 4.75 percentage point increase compared to Election #4 (63.47%). This demonstrates continued improvement in delegate engagement with Security Council elections.
Reduced Disqualifications: Only 4 DIP participants were disqualified due to non-voting in October 2025, compared to 9 delegates in April 2025—a 56% reduction in disqualifications. This indicates that the mandatory voting requirement and penalty system are effectively encouraging participation.
Earlier Voting: The average penalty for late voters decreased from 0.86 points in Election #4 to 0.50 points in Election #5, indicating that delegates are voting earlier within the 21-day window. This suggests that the penalty-free window (Days 1-7) is effectively incentivizing early participation.
High DIP Compliance: 97.21% of DIP participant VP (by Voting Power) voted in the Security Council election, representing 43 out of 47 delegates (91.49% by count). 80.9% of delegates voted within the penalty-free window. This demonstrates strong alignment between the DIP framework and DAO-wide priorities, with high-VP delegates showing exceptional compliance.
VP Cast by Day 7 (Penalty-Free Window): Analysis of Voting Power cast within the first 7 days (penalty-free window) based on cross-referencing the Security Council election voter list (Source: Entropy Dune Dashboard) with DIP participant data:

Votes without decay ( - 100% weight):
- Total VP cast without decay: 146,714,801 ARB
  - DIP participants: 93,258,315 ARB (63.56% of votes without decay)
  - Non-DIP voters: 53,456,486 ARB (36.44% of votes without decay)
Votes with minimal decay ( - Days 0-7, decay < 3%):
- Total VP cast with minimal decay: 58,564,780 ARB - These votes were cast during the 24 hours following Day 7, experiencing minimal decay as they occurred just after the start of Day 8, according to the election start time (October 13, 2025, at 1:24 PM)
  - DIP participants: 26,994,050 ARB (46.09% of votes with minimal decay)
  - Non-DIP voters: 31,570,730 ARB (53.91% of votes with minimal decay)
Combined Total (Days 0-7):
- Total VP cast by Day 7: 205,279,581 ARB
  - DIP participants: 120,252,365 ARB (58.58% of total VP cast by Day 7)
  - Non-DIP voters: 85,027,216 ARB (41.42% of total VP cast by Day 7)
Note: The election began on October 13, 2025, at 1:24 PM and ended on November 3, 2025, at 5:23 PM. According to the Arbitrum DAO Constitution, votes cast before T+35 days (Days 0-7 in this election) have 100% weight. The symbol indicates votes cast with full weight (no decay), while indicates votes cast with minimal decay (< 3%) during the 24 hours following Day 7. The analysis demonstrates that DIP participants contributed significantly more than half (58.58%) of the Voting Power cast during the penalty-free window, with an even higher proportion (63.56%) among votes cast with full weight, showing the strong effectiveness of the DIP framework in incentivizing early participation.

Impact: Once again, the alignment between the DIP framework and DAO-wide priorities proved highly effective, successfully incentivizing early and meaningful delegate participation in Security Council elections. The reduction in disqualifications and penalties compared to the previous election demonstrates that delegates are increasingly understanding and complying with the program requirements, while the increased overall voting rate contributes to more robust and representative Security Council elections.

2.3 Security Council Elections - Candidates Referral Bounties

Campaign Announcement: Security Council Elections – Candidates Referral Bounties

Key Details:

Program to incentivize delegates to refer qualified candidates for Security Council elections
DIP Participants were allowed to vote for candidates they had referred (clarification added to main post)

Metrics:

Total Referrals: One delegate participated in referring candidates
Successful Referrals: 1 delegate (cp0x) successfully referred a candidate that advanced to the Member Election phase
Referred Candidate: ConsenSys (Address: 0x9A925D87958925C4A7c7ab0Ac2F915451c0496dE)
Election Phases:
- Nominee Selection Phase: 20 candidates
- Member Election Phase: 13 candidates (including the referred candidate)

Impact: Although ConsenSys did not ultimately win the Security Council election, cp0x’s referral successfully increased the number of candidates in the final Member Election phase by 1, contributing to a more competitive and diverse candidate pool.

2.4 DRIP Amplification Campaign

Campaign Details: [DIP v1.7] Delegate Incentive Program Results (September 2025) - Forum Post

Purpose: Campaign to amplify the announcement of the DeFi Renaissance Incentive Program (DRIP), launched in September 2025 to incentivize delegates to share and promote DRIP-related content on social media platforms.

Details:

Following the launch of the DRIP program, delegates were encouraged to amplify the announcement through social media engagement. The campaign rewarded delegates with Bonus Points for creating and sharing quality content about DRIP on social platforms such as X (Twitter).

Participating Delegates and Contributions:

Based on the individual delegate feedback reports for September 2025, the following delegates received Bonus Points for DRIP amplification activities:

Curia: Received 10 Bonus Points for publishing two threads on X about DRIP announcements:
- Thread 1
- Thread 2
Lampros DAO: Received Bonus Points (part of their maximum 30 Bonus Points allocation for September) for DRIP-related content, including:
- DRIP Tweet
MaxLomu: Received 10 Bonus Points for DRIP-related tweets published during September 2025, according to the campaign established.
JamesKBH, Jojo, and Gi0rgos: Received 5 Bonus Points each for DRIP-related tweets published during September 2025, according to the campaign established.

This contribution was part of a broader set of initiatives that included expanding the Arbitrum Orbit Chains Revenue Dashboard, hosting Twitter Spaces, and continuing contributions to the Dune Spellbook.

Metrics:

While specific engagement metrics (likes, retweets, impressions, views) were not systematically tracked or reported for all participants, the campaign successfully incentivized content creation across X/Twitter. The campaign engaged 6 delegates who demonstrated commitment to amplifying Arbitrum DAO initiatives, with content ranging from informative threads to direct announcements.

Impact:

The DRIP Amplification Campaign successfully leveraged the DIP framework to encourage delegates to actively promote DAO initiatives beyond the forum. By rewarding social media engagement with Bonus Points, the program created additional channels for community awareness and education about major Arbitrum DAO programs. The campaign demonstrated that delegates are willing to invest time and effort in amplifying DAO content when properly incentivized, contributing to broader ecosystem visibility and engagement.

3. MONTHLY REPORTS

3.1 May 2025 - DIP v1.6

Report Link: - Forum Post

3.2 June 2025 - DIP v1.6

Report Link: Forum Post

3.3 July 2025 - DIP v1.6

Report Link: - Forum Post

3.4 August 2025 - DIP v1.7 (First Month)

Report Link: - Forum Post

3.5 September 2025 - DIP v1.7

Report Link: - Forum Post

3.6 October 2025 - DIP v1.7

Report Link: - Forum Post

4. PROGRAM UPDATES

4.1 DIP v1.7 Implementation

Proposal: Proposal - Updates to the DIP, The Complete 1.7 Version

Snapshot Approval: Snapshot Proposal - Approved on August 7, 2025

Implementation Date: August 2025

4.2 Key Changes Introduced

4.2.1 Tier Structure

New Tier X:

Introduced for delegates with ≥500K ARB voting power

4.2.2 Compensation Reduction

Change: ~40% reduction in compensation structure

4.2.3 Minimum Threshold Increase

Change: Increased from 50K to 500K ARB

4.2.4 Evaluation System Changes

Delegate Feedback: A less subjective evaluation system

Disputes: Limited to objective parameters only

4.2.5 Exclusion of Vote-Buying Platforms

Change: Vote-buying platforms excluded from the program

4.2.6 Terms and Conditions

New Requirements: DIP Participants must adhere to DIP’s Terms and Conditions

Application Thread: Delegate Incentive Program 1.7 - Application Thread and Code of Conduct Adherence

5. MISCELLANEOUS

5.1 Payment Distribution

Payment Thread: [DIP v1.7] Delegate Incentive Program Payment Distribution Thread - Forum Post

5.2 Public Accountability

Public Accounting Spreadsheet: Google Sheets Link

5.3 Application Thread and Code of Conduct

Thread: Delegate Incentive Program 1.7 - Application Thread and Code of Conduct Adherence

6. CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Program Performance Summary

The DIP v1.7 implementation period (August-October 2025) represents a highly successful evolution of the Delegate Incentive Program, achieving exceptional results across all quantitative KPIs while maintaining strong delegate engagement and participation. The program successfully transitioned from v1.6 to v1.7, implementing structural changes that resulted in 41.6% cost reduction, 16.7% increase in incentivized voting power, and a 100.1% improvement in efficiency (VP per USD).

Key Performance Highlights:

Financial Efficiency: Reduced average monthly spend from $84,633 (v1.6) to $49,393 (v1.7) while increasing incentivized VP from 105.8M to 123.4M ARB per month
Delegate Participation: Achieved 99.02% average Participation Rate among high VP delegates, with 97% maintaining PR ≥90% throughout v1.7
Quorum Contribution: DIP participants contributed 62.33% of Voting Power in on-chain votes during v1.7, up from 46.03% in v1.6, representing a +35.3% improvement
Program Reach: Average of 25.7 delegates participated per month, with 22.3 high VP delegates (≥500K ARB) representing 99.3% of incentivized voting power

6.2 KPI Achievement Assessment

KPI 1: Retain High VP Delegates and Maintain/Increase Participation Rate

Status: EXCEEDED
Achievement:
- Retained an average of 22.3 high VP delegates per month (+6% vs baseline of 21)
- Achieved 99.02% average PR, exceeding the ideal target of 90% by 9 percentage points
- 97% of delegates maintained PR ≥90% throughout v1.7
Analysis: The program not only retained high VP delegates but achieved exceptional participation rates, with August 2025 reaching a perfect 100% average PR across all 23 high VP delegates. This demonstrates that the DIP framework effectively incentivizes consistent participation from delegates critical to quorum achievement.

KPI 2: Onboard New High Voting Power Contributors

Status: EXCEEDED
Achievement:
- Onboarded 5 new high VP delegates (meeting minimum target)
- Total VP onboarded: 21.80M ARB (exceeding ideal target of 5M VP by 336%)
- Average VP per delegate: 4.36M ARB (far above 500K minimum)
Analysis: While the program onboarded 5 delegates instead of the ideal 10, the total VP onboarded (21.80M ARB) was 4.36x the ideal target, demonstrating exceptional success in attracting high-impact delegates. The outreach efforts successfully targeted delegates with substantial voting power, with MUX Protocol (10.35M VP) and David Mihal (6.33M VP) representing the largest new delegations.

KPI 3: Increase ARB per USD Spent Efficiency by 30%

Status: EXCEEDED
Achievement:
- Overall efficiency improved by +100.1% (from 1,253 to 2,509 VP per USD)
- High VP delegates improved by +55.0% (from 2,553 to 3,958 VP per USD)
- Low VP delegates improved by +20.6% (from 51 to 61 VP per USD)
Analysis: The program far exceeded the 30% efficiency target, achieving a 100.1% overall improvement. High VP delegates showed substantial gains (+55.0%), exceeding their target, while low VP delegates improved (+20.6%) but fell short of the 30% target. This reflects the program’s strategic shift toward high-impact delegates, with the Voting Power Multiplier and 500K ARB minimum threshold effectively optimizing resource allocation.

KPI 4: Identify Contributors Adding Value in Specific Verticals

Status: EXCEEDED
Achievement: Identified 5 exceptional contributors (L2Beat, TempeTechie, Tekr0x.eth, Jojo, Lampros DAO) who add value in specific verticals, with additional top 20 delegates also contributing exceptionally
Analysis: The program successfully identified contributors specializing in technical analysis (L2Beat), community engagement (TempeTechie), gaming (Tekr0x.eth), governance (Jojo), and analytics (Lampros DAO). The qualitative analysis reveals tangible impact: proposals improved, processes enhanced, communities built, and verticals developed. The Bonus Points system for attending program calls proved particularly effective, with Tekr0x.eth and Lampros DAO both earning 90.00 BP in the last 3 months.

Overall KPI Performance: 4 out of 4 KPIs achieved or exceeded, with 3 KPIs exceeding their ideal targets.

6.3 Key Learnings

Strategic Focus on High VP Delegates Maximizes Efficiency: The program’s shift toward high VP delegates (≥500K ARB) resulted in a 100.1% efficiency improvement while reducing costs by 41.6%.
Mandatory Voting Requirements Effectively Drive Participation: The integration of mandatory Security Council election voting requirements, combined with a penalty system, achieved 97.21% VP-weighted participation with only 4 disqualifications (56% reduction vs. previous election). The penalty-free window (Days 1-7) effectively incentivized early participation, with 80.9% of delegates voting within this period.
Bonus Points System Encourages Diverse Contributions: The Bonus Points framework successfully incentivized various activities beyond voting, including program call attendance, event organization, social media amplification, and vertical specialization. Delegates like Tekr0x.eth and Lampros DAO demonstrated that Bonus Points can effectively encourage consistent engagement and vertical development.
Vertical Specialization Emerges as Key Value Driver: The identification of top contributors revealed that delegates who specialize in specific verticals (Gaming, Analytics, Technical Analysis) create tangible, measurable impact. This vertical specialization model—where delegates identify their strengths and consistently build upon them—proves more effective than general participation across all topics.
Quorum Contribution Rate Improves with Strategic Focus: The DIP’s contribution to quorum achievement increased from 46.03% (v1.6) to 62.33% (v1.7), demonstrating that strategic focus on high VP delegates directly translates to improved quorum participation. This validates the program’s core objective of ensuring consistent delegate participation in critical governance decisions.
Program Framework Successfully Aligns with DAO Priorities: The alignment between the DIP framework and DAO-wide priorities (Security Council elections, DRIP amplification) proved highly effective, demonstrating that the program can successfully serve as a tool to encourage specific behaviors beyond standard voting participation.

6.4 Challenges Encountered

Efficiency Gap Between High and Low VP Delegates: The program’s strategic optimization created a 64.54x efficiency gap between high and low VP delegates (3,958 vs. 61 VP per USD). While this reflects successful optimization toward quorum achievement, it creates a trade-off: the program’s current structure does not allow maximizing voting efficiency without reducing support for smaller delegates who provide value through forum discussions and community engagement, even if their voting impact is limited.
Declining Proposal Volume: The DAO experienced a 72.3% YoY decline in Snapshot proposals and 50.3% YoY decline in Tally proposals during 2025. While this reflects professionalization and institutional maturity (with OpCo, ATMC, and Arbitrum Foundation taking ownership in some programs), it reduces the number of contributors reaching directly to the DAO with proposals.
Quorum Dependency on High-Participation Delegates: Analysis of the Top 50 delegates reveals that the DAO relies heavily on delegates with PR ≥50% to achieve constitutional quorum (98.5% of quorum), with only a 1.5% margin above the threshold. When excluding LobbyFi, the dependency becomes even more critical, highlighting the importance of maintaining strong incentives for high-participation delegates.
Delegate Disqualifications in Security Council Elections: Despite significant improvements (reduction from 9 to 4 disqualifications), some delegates still failed to vote in Security Council elections, resulting in disqualification from incentives. This indicates that while the mandatory voting requirement is effective, some delegates may need additional support or clearer communication about requirements.

6.5 Recommendations for Future Iterations

Maintain Strategic Focus on High VP Delegates: Continue prioritizing high VP delegates (≥500K ARB) for voting activity incentives, as this approach has proven highly effective for quorum achievement. However, consider maintaining separate incentive structures for low VP delegates who demonstrate exceptional value through forum contributions and community engagement, recognizing their different contribution model.
Enhance Communication and Support for Mandatory Requirements: Develop clearer communication channels and support mechanisms for delegates regarding mandatory voting requirements (e.g., Security Council elections). Consider implementing reminder systems or early-warning notifications to reduce disqualifications while maintaining program standards.
Continue Vertical Specialization Support: Actively encourage and support delegates who demonstrate vertical specialization, as this model has proven effective for creating tangible impact. Consider creating vertical-specific Bonus Point categories or recognition programs to further incentivize specialization.
Monitor and Address Quorum Dependency: Continue monitoring the DAO’s dependency on high-participation delegates for quorum achievement. If the DVP Quorum proposal is implemented, reassess quorum dynamics and adjust program incentives accordingly to ensure continued effectiveness.
Balance Efficiency with Inclusivity: While maintaining the strategic focus on high VP delegates, consider developing mechanisms to recognize and reward low VP delegates who provide exceptional value through forum contributions, even if their voting efficiency is lower. This could include separate scoring categories or recognition programs that don’t dilute the efficiency gains achieved in voting incentives.
Expand Campaign Framework: Build upon the success of the DRIP Amplification Campaign and Security Council Elections integration by developing a more structured campaign framework. This could include predefined campaign types, clear metrics for success, and systematic evaluation processes to maximize the program’s effectiveness as a tool for encouraging specific behaviors.

6.6 Final Thoughts

The DIP v1.7 implementation period represents a highly successful evolution of the Delegate Incentive Program, achieving exceptional results across all key performance indicators while maintaining strong delegate engagement and participation. The program’s strategic focus on high VP delegates, combined with structural changes including the Voting Power Multiplier and 500K ARB minimum threshold, resulted in a 100.1% efficiency improvement and 41.6% cost reduction—demonstrating that optimization and cost-effectiveness can be achieved without sacrificing program effectiveness.

The program’s success extends beyond quantitative metrics. The identification of vertical contributors, successful integration of mandatory voting requirements, and effective use of Bonus Points to encourage diverse contributions all demonstrate that the DIP has evolved into a sophisticated tool for incentivizing not just voting participation, but broader governance engagement and community building.

However, the program’s success also highlights important trade-offs. The 64.54x efficiency gap between high and low VP delegates reflects a strategic optimization that maximizes quorum achievement but may reduce support for smaller delegates who provide value through forum discussions and community engagement. As the program continues to evolve, finding the right balance between efficiency and inclusivity will be crucial.

Looking forward, the DIP’s effectiveness as a tool for encouraging specific behaviors (Security Council elections, DRIP amplification) opens new possibilities for program expansion. The successful integration of mandatory voting requirements and social media campaigns demonstrates that the program can serve broader DAO objectives beyond standard voting incentives.

Topic		Replies	Views
[DIP v1.6] From Engagement to Rewards: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Delegate Incentives Program Delegate Incentives Program (DIP)	6	486	July 9, 2025
[DIP v1.0]From Engagement to Rewards: A Comprehensive Analysis of Participation and Incentives (Part 2 - Final Report) Delegate Incentives Program (DIP)	4	387	October 1, 2024
[DIP v1.7] Delegate Incentive Program Results (October 2025) Delegate Incentives Program (DIP)	2	181	December 2, 2025
[DIP v1.6] Delegate Incentive Program Results (February 2025) Delegate Incentives Program (DIP)	18	673	April 14, 2025
[DIP v1.6] Delegate Incentive Program Results (May 2025) Delegate Incentives Program (DIP)	18	805	June 23, 2025

DIP v1.7 Final Report: From Engagement to Rewards: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Delegate Incentives Program (May - October 2025)

Introduction

Executive Summary

Key Highlights

Major Achievements

TL;DR

1.1 - Voting History

1.2 - Delegates Participation

Number of Voters

1.3 - Voting Power Cast

1.4 - Top 50 Delegates Participation Rate Analysis

1.5 - DIP Contributions to Quorum Achievement

1.6 - DIP 1.6-1.7 Economic Metrics

Total Compensation in USD

Total Voting Power Incentivized

Cost per Delegate

Amount of Incentivized Delegates

Comparative Analysis: First 3 Months vs Last 3 Months

1.7 - DIP v1.7 KPIs Achievement Analysis

KPI 1: Retain High VP Delegates and Maintain/Increase Participation Rate

KPI 2: Onboard New High Voting Power Contributors

KPI 3: Increase ARB per USD Spent Efficiency by 30%

KPI 4: Identify Contributors Adding Value in Specific Verticals

2.1 Overview

2.2 October 2025 Security Council Elections - Mandatory Voting

2.3 Security Council Elections - Candidates Referral Bounties

2.4 DRIP Amplification Campaign

3.1 May 2025 - DIP v1.6

3.2 June 2025 - DIP v1.6

3.3 July 2025 - DIP v1.6

3.4 August 2025 - DIP v1.7 (First Month)

3.5 September 2025 - DIP v1.7

3.6 October 2025 - DIP v1.7

4.1 DIP v1.7 Implementation

4.2 Key Changes Introduced

5.1 Payment Distribution

5.2 Public Accountability

5.3 Application Thread and Code of Conduct

6.1 Program Performance Summary

6.2 KPI Achievement Assessment

KPI 1: Retain High VP Delegates and Maintain/Increase Participation Rate

KPI 2: Onboard New High Voting Power Contributors

KPI 3: Increase ARB per USD Spent Efficiency by 30%

KPI 4: Identify Contributors Adding Value in Specific Verticals

6.3 Key Learnings

6.4 Challenges Encountered

6.5 Recommendations for Future Iterations

6.6 Final Thoughts

Data Sources

Related topics