At Entropy, we believe that effective coordination within DAOs is a prerequisite to crypto delivering on its promise of a globally accessible internet of value. As the leading scaling tech stack, we view Arbitrum as best primed to deliver on this vision and have therefore committed to work exclusively with the Arbitrum DAO. Our team is composed of crypto natives, with previous experience at Blockworks Research and 404 DAO.
Delegate Statement
Our primary objective for the Arbitrum DAO is to ensure that the Arbitrum tech stack becomes the most widely adopted infrastructure in the entire blockchain ecosystem. We envision a world where investors, users, and developers focus on contributing to the Arbitrum ecosystem without even making the conscious decision to do so, primarily because the network effects have grown so exponentially that “Why Arbitrum?” is no longer a question being asked. We believe the Arbitrum tech speaks for itself in practice, and that with proper stewardship and contributions to the Arbitrum DAO, the aforementioned question will turn into “Why not Arbitrum?”.
We are interested in contributing to all areas of the Arbitrum ecosystem as needs arise, but will be focusing on improving governance participation as well as tooling and protocol decentralization. The Arbitrum DAO is Entropy Advisors’ only customer, which is not something many other Arbitrum delegates can tout today. Our employees have extensive experience in research and have been active across numerous DAOs in the past, but have identified Arbitrum as the most promising technology stack and want to put all of our time, effort, and collective brainpower into ensuring the sustainable growth of the ecosystem – powered by the Arbitrum DAO.
Put simply, we believe in a diverse and highly capable delegate base, a DAO that is sustainable through diversified and robust revenue streams, responsible and carefully calculated spending that encourages the growth of the ecosystem, a highly intellectual group of service providers that can effectively execute on tasks on behalf of the DAO, and measures for accountability/processes that can stand the test of time.
Conflicts of Interest
Entropy Advisors often authors or is directly involved in several proposals within Arbitrum DAO. As a delegate, we acknowledge that there will likely be instances where it will be a conflict of interest for us to vote on a proposal. Going forward we will be abstaining from Snapshot and Tally votes that directly place Entropy in a position of power.
Entropy Advisors has hosted delegate events in the past and has plans to do so at future conferences. Therefore, we voted ABSTAIN due to what we view as a possible conflict of interest. We have ranked our choices in the following manner:
Based on our team’s experience hosting events, the outlined budget appears high, especially for the online option. This influenced our rankings, which are placed from lowest to highest cost.
Entropy has voted FOR additional funds for one year as it is vital that Arbitrum DAO honors its commitments with service providers and is viewed in a professional manner. The STEP program is one of the most high-profile and successful DAO initiatives to date. Making sure that it can operate effectively through its intended term should be a priority. We have ranked our choices in the following manner:
Entropy has voted FOR collecting bids in ETH. Our team has previously commented about the benefits of adding ETH to the treasury over burning ARB. Arbitrum DAO should take the long-term approach and set itself up to be well capitalized for the coming decades. Additional ETH in the treasury can be leveraged to earn yield or attract strategic growth partnerships.
Entropy has voted AGAINST Aave’s LTIPP extension request, primarily because allowing Aave to continue to run incentives would unfairly increase the cost of capital for its competitors on Arbitrum who are unable to run incentives in return. Additionally, with the Incentive Detox proposal passing a temperature check, we feel it is best for the DAO to turn its focus to designing a proper, well structured program for the future.
It is our team’s belief that at least one member of Offchain Labs should be present on the Security Council, as their technical expertise and unparalleled knowledge of the Arbitrum tech stack are crucial in war room situations. With Gzeon having already received sufficient votes in the Nomination Phase, Entropy has instead split its votes between ConsenSys Diligence and Emiliano Bonassi. Both candidates are qualified, with ConsenSys Diligence being a reputable audit firm and Emiliano having deep expertise of the Arbitrum Orbit Stack.
Entropy Advisors has hosted delegate events in the past and has plans to do so at future conferences. Therefore we voted ABSTAIN due to what we view as a possible conflict of interest.
Entropy has voted FOR, and as previously commented, our team is fully in support of this proposal. The Arbitrum Foundation has proven itself to be a credible entity over the last year and a half, and such an amount is necessary to secure high-impact partnerships for Arbitrum.
Several other delegates have suggested an oversight board composed of DAO members who would have insight into the deal process. While this may sound like an appropriate solution, there are many important questions being overlooked:
What powers does the board have to stop a deal it doesn’t approve of?
Does every deal have to be approved by the board?
Does the board have a veto ability? In what situations could it utilize this authority?
What relevant information can members even share with the DAO if under NDA?
What happens if a board member leaks private information about a deal?
Once diving into the details, such a board seems impractical, and ultimately would just serve as a hindrance to the Foundation’s ability to properly execute rather than providing the DAO any real transparency.
Entropy has voted FOR DIP V1.5 as we considered the first rendition of the Delegate Incentive Program to be successful and a meaningful driver in increasing delegate participation in the Arbitrum DAO.
Compared to V1.1 presented, we are more supportive of qualitatively assessing a delegate’s contribution and the fact that V1.5 helps encourage participation in conversations that may not make it to Snapshot. Additionally, while the Karma Score was a better mechanism than voting performance, it is still relatively easy to game and the forums saw a noticeable increase in bot activity after DIP V1 launched.
Qualitatively assessing the impact of delegate contributions will be difficult and managing the DAO’s compensation program is a serious responsibility, but we have faith that the SEEDLatam team can be trusted for the task.
Two points of constructive criticism:
Echoing some of the other comments made by delegates, a minimum participation rate of 60% for onchain votes in the last 90 days is low. Granted there are not as many Tally votes, but an 80% participation rate feels more appropriate given that being up to date on onchain proposals is the most important delegate function.
While we recognize the amount of time and effort a delegate must put in to be truly effective, most delegates arguably shouldn’t be in the $6-7K payment range. We will be keen to see the first few months of data to see what the average compensation is in this updated version. A suggestion for a future iteration is to set a lower base pay ($2,500 in ARB) with the remainder being, e.g., delegated to the recipients’ address and vested over 1 year. This would help promote long-term alignment with Arbitrum and its token.
Overall though, Entropy is supportive of the program and hopes it continues to attract top talent to the Arbitrum DAO.
Entropy has voted FOR to whitelist Infura as a Arbitrum Nova validator. This vote served more as formality given that Infura was already operating as a validator. They have been an excellent infrastructure partner thus far so our team sees no reason not to whitelist them.
Despite being supportive of the idea and research, after consideration Entropy has voted ABSTAIN primarily due to concerns surrounding the inclusion of Arbitrum’s Discord data. As several delegates mentioned, the DAO has no control over the Arbitrum Discord Channel. It is therefore unclear if the DAO even has the ability to grant permission to collect data from Discord. Given this point was never directly addressed by the authors or the Arbitrum Foundation, Entropy decided to abstain over outright voting against due to being generally supportive of the research opportunity presented.
Entropy has voted FOR - ENS txt records as in this case we feel it is best to proceed with the implementation of least resistance. Regarding publishing a daoURI that follows the EIP-4824 standard, our team is very supportive of bringing more information of the DAO’s activities onchain. Making this information easily and freely accessible at no cost is a no-brainer in our opinion.
Arbitrum was built with the purpose to scale Ethereum and as a protocol is reliant on Ethereum security. Entropy has therefore voted FOR the Attackathon Panda Tier sponsorship. Participating as a sponsor communicates Ethereum alignment and attractively positions the Arbitrum brand, which will help reinforce user perception of Arbitrum as a leader in the Ethereum community. Entropy was supportive of sponsoring the Attackathon at the highest tier (Unicorn), but the 30 ETH sponsorship cost includes an appropriate list of benefits and we are looking forward to having Arbitrum participate in some capacity.
Entropy is supportive of the ADPC and has voted FOR funding Phase II. In the future, one of OpCo’s primary functions will be procurement and interfacing with service providers during negotiations. We foresee the ADPC and its services eventually being rolled up into OpCo, but until this entity is stood up it makes sense to continue building out the DAO’s procurement abilities.
Entropy has voted FOR extending the delay on the L2Time lock to 8 days, thus extending the exit window by 5 days for constitutional proposals. We are very supportive of this proposal as it brings Arbitrum closer to a Stage 2 rollup as outlined by L2Beat’s guidelines and increases overall security for users.
Early in this discussion, our team communicated support for bolstering the Foundation’s strategic partnership budget and Entropy has subsequently voted FOR on the Tally vote. We commend the ethical approach taken by the Foundation to not commit unvested tokens:
Unlike other foundations, the AF is subject to a 4-year vesting schedule, implemented as a result of AIP-1. While AIP-1 was a demonstration of power that helped cement the DAO’s legitimacy, and in our opinion helped lay the foundation for its more decentralized approach when compared to other DAOs, it has undoubtedly constrained the Foundation in its ability to secure a certain caliber of partnerships.
In the year and half following AIP-1, The Foundation has proven to be a trustworthy actor and has been a tremendous asset for the DAO and Arbitrum as a whole. We believe this strategic partnership budget is crucial in strengthening Arbitrum’s position against intense competition from other L2 ecosystems.
While Orbit partnerships are explicitly highlighted in the proposal and serve as a key piece to Arbitrum’s long-term strategy, we believe the community may be over-indexing its focus on Orbit in the short-term. In light of recent announcements from competing ecosystems, the concern expressed by delegates that Arbitrum is falling behind is understandable. However, it is important to highlight that Arbitrum One holds significant competitive advantages in other products like Stylus and its existing relationship with traditional asset managers like Blackrock and Franklin Templeton. We encourage the Foundation to utilize this extra budget to secure partnerships in these realms so that Arbitrum leans into its advantages rather than spending significant capital playing “catch up” in other competitor’s narratives.
As communicated during the Snapshot vote, our team has perceived a possible conflict of interest; therefore, we have once again voted ABSTAIN.
However, we are pleased to see the cost for the online event has been significantly reduced, aligning more closely with the scope of work required. Furthermore, we are supportive of the proposed 5K ARB bonus, as it provides a tangible incentive for successful facilitation.
Following the technical review by the ARDC and code audit for upgrading the RARI governance token, Entropy Advisors has voted FOR and is supportive of the migration. We agree with L2Beat’s comment that such configurations should not require a constitutional vote every time, as this likely serves as deterrent for other projects considering the move from Ethereum mainnet to Arbitrum One.
As previously stated above, it is our team’s belief that at least one member of Offchain Labs should be present on the Security Council. Their technical expertise and knowledge of the Arbitrum tech stack are crucial in war room situations. Therefore, Entropy has placed 3m of its votes towards Gzeon in the Security Council elections.
Entropy is voting ABSTAIN as our team lacks sufficient information and context to pick who deserves a retroactive grant or if the amounts requested properly reflect work completed. At first glance, the requested grant amounts seem very high, with a few applicants requesting more ARB than was given to either the council members or advisors. In general, retroactive funding is difficult without predefined criteria, and in hindsight, this part of the LTIPP proposal could have been structured more appropriately in our opinion. We think this is a learning for the DAO and should be incorporated into any future retroactive funding initiative.
Having said that, since retroactive rewards were promised as part of LTIPP and contributors have performed work with the expectation of possibly being eligible for compensation, Entropy feels that returning the funds risks discrediting the DAO, which is why we decided to abstain from this vote
Entropy Advisors has voted ABSTAIN on establishing an event’s budget for 2025 as we have facilitated this proposal and, more significantly, our team, along with ADPC and Disruption Joe, will serve as leads in running ongoing RFPs to satisfy the DAO’s event demands and interfacing with the OCL and AF event teams for the 3 listed events (ETH Denver, Bitcoin 2025, and ETH CC). All three members of the quoted group are waiving payment as part of the 2025 Events Budget proposal.
Our team maintains its support for the Delegate Incentive Program and voted FOR on Tally. As previously stated, we considered the first version of the DIP to be successful in increasing voter turnout and overall participation, although we do acknowledge that some of the increased metrics might be a result of some participants “gaming” the system—something that is extremely difficult to prevent. Nevertheless, going forward, we believe the DIP can serve as an effective soft enforcement mechanism for our recently proposed Delegate Code of Conduct.
Our team would also like to reiterate our opinion that the average compensation for delegates should be well below $7k. This maximum is already much higher than a vast majority of comparable delegate compensation programs in other ecosystems, but we trust the SEEDGov team to appropriately manage the DIP, who have already proved their capability in running such a complex program. For future iterations, we would prefer to see payments denominated in ARB rather than USD, so that delegates are long-term aligned with Arbitrum and its token.
Emiliano and ConsenSys were both applicants that we supported during the nomination phase. Dennison and Immunefi also bring technical expertise and security backgrounds to the Council.
Entropy is voting FOR extending the ARDC’s term by 6 months with a budget of $1.73m. Despite requiring a significant investment from the DAO, the ARDC produced some useful deliverables over the course of its first term, especially the research analysis and some of the STIP-related deliverables.
Our team also intends to apply for the Supervisory Council, which we stated in a COI disclosure before voting. Given Entropy’s full-time involvement in the Arbitrum DAO, we believe our level of context regarding upcoming proposals and initiatives will be useful in informing the type of work the ARDC should undertake. We would also like to highlight that many of our team members had prior affiliations with a specific ARDCv1 member, Blockworks Research. When it comes time to vote for the research member of the ARDC, Entropy will abstain from selection.
While Entropy is very much for exploring how the DAO can take advantage of investment opportunities, we have voted AGAINST the Token Swap Pilot Program. There were several concerns brought up by other delegates, but we’d like to reiterate a few that we share:
There are much more attractive and safer ways to diversify the Arbitrum DAO treasury. Swapping ARB for a more volatile, riskier asset makes little sense.
There is no clear plan for when the program would end, or how assets would be managed / sold over time. We envision a scenario where if the DAO does conduct a token swap, it will either not have the proper processes in place to actually manage the position and there will likely be negative PR once the DAO begins to exit the position.
The low amount of 0.5m ARB and short lock-up period do not help the DAO really guarantee any “alignment” from participating projects.
Restricting eligibility requirements to projects that held greater than 50% of the airdrop means that projects approached with a token swap already have exposure to ARB in their own treasury.
There is a notable risk that a token swap program would end up deterring new projects from launching on/migrating to Arbitrum since the DAO doing token swaps with a targeted set of protocols could be seen as the DAO picking favorites.
We would like to thank @LuukDAO for the extensive amount of time he has spent researching this idea and bringing it forward as a proposal.
Entropy voted FOR the re-confirmation of John Kennedy. Similar to Tim, John’s resume is outstanding, and we were pleased to hear from Dan Peng that John has already provided value to the GCP since recently joining the council.
Despite authoring this proposal, it does not place our team in a position of power or compensation; therefore, Entropy has voted FOR adopting a Delegate Code of Conduct and to formalize several of the DAO’s operating procedures. Having researched dozens of other DAOs, we believe that the crafted code of conduct reflects many of the important lessons and best practices observed over time. Hard-enforcement through strict rules and an oversight body (whether centralized or a committee approach) are impractical with token delegations and pseudonymous delegates.
However, we expect many elements of the Code of Conduct to be adjusted or further refined after seeing it in practice, which is why our team structured the proposal as a trial period. In May 2025, our team will begin incorporating feedback and critiques from delegates into an updated proposal that will be constitutional.
Entropy has again voted ABSTAIN on establishing an Events Budget for 2025 as the proposal positions our team as leads in running ongoing RFPs to satisfy the DAO’s event demands and interfacing with the OCL and AF event teams.
Entropy Advisors has voted ABSTAIN since the proposal places our team on the Growth Management Committee (GMC). It is our practice to abstain on votes that place Entropy in a position of power.
Entropy has voted AGAINST and will echo the sentiment of other delegates. While this situation is unfortunate, the payment was denominated in ARB and it would set a bad precedent for the DAO to retroactively cover fluctuations in the price of ARB.
Entropy has voted AGAINST. We would like to emphasize that we are aligned with the overall purpose of the proposed program; continued support for promising builders and hackathon projects is important. Additionally, providing this support via investment instead of grant makes a lot of sense. However, we feel there are some key details missing that make it difficult to gauge whether the terms between the DAO and RnDAO are fair compared to the return for both parties.
It is implied that RnDAO will receive ownership in supported protocols through a SAFE + token warrant, but it is not immediately clear whether or not they will be providing any matching capital for the investment or what the split in equity received between RnDao and Arbitrum DAO will be. In the past, RnDAO’s Co.Lab program was funded through Pluriality Labs with 156k ARB and it appears that RnDAO received 10% equity in each of the 3 projects that joined. This is the model as described by @danielo:
Our concern is not derived from RnDAO’s venture model, but more so with the lack of detail presented in the proposal. When looking at the contributions from both sides, Arbitrum DAO is covering ⅔ of the management cost for running the program and the $124k capital investment. While, the majority of the quoted “matching” of value comes from the $180k of “venture support.” Whether this venture support involves any capital or simply RnDAO valuing its support services is unclear (x hours of support at x rate).
The comments make it clear that the DAO will be receiving equity but the proposal itself lacks required details surrounding what this will look like in practice. Based solely on the proposal’s language without the supporting comments, it appears that Arbitrum DAO is LPing $124k, paying ~$60,000 for the salaries associated with operating the program, and giving one of RnDAO’s portfolio companies a $30,000 grant, but not receiving any upside. Specific details surrounding the split between RnDAO and Arbitrum DAO, both in terms of value provided and equity acquired, should be present before moving forward. In general, the proposal seems to be more of a sentiment check to see if it’s worth RnDAO’s time to continue exploring the idea rather than a fully planned out program.
On a separate note, internally our team has made note that this seems to be a recent trend where proposals are posted to the forum with a majority of details missing (not saying this is fully the case here). We speculate that there may be several factors contributing to this trend, but regardless of the cause, it is something we’d encourage proposal authors to refrain from doing.
Before moving to Tally, our team would like to see the following revisions:
The expected terms and RnDAO’s involvement for the investments laid out as simply as possible.
The inclusion of reports to the DAO at the conclusion of each stage so that we can understand the rationale behind the 4 teams selected for Stage 1 and the 2 teams for stage 2.
A short update on the projects that were invested by RnDAO’s as part of the Co.Lab grant from Plurality Labs. Greater transparency into how these ventures have progressed since the final Co.Lab report in May would be helpful in evaluating the overall value proposition of this proposal.
With the Holiday Break coming up, we would recommend to the RnDAO team that they take the extra time to fully flesh out the details and expectations for this program. This will add ~28 days to when an onchain vote can be executed and funds sent. While we understand that maintaining momentum may feel like the strongest priority, we strongly believe that it is more valuable to take the time to structure this program correctly, especially since there is an investment coming from the DAO.
Entropy would like to first reiterate that we are aligned with the overall purpose of the proposed program. Continued support for promising builders and hackathon projects is important, and providing this support via investments instead of grants makes a lot of sense. We also appreciate the RnDAO team for adding our request of rationale reports for the projects chosen at each stage.
That being said, Entropy has decided to vote AGAINST. While both the expected terms of the investments and the program’s budget are now more clearly stated, our original concern about the contributions from each side remains unchanged. The proposal somewhat paints the picture that Arbitrum DAO and RnDAO are both putting capital into the program, but it is our understanding that the DAO is putting up $187,980 worth of monetary capital (both towards investments as well as to cover OpEx) while RnDAO is putting up what it values as $200,000 of human capital.
Thus without any monetary capital contributions, the allocations of the budget between Program Ops and Venture Support is arbitrary from RnDAO’s perspective. For example, the Snapshot version of the proposal looked like this:
Before moving the proposal to Tally, the following updates to each party’s contributions were made:
Framing the monetary and human capital contributions as equal (50/50 split between Arbitrum DAO and the contributors) is inaccurate in our opinion due to several reasons such as adherently different risk profiles and an uneven impact of each type of contribution on the investments. Given that human capital contribution accounts for ~67% of the total dollar amount given in the proposal, we struggle to see why the DAO shouldn’t utilize $x to cover OpEx and $y for the monetary contribution, which would be matched by the proposer, with the resulting equity allocation for the DAO being ($x + $y) / ($x + 2 * $y). As such, we would echo SeedGov in that it makes more sense for the monetary investment into projects to be equal.
Additionally, Entropy agrees with the notion that builders require more support than just capital. However, the DAO has previously funded RnDAO’s CoLab, a similar program with the goal of providing network access and venture expertise, with mixed results. Although we are cognizant of the sample size being relatively small, within just a few months, three of the six funded projects disbanded and one has moved to another ecosystem. We feel it is ill-advised for the DAO to be rushed into allocating an additional ~200k ARB as this is no longer a first-time “experiment”.
Lastly, we realize the unfortunate timing of the Holiday Break has resulted in the proposal feeling rushed. This situation will be taken into account when reevaluating the guidelines in May, but we’d remind delegates that this information has been known for almost 6 months since the DAO first passed updates to its voting schedule in July. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the proposer to be aware of important timelines, and rushing investment decisions for the sake of ~1 month’s difference is in our opinion a bad precedent.
Members of our team have experience starting and operating a research business. Contingent upon a high-quality deliverable, we would expect a quote of $40k-$50k for this type of research. We mention this to highlight that the budget is relatively fair, even though it is a bit on the higher end of what we’d expect. Additionally, we do not have great familiarity with the proposer’s past research, so it is difficult to assess what quality we should expect, making this proposal somewhat of a “leap of faith”.
We also have concerns about the usefulness of this type of proposal in practice. What are we actually trying to achieve by funding this?
We would support this proposal if the report itself was for Arbitrum, Optimism, and Solana for $25k upon delivery, with an additional $60k contingent upon a successfully passed proposal as a follow-up deliverable that takes the information gathered and turns it into something actionable. For example, if it is discovered that 60% of builders are choosing Solana over Optimism or Arbitrum for XYZ reason, a follow-up proposal that aims to improve Arbitrum’s weakness in the diagnosed category would be required to receive a bulk of the funds. It is our view that research is nice to have, but what we really need are actionable takeaways with feasible paths forward.
Lastly, we also echo SEEDGov’s sentiment posted here that the ARDCv2 should be leveraged if this remains strictly a research-based task.
Therefore, our team has decided to vote AGAINST this proposal on Snapshot.
Entropy has voted AGAINST the proposal at this stage but looks forward to seeing a revised version.
First, we will quickly echo the common critiques from other delegates:
Overall, the salary and bonus structure are very high for the quoted responsibilities.
A retroactive payment of $9k per month for previous work is also extremely high.
It is not immediately clear what Lumen and Powerhouse’s responsibilities are.
Concerns on increasing bureaucracy: The proposal states that there will be bi-weekly calls with initiative leads. Depending on the purpose & length of these calls, we fear this is overkill. With updates being provided on the monthly GRC calls and most programs including milestone/monthly updates as part of their proposals, there is already a substantial amount of “reporting” information being created by the DAO, much of which we suspect is only being read by a few delegates. For example, Entropy has been posting monthly updates to the forums and only 1 has surpassed 100 views. Entropy has discussed this with Alex and is interested in hearing other delegates’ opinions, but perhaps the DAO has a greater problem with information dissemination than reporting.
Immediate, short-term ideas that we believe would help in the dissemination of information include:
A Getting Started + Important Resources section in the Forums that has the Delegate Code of Conduct, DAO Procedures, DIP guidelines, and Important Links. This moves important information from the Announcements section, which is mainly used by the Foundation. Optimism has a great example for inspiration and helps delegates who may be returning after an extended time period to get caught up quickly.
An ongoing list of DAO Funded Initiatives that includes only the most necessary information for delegates, such as ARB allocated, expected end date, POC, a very short TLDR of expected deliverables, and a consolidated list of each initiative’s most recent update. While Alex has created a Governance Reporting Notion page, this should be hosted on the forums, extremely easy to skim, and pinned in a prominent place.
Replacing the Foundation for the “Open Discussion of Proposals” call: We strongly agree with @Pedro that it does not make sense to take over this responsibility from the Foundation. It is valuable to have their presence and it is a cost they have already decided to cover.
Simplify with clear deliverables: When evaluating the three phases it was difficult to come away with a clear picture of what the proposed tasks/deliverables are supposed to entail. To be frank, it feels like there are significant overestimations in the necessary responsibilities and hours required to inflate the overall costs of the proposal. While we recognize Alex’s contributions and extensive time given to the DAO, we advise against unnecessarily seeking to expand the scope of work to justify a certain salary amount. We’d like to see a proposal that is narrow-focused and has clear deliverables that are easy for delegates to digest.
Entropy voted 60% for Trail of Bits and 40% for OpenZeppelin. It is amazing to see two of the most respected auditors in the industry applying for the ARDC, both of which we are confident would bring value to the DAO if elected.
OpenZeppelin has repeatedly proven to be a key member of the Arbitrum DAO and their familiarity with Arbitrum governance would allow them to hit the ground running immediately. Additionally, establishing Arbitrum DAO as Trial of Bits’ first ever DAO engagement is an exciting opportunity. While Trail of Bits may have a bit of an onboarding period, we believe the company’s extensive knowledge of the Arbitrum codebase and network of clients will be of immense value to the Arbitrum DAO.
Entropy voted 70% for Nethmind and 30% for Vending Machine. We believe that both of these firms have extreme competency and will do a great job at the role. We appreciate that Nethmind’s initial scope of work is focused on incentives and treasury management and that having them as a resource on these subjects will be of immense value.
Entropy decided to ABSTAIN from the ARDC V2 Research election as a perceived conflict due to several of the team members’ previous employment at Blockworks Research.
Entropy decided to ABSTAIN on extending the Domain Allocator Offerings (Prev. Questbook Program) for a third season. The program has served as an important complement to the Foundation’s grant program and other Arbitrum DAO initiatives. We believe that the DAO needs community-led grants and its an invaluable workstream within Arbitrum governance. That said, we need to raise the bar. With over $600K in OpEx, the expectation of the program should be professional and the role of DA should be close to a full-time role. Additionally, results from the first program have shown that the structure requires more diligence as well as checks and balances. While we fully support continuing with DA grant funding, we would like to see significant changes between Snapshot and Tally, and look forward to working with JoJo to ensure this happens.
In its current state, Entropy decided to vote AGAINST the V2 of the Arbitrum Onboarding program. However, we’d like to state that this was not in any way due to lack of confidence in the proposal authors and executing members, but rather our belief that the core framing of the proposal should be adjusted from simply increasing governance participation to focusing on how we get key stakeholders like protocols and/or funds more actively involved in DAO governance.
Looking at the key KPIs and objectives of the current program, we fear that requiring 20 analysts to comment and eventually create their own proposal will create redundant text that crowds the forum with more noise. There is currently a tremendous amount of activity and comments to sort through. Often, proposals are “supply” based and potentially not the highest priority items that delegates should spend immense time helping to get to a place where they can pass. That is not to say that new voices are not welcome or valuable, but from our team’s experience, it is better to have targeted “demand based” proposals and ensure the contributors involved are best-suited for that specific type of initiative.
This is all to say we are unsure if the proposal described will achieve the goal of getting more stakeholders caught up and involved in governance in the most optimal way.
We’d like to echo L2BEAT’s sentiment. Given their close familiarity with the program, we take their opinion on the matter as a significant influence:
