Griff
May 29, 2025, 6:03pm
67
It was a relatively slow month in the DAO from a vote perspective, but there were a lot of calls and activity around SOS and the new vision for governance in Arbitrum, which I am actively participating.
I also made my own proposal to build a new kind of grant program in Arbitrum, [Non-Constitutional] Invest in Builders & Ignite ARB Demand with q/acc .
I agree with this proposal, we should lower the threshold.
It’s clearly been a struggle to hit the 5% quorum, and getting there takes an too much time and energy from key contributors just to catherd delegates into voting. It’s a waste of time for important people that could be doing more impactful work. This isn’t how we win.
Let’s lower it.
It’s important and relevant that there’s also ongoing work to drive more organic engagement from larger stakeholders (which I fully support and hope to …
I’m voting for this proposal to lower the threshold.
This makes sense as a short-term fix while we work on better long-term engagement strategies.
Hitting the 5% quorum is more difficult than it needs to be, and it’s burning key contributors time who have to chase down delegates just to get votes. That’s not efficient and has an opportunity cost that is hard to measure, but undoubtedly high.
I’m voting only to top-up the HCP, I’m against spending the remaining funds elsewhere.
For Ospina’s situation, I fully support the allocation. I’ve been in that exact position myself multiple times - receiving a grant denominated in tokens, watching the token price depreciate before disbursement, and then being unable to deliver what was promised to other stakeholders. It’s good practice to ask for a buffer amount, for future grants. Supporting Daniel here helps him fulfill the promises and exp…
Voting for, this is one of those “of course we’re doing this” votes. Staying in sync with Ethereum and making things smoother for everyone.
Voting for this proposal.
It helps us bring more accountability and aligns us with TWO of Elenor Ostrom’s principles that are commonly not applied hard enough in DAOs: mutual monitoring and graduated sanctions.
It’s rare to see something that we can vote on that will bring more accountability to the DAO in a decentralized way.
[kids thumbs up]
I’m abstaining. In general, I like the idea, but the budget seems too big, why does it have to be 4 seasons? Why not 1 or 2 and then we reasses?
I would like to know what the first season will be. What will you be incentivizing? At this stage, the proposal looks too vague. I’m in general very supportive and really love the approach of not incentivizing one platform, but instead a whole vertical. When the details get cleaned up , and it goes to tally, I will probably support it.
100% we have a referral program behind the scenes, which will give upside to Questbook and other allies in the Arbitrum Ecosystem in the teams they recommend to us if they make it into the round.
I don’t think it’s worth the complexity… The goal would be to not sell the ARB and just return it to the DAO if it is unused… in the end, we need stables, which we will convert to ARB at the last minute, so the volatility buffer is there for that, and i’t probably better to just sell less ARB. Howeve…
We absolutely will work with other grant programs, and we have a referral program for them to bring us good teams. But the crossover will probably be more with OCL and the AF more than questbook. I would love to see us launch some Orbit Chains’ Gas Tokens on q/acc, like we did for Prismo in season 1. We compliment existing grant programs well, because we don’t impose product deadlines or milestones, it is pure incentive alignment. If projects do well and the market buys a lot of tokens, they co…
The 1.76M POL is the amount of POL given to the teams (not including the overhead cost). Which is about the same design for this proposal, the only difference is 10 teams instead of 8, the Polygon season 1 round had the same $250k Matching Pool and $50k to launch each bonding curve, and $5k for each Arb Bot.
There are 2 main reasons we chose 10 teams for this round. #1 to keep the overhead low, the overhead is 24% here. Our first draft of this proposal was for 2 seasons and 30 teams which had …
We absolutely are excited to tailor cohorts to each chain’s priorities, at least from our side. I am excited to see the finalization of SOS to do so. Also of course, if we have programs running on Arbitrum and Polygon, they will have 2 different applications and the teams will sort themselves. In general, many teams will have a preference for what chain they will want to launch on, and they really get the final choice.
DAOs will fund each cohort separately. As far as funding model, we have an…
They are not project specific, they are mostly economic, and the data is very public
The default graduation KPIs consider several factors:
Minimum 50% of the supply circulating (which will take ~14 months)
Market Cap above $15M (at $8M market cap ($1M in the bonding curve) we turn off minting)
Enough liquidity in DEXs to handle the supply.
(For the first few) Sign off from the q/acc team to protect community from unknowns.
However, we are early in experimenting with this mechanism and have …
Polygon did not want to own any of the tokens surprisingly… We offered it to them, but their legal set up for their grant programs didn’t work for it, so we don’t have direct experience with this. But I can outline how the process works:
Everytime a token is launched, 5% of the initially minted supply (320k tokens) would be locked for a year in the Payment Processor contract and then streamed for a year, claimable by an address that an AAE would control (I assume a multisig).
We would need g…
WOW! Thats amazing! I love that you guys added an AI Agent swarm to your offering! This is super cool!
Yes! Bonding curves actually dampen volatility, as the price goes up, more tokens are minted, as the price goes down, tokens are burned. This desing naturally combats the a short-term hype cycles.
Tying token prices to product results however is just impossible sadly… I wish the free market worked that way
Thanks for the kind words @Tane ! I’ll jump straight to answering your Q’s
The $120k liquidity is just the Liquidity in the DEX, but their Augmented Bonding Curve (ABC) also has over $100k in it, it just doesn’t show on gecko terminal. Here is a screen shot of the dashboard we use for internal tracking, which shows the collateral for each ABC in the protocol:
[Screenshot 2025-05-20 at 3.49.10 PM]
As far as empirical effectiveness, if you go to your link and click Show X23/WPOL Price Chart in…
I love these suggestions… one important thing that maybe I didn’t make clear in the proposal is that each team is absolutely locked into the Arbitrum ecosystem and the success of ARB because their token’s price is directly pegged to the ARB price.
The Augmented Bonding Curve’s (ABC) collateral will be ARB and the LPs on Camelot will be ARB pairs so if ARB goes up 5%, the builder’s token goes up 5%, if ARB goes down 3%, the builder’s token goes down 3%. There is a direct economic connection bet…
The twelve teams that have launched on q/acc so far can be found here:
They are pretty great projects. These 12 teams wanted to launch a token, but they were short on capital. We offer them a fair launch platform, and a deep liquid low cap token. Many of these projects see ways where a token can enhance their product, or is core to their product, but the complexity of executing on a token launch is a lot of work, we streamline that process for them and they really appreciate it.
Jump to 2:19…
100% aligned on this. Already talked to @danielo about making q/acc part of his pipeline for the Hackahton Continuation Program and will absolutely connect with Questbook, AF, OCL and other programs to ensure they know to recommend builders our way.
We created a referral program last round which brought in one of our teams, and gave the program that recommended the team 0.2% of the initial token supply. We expect to do something similar.
Launching tokens is legally challenging of course. From our side, we have 2 legal entities one that accepts the grant from Arbitrum and distributes the grants to the teams, and then one that supports the team and their token economy. In our terms and smart contracts, the project launches their own token and supporting contracts. We advise them to use a one time-use EOA to do this and load it with ETH from a mixer to avoid anyone having weird personal liability.
We are mitigating the legal issu…
Thx for the vote of confidence!!
In general we tend to focus on the token KPIs. They are easier and more fair to measure.
We have several external contractors that we work with, most notably Inverter Network, and out of professional curtesy, we can’t itemize every cost publicly. So we broke it down along the lines of what is a one-time, setup cost, and what is an on going recurring cost for the program. We intend on running this program for multiple seasons, and have a 10% overhead on the program, but the set up is not free. I can go deeper into what those different bucket include, but because of external agreemen…
We will absolutely coordinate with Lino and AVI. The scope though is very different. This is more of a narrowly scoped support program that helps builders tokenize on Arbitrum. The upside in the projects is less of a focus. I don’t think the AVI is actively investing right now in anything.
Advantages:
LBP and MISO are launch tools projects can use in isolation. q/acc is an Arbitrum-native accelerator that makes it a community event and creates a cohort of builders that can share learnings wi…
…
This is just too general of a statement. Not every project will benefit from launching a token before PMF, it depends on the project. There are a lot of instances where the token is integral to the project (e.g. the gas token for an Orbit chain, but also many other instances) and needs to be launched for the product to work, or there is a strategic benefit to building incentivized community early, or several other circumstances.
Those are the projects we accept into the program, they must …
We can definitely do this if we win the bid. We can ensure we have a dedicated program manager focusing on Arbitrum, and no other chains.
A lot of things are shifting in Arbitrum DAO’s structure right now, I am following along as a delegate and we will ensure an AAE has proper oversight over our program. But exactly how that all plays out is ambiguous because the rules are still be written… not by us, but by the DAO. This is a timing issue. A lot of things will become more clear, such as Arbi…
Thank you for the support!
Thank you! I’ve been in the web3 grant game as long as anyone and have seen the horrors… we want to do something different.
Behind the scenes, there is an Arbitrum Treasury Management proposal brewing, we hope to just send the tokens there and let that group make the calls.
My recommendation would be to mirror the team’s moves. If they sell, we sell, if they hold we hold. We have the same lock up schedule as they do, so it makes sense and I’m sure an automation could be easily vibecoded by t…
Griff
October 29, 2025, 7:33pm
70
Proposal - Updates to the DIP, The Complete 1.7 Version
MY VOTE: For: Upgrade to v1.7
I’m voting for this proposal but I want to be transparent that I have concerns about the DIP program as it stands today. The original intention is good. We all want to support governance participation, reward delegates who contribute, and bring more structure to how value is recognized in the DAO. But over time the program has become bloated and difficult to manage. The overhead it creates is significant. It takes time and energy away from the actual work of growin…
[Constitutional] AIP: Security Council Election Process Improvements
Griff Green - Candidate for Security Council - September 2025
Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies
I’m voting FOR
I’m 100% supportive of putting our assets to work, and using a council makes a lot of sense as it allows flexibility to optimize in real time. Just like how Plasma had $2B on chain at launch, having the funds be strategically utilized to support the DRIP initiative is just smart, and we get yield on top of it. Who would vote against >200 extra ETH per year while making DRIP more accessible?
It’s like we get paid to do our own strategic defi market making.
h/t to @Entropy for an…
DVP-Quorum for ArbitrumDAO
I agree with the proposal’s intention.
It’s clearly been a struggle to hit the quorum which is why we lowered it to 4.5% as a stop gap, to avoid burning too much energy just trying to get people to vote.
The DVP quorum as a more long term solution actually makes a lot of sense for me. In, practice, delegated ARB is the real votable supply, that’s what the quorum should be based on, its as simple as that.
The key is keeping it simple from a code perspective. We need to make sure the DVP math i…
[Constitutional] AIP: Security Council Election Process Improvements
It’s debatable which is a bigger security risk, adding extra code to the most critical smart contracts we have, or having someone control 9 out of 12 multisig with a hot wallet for a few days.
They can always rotate their keys the day after their term starts if needed. Accounting for the timelock and 3 week delay for key rotation, the math changes a little bit from my initial argument, but that was my concern. To me, it feels like unnecessary code changes.
[DAO Discussion] Governance Security: blockful’s stress test Using LobbyFi in the Security Council Election
My vote will be that you keep the seat.
This is exactly why I would love to see you guys on the Security Council, the governance attack surface area needs security expertise too.
Arbitrum Triple Dip (Delegate Incentive Program)
previously , and seeing it reflected here is definitely a step in the right direction.
I love the auto peer monitoring concept, which aligns well with Ostrom’s principles (I’m an Ostrom Maxi) and avoids the need for a lot of oversight using more of a coordinape approach.
…
Proposal: AGV Council Compensation Calibration: Benchmark for Next Term & Startup-Phase Bonus
The DAO Incentive Program (DIP 2.0)
I’m voting against this proposal.
Don’t get me wrong, I really like the experiment with the social graph concept and most of the details proposed, and I don’t think its a problem if it’s ARB denominated. But I would love it if the Foundation worked with Paulo to find the best proposal out of the two approaches. This vote failing is an opportunity to gather more feedback on the proposal and collaborate rather than compete.
I think the AAEs should look to foster community led efforts whenever po…